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A static model of cooperation for group-based incentive plans

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Title: A static model of cooperation for group-based incentive plans
Authors: Singer, Marcos1 msinger@uc.cl, Donoso, Patricio1, Rodríguez-Sickert, Carlos2
Source: International Journal of Production Economics. Oct2008, Vol. 115 Issue 2, p492-501. 10p.
Subjects: Teams in the workplace, Monetary incentives, Employee competitive behavior, Social loafing, Employee motivation, Industrial psychology, Labor incentives, Personnel management
Abstract: Abstract: Whenever a company implements a group-based incentive plan for the first time, free-riding may destroy trust among employees and harm performance. We propose a static model to describe how employees make the decision of whether to cooperate or not, which considers material rewards and social preferences. Given the deep uncertainty involved, we conjecture that workers apply the Arrow–Hurwicz criterion, which considers a combination of the best- and the worst-case scenarios. We derive a set of hypothesis from this model that we validate using a dataset of 107 effectively implemented incentive plans. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]
Copyright of International Journal of Production Economics is the property of Elsevier B.V. and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)
Database: Engineering Source
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DbLabel: Engineering Source
An: 34436480
AccessLevel: 6
PubType: Academic Journal
PubTypeId: academicJournal
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  Data: <searchLink fieldCode="JN" term="%22International+Journal+of+Production+Economics%22">International Journal of Production Economics</searchLink>. Oct2008, Vol. 115 Issue 2, p492-501. 10p.
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  Data: <searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Teams+in+the+workplace%22">Teams in the workplace</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Monetary+incentives%22">Monetary incentives</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Employee+competitive+behavior%22">Employee competitive behavior</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Social+loafing%22">Social loafing</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Employee+motivation%22">Employee motivation</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Industrial+psychology%22">Industrial psychology</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Labor+incentives%22">Labor incentives</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Personnel+management%22">Personnel management</searchLink>
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  Label: Abstract
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  Data: Abstract: Whenever a company implements a group-based incentive plan for the first time, free-riding may destroy trust among employees and harm performance. We propose a static model to describe how employees make the decision of whether to cooperate or not, which considers material rewards and social preferences. Given the deep uncertainty involved, we conjecture that workers apply the Arrow–Hurwicz criterion, which considers a combination of the best- and the worst-case scenarios. We derive a set of hypothesis from this model that we validate using a dataset of 107 effectively implemented incentive plans. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]
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  Data: <i>Copyright of International Journal of Production Economics is the property of Elsevier B.V. and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract.</i> (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)
PLink https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=egs&AN=34436480
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        Value: 10.1016/j.ijpe.2007.02.053
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      – Code: eng
        Text: English
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        PageCount: 10
        StartPage: 492
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      – SubjectFull: Teams in the workplace
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Monetary incentives
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Employee competitive behavior
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Social loafing
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Employee motivation
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Industrial psychology
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Labor incentives
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      – SubjectFull: Personnel management
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      – TitleFull: A static model of cooperation for group-based incentive plans
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              M: 10
              Text: Oct2008
              Type: published
              Y: 2008
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