The anarchy of scheduling without money.
Saved in:
| Title: | The anarchy of scheduling without money. |
|---|---|
| Authors: | Giannakopoulos, Yiannis1 (AUTHOR) yiannis.giannakopoulos@tum.de, Koutsoupias, Elias2 (AUTHOR) elias@cs.ox.ac.uk, Kyropoulou, Maria1,3 (AUTHOR) maria.kyropoulou@essex.ac.uk |
| Source: | Theoretical Computer Science. Jul2019, Vol. 778, p19-32. 14p. |
| Subjects: | Anarchism, Assignment problems (Programming), Public welfare, Money, Approximation algorithms |
| Abstract: | We consider the scheduling problem on n strategic unrelated machines when no payments are allowed, under the objective of minimizing the makespan. We adopt the model introduced in [Koutsoupias 2014] where a machine is bound by her declarations in the sense that if she is assigned a particular job then she will have to execute it for an amount of time at least equal to the one she reported, even if her private, true processing capabilities are actually faster. We provide a (non-truthful) randomized algorithm whose pure Price of Anarchy is arbitrarily close to 1 for the case of a single task and close to n if it is applied independently to schedule many tasks, which is asymptotically optimal for the natural class of anonymous, task-independent algorithms. Previous work considers the constraint of truthfulness and proves a tight approximation ratio of (n + 1) / 2 for one task which generalizes to n (n + 1) / 2 for many tasks. Furthermore, we revisit the truthfulness case and reduce the latter approximation ratio for many tasks down to n , asymptotically matching the best known lower bound. This is done via a detour to the relaxed, fractional version of the problem, for which we are also able to provide an optimal approximation ratio of 1. Finally, we mention that all our algorithms achieve optimal ratios of 1 for the social welfare objective. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] |
| Copyright of Theoretical Computer Science is the property of Elsevier B.V. and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.) | |
| Database: | Engineering Source |
| FullText | Text: Availability: 0 |
|---|---|
| Header | DbId: egs DbLabel: Engineering Source An: 136563112 AccessLevel: 6 PubType: Academic Journal PubTypeId: academicJournal PreciseRelevancyScore: 0 |
| IllustrationInfo | |
| Items | – Name: Title Label: Title Group: Ti Data: The anarchy of scheduling without money. – Name: Author Label: Authors Group: Au Data: <searchLink fieldCode="AR" term="%22Giannakopoulos%2C+Yiannis%22">Giannakopoulos, Yiannis</searchLink><relatesTo>1</relatesTo> (AUTHOR)<i> yiannis.giannakopoulos@tum.de</i><br /><searchLink fieldCode="AR" term="%22Koutsoupias%2C+Elias%22">Koutsoupias, Elias</searchLink><relatesTo>2</relatesTo> (AUTHOR)<i> elias@cs.ox.ac.uk</i><br /><searchLink fieldCode="AR" term="%22Kyropoulou%2C+Maria%22">Kyropoulou, Maria</searchLink><relatesTo>1,3</relatesTo> (AUTHOR)<i> maria.kyropoulou@essex.ac.uk</i> – Name: TitleSource Label: Source Group: Src Data: <searchLink fieldCode="JN" term="%22Theoretical+Computer+Science%22">Theoretical Computer Science</searchLink>. Jul2019, Vol. 778, p19-32. 14p. – Name: Subject Label: Subjects Group: Su Data: <searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Anarchism%22">Anarchism</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Assignment+problems+%28Programming%29%22">Assignment problems (Programming)</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Public+welfare%22">Public welfare</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Money%22">Money</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Approximation+algorithms%22">Approximation algorithms</searchLink> – Name: Abstract Label: Abstract Group: Ab Data: We consider the scheduling problem on n strategic unrelated machines when no payments are allowed, under the objective of minimizing the makespan. We adopt the model introduced in [Koutsoupias 2014] where a machine is bound by her declarations in the sense that if she is assigned a particular job then she will have to execute it for an amount of time at least equal to the one she reported, even if her private, true processing capabilities are actually faster. We provide a (non-truthful) randomized algorithm whose pure Price of Anarchy is arbitrarily close to 1 for the case of a single task and close to n if it is applied independently to schedule many tasks, which is asymptotically optimal for the natural class of anonymous, task-independent algorithms. Previous work considers the constraint of truthfulness and proves a tight approximation ratio of (n + 1) / 2 for one task which generalizes to n (n + 1) / 2 for many tasks. Furthermore, we revisit the truthfulness case and reduce the latter approximation ratio for many tasks down to n , asymptotically matching the best known lower bound. This is done via a detour to the relaxed, fractional version of the problem, for which we are also able to provide an optimal approximation ratio of 1. Finally, we mention that all our algorithms achieve optimal ratios of 1 for the social welfare objective. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] – Name: AbstractSuppliedCopyright Label: Group: Ab Data: <i>Copyright of Theoretical Computer Science is the property of Elsevier B.V. and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract.</i> (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.) |
| PLink | https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=egs&AN=136563112 |
| RecordInfo | BibRecord: BibEntity: Identifiers: – Type: doi Value: 10.1016/j.tcs.2019.01.022 Languages: – Code: eng Text: English PhysicalDescription: Pagination: PageCount: 14 StartPage: 19 Subjects: – SubjectFull: Anarchism Type: general – SubjectFull: Assignment problems (Programming) Type: general – SubjectFull: Public welfare Type: general – SubjectFull: Money Type: general – SubjectFull: Approximation algorithms Type: general Titles: – TitleFull: The anarchy of scheduling without money. Type: main BibRelationships: HasContributorRelationships: – PersonEntity: Name: NameFull: Giannakopoulos, Yiannis – PersonEntity: Name: NameFull: Koutsoupias, Elias – PersonEntity: Name: NameFull: Kyropoulou, Maria IsPartOfRelationships: – BibEntity: Dates: – D: 26 M: 07 Text: Jul2019 Type: published Y: 2019 Identifiers: – Type: issn-print Value: 03043975 Numbering: – Type: volume Value: 778 Titles: – TitleFull: Theoretical Computer Science Type: main |
| ResultId | 1 |
