Optimal Auction Design with Deferred Inspection and Reward.

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Title: Optimal Auction Design with Deferred Inspection and Reward.
Authors: Alaei, Saeed1 (AUTHOR) saeed.a@gmail.com, Belloni, Alexandre2,3 (AUTHOR) alexandre.belloni@duke.edu, Makhdoumi, Ali3 (AUTHOR) ali.makhdoumi@duke.edu, Malekian, Azarakhsh4 (AUTHOR) azarakhsh.malekian@rotman.utoronto.ca
Source: Operations Research. Nov/Dec2024, Vol. 72 Issue 6, p2413-2429. 17p.
Database: Business Source Ultimate
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  Data: <searchLink fieldCode="JN" term="%22Operations+Research%22">Operations Research</searchLink>. Nov/Dec2024, Vol. 72 Issue 6, p2413-2429. 17p.
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RecordInfo BibRecord:
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      – Type: doi
        Value: 10.1287/opre.2020.0651
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      – Code: eng
        Text: English
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        PageCount: 17
        StartPage: 2413
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      – TitleFull: Optimal Auction Design with Deferred Inspection and Reward.
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            NameFull: Alaei, Saeed
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            NameFull: Belloni, Alexandre
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            NameFull: Makhdoumi, Ali
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              Text: Nov/Dec2024
              Type: published
              Y: 2024
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              Value: 72
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