Selling two goods optimally.
Saved in:
| Title: | Selling two goods optimally. |
|---|---|
| Authors: | Giannakopoulos, Yiannis1 ygiannak@cs.ox.ac.uk, Koutsoupias, Elias1 elias@cs.ox.ac.uk |
| Source: | Information & Computation. Aug2018 Part 2, Vol. 261, p432-445. 14p. |
| Subjects: | Duality (Nuclear physics), Deterministic processes, Biomathematics, Stochastic analysis, Computer networks |
| Abstract: | We provide sufficient conditions for revenue maximization in a two-good monopoly where the buyer's values for the items come from independent (but not necessarily identical) distributions over bounded intervals. Under certain distributional assumptions, we give exact, closed-form formulas for the prices and allocation rule of the optimal selling mechanism. As a side result we give the first example of an optimal mechanism in an i.i.d. setting over a support of the form [ 0 , b ] which is not deterministic. Since our framework is based on duality techniques, we were also able to demonstrate how slightly relaxed versions of it can still be used to design mechanisms that have very good approximation ratios with respect to the optimal revenue, through a “convexification” process. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] |
| Copyright of Information & Computation is the property of Academic Press Inc. and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.) | |
| Database: | Engineering Source |
Be the first to leave a comment!
