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Selecting permit allocation rules for agricultural pollution control: a bargaining solution

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Title: Selecting permit allocation rules for agricultural pollution control: a bargaining solution
Authors: Kampas, Athanasios1, White, Ben2 bwhite@agric.uwa.edu.au
Source: Ecological Economics. Dec2003, Vol. 47 Issue 2/3, p135. 13p.
Subjects: Pollution control industry, Licenses, Nitrates, Equity management
Abstract: One of the primary justifications for using transferable permits for pollution control is that they achieve a given level of emission reduction at the lowest cost. Although the initial allocation of pollution permits may have no impact in terms of efficiency, it does have a significant impact on equity. In this paper, we examine a variety of permit allocation rules for a small catchment in South West England. An asymmetric Nash bargaining framework is employed to characterise agents’ co-operative behaviour and to explain their likely preferences over permit allocation rules. The results indicate that the preferred allocation scheme depends upon the relative bargaining power of the agents. Furthermore, some potential links between ex-ante and ex-post equity criteria were also discussed. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]
Copyright of Ecological Economics is the property of Elsevier B.V. and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)
Database: Engineering Source
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DbLabel: Engineering Source
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AccessLevel: 6
PubType: Academic Journal
PubTypeId: academicJournal
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  Data: Selecting permit allocation rules for agricultural pollution control: a bargaining solution
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  Data: <searchLink fieldCode="AR" term="%22Kampas%2C+Athanasios%22">Kampas, Athanasios</searchLink><relatesTo>1</relatesTo><br /><searchLink fieldCode="AR" term="%22White%2C+Ben%22">White, Ben</searchLink><relatesTo>2</relatesTo><i> bwhite@agric.uwa.edu.au</i>
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  Data: <searchLink fieldCode="JN" term="%22Ecological+Economics%22">Ecological Economics</searchLink>. Dec2003, Vol. 47 Issue 2/3, p135. 13p.
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  Data: <searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Pollution+control+industry%22">Pollution control industry</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Licenses%22">Licenses</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Nitrates%22">Nitrates</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Equity+management%22">Equity management</searchLink>
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  Data: One of the primary justifications for using transferable permits for pollution control is that they achieve a given level of emission reduction at the lowest cost. Although the initial allocation of pollution permits may have no impact in terms of efficiency, it does have a significant impact on equity. In this paper, we examine a variety of permit allocation rules for a small catchment in South West England. An asymmetric Nash bargaining framework is employed to characterise agents’ co-operative behaviour and to explain their likely preferences over permit allocation rules. The results indicate that the preferred allocation scheme depends upon the relative bargaining power of the agents. Furthermore, some potential links between ex-ante and ex-post equity criteria were also discussed. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]
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  Data: <i>Copyright of Ecological Economics is the property of Elsevier B.V. and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract.</i> (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)
PLink https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=egs&AN=11536472
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      – Type: doi
        Value: 10.1016/S0921-8009(03)00195-2
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      – Code: eng
        Text: English
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        PageCount: 13
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      – SubjectFull: Pollution control industry
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Licenses
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Nitrates
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Equity management
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      – TitleFull: Selecting permit allocation rules for agricultural pollution control: a bargaining solution
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            NameFull: Kampas, Athanasios
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            NameFull: White, Ben
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            – D: 01
              M: 12
              Text: Dec2003
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              Y: 2003
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              Value: 47
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              Value: 2/3
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            – TitleFull: Ecological Economics
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