Formal analysis of Kerberos 5
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| Title: | Formal analysis of Kerberos 5 |
|---|---|
| Authors: | Butler, Frederick1 fbutler@math.wvu.edu, Cervesato, Iliano2 iliano@cmu.edu, Jaggard, Aaron D.3 adj@math.tulane.edu, Scedrov, Andre4 scedrov@math.upenn.edu, Walstad, Christopher4 cwalstad@seas.upenn.edu |
| Source: | Theoretical Computer Science. Nov2006, Vol. 367 Issue 1/2, p57-87. 31p. |
| Subjects: | Computer network protocols, Computer network security, Computer science, Systems design |
| Abstract: | Abstract: We report on the detailed verification of a substantial portion of the Kerberos 5 protocol specification. Because it targeted a deployed protocol rather than an academic abstraction, this multiyear effort led to the development of new analysis methods in order to manage the inherent complexity. This enabled proving that Kerberos supports the expected authentication and confidentiality properties, and that it is structurally sound; these results rely on a pair of intertwined inductions. Our work also detected a number of innocuous but nonetheless unexpected behaviors, and it clearly described how vulnerable the cross-realm authentication support of Kerberos is to the compromise of remote administrative domains. [Copyright &y& Elsevier] |
| Copyright of Theoretical Computer Science is the property of Elsevier B.V. and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.) | |
| Database: | Engineering Source |
| FullText | Text: Availability: 0 |
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| Header | DbId: egs DbLabel: Engineering Source An: 22965647 AccessLevel: 6 PubType: Academic Journal PubTypeId: academicJournal PreciseRelevancyScore: 0 |
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| Items | – Name: Title Label: Title Group: Ti Data: Formal analysis of Kerberos 5 – Name: Author Label: Authors Group: Au Data: <searchLink fieldCode="AR" term="%22Butler%2C+Frederick%22">Butler, Frederick</searchLink><relatesTo>1</relatesTo><i> fbutler@math.wvu.edu</i><br /><searchLink fieldCode="AR" term="%22Cervesato%2C+Iliano%22">Cervesato, Iliano</searchLink><relatesTo>2</relatesTo><i> iliano@cmu.edu</i><br /><searchLink fieldCode="AR" term="%22Jaggard%2C+Aaron+D%2E%22">Jaggard, Aaron D.</searchLink><relatesTo>3</relatesTo><i> adj@math.tulane.edu</i><br /><searchLink fieldCode="AR" term="%22Scedrov%2C+Andre%22">Scedrov, Andre</searchLink><relatesTo>4</relatesTo><i> scedrov@math.upenn.edu</i><br /><searchLink fieldCode="AR" term="%22Walstad%2C+Christopher%22">Walstad, Christopher</searchLink><relatesTo>4</relatesTo><i> cwalstad@seas.upenn.edu</i> – Name: TitleSource Label: Source Group: Src Data: <searchLink fieldCode="JN" term="%22Theoretical+Computer+Science%22">Theoretical Computer Science</searchLink>. Nov2006, Vol. 367 Issue 1/2, p57-87. 31p. – Name: Subject Label: Subjects Group: Su Data: <searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Computer+network+protocols%22">Computer network protocols</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Computer+network+security%22">Computer network security</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Computer+science%22">Computer science</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Systems+design%22">Systems design</searchLink> – Name: Abstract Label: Abstract Group: Ab Data: Abstract: We report on the detailed verification of a substantial portion of the Kerberos 5 protocol specification. Because it targeted a deployed protocol rather than an academic abstraction, this multiyear effort led to the development of new analysis methods in order to manage the inherent complexity. This enabled proving that Kerberos supports the expected authentication and confidentiality properties, and that it is structurally sound; these results rely on a pair of intertwined inductions. Our work also detected a number of innocuous but nonetheless unexpected behaviors, and it clearly described how vulnerable the cross-realm authentication support of Kerberos is to the compromise of remote administrative domains. [Copyright &y& Elsevier] – Name: AbstractSuppliedCopyright Label: Group: Ab Data: <i>Copyright of Theoretical Computer Science is the property of Elsevier B.V. and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract.</i> (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.) |
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| RecordInfo | BibRecord: BibEntity: Identifiers: – Type: doi Value: 10.1016/j.tcs.2006.08.040 Languages: – Code: eng Text: English PhysicalDescription: Pagination: PageCount: 31 StartPage: 57 Subjects: – SubjectFull: Computer network protocols Type: general – SubjectFull: Computer network security Type: general – SubjectFull: Computer science Type: general – SubjectFull: Systems design Type: general Titles: – TitleFull: Formal analysis of Kerberos 5 Type: main BibRelationships: HasContributorRelationships: – PersonEntity: Name: NameFull: Butler, Frederick – PersonEntity: Name: NameFull: Cervesato, Iliano – PersonEntity: Name: NameFull: Jaggard, Aaron D. – PersonEntity: Name: NameFull: Scedrov, Andre – PersonEntity: Name: NameFull: Walstad, Christopher IsPartOfRelationships: – BibEntity: Dates: – D: 24 M: 11 Text: Nov2006 Type: published Y: 2006 Identifiers: – Type: issn-print Value: 03043975 Numbering: – Type: volume Value: 367 – Type: issue Value: 1/2 Titles: – TitleFull: Theoretical Computer Science Type: main |
| ResultId | 1 |
