Informative voting and condorcet jury theorems with a continuum of typesAdamMeirowitzGraduate School of Business, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305-5015, USA (e-mail: ameirow@stanf...

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Title: Informative voting and condorcet jury theorems with a continuum of typesAdamMeirowitzGraduate School of Business, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305-5015, USA (e-mail: ameirow@stanf...
Authors: Meirowitz, Adam
Source: Social Choice & Welfare. Jan2002, Vol. 19 Issue 1, p219. 18p.
Database: Academic Search Ultimate
Description
ISSN:01761714
DOI:10.1007/s355-002-8334-5