View in EDS

Optimal favoritism in contests with identity-contingent prizes.

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Title: Optimal favoritism in contests with identity-contingent prizes.
Authors: Lu, Jingfeng1 (AUTHOR) ecsljf@nus.edu.sg, Wang, Zhewei1,2 (AUTHOR) zheweiwang@sdu.edu.cn, Zhou, Lixue2 (AUTHOR) sdzhoulixue@outlook.com
Source: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. Apr2022, Vol. 196, p40-50. 11p.
Subjects: Contests, Direct costing
Abstract: We investigate optimal favoritism using identity-contingent prizes in a two-player Tullock model. Besides the usual balance effect, prize allocation has an extra efficiency effect: One additional unit of prize tends to induce more effort, if it is used as the winning prize for the stronger player whose marginal cost is lower. We find that a total-effort-maximizing (contest) designer should offer a larger prize to the strong player if and only if the contest is sufficiently noisy. Our paper provides a more complete analysis on identity-contingent prizes, which completes the conventional insight on levelling battle field for effort maximization in contests with asymmetric players. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
Copyright of Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization is the property of Elsevier B.V. and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)
Database: Engineering Source
FullText Text:
  Availability: 0
Header DbId: egs
DbLabel: Engineering Source
An: 156197778
AccessLevel: 6
PubType: Academic Journal
PubTypeId: academicJournal
PreciseRelevancyScore: 0
IllustrationInfo
Items – Name: Title
  Label: Title
  Group: Ti
  Data: Optimal favoritism in contests with identity-contingent prizes.
– Name: Author
  Label: Authors
  Group: Au
  Data: <searchLink fieldCode="AR" term="%22Lu%2C+Jingfeng%22">Lu, Jingfeng</searchLink><relatesTo>1</relatesTo> (AUTHOR)<i> ecsljf@nus.edu.sg</i><br /><searchLink fieldCode="AR" term="%22Wang%2C+Zhewei%22">Wang, Zhewei</searchLink><relatesTo>1,2</relatesTo> (AUTHOR)<i> zheweiwang@sdu.edu.cn</i><br /><searchLink fieldCode="AR" term="%22Zhou%2C+Lixue%22">Zhou, Lixue</searchLink><relatesTo>2</relatesTo> (AUTHOR)<i> sdzhoulixue@outlook.com</i>
– Name: TitleSource
  Label: Source
  Group: Src
  Data: <searchLink fieldCode="JN" term="%22Journal+of+Economic+Behavior+%26+Organization%22">Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization</searchLink>. Apr2022, Vol. 196, p40-50. 11p.
– Name: Subject
  Label: Subjects
  Group: Su
  Data: <searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Contests%22">Contests</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Direct+costing%22">Direct costing</searchLink>
– Name: Abstract
  Label: Abstract
  Group: Ab
  Data: We investigate optimal favoritism using identity-contingent prizes in a two-player Tullock model. Besides the usual balance effect, prize allocation has an extra efficiency effect: One additional unit of prize tends to induce more effort, if it is used as the winning prize for the stronger player whose marginal cost is lower. We find that a total-effort-maximizing (contest) designer should offer a larger prize to the strong player if and only if the contest is sufficiently noisy. Our paper provides a more complete analysis on identity-contingent prizes, which completes the conventional insight on levelling battle field for effort maximization in contests with asymmetric players. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
– Name: AbstractSuppliedCopyright
  Label:
  Group: Ab
  Data: <i>Copyright of Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization is the property of Elsevier B.V. and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract.</i> (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)
PLink https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=egs&AN=156197778
RecordInfo BibRecord:
  BibEntity:
    Identifiers:
      – Type: doi
        Value: 10.1016/j.jebo.2022.01.027
    Languages:
      – Code: eng
        Text: English
    PhysicalDescription:
      Pagination:
        PageCount: 11
        StartPage: 40
    Subjects:
      – SubjectFull: Contests
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Direct costing
        Type: general
    Titles:
      – TitleFull: Optimal favoritism in contests with identity-contingent prizes.
        Type: main
  BibRelationships:
    HasContributorRelationships:
      – PersonEntity:
          Name:
            NameFull: Lu, Jingfeng
      – PersonEntity:
          Name:
            NameFull: Wang, Zhewei
      – PersonEntity:
          Name:
            NameFull: Zhou, Lixue
    IsPartOfRelationships:
      – BibEntity:
          Dates:
            – D: 01
              M: 04
              Text: Apr2022
              Type: published
              Y: 2022
          Identifiers:
            – Type: issn-print
              Value: 01672681
          Numbering:
            – Type: volume
              Value: 196
          Titles:
            – TitleFull: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
              Type: main
ResultId 1