The Coase Conjecture When the Monopolist and Customers have Different Discount Rates.
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| Title: | The Coase Conjecture When the Monopolist and Customers have Different Discount Rates. |
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| Authors: | Groseclose, Tim1 (AUTHOR) timgroseclose@gmail.com |
| Source: | Review of Industrial Organization. Mar2025, Vol. 66 Issue 3, p349-365. 17p. |
| Subjects: | Discount prices, Consumers, Logical prediction, Negotiation |
| Abstract: | One of the most famous and outstanding formalizations of the Coase Conjecture is by Gul et al. (J Econ Theory 39(1):155–190, 1986. https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(86)90024-4) peculiarity of their model—as well as nearly all other examinations of the Coase Conjecture, including that by Coase himself—is that it assumes that the monopolist and customers have the same discount rate. I re-examine their model, while relaxing this restriction. Gul et. al. show that, if the (common) discount rate of the monopolist and customers approaches one, then the Coase Conjecture follows. I show that one only needs the discount rate of the customers to approach one for this to be true. I also show a second result: If the customers' discount rate is fixed at a value less than one, while the monopolist's discount rate approaches one, then the Coase Conjecture is guaranteed not to follow. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] |
| Copyright of Review of Industrial Organization is the property of Springer Nature and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.) | |
| Database: | Engineering Source |
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| Header | DbId: egs DbLabel: Engineering Source An: 184301889 AccessLevel: 6 PubType: Academic Journal PubTypeId: academicJournal PreciseRelevancyScore: 0 |
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| Items | – Name: Title Label: Title Group: Ti Data: The Coase Conjecture When the Monopolist and Customers have Different Discount Rates. – Name: Author Label: Authors Group: Au Data: <searchLink fieldCode="AR" term="%22Groseclose%2C+Tim%22">Groseclose, Tim</searchLink><relatesTo>1</relatesTo> (AUTHOR)<i> timgroseclose@gmail.com</i> – Name: TitleSource Label: Source Group: Src Data: <searchLink fieldCode="JN" term="%22Review+of+Industrial+Organization%22">Review of Industrial Organization</searchLink>. Mar2025, Vol. 66 Issue 3, p349-365. 17p. – Name: Subject Label: Subjects Group: Su Data: <searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Discount+prices%22">Discount prices</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Consumers%22">Consumers</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Logical+prediction%22">Logical prediction</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Negotiation%22">Negotiation</searchLink> – Name: Abstract Label: Abstract Group: Ab Data: One of the most famous and outstanding formalizations of the Coase Conjecture is by Gul et al. (J Econ Theory 39(1):155–190, 1986. https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(86)90024-4) peculiarity of their model—as well as nearly all other examinations of the Coase Conjecture, including that by Coase himself—is that it assumes that the monopolist and customers have the same discount rate. I re-examine their model, while relaxing this restriction. Gul et. al. show that, if the (common) discount rate of the monopolist and customers approaches one, then the Coase Conjecture follows. I show that one only needs the discount rate of the customers to approach one for this to be true. I also show a second result: If the customers' discount rate is fixed at a value less than one, while the monopolist's discount rate approaches one, then the Coase Conjecture is guaranteed not to follow. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] – Name: AbstractSuppliedCopyright Label: Group: Ab Data: <i>Copyright of Review of Industrial Organization is the property of Springer Nature and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract.</i> (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.) |
| PLink | https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=egs&AN=184301889 |
| RecordInfo | BibRecord: BibEntity: Identifiers: – Type: doi Value: 10.1007/s11151-024-09990-w Languages: – Code: eng Text: English PhysicalDescription: Pagination: PageCount: 17 StartPage: 349 Subjects: – SubjectFull: Discount prices Type: general – SubjectFull: Consumers Type: general – SubjectFull: Logical prediction Type: general – SubjectFull: Negotiation Type: general Titles: – TitleFull: The Coase Conjecture When the Monopolist and Customers have Different Discount Rates. Type: main BibRelationships: HasContributorRelationships: – PersonEntity: Name: NameFull: Groseclose, Tim IsPartOfRelationships: – BibEntity: Dates: – D: 01 M: 03 Text: Mar2025 Type: published Y: 2025 Identifiers: – Type: issn-print Value: 0889938X Numbering: – Type: volume Value: 66 – Type: issue Value: 3 Titles: – TitleFull: Review of Industrial Organization Type: main |
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