State-Level Antitrust Enforcement: Revisiting the Determinants.

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Bibliographic Details
Title: State-Level Antitrust Enforcement: Revisiting the Determinants.
Authors: Feinberg, Robert M.1 (AUTHOR) feinber@american.edu, Reynolds, Kara M.1 (AUTHOR)
Source: Review of Industrial Organization. Nov2024, Vol. 65 Issue 3, p793-806. 14p.
Subjects: Attorneys general, Economies of scale, Antitrust law, COVID-19, Political parties
Abstract: State-level antitrust enforcement has historically been an important tool that promotes competition in the U.S. The total number of cases that were filed between 1990 and 2006 averaged 22 per year, and generally fluctuated in a fairly tight band. In an earlier article we found that political and macroeconomic variables tended to explain well these filing patterns. However, since then the number of state cases filed has dropped dramatically and averaged just 12 cases over the five years that preceded Covid. In this paper we consider again the political economy of antitrust enforcement at the state level: we find similar explanations to our 2010 article, with the size of the state economy, the macroeconomic conditions that face the state, and the political party in charge of enforcement continuing to drive antitrust filing activity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
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Database: Engineering Source
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