Taylor, M. A., Sohngen, B., Randall, A., & Pushkarskaya, H. (2004). Group Contracts for Voluntary Nonpoint Source Pollution Reductions: Evidence from Experimental Auctions. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 86(5), 1196. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0002-9092.2004.00664.x
Chicago Style (17th ed.) CitationTaylor, Michael A., Brent Sohngen, Alan Randall, and Helen Pushkarskaya. "Group Contracts for Voluntary Nonpoint Source Pollution Reductions: Evidence from Experimental Auctions." American Journal of Agricultural Economics 86, no. 5 (2004): 1196. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0002-9092.2004.00664.x.
MLA (9th ed.) CitationTaylor, Michael A., et al. "Group Contracts for Voluntary Nonpoint Source Pollution Reductions: Evidence from Experimental Auctions." American Journal of Agricultural Economics, vol. 86, no. 5, 2004, p. 1196, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0002-9092.2004.00664.x.