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Coupling Information Disclosure with a Quality Standard in R&D Contests*.

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Title: Coupling Information Disclosure with a Quality Standard in R&D Contests*.
Authors: Cai, Gaoyang1 (AUTHOR) gaoyang.cai@kellogg.northwestern.edu, Jiao, Qian2 (AUTHOR) jiaoq3@mail.sysu.edu.cn, Lu, Jingfeng3 (AUTHOR) ecsljf@nus.edu.sg, Zheng, Jie4 (AUTHOR) jie.academic@gmail.com
Source: Journal of Industrial Economics. Sep2024, Vol. 72 Issue 3, p1299-1337. 39p.
Subjects: Disclosure, Quality standards, Information policy, Change agents, Contests
Abstract: We study two‐player R&D contest design using both an information disclosure policy and a quality standard as instruments. The ability of an innovator is known only to himself. The organizer commits ex‐ante to a minimum quality standard and whether to have innovators' abilities publicly revealed before they conduct R&D activities. We find that without quality standards, fully concealing innovators' abilities elicits both higher expected aggregate quality and expected highest quality. With optimally set quality standards, although fully concealing ability information still elicits higher expected aggregate quality, fully disclosing this information leads to a higher level of expected highest quality. Moreover, the optimal quality standards are compared across different objectives and disclosure policies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
Copyright of Journal of Industrial Economics is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)
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PubType: Academic Journal
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  Data: Coupling Information Disclosure with a Quality Standard in R&D Contests*.
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  Data: <searchLink fieldCode="AR" term="%22Cai%2C+Gaoyang%22">Cai, Gaoyang</searchLink><relatesTo>1</relatesTo> (AUTHOR)<i> gaoyang.cai@kellogg.northwestern.edu</i><br /><searchLink fieldCode="AR" term="%22Jiao%2C+Qian%22">Jiao, Qian</searchLink><relatesTo>2</relatesTo> (AUTHOR)<i> jiaoq3@mail.sysu.edu.cn</i><br /><searchLink fieldCode="AR" term="%22Lu%2C+Jingfeng%22">Lu, Jingfeng</searchLink><relatesTo>3</relatesTo> (AUTHOR)<i> ecsljf@nus.edu.sg</i><br /><searchLink fieldCode="AR" term="%22Zheng%2C+Jie%22">Zheng, Jie</searchLink><relatesTo>4</relatesTo> (AUTHOR)<i> jie.academic@gmail.com</i>
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  Data: <searchLink fieldCode="JN" term="%22Journal+of+Industrial+Economics%22">Journal of Industrial Economics</searchLink>. Sep2024, Vol. 72 Issue 3, p1299-1337. 39p.
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  Data: <searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Disclosure%22">Disclosure</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Quality+standards%22">Quality standards</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Information+policy%22">Information policy</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Change+agents%22">Change agents</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Contests%22">Contests</searchLink>
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  Label: Abstract
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  Data: We study two‐player R&D contest design using both an information disclosure policy and a quality standard as instruments. The ability of an innovator is known only to himself. The organizer commits ex‐ante to a minimum quality standard and whether to have innovators' abilities publicly revealed before they conduct R&D activities. We find that without quality standards, fully concealing innovators' abilities elicits both higher expected aggregate quality and expected highest quality. With optimally set quality standards, although fully concealing ability information still elicits higher expected aggregate quality, fully disclosing this information leads to a higher level of expected highest quality. Moreover, the optimal quality standards are compared across different objectives and disclosure policies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
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  Label:
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  Data: <i>Copyright of Journal of Industrial Economics is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract.</i> (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)
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      – Type: doi
        Value: 10.1111/joie.12387
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      – Code: eng
        Text: English
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      Pagination:
        PageCount: 39
        StartPage: 1299
    Subjects:
      – SubjectFull: Disclosure
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Quality standards
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Information policy
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Change agents
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Contests
        Type: general
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      – TitleFull: Coupling Information Disclosure with a Quality Standard in R&D Contests*.
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            NameFull: Cai, Gaoyang
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            NameFull: Jiao, Qian
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            NameFull: Lu, Jingfeng
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            NameFull: Zheng, Jie
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            – D: 01
              M: 09
              Text: Sep2024
              Type: published
              Y: 2024
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            – TitleFull: Journal of Industrial Economics
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