ВПЛИВ ЕКСПЛУАТАЦІЙНИХ РІШЕНЬ ПЕРСОНАЛУ НА БЕЗПЕКУ ФІЗИЧНОГО І КАНАЛЬНОГО РІВНІВ ЛОКАЛЬНИХ МЕРЕЖ

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Bibliographic Details
Title:	ВПЛИВ ЕКСПЛУАТАЦІЙНИХ РІШЕНЬ ПЕРСОНАЛУ НА БЕЗПЕКУ ФІЗИЧНОГО І КАНАЛЬНОГО РІВНІВ ЛОКАЛЬНИХ МЕРЕЖ
Alternate Title:	INFLUENCE OF PERSONNEL OPERATIONAL DECISIONS ON THE SECURITY OF THE PHYSICAL AND CHANNEL LEVELS OF LOCAL NETWORKS.
Authors:	Прокопович-Ткаченко, Д. М.¹ omega2417@gmail.com, Хохлачова, Ю. Є.² yuliiahohlachova@gmail.com, Торстенссон, О.³ pirogova0303@gmail.com, Черкаський, Д. О.⁴ Cherkaskyi.Dav.O@nmu.one, Переметчик, Д. О.⁵ peremetchyk.d@gmail.com
Source:	Informatics & Mathematical Methods in Simulation / Informatika ta Matematičnì Metodi v Modelûvannì. 2026, Vol. 16 Issue 2, p376-389. 14p.
Subjects:	Local area networks, Computer network security, Risk managers, Human capital, Electric network topology
Abstract:	The paper analyzes how personnel decisions and errors create risks at the physical and channel levels of the reference model of open systems interaction, which are usually considered purely engineering. It is shown that incorrect switching and marking of lines, the use of poor-quality or inappropriate cables and optical modules, the connection of uninventoryed switches or wireless access points, as well as undisciplined actions with power and access to switching cabinets cause not only availability failures, but also hidden changes in topology and segment boundaries. Such changes open the way to intercept traffic, change network parameters, and also to move an attacker unnoticed between sections of the local network. At the channel level, segmentation errors, excessive trust in the local port, lack of connection control, incorrect construction of a secure topology, and ignoring service message checks are critical, which allows frames to be redirected, address mapping tables to be changed, and network services to be imitated. Practical areas of risk reduction are proposed: unification of operating procedures, strict asset accounting, standardized labeling, regulation of changes, automated application of configuration templates, and constant validation of access and segmentation policies. It is proved that a person at levels one and two is an element of the infrastructure, therefore risk management should combine technical mechanisms with controlled operational processes. To assess the impact, it is proposed to describe the probability of incidents through a combination of technical exposure and operational maturity indicators: the frequency of manual interventions, the presence of double-checking, logging and regularity of audits. The practical result is the transition from responding to random errors to managed prevention, when typical dangerous connection and configuration schemes become impossible by default, as follows. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
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Database:	Engineering Source

Description
Abstract:	The paper analyzes how personnel decisions and errors create risks at the physical and channel levels of the reference model of open systems interaction, which are usually considered purely engineering. It is shown that incorrect switching and marking of lines, the use of poor-quality or inappropriate cables and optical modules, the connection of uninventoryed switches or wireless access points, as well as undisciplined actions with power and access to switching cabinets cause not only availability failures, but also hidden changes in topology and segment boundaries. Such changes open the way to intercept traffic, change network parameters, and also to move an attacker unnoticed between sections of the local network. At the channel level, segmentation errors, excessive trust in the local port, lack of connection control, incorrect construction of a secure topology, and ignoring service message checks are critical, which allows frames to be redirected, address mapping tables to be changed, and network services to be imitated. Practical areas of risk reduction are proposed: unification of operating procedures, strict asset accounting, standardized labeling, regulation of changes, automated application of configuration templates, and constant validation of access and segmentation policies. It is proved that a person at levels one and two is an element of the infrastructure, therefore risk management should combine technical mechanisms with controlled operational processes. To assess the impact, it is proposed to describe the probability of incidents through a combination of technical exposure and operational maturity indicators: the frequency of manual interventions, the presence of double-checking, logging and regularity of audits. The practical result is the transition from responding to random errors to managed prevention, when typical dangerous connection and configuration schemes become impossible by default, as follows. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
ISSN:	22235744
DOI:	10.15276/imms.v16.no2.376