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Long-Term Pay for Performance: Cumulative Evidence over CEO Tenure.

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Title: Long-Term Pay for Performance: Cumulative Evidence over CEO Tenure.
Authors: Jain, Kalash1 (AUTHOR) kj2625@gsb.columbia.edu, Rajgopal, Shivaram1 (AUTHOR) sr3269@gsb.columbia.edu, Rappaport, Alfred2 (AUTHOR) alrapp@san.rr.com, Song, M. J.1 (AUTHOR) msong26@gsb.columbia.edu
Source: Management Science (INFORMS). Sep2026, Vol. 72 Issue 9, p7731-7753. 23p.
Database: Business Source Ultimate
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ISSN:00251909
DOI:10.1287/mnsc.2024.04322