ASICS: authenticated key exchange security incorporating certification systems.

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Bibliographic Details
Title:	ASICS: authenticated key exchange security incorporating certification systems.
Authors:	Boyd, Colin¹ colin.boyd@item.ntnu.no, Cremers, Cas² cas.cremers@cs.ox.ac.uk, Feltz, Michèle³, Paterson, Kenneth⁴ kenny.paterson@rhul.ac.uk, Poettering, Bertram⁵ bertram.poettering@rhul.ac.uk, Stebila, Douglas⁶ stebila@qut.edu.au
Source:	International Journal of Information Security. Apr2017, Vol. 16 Issue 2, p151-171. 21p.
Subjects:	Computer network protocol software, Computer security, Public key infrastructure (Computer security)
Abstract:	Most security models for authenticated key exchange (AKE) do not explicitly model the associated certification system, which includes the certification authority and its behaviour. However, there are several well-known and realistic attacks on AKE protocols which exploit various forms of malicious key registration and which therefore lie outside the scope of these models. We provide the first systematic analysis of AKE security incorporating certification systems. We define a family of security models that, in addition to allowing different sets of standard AKE adversary queries, also permit the adversary to register arbitrary bitstrings as keys. For this model family, we prove generic results that enable the design and verification of protocols that achieve security even if some keys have been produced maliciously. Our approach is applicable to a wide range of models and protocols; as a concrete illustration of its power, we apply it to the CMQV protocol in the natural strengthening of the eCK model to the ASICS setting. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
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Database:	Engineering Source

Description
Abstract:	Most security models for authenticated key exchange (AKE) do not explicitly model the associated certification system, which includes the certification authority and its behaviour. However, there are several well-known and realistic attacks on AKE protocols which exploit various forms of malicious key registration and which therefore lie outside the scope of these models. We provide the first systematic analysis of AKE security incorporating certification systems. We define a family of security models that, in addition to allowing different sets of standard AKE adversary queries, also permit the adversary to register arbitrary bitstrings as keys. For this model family, we prove generic results that enable the design and verification of protocols that achieve security even if some keys have been produced maliciously. Our approach is applicable to a wide range of models and protocols; as a concrete illustration of its power, we apply it to the CMQV protocol in the natural strengthening of the eCK model to the ASICS setting. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
ISSN:	16155262
DOI:	10.1007/s10207-015-0312-y