Investigating the social dilemma of an epidemic model with provaccination and antivaccination groups: An evolutionary approach.
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| Title: | Investigating the social dilemma of an epidemic model with provaccination and antivaccination groups: An evolutionary approach. |
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| Authors: | Mamun-Ur-Rashid Khan, Md.1,2 (AUTHOR) mamun.math@du.ac.bd, Tanimoto, Jun1,3 (AUTHOR) |
| Source: | Alexandria Engineering Journal. Jul2023, Vol. 75, p341-349. 9p. |
| Subjects: | Dilemma, Nash equilibrium, Natural immunity, Epidemiological models, Economic aspects of diseases |
| Abstract: | • An epidemic model with provaccination and antivaccination susceptible groups along with four behavior model equations is considered. • At the Nash equilibrium, both groups behave alike. • The social efficiency deficit determines the existence of a Social Dilemma. In this study, an epidemiological model with the provaccination and antivaccination susceptible groups is proposed, and the social dilemma of the model is analyzed. During a pandemic, such as the current COVID-19, many individuals get confused to choose the option of adopting a provaccination or antivaccination strategy based on the number of infected people and the payoff of being infected. In the proposed model, people can obtain immunity either through vaccination or by getting infected with the disease which is known as natural immunity. In addition, increasing the waning immunity influences the choice of adopting the provaccination or antivaccination strategy. We used the behavior model to analyze the choice of the two strategies, where any individual can choose a strategy based on the number of infected individuals from each group. Moreover, individuals who are already infected can choose their strategy based on the payoff of their disease cost or vaccination cost. Our results show that, at Nash equilibrium, individuals in both groups behave the same. Further, from our numerical results, increasing the number of vaccinations can reduce the social dilemma whereas an increase in the waning immunity rate increases the social dilemma. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] |
| Copyright of Alexandria Engineering Journal is the property of Elsevier B.V. and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.) | |
| Database: | Engineering Source |
| FullText | Text: Availability: 0 |
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| Header | DbId: egs DbLabel: Engineering Source An: 164924680 AccessLevel: 6 PubType: Academic Journal PubTypeId: academicJournal PreciseRelevancyScore: 0 |
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| Items | – Name: Title Label: Title Group: Ti Data: Investigating the social dilemma of an epidemic model with provaccination and antivaccination groups: An evolutionary approach. – Name: Author Label: Authors Group: Au Data: <searchLink fieldCode="AR" term="%22Mamun-Ur-Rashid+Khan%2C+Md%2E%22">Mamun-Ur-Rashid Khan, Md.</searchLink><relatesTo>1,2</relatesTo> (AUTHOR)<i> mamun.math@du.ac.bd</i><br /><searchLink fieldCode="AR" term="%22Tanimoto%2C+Jun%22">Tanimoto, Jun</searchLink><relatesTo>1,3</relatesTo> (AUTHOR) – Name: TitleSource Label: Source Group: Src Data: <searchLink fieldCode="JN" term="%22Alexandria+Engineering+Journal%22">Alexandria Engineering Journal</searchLink>. Jul2023, Vol. 75, p341-349. 9p. – Name: Subject Label: Subjects Group: Su Data: <searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Dilemma%22">Dilemma</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Nash+equilibrium%22">Nash equilibrium</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Natural+immunity%22">Natural immunity</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Epidemiological+models%22">Epidemiological models</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Economic+aspects+of+diseases%22">Economic aspects of diseases</searchLink> – Name: Abstract Label: Abstract Group: Ab Data: • An epidemic model with provaccination and antivaccination susceptible groups along with four behavior model equations is considered. • At the Nash equilibrium, both groups behave alike. • The social efficiency deficit determines the existence of a Social Dilemma. In this study, an epidemiological model with the provaccination and antivaccination susceptible groups is proposed, and the social dilemma of the model is analyzed. During a pandemic, such as the current COVID-19, many individuals get confused to choose the option of adopting a provaccination or antivaccination strategy based on the number of infected people and the payoff of being infected. In the proposed model, people can obtain immunity either through vaccination or by getting infected with the disease which is known as natural immunity. In addition, increasing the waning immunity influences the choice of adopting the provaccination or antivaccination strategy. We used the behavior model to analyze the choice of the two strategies, where any individual can choose a strategy based on the number of infected individuals from each group. Moreover, individuals who are already infected can choose their strategy based on the payoff of their disease cost or vaccination cost. Our results show that, at Nash equilibrium, individuals in both groups behave the same. Further, from our numerical results, increasing the number of vaccinations can reduce the social dilemma whereas an increase in the waning immunity rate increases the social dilemma. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] – Name: AbstractSuppliedCopyright Label: Group: Ab Data: <i>Copyright of Alexandria Engineering Journal is the property of Elsevier B.V. and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract.</i> (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.) |
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| RecordInfo | BibRecord: BibEntity: Identifiers: – Type: doi Value: 10.1016/j.aej.2023.05.091 Languages: – Code: eng Text: English PhysicalDescription: Pagination: PageCount: 9 StartPage: 341 Subjects: – SubjectFull: Dilemma Type: general – SubjectFull: Nash equilibrium Type: general – SubjectFull: Natural immunity Type: general – SubjectFull: Epidemiological models Type: general – SubjectFull: Economic aspects of diseases Type: general Titles: – TitleFull: Investigating the social dilemma of an epidemic model with provaccination and antivaccination groups: An evolutionary approach. Type: main BibRelationships: HasContributorRelationships: – PersonEntity: Name: NameFull: Mamun-Ur-Rashid Khan, Md. – PersonEntity: Name: NameFull: Tanimoto, Jun IsPartOfRelationships: – BibEntity: Dates: – D: 25 M: 07 Text: Jul2023 Type: published Y: 2023 Identifiers: – Type: issn-print Value: 11100168 Numbering: – Type: volume Value: 75 Titles: – TitleFull: Alexandria Engineering Journal Type: main |
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