Multiple agents managing a harmful species population should either work together to control it or split their duties to eradicate it.
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| Title: | Multiple agents managing a harmful species population should either work together to control it or split their duties to eradicate it. |
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| Authors: | Lampert, Adam1,2 adam.lampert@asu.edu |
| Source: | Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America. 5/12/2020, Vol. 117 Issue 19, p1-8. 8p. |
| Subjects: | Nash equilibrium, Species, Population density, Dynamic models, Introduced species |
| Abstract: | The management of harmful species, including invasive species, pests, parasites, and diseases, is a major global challenge. Harmful species cause severe damage to ecosystems, biodiversity, agriculture, and human health. In particular, managing harmful species often requires cooperation among multiple agents, such as landowners, agencies, and countries. Each agent may have incentives to contribute less to the treatment, leaving more work for other agents, which may result in inefficient treatment. A central question is, therefore, how should a policymaker allocate treatment duties among the agents? Specifically, should the agents work together in the same area, or should each agent work only in a smaller area designated just for her/him? We consider a dynamic game-theoretic model, where a Nash equilibrium corresponds to a possible set of contributions that the agents could adopt over time. In turn, the allocation by the policymaker determines which of the Nash equilibria could be adopted, which allows us to compare the outcome of various allocations. Our results show that fewer agents can abate the harmful species population faster, but more agents can better control the population to keep its density lower. We prove this result in a general theorem and demonstrate it numerically for two case studies. Therefore, following an outbreak, the better policy would be to split and assign one or a few agents to treat the species in a given location, but if controlling the harmful species population at some low density is needed, the agents should work together in all of the locations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] |
| Copyright of Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America is the property of National Academy of Sciences and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.) | |
| Database: | Engineering Source |
| FullText | Text: Availability: 0 |
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| Header | DbId: egs DbLabel: Engineering Source An: 143201474 AccessLevel: 6 PubType: Academic Journal PubTypeId: academicJournal PreciseRelevancyScore: 0 |
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| Items | – Name: Title Label: Title Group: Ti Data: Multiple agents managing a harmful species population should either work together to control it or split their duties to eradicate it. – Name: Author Label: Authors Group: Au Data: <searchLink fieldCode="AR" term="%22Lampert%2C+Adam%22">Lampert, Adam</searchLink><relatesTo>1,2</relatesTo><i> adam.lampert@asu.edu</i> – Name: TitleSource Label: Source Group: Src Data: <searchLink fieldCode="JN" term="%22Proceedings+of+the+National+Academy+of+Sciences+of+the+United+States+of+America%22">Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America</searchLink>. 5/12/2020, Vol. 117 Issue 19, p1-8. 8p. – Name: Subject Label: Subjects Group: Su Data: <searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Nash+equilibrium%22">Nash equilibrium</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Species%22">Species</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Population+density%22">Population density</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Dynamic+models%22">Dynamic models</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Introduced+species%22">Introduced species</searchLink> – Name: Abstract Label: Abstract Group: Ab Data: The management of harmful species, including invasive species, pests, parasites, and diseases, is a major global challenge. Harmful species cause severe damage to ecosystems, biodiversity, agriculture, and human health. In particular, managing harmful species often requires cooperation among multiple agents, such as landowners, agencies, and countries. Each agent may have incentives to contribute less to the treatment, leaving more work for other agents, which may result in inefficient treatment. A central question is, therefore, how should a policymaker allocate treatment duties among the agents? Specifically, should the agents work together in the same area, or should each agent work only in a smaller area designated just for her/him? We consider a dynamic game-theoretic model, where a Nash equilibrium corresponds to a possible set of contributions that the agents could adopt over time. In turn, the allocation by the policymaker determines which of the Nash equilibria could be adopted, which allows us to compare the outcome of various allocations. Our results show that fewer agents can abate the harmful species population faster, but more agents can better control the population to keep its density lower. We prove this result in a general theorem and demonstrate it numerically for two case studies. Therefore, following an outbreak, the better policy would be to split and assign one or a few agents to treat the species in a given location, but if controlling the harmful species population at some low density is needed, the agents should work together in all of the locations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] – Name: AbstractSuppliedCopyright Label: Group: Ab Data: <i>Copyright of Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America is the property of National Academy of Sciences and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract.</i> (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.) |
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| RecordInfo | BibRecord: BibEntity: Identifiers: – Type: doi Value: 10.1073/pnas.1917028117 Languages: – Code: eng Text: English PhysicalDescription: Pagination: PageCount: 8 StartPage: 1 Subjects: – SubjectFull: Nash equilibrium Type: general – SubjectFull: Species Type: general – SubjectFull: Population density Type: general – SubjectFull: Dynamic models Type: general – SubjectFull: Introduced species Type: general Titles: – TitleFull: Multiple agents managing a harmful species population should either work together to control it or split their duties to eradicate it. Type: main BibRelationships: HasContributorRelationships: – PersonEntity: Name: NameFull: Lampert, Adam IsPartOfRelationships: – BibEntity: Dates: – D: 12 M: 05 Text: 5/12/2020 Type: published Y: 2020 Identifiers: – Type: issn-print Value: 00278424 Numbering: – Type: volume Value: 117 – Type: issue Value: 19 Titles: – TitleFull: Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America Type: main |
| ResultId | 1 |
