View in EDS PDF Full Text

SRAM Has No Chill: Exploiting Power Domain Separation to Steal On-Chip Secrets.

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Title: SRAM Has No Chill: Exploiting Power Domain Separation to Steal On-Chip Secrets.
Authors: Mahmod, Jubayer1 (AUTHOR) jubayer@vt.edu, Hicks, Matthew1 (AUTHOR) mdhicks2@vt.edu
Source: Communications of the ACM. Aug2025, Vol. 68 Issue 8, p82-90. 9p.
Subjects: Cryptography, Static random access memory chips, Dynamic random access memory, Embedded computer systems, Systems on a chip, Computer security vulnerabilities
Abstract: The widespread use of embedded systems and smart devices has heightened the threat of physical memory attacks, such as cold boot attacks that exploit DRAM’s temporary data retention at low temperatures. Although storing secrets in on-chip SRAM typically protects against these attacks due to its isolation and minimal capacitance, this protection is not foolproof. This paper introduces Volt Boot, an attack that bypasses traditional defenses by exploiting uneven power states in system-on-chip architectures to retain data in volatile SRAM across reboots. Tested on modern ARM Cortex-A devices, Volt Boot reliably extracts sensitive information from caches, registers, and internal RAM with perfect accuracy and no need for low temperatures or complex processing.
Database: Engineering Source
FullText Links:
  – Type: pdflink
Text:
  Availability: 0
Header DbId: egs
DbLabel: Engineering Source
An: 186913168
AccessLevel: 6
PubType: Periodical
PubTypeId: serialPeriodical
PreciseRelevancyScore: 0
IllustrationInfo
Items – Name: Title
  Label: Title
  Group: Ti
  Data: SRAM Has No Chill: Exploiting Power Domain Separation to Steal On-Chip Secrets.
– Name: Author
  Label: Authors
  Group: Au
  Data: <searchLink fieldCode="AR" term="%22Mahmod%2C+Jubayer%22">Mahmod, Jubayer</searchLink><relatesTo>1</relatesTo> (AUTHOR)<i> jubayer@vt.edu</i><br /><searchLink fieldCode="AR" term="%22Hicks%2C+Matthew%22">Hicks, Matthew</searchLink><relatesTo>1</relatesTo> (AUTHOR)<i> mdhicks2@vt.edu</i>
– Name: TitleSource
  Label: Source
  Group: Src
  Data: <searchLink fieldCode="JN" term="%22Communications+of+the+ACM%22">Communications of the ACM</searchLink>. Aug2025, Vol. 68 Issue 8, p82-90. 9p.
– Name: Subject
  Label: Subjects
  Group: Su
  Data: <searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Cryptography%22">Cryptography</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Static+random+access+memory+chips%22">Static random access memory chips</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Dynamic+random+access+memory%22">Dynamic random access memory</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Embedded+computer+systems%22">Embedded computer systems</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Systems+on+a+chip%22">Systems on a chip</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Computer+security+vulnerabilities%22">Computer security vulnerabilities</searchLink>
– Name: Abstract
  Label: Abstract
  Group: Ab
  Data: The widespread use of embedded systems and smart devices has heightened the threat of physical memory attacks, such as cold boot attacks that exploit DRAM’s temporary data retention at low temperatures. Although storing secrets in on-chip SRAM typically protects against these attacks due to its isolation and minimal capacitance, this protection is not foolproof. This paper introduces Volt Boot, an attack that bypasses traditional defenses by exploiting uneven power states in system-on-chip architectures to retain data in volatile SRAM across reboots. Tested on modern ARM Cortex-A devices, Volt Boot reliably extracts sensitive information from caches, registers, and internal RAM with perfect accuracy and no need for low temperatures or complex processing.
PLink https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=egs&AN=186913168
RecordInfo BibRecord:
  BibEntity:
    Identifiers:
      – Type: doi
        Value: 10.1145/3725845
    Languages:
      – Code: eng
        Text: English
    PhysicalDescription:
      Pagination:
        PageCount: 9
        StartPage: 82
    Subjects:
      – SubjectFull: Cryptography
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Static random access memory chips
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Dynamic random access memory
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Embedded computer systems
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Systems on a chip
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Computer security vulnerabilities
        Type: general
    Titles:
      – TitleFull: SRAM Has No Chill: Exploiting Power Domain Separation to Steal On-Chip Secrets.
        Type: main
  BibRelationships:
    HasContributorRelationships:
      – PersonEntity:
          Name:
            NameFull: Mahmod, Jubayer
      – PersonEntity:
          Name:
            NameFull: Hicks, Matthew
    IsPartOfRelationships:
      – BibEntity:
          Dates:
            – D: 01
              M: 08
              Text: Aug2025
              Type: published
              Y: 2025
          Identifiers:
            – Type: issn-print
              Value: 00010782
          Numbering:
            – Type: volume
              Value: 68
            – Type: issue
              Value: 8
          Titles:
            – TitleFull: Communications of the ACM
              Type: main
ResultId 1