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A generalized Nash equilibrium problem arising in banking regulation: An existence result with Tarski's theorem.

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Title: A generalized Nash equilibrium problem arising in banking regulation: An existence result with Tarski's theorem.
Authors: Braouezec, Yann1 (AUTHOR) y.braouezec@ieseg.fr, Kiani, Keyvan2 (AUTHOR) kiani@em-lyon.com
Source: Operations Research Letters. Jan2023, Vol. 51 Issue 1, p105-110. 6p.
Subjects: Nash equilibrium, Banking laws, Bank assets, Financial markets
Abstract: When hit with an adverse shock, banks that do not comply with capital regulation sell risky assets to satisfy their solvency constraint. When financial markets are imperfectly competitive, this naturally gives rise to a GNEP. We consider a new framework with an arbitrary number of banks and assets, and show that Tarski's theorem can be used to prove the existence of a Nash equilibrium when markets are sufficiently competitive. We also prove the existence of ϵ -Nash equilibria. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
Copyright of Operations Research Letters is the property of Elsevier B.V. and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)
Database: Engineering Source
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Header DbId: egs
DbLabel: Engineering Source
An: 161399849
AccessLevel: 6
PubType: Academic Journal
PubTypeId: academicJournal
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  Data: A generalized Nash equilibrium problem arising in banking regulation: An existence result with Tarski's theorem.
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  Data: <searchLink fieldCode="AR" term="%22Braouezec%2C+Yann%22">Braouezec, Yann</searchLink><relatesTo>1</relatesTo> (AUTHOR)<i> y.braouezec@ieseg.fr</i><br /><searchLink fieldCode="AR" term="%22Kiani%2C+Keyvan%22">Kiani, Keyvan</searchLink><relatesTo>2</relatesTo> (AUTHOR)<i> kiani@em-lyon.com</i>
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  Data: <searchLink fieldCode="JN" term="%22Operations+Research+Letters%22">Operations Research Letters</searchLink>. Jan2023, Vol. 51 Issue 1, p105-110. 6p.
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  Data: <searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Nash+equilibrium%22">Nash equilibrium</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Banking+laws%22">Banking laws</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Bank+assets%22">Bank assets</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Financial+markets%22">Financial markets</searchLink>
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  Label: Abstract
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  Data: When hit with an adverse shock, banks that do not comply with capital regulation sell risky assets to satisfy their solvency constraint. When financial markets are imperfectly competitive, this naturally gives rise to a GNEP. We consider a new framework with an arbitrary number of banks and assets, and show that Tarski's theorem can be used to prove the existence of a Nash equilibrium when markets are sufficiently competitive. We also prove the existence of ϵ -Nash equilibria. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
– Name: AbstractSuppliedCopyright
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  Group: Ab
  Data: <i>Copyright of Operations Research Letters is the property of Elsevier B.V. and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract.</i> (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)
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      – Type: doi
        Value: 10.1016/j.orl.2022.12.003
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      – Code: eng
        Text: English
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      Pagination:
        PageCount: 6
        StartPage: 105
    Subjects:
      – SubjectFull: Nash equilibrium
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Banking laws
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Bank assets
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Financial markets
        Type: general
    Titles:
      – TitleFull: A generalized Nash equilibrium problem arising in banking regulation: An existence result with Tarski's theorem.
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            NameFull: Braouezec, Yann
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            NameFull: Kiani, Keyvan
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            – D: 01
              M: 01
              Text: Jan2023
              Type: published
              Y: 2023
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              Value: 51
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