Vetting Browser Extensions for Security Vulnerabilities with VEX.

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Bibliographic Details
Title:	Vetting Browser Extensions for Security Vulnerabilities with VEX.
Authors:	Bandhakavi, Sruthi¹ sbandha2@illinois.edu, Tiku, Nandit¹ tiku1@illinois.edu, Pittman, Wyatt¹ wpittma2@illinois.edu, King, Samuel T.¹ kingst@illinois.edu, Madhusudan, P.¹ madhu@illinois.edu, Winslett, Marianne¹ winslett@illinois.edu
Source:	Communications of the ACM. Sep2011, Vol. 54 Issue 9, p91-99. 9p. 3 Diagrams, 5 Charts.
Subjects:	Web browser security, Anti-malware (Computer software), Malware, Computer security, JavaScript programming language, World Wide Web
Abstract:	The browser has become the de facto platform for everyday computation and a popular target for attackers of computer systems. Among the many potential attacks that target or exploit browsers, vulnerabilities in browser extensions have received relatively little attention. Currently, extensions are vetted by manual inspection, which is time consuming and subject to human error. In this paper, we present Vex, a framework for applying static information flow analysis to JavaScript code to identify security vulnerabilities in browser extensions. We describe several patterns of flows that can lead to privilege escalations in Firefox extensions. Vex analyzes Firefox extensions for such flow patterns using high-precision, context-sensitive, flow-sensitive static analysis. We subject 2460 browser extensions to the analysis, and Vex finds 5 of the 18 previously known vulnerabilities and 7 previously unknown vulnerabilities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
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Database:	Engineering Source

Description
Abstract:	The browser has become the de facto platform for everyday computation and a popular target for attackers of computer systems. Among the many potential attacks that target or exploit browsers, vulnerabilities in browser extensions have received relatively little attention. Currently, extensions are vetted by manual inspection, which is time consuming and subject to human error. In this paper, we present Vex, a framework for applying static information flow analysis to JavaScript code to identify security vulnerabilities in browser extensions. We describe several patterns of flows that can lead to privilege escalations in Firefox extensions. Vex analyzes Firefox extensions for such flow patterns using high-precision, context-sensitive, flow-sensitive static analysis. We subject 2460 browser extensions to the analysis, and Vex finds 5 of the 18 previously known vulnerabilities and 7 previously unknown vulnerabilities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
ISSN:	00010782
DOI:	10.1145/1995376.1995398