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A social welfare function based on dominating set relaxations.

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Title: A social welfare function based on dominating set relaxations.
Authors: Hou, Fujun1 (AUTHOR) houfj@bit.edu.cn
Source: International Journal of General Systems. Jul2026, Vol. 55 Issue 5, p641-668. 28p.
Subjects: Dominating set, Social choice, Pareto optimum, Anonymity
Abstract: By relaxing the dominating set in several ways, we propose a social welfare function, which satisfies a number of attractive properties including anonymity (hence non-dictatorship), neutrality, strong Pareto (hence weak Pareto), and strong Gehrlein-stability (hence Smith set principle and Condorcet winner principle as well as Condorcet loser principle). It will return the majority relation when the majority relation is transitive, and thus it satisfies the property of independence of irrelevant alternatives in domains where the majority relation is guaranteed to be transitive. It runs in polynomial time. In tournaments, its winner belongs to the uncovered set (hence the top cycle set and Smith set as well as Schwartz set). In addition, in a tournament where the alternative number is not more than 4, its winner set is a subset, sometimes proper, of the Copeland winner set. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
Copyright of International Journal of General Systems is the property of Taylor & Francis Ltd and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)
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  Data: A social welfare function based on dominating set relaxations.
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  Data: <searchLink fieldCode="AR" term="%22Hou%2C+Fujun%22">Hou, Fujun</searchLink><relatesTo>1</relatesTo> (AUTHOR)<i> houfj@bit.edu.cn</i>
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  Data: <searchLink fieldCode="JN" term="%22International+Journal+of+General+Systems%22">International Journal of General Systems</searchLink>. Jul2026, Vol. 55 Issue 5, p641-668. 28p.
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  Data: <searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Dominating+set%22">Dominating set</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Social+choice%22">Social choice</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Pareto+optimum%22">Pareto optimum</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Anonymity%22">Anonymity</searchLink>
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  Data: By relaxing the dominating set in several ways, we propose a social welfare function, which satisfies a number of attractive properties including anonymity (hence non-dictatorship), neutrality, strong Pareto (hence weak Pareto), and strong Gehrlein-stability (hence Smith set principle and Condorcet winner principle as well as Condorcet loser principle). It will return the majority relation when the majority relation is transitive, and thus it satisfies the property of independence of irrelevant alternatives in domains where the majority relation is guaranteed to be transitive. It runs in polynomial time. In tournaments, its winner belongs to the uncovered set (hence the top cycle set and Smith set as well as Schwartz set). In addition, in a tournament where the alternative number is not more than 4, its winner set is a subset, sometimes proper, of the Copeland winner set. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
– Name: AbstractSuppliedCopyright
  Label:
  Group: Ab
  Data: <i>Copyright of International Journal of General Systems is the property of Taylor & Francis Ltd and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract.</i> (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)
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RecordInfo BibRecord:
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    Identifiers:
      – Type: doi
        Value: 10.1080/03081079.2025.2493189
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      – Code: eng
        Text: English
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      Pagination:
        PageCount: 28
        StartPage: 641
    Subjects:
      – SubjectFull: Dominating set
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Social choice
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Pareto optimum
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Anonymity
        Type: general
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      – TitleFull: A social welfare function based on dominating set relaxations.
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            – D: 01
              M: 07
              Text: Jul2026
              Type: published
              Y: 2026
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