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Research on government carbon allowance allocation mechanism from the perspective of the differential game.

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Title: Research on government carbon allowance allocation mechanism from the perspective of the differential game.
Authors: Zheng, Jialin1 (AUTHOR), Bo, Yu2 (AUTHOR) boyu@mail.iap.ac.cn, Wang, Yubo3 (AUTHOR), Liu, Guixian4 (AUTHOR), Lu, Xi1,5 (AUTHOR), He, Kebin1,5 (AUTHOR)
Source: Clean Technologies & Environmental Policy. Apr2026, Vol. 28 Issue 4, p1-21. 21p.
Subject Terms: *Carbon emissions, *Emissions (Air pollution), *Carbon credits, Differential games, Optimal control theory, Government policy, Benchmarking (Management)
Abstract: We establish two long-term dynamic optimization differential game models between the government and industry based on grandfathering and benchmarking allocation methods of carbon emission allowance. Consequently, we derive the optimal trajectory of the carbon emission stock in the environment and the government and industry's optimal strategic path evolutions over the long term. Through analysis, we discover that when external carbon allowances are provided, carbon emissions are lower under the benchmarking scenario than carbon emissions under the grandfathering allocation scenario. However, when the government acts as a leader, the optimal strategic paths for industry output and the optimal trajectory of carbon emission stock are consistent under both grandfathering and benchmarking allocation methods. Thus, a policymaker can combine the carbon emission stock target at the end of a certain period with the trajectory of carbon emission stock to deduce the carbon emission quotas allocated to different industries during that period and then deduce the optimal production strategies of industries in the corresponding period. Based on the equilibrium solution of the differential game, this research can serve as a theoretical reference for establishing the initial carbon emission quotas across different industries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
Copyright of Clean Technologies & Environmental Policy is the property of Springer Nature and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)
Database: GreenFILE
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Header DbId: 8gh
DbLabel: GreenFILE
An: 192012029
AccessLevel: 6
PubType: Academic Journal
PubTypeId: academicJournal
PreciseRelevancyScore: 0
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  Label: Title
  Group: Ti
  Data: Research on government carbon allowance allocation mechanism from the perspective of the differential game.
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  Data: <searchLink fieldCode="AR" term="%22Zheng%2C+Jialin%22">Zheng, Jialin</searchLink><relatesTo>1</relatesTo> (AUTHOR)<br /><searchLink fieldCode="AR" term="%22Bo%2C+Yu%22">Bo, Yu</searchLink><relatesTo>2</relatesTo> (AUTHOR)<i> boyu@mail.iap.ac.cn</i><br /><searchLink fieldCode="AR" term="%22Wang%2C+Yubo%22">Wang, Yubo</searchLink><relatesTo>3</relatesTo> (AUTHOR)<br /><searchLink fieldCode="AR" term="%22Liu%2C+Guixian%22">Liu, Guixian</searchLink><relatesTo>4</relatesTo> (AUTHOR)<br /><searchLink fieldCode="AR" term="%22Lu%2C+Xi%22">Lu, Xi</searchLink><relatesTo>1,5</relatesTo> (AUTHOR)<br /><searchLink fieldCode="AR" term="%22He%2C+Kebin%22">He, Kebin</searchLink><relatesTo>1,5</relatesTo> (AUTHOR)
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  Data: <searchLink fieldCode="JN" term="%22Clean+Technologies+%26+Environmental+Policy%22">Clean Technologies & Environmental Policy</searchLink>. Apr2026, Vol. 28 Issue 4, p1-21. 21p.
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  Data: *<searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Carbon+emissions%22">Carbon emissions</searchLink><br />*<searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Emissions+%28Air+pollution%29%22">Emissions (Air pollution)</searchLink><br />*<searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Carbon+credits%22">Carbon credits</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Differential+games%22">Differential games</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Optimal+control+theory%22">Optimal control theory</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Government+policy%22">Government policy</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Benchmarking+%28Management%29%22">Benchmarking (Management)</searchLink>
– Name: Abstract
  Label: Abstract
  Group: Ab
  Data: We establish two long-term dynamic optimization differential game models between the government and industry based on grandfathering and benchmarking allocation methods of carbon emission allowance. Consequently, we derive the optimal trajectory of the carbon emission stock in the environment and the government and industry's optimal strategic path evolutions over the long term. Through analysis, we discover that when external carbon allowances are provided, carbon emissions are lower under the benchmarking scenario than carbon emissions under the grandfathering allocation scenario. However, when the government acts as a leader, the optimal strategic paths for industry output and the optimal trajectory of carbon emission stock are consistent under both grandfathering and benchmarking allocation methods. Thus, a policymaker can combine the carbon emission stock target at the end of a certain period with the trajectory of carbon emission stock to deduce the carbon emission quotas allocated to different industries during that period and then deduce the optimal production strategies of industries in the corresponding period. Based on the equilibrium solution of the differential game, this research can serve as a theoretical reference for establishing the initial carbon emission quotas across different industries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
– Name: AbstractSuppliedCopyright
  Label:
  Group: Ab
  Data: <i>Copyright of Clean Technologies & Environmental Policy is the property of Springer Nature and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract.</i> (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)
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RecordInfo BibRecord:
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    Identifiers:
      – Type: doi
        Value: 10.1007/s10098-026-03448-1
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        Text: English
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        PageCount: 21
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    Subjects:
      – SubjectFull: Carbon emissions
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Emissions (Air pollution)
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Carbon credits
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Differential games
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Optimal control theory
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Government policy
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Benchmarking (Management)
        Type: general
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      – TitleFull: Research on government carbon allowance allocation mechanism from the perspective of the differential game.
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            NameFull: Zheng, Jialin
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            NameFull: Bo, Yu
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            NameFull: Wang, Yubo
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            NameFull: Liu, Guixian
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            NameFull: Lu, Xi
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              M: 04
              Text: Apr2026
              Type: published
              Y: 2026
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