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Lewis' Triviality for Quasi Probabilities.

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Title: Lewis' Triviality for Quasi Probabilities.
Authors: Raidl, Eric1,2 (AUTHOR) eric.3.raidl@uni-konstanz.de
Source: Journal of Logic, Language & Information. Dec2019, Vol. 28 Issue 4, p515-549. 35p.
Subjects: Conditional probability, Probability theory
Abstract: According to Stalnaker's Thesis (S), the probability of a conditional is the conditional probability. Under some mild conditions, the thesis trivialises probabilities and conditionals, as initially shown by David Lewis. This article asks the following question: does (S) still lead to triviality, if the probability function in (S) is replaced by a probability-like function? The article considers plausibility functions, in the sense of Friedman and Halpern, which additionally mimic probabilistic additivity and conditionalisation. These quasi probabilities comprise Friedman–Halpern's conditional plausibility spaces, as well as other known representations of conditional doxastic states. The paper proves Lewis' triviality for quasi probabilities and discusses how this has implications for three other prominent strategies to avoid Lewis' triviality: (1) Adams' thesis, where the probability function on the left in (S) is replaced by a probability-like function, (2) abandoning conditionalisation, where probability conditionalisation on the right in (S) is replaced by another propositional update procedure and (3) the approximation thesis, where equality in (S) is replaced by approximation. The paper also shows that Lewis' triviality result is really about 'additiveness' and 'conditionality'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
Copyright of Journal of Logic, Language & Information is the property of Springer Nature and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)
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  Data: According to Stalnaker's Thesis (S), the probability of a conditional is the conditional probability. Under some mild conditions, the thesis trivialises probabilities and conditionals, as initially shown by David Lewis. This article asks the following question: does (S) still lead to triviality, if the probability function in (S) is replaced by a probability-like function? The article considers plausibility functions, in the sense of Friedman and Halpern, which additionally mimic probabilistic additivity and conditionalisation. These quasi probabilities comprise Friedman–Halpern's conditional plausibility spaces, as well as other known representations of conditional doxastic states. The paper proves Lewis' triviality for quasi probabilities and discusses how this has implications for three other prominent strategies to avoid Lewis' triviality: (1) Adams' thesis, where the probability function on the left in (S) is replaced by a probability-like function, (2) abandoning conditionalisation, where probability conditionalisation on the right in (S) is replaced by another propositional update procedure and (3) the approximation thesis, where equality in (S) is replaced by approximation. The paper also shows that Lewis' triviality result is really about 'additiveness' and 'conditionality'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
– Name: AbstractSuppliedCopyright
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  Data: <i>Copyright of Journal of Logic, Language & Information is the property of Springer Nature and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract.</i> (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)
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              Text: Dec2019
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