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Cartel Member or Free Rider? Detecting Collusion at the Firm Level: Cartel member or free...: A. Bovin.

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Title: Cartel Member or Free Rider? Detecting Collusion at the Firm Level: Cartel member or free...: A. Bovin.
Authors: Bovin, Andreas1 (AUTHOR) Andreas.BOVIN@ec.europa.be
Source: Review of Industrial Organization. Mar2025, Vol. 66 Issue 3, p293-324. 32p.
Subjects: Opportunity costs, Direct costing, Cost estimates, Free-rider problem, Scania trucks
Abstract: In this article, an approach to detect collusive conduct at the firm level is proposed, which consists of comparing implied marginal costs under alternative approaches that focus on (i) demand estimation and the assumption that firms maximize own profits; and (ii) cost estimation and the assumption that firms minimize costs. If firms cooperate and assumption (i) is violated, cost estimates start to diverge. Based on this divergence, a switching regression technique is employed to detect deviations from a competitive equilibrium. This method is empirically tested using data on Swedish truck manufacturer Scania. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
Copyright of Review of Industrial Organization is the property of Springer Nature and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)
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  Data: In this article, an approach to detect collusive conduct at the firm level is proposed, which consists of comparing implied marginal costs under alternative approaches that focus on (i) demand estimation and the assumption that firms maximize own profits; and (ii) cost estimation and the assumption that firms minimize costs. If firms cooperate and assumption (i) is violated, cost estimates start to diverge. Based on this divergence, a switching regression technique is employed to detect deviations from a competitive equilibrium. This method is empirically tested using data on Swedish truck manufacturer Scania. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
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  Data: <i>Copyright of Review of Industrial Organization is the property of Springer Nature and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract.</i> (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)
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        Value: 10.1007/s11151-024-09968-8
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        Text: English
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      – SubjectFull: Opportunity costs
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Direct costing
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      – SubjectFull: Cost estimates
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      – SubjectFull: Free-rider problem
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      – SubjectFull: Scania trucks
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      – TitleFull: Cartel Member or Free Rider? Detecting Collusion at the Firm Level: Cartel member or free...: A. Bovin.
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              Text: Mar2025
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