State-Level Antitrust Enforcement: Revisiting the Determinants.
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| Title: | State-Level Antitrust Enforcement: Revisiting the Determinants. |
|---|---|
| Authors: | Feinberg, Robert M.1 (AUTHOR) feinber@american.edu, Reynolds, Kara M.1 (AUTHOR) |
| Source: | Review of Industrial Organization. Nov2024, Vol. 65 Issue 3, p793-806. 14p. |
| Subjects: | Attorneys general, Economies of scale, Antitrust law, COVID-19, Political parties |
| Abstract: | State-level antitrust enforcement has historically been an important tool that promotes competition in the U.S. The total number of cases that were filed between 1990 and 2006 averaged 22 per year, and generally fluctuated in a fairly tight band. In an earlier article we found that political and macroeconomic variables tended to explain well these filing patterns. However, since then the number of state cases filed has dropped dramatically and averaged just 12 cases over the five years that preceded Covid. In this paper we consider again the political economy of antitrust enforcement at the state level: we find similar explanations to our 2010 article, with the size of the state economy, the macroeconomic conditions that face the state, and the political party in charge of enforcement continuing to drive antitrust filing activity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] |
| Copyright of Review of Industrial Organization is the property of Springer Nature and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.) | |
| Database: | Engineering Source |
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| Header | DbId: egs DbLabel: Engineering Source An: 180970759 AccessLevel: 6 PubType: Academic Journal PubTypeId: academicJournal PreciseRelevancyScore: 0 |
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| Items | – Name: Title Label: Title Group: Ti Data: State-Level Antitrust Enforcement: Revisiting the Determinants. – Name: Author Label: Authors Group: Au Data: <searchLink fieldCode="AR" term="%22Feinberg%2C+Robert+M%2E%22">Feinberg, Robert M.</searchLink><relatesTo>1</relatesTo> (AUTHOR)<i> feinber@american.edu</i><br /><searchLink fieldCode="AR" term="%22Reynolds%2C+Kara+M%2E%22">Reynolds, Kara M.</searchLink><relatesTo>1</relatesTo> (AUTHOR) – Name: TitleSource Label: Source Group: Src Data: <searchLink fieldCode="JN" term="%22Review+of+Industrial+Organization%22">Review of Industrial Organization</searchLink>. Nov2024, Vol. 65 Issue 3, p793-806. 14p. – Name: Subject Label: Subjects Group: Su Data: <searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Attorneys+general%22">Attorneys general</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Economies+of+scale%22">Economies of scale</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Antitrust+law%22">Antitrust law</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22COVID-19%22">COVID-19</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Political+parties%22">Political parties</searchLink> – Name: Abstract Label: Abstract Group: Ab Data: State-level antitrust enforcement has historically been an important tool that promotes competition in the U.S. The total number of cases that were filed between 1990 and 2006 averaged 22 per year, and generally fluctuated in a fairly tight band. In an earlier article we found that political and macroeconomic variables tended to explain well these filing patterns. However, since then the number of state cases filed has dropped dramatically and averaged just 12 cases over the five years that preceded Covid. In this paper we consider again the political economy of antitrust enforcement at the state level: we find similar explanations to our 2010 article, with the size of the state economy, the macroeconomic conditions that face the state, and the political party in charge of enforcement continuing to drive antitrust filing activity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] – Name: AbstractSuppliedCopyright Label: Group: Ab Data: <i>Copyright of Review of Industrial Organization is the property of Springer Nature and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract.</i> (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.) |
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| RecordInfo | BibRecord: BibEntity: Identifiers: – Type: doi Value: 10.1007/s11151-024-09970-0 Languages: – Code: eng Text: English PhysicalDescription: Pagination: PageCount: 14 StartPage: 793 Subjects: – SubjectFull: Attorneys general Type: general – SubjectFull: Economies of scale Type: general – SubjectFull: Antitrust law Type: general – SubjectFull: COVID-19 Type: general – SubjectFull: Political parties Type: general Titles: – TitleFull: State-Level Antitrust Enforcement: Revisiting the Determinants. Type: main BibRelationships: HasContributorRelationships: – PersonEntity: Name: NameFull: Feinberg, Robert M. – PersonEntity: Name: NameFull: Reynolds, Kara M. IsPartOfRelationships: – BibEntity: Dates: – D: 01 M: 11 Text: Nov2024 Type: published Y: 2024 Identifiers: – Type: issn-print Value: 0889938X Numbering: – Type: volume Value: 65 – Type: issue Value: 3 Titles: – TitleFull: Review of Industrial Organization Type: main |
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