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Compact preference representation and Boolean games.

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Title: Compact preference representation and Boolean games.
Authors: Elise Bonzon1, Marie-Christine Lagasquie-Schiex1, Jérôme Lang1, Bruno Zanuttini2
Source: Autonomous Agents & Multi-Agent Systems. Feb2009, Vol. 18 Issue 1, p1-35. 35p.
Subjects: Kaufmann, Morgan, Military strategy, Military science, Military doctrine, Military offensives, Nash equilibrium
Abstract: Abstract  Game theory is a widely used formal model for studying strategical interactions between agents. Boolean games (Harrenstein, Logic in conflict, PhD thesis, 2004; Harrenstein et al., Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge, pp. 287–298, San Francisco Morgan Kaufmann, 2001) yield a compact representation of 2-player zero-sum static games with binary preferences: an agent’s strategy consists of a truth assignment of the propositional variables she controls, and a player’s preferences are expressed by a plain propositional formula. These restrictions (2-player, zero-sum, binary preferences) strongly limit the expressivity of the framework. We first generalize the framework to n-player games which are not necessarily zero-sum. We give simple characterizations of Nash equilibria and dominated strategies, and investigate the computational complexity of the associated problems. Then, we relax the last restriction by coupling Boolean games with a representation, namely, CP-nets. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
Copyright of Autonomous Agents & Multi-Agent Systems is the property of Springer Nature and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)
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  Data: Abstract  Game theory is a widely used formal model for studying strategical interactions between agents. Boolean games (Harrenstein, Logic in conflict, PhD thesis, 2004; Harrenstein et al., Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge, pp. 287–298, San Francisco Morgan Kaufmann, 2001) yield a compact representation of 2-player zero-sum static games with binary preferences: an agent’s strategy consists of a truth assignment of the propositional variables she controls, and a player’s preferences are expressed by a plain propositional formula. These restrictions (2-player, zero-sum, binary preferences) strongly limit the expressivity of the framework. We first generalize the framework to n-player games which are not necessarily zero-sum. We give simple characterizations of Nash equilibria and dominated strategies, and investigate the computational complexity of the associated problems. Then, we relax the last restriction by coupling Boolean games with a representation, namely, CP-nets. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
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  Data: <i>Copyright of Autonomous Agents & Multi-Agent Systems is the property of Springer Nature and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract.</i> (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)
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              Text: Feb2009
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