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International environmental agreements for local and global pollution.

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Title: International environmental agreements for local and global pollution.
Authors: Günther, Michael1,2 michael.guenther@uni-bielefeld.de, Hellmann, Tim1 tim.hellmann@uni-bielefeld.de
Source: Journal of Environmental Economics & Management. Jan2017, Vol. 81, p38-58. 21p.
Subjects: International environmental law, Pollution, Externalities, Public goods, Renegotiation
Abstract: Increasing concerns about climate change have given rise to the formation of International Environmental Agreements (IEAs) as a possible solution to limit global pollution effects. In this paper, we study the stability of IEAs in a repeated game framework where we restrict to strategies which are simple and invariant to renegotiation. Our main contribution is that we characterize necessary and sufficient conditions for stability of an IEA when pollution has both a global and local effect. Local pollution spillovers are represented by a network structure. We find that stable IEAs exist if the network structure is balanced. Too large asymmetries in the degree of local spillovers may, however, lead to non-existence of stable structures. We also discuss the implications of our results for welfare. The generality of our approach allows for several applications, in particular the provision of public goods. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
Copyright of Journal of Environmental Economics & Management is the property of Academic Press Inc. and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)
Database: Engineering Source
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  Data: International environmental agreements for local and global pollution.
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  Data: <searchLink fieldCode="JN" term="%22Journal+of+Environmental+Economics+%26+Management%22">Journal of Environmental Economics & Management</searchLink>. Jan2017, Vol. 81, p38-58. 21p.
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  Data: <searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22International+environmental+law%22">International environmental law</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Pollution%22">Pollution</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Externalities%22">Externalities</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Public+goods%22">Public goods</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Renegotiation%22">Renegotiation</searchLink>
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  Data: Increasing concerns about climate change have given rise to the formation of International Environmental Agreements (IEAs) as a possible solution to limit global pollution effects. In this paper, we study the stability of IEAs in a repeated game framework where we restrict to strategies which are simple and invariant to renegotiation. Our main contribution is that we characterize necessary and sufficient conditions for stability of an IEA when pollution has both a global and local effect. Local pollution spillovers are represented by a network structure. We find that stable IEAs exist if the network structure is balanced. Too large asymmetries in the degree of local spillovers may, however, lead to non-existence of stable structures. We also discuss the implications of our results for welfare. The generality of our approach allows for several applications, in particular the provision of public goods. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
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  Data: <i>Copyright of Journal of Environmental Economics & Management is the property of Academic Press Inc. and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract.</i> (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)
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        Value: 10.1016/j.jeem.2016.09.001
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      – Code: eng
        Text: English
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        PageCount: 21
        StartPage: 38
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      – SubjectFull: International environmental law
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Pollution
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Externalities
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Public goods
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      – SubjectFull: Renegotiation
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      – TitleFull: International environmental agreements for local and global pollution.
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              Text: Jan2017
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