Compelling collective action: Does a shared pollution cap incentivize farmer cooperation to restore water quality?
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| Title: | Compelling collective action: Does a shared pollution cap incentivize farmer cooperation to restore water quality? |
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| Authors: | Yoder, Landon1 yoderl@indiana.edu |
| Source: | International Journal of the Commons. 2019, Vol. 13 Issue 1, p378-399. 22p. |
| Subject Terms: | *Nonpoint source pollution, *Water quality, *Pollution, *Farmers, Collective action, Social dynamics |
| Geographic Terms: | Everglades (Fla.) |
| Abstract: | Decades of voluntary efforts to reduce agricultural nonpoint source pollution have been ineffective at protecting water quality worldwide. While farmer collective action is needed to deal with the geographical extent of diffuse pollution from nutrient runoff, theoretical expectations from commons governance research predicts that farmers will not protect water quality since they have few incentives to do so. These different factors indicate that compulsory approaches are needed. However, the commons literature has tended to overlook the constructive roles that government regulation can play. Research on why farmers adopt on-farm conservation measures similarly has failed to explore farmer cooperation, instead focusing mainly on financial motivations of farmers. Yet, some adoption research indicates that social norms are essential factors shaping (non)adoption, but which are largely overlooked by existing agri-environmental policies. This study examines the important gap of how government regulations can incentivise farmer cooperation to improve water quality. I focus on a case study of the Florida Everglades, where farmers face joint liability under a phosphorus pollution cap and which has resulted in improvements in water quality over the past 20 years. Farms’ drainage disrupts the oligotrophic conditions of the Florida Everglades, but water quality has steadily improved since regulations began in 1994. However, the regulations set compliance jointly for farmers, devolving responsibility to ensure sufficient adoption of conservation practices and deal with free riding. While state monitoring shows that collectively farms have improved water quality, we do not know whether participation is widespread or concentrated among a few large farms. This study provides the first analysis of farm-level water quality outcomes for this area and how judicial, legislative, and local institutions interact to encourage farmer cooperation. Results show that a large majority of farms have improved their water quality, demonstrating that collective action has been a key element in the outcome. At the same time, poor-performing farms reveal the shortcomings of joint compliance. I end by discussing the implications of how individual and collective requirements can provide farmers with valuable information while also drawing on farmer social dynamics to encourage greater participation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] |
| Copyright of International Journal of the Commons is the property of Universiteit Utrecht and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.) | |
| Database: | GreenFILE |
| FullText | Text: Availability: 0 |
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| Header | DbId: 8gh DbLabel: GreenFILE An: 136756266 AccessLevel: 6 PubType: Academic Journal PubTypeId: academicJournal PreciseRelevancyScore: 0 |
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| Items | – Name: Title Label: Title Group: Ti Data: Compelling collective action: Does a shared pollution cap incentivize farmer cooperation to restore water quality? – Name: Author Label: Authors Group: Au Data: <searchLink fieldCode="AR" term="%22Yoder%2C+Landon%22">Yoder, Landon</searchLink><relatesTo>1</relatesTo><i> yoderl@indiana.edu</i> – Name: TitleSource Label: Source Group: Src Data: <searchLink fieldCode="JN" term="%22International+Journal+of+the+Commons%22">International Journal of the Commons</searchLink>. 2019, Vol. 13 Issue 1, p378-399. 22p. – Name: Subject Label: Subject Terms Group: Su Data: *<searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Nonpoint+source+pollution%22">Nonpoint source pollution</searchLink><br />*<searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Water+quality%22">Water quality</searchLink><br />*<searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Pollution%22">Pollution</searchLink><br />*<searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Farmers%22">Farmers</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Collective+action%22">Collective action</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Social+dynamics%22">Social dynamics</searchLink> – Name: SubjectGeographic Label: Geographic Terms Group: Su Data: <searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Everglades+%28Fla%2E%29%22">Everglades (Fla.)</searchLink> – Name: Abstract Label: Abstract Group: Ab Data: Decades of voluntary efforts to reduce agricultural nonpoint source pollution have been ineffective at protecting water quality worldwide. While farmer collective action is needed to deal with the geographical extent of diffuse pollution from nutrient runoff, theoretical expectations from commons governance research predicts that farmers will not protect water quality since they have few incentives to do so. These different factors indicate that compulsory approaches are needed. However, the commons literature has tended to overlook the constructive roles that government regulation can play. Research on why farmers adopt on-farm conservation measures similarly has failed to explore farmer cooperation, instead focusing mainly on financial motivations of farmers. Yet, some adoption research indicates that social norms are essential factors shaping (non)adoption, but which are largely overlooked by existing agri-environmental policies. This study examines the important gap of how government regulations can incentivise farmer cooperation to improve water quality. I focus on a case study of the Florida Everglades, where farmers face joint liability under a phosphorus pollution cap and which has resulted in improvements in water quality over the past 20 years. Farms’ drainage disrupts the oligotrophic conditions of the Florida Everglades, but water quality has steadily improved since regulations began in 1994. However, the regulations set compliance jointly for farmers, devolving responsibility to ensure sufficient adoption of conservation practices and deal with free riding. While state monitoring shows that collectively farms have improved water quality, we do not know whether participation is widespread or concentrated among a few large farms. This study provides the first analysis of farm-level water quality outcomes for this area and how judicial, legislative, and local institutions interact to encourage farmer cooperation. Results show that a large majority of farms have improved their water quality, demonstrating that collective action has been a key element in the outcome. At the same time, poor-performing farms reveal the shortcomings of joint compliance. I end by discussing the implications of how individual and collective requirements can provide farmers with valuable information while also drawing on farmer social dynamics to encourage greater participation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] – Name: AbstractSuppliedCopyright Label: Group: Ab Data: <i>Copyright of International Journal of the Commons is the property of Universiteit Utrecht and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract.</i> (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.) |
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| RecordInfo | BibRecord: BibEntity: Identifiers: – Type: doi Value: 10.18352/ijc.879 Languages: – Code: eng Text: English PhysicalDescription: Pagination: PageCount: 22 StartPage: 378 Subjects: – SubjectFull: Nonpoint source pollution Type: general – SubjectFull: Water quality Type: general – SubjectFull: Pollution Type: general – SubjectFull: Farmers Type: general – SubjectFull: Collective action Type: general – SubjectFull: Social dynamics Type: general – SubjectFull: Everglades (Fla.) Type: general Titles: – TitleFull: Compelling collective action: Does a shared pollution cap incentivize farmer cooperation to restore water quality? Type: main BibRelationships: HasContributorRelationships: – PersonEntity: Name: NameFull: Yoder, Landon IsPartOfRelationships: – BibEntity: Dates: – D: 01 M: 03 Text: 2019 Type: published Y: 2019 Identifiers: – Type: issn-print Value: 18750281 Numbering: – Type: volume Value: 13 – Type: issue Value: 1 Titles: – TitleFull: International Journal of the Commons Type: main |
| ResultId | 1 |
