MARKET STRUCTURE AND EXTERNALITIES: THE CASE OF WATER POLLUTION IN ENGLAND AND WALES.
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| Title: | MARKET STRUCTURE AND EXTERNALITIES: THE CASE OF WATER POLLUTION IN ENGLAND AND WALES. |
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| Authors: | Storey, D. J.1 |
| Source: | Journal of Industrial Economics. Dec78, Vol. 27 Issue 2, p149-162. 14p. |
| Subjects: | Water pollution, Water pollution control industry, Cost effectiveness, Water quality, Externalities, Industrial efficiency, Industrial organization (Economic theory) |
| Geographic Terms: | United Kingdom |
| Abstract: | The article examines the theories of market structure and externalities in the case of water pollution in Great Britain. A major criticism of externality theorists is their presumption that all polluters are profit maximizers (cost minimizers) operating in a perfectly competitive selling market. If the firm is spending only a little the authority will spend more. Thus the profit-maximizing firm can contest the consent conditions imposed by authority and be better off, but the outcome, a priori, is uncertain. Hence the hypothesis is presented that the less competitive industries will receive more favorable treatment from the enforcing authority. Since society as a whole has, over the past decade, shown a greater interest in the environment this might be reflected in a greater consciousness of industrial management of their social responsibilities. Since there is no a priori reason why firms in the medium concentrated industries should have significantly higher or lower costs of abatement than other firms this study represents further support for those arguing that water quality improvement has not been achieved in a cost-effective manner. Finally it should be realized that anti-trust policies, whilst they may increase social welfare by the introduction of greater competition designed to reduce product prices may simultaneously increase social damage from pollution through reducing the opportunity for discretionary expenditure on abatement. |
| Database: | Engineering Source |
| FullText | Links: – Type: pdflink Text: Availability: 0 |
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| Header | DbId: egs DbLabel: Engineering Source An: 6015769 AccessLevel: 6 PubType: Academic Journal PubTypeId: academicJournal PreciseRelevancyScore: 0 |
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| Items | – Name: Title Label: Title Group: Ti Data: MARKET STRUCTURE AND EXTERNALITIES: THE CASE OF WATER POLLUTION IN ENGLAND AND WALES. – Name: Author Label: Authors Group: Au Data: <searchLink fieldCode="AR" term="%22Storey%2C+D%2E+J%2E%22">Storey, D. J.</searchLink><relatesTo>1</relatesTo> – Name: TitleSource Label: Source Group: Src Data: <searchLink fieldCode="JN" term="%22Journal+of+Industrial+Economics%22">Journal of Industrial Economics</searchLink>. Dec78, Vol. 27 Issue 2, p149-162. 14p. – Name: Subject Label: Subjects Group: Su Data: <searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Water+pollution%22">Water pollution</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Water+pollution+control+industry%22">Water pollution control industry</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Cost+effectiveness%22">Cost effectiveness</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Water+quality%22">Water quality</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Externalities%22">Externalities</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Industrial+efficiency%22">Industrial efficiency</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Industrial+organization+%28Economic+theory%29%22">Industrial organization (Economic theory)</searchLink> – Name: SubjectGeographic Label: Geographic Terms Group: Su Data: <searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22United+Kingdom%22">United Kingdom</searchLink> – Name: Abstract Label: Abstract Group: Ab Data: The article examines the theories of market structure and externalities in the case of water pollution in Great Britain. A major criticism of externality theorists is their presumption that all polluters are profit maximizers (cost minimizers) operating in a perfectly competitive selling market. If the firm is spending only a little the authority will spend more. Thus the profit-maximizing firm can contest the consent conditions imposed by authority and be better off, but the outcome, a priori, is uncertain. Hence the hypothesis is presented that the less competitive industries will receive more favorable treatment from the enforcing authority. Since society as a whole has, over the past decade, shown a greater interest in the environment this might be reflected in a greater consciousness of industrial management of their social responsibilities. Since there is no a priori reason why firms in the medium concentrated industries should have significantly higher or lower costs of abatement than other firms this study represents further support for those arguing that water quality improvement has not been achieved in a cost-effective manner. Finally it should be realized that anti-trust policies, whilst they may increase social welfare by the introduction of greater competition designed to reduce product prices may simultaneously increase social damage from pollution through reducing the opportunity for discretionary expenditure on abatement. |
| PLink | https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=egs&AN=6015769 |
| RecordInfo | BibRecord: BibEntity: Identifiers: – Type: doi Value: 10.2307/2097994 Languages: – Code: eng Text: English PhysicalDescription: Pagination: PageCount: 14 StartPage: 149 Subjects: – SubjectFull: Water pollution Type: general – SubjectFull: Water pollution control industry Type: general – SubjectFull: Cost effectiveness Type: general – SubjectFull: Water quality Type: general – SubjectFull: Externalities Type: general – SubjectFull: Industrial efficiency Type: general – SubjectFull: Industrial organization (Economic theory) Type: general – SubjectFull: United Kingdom Type: general Titles: – TitleFull: MARKET STRUCTURE AND EXTERNALITIES: THE CASE OF WATER POLLUTION IN ENGLAND AND WALES. Type: main BibRelationships: HasContributorRelationships: – PersonEntity: Name: NameFull: Storey, D. J. IsPartOfRelationships: – BibEntity: Dates: – D: 01 M: 12 Text: Dec78 Type: published Y: 1978 Identifiers: – Type: issn-print Value: 00221821 Numbering: – Type: volume Value: 27 – Type: issue Value: 2 Titles: – TitleFull: Journal of Industrial Economics Type: main |
| ResultId | 1 |
