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Evolution of cooperation and skew under imperfect information.

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Title: Evolution of cooperation and skew under imperfect information.
Authors: Akçay, Erol1 eakcay@princeton.edu, Meirowitz, Adam2, Ramsay, Kristopher W.2, Levin, Simon A.1 slevin@princeton.edu
Source: Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America. 9/11/2012, Vol. 109 Issue 37, p14936-14941. 6p.
Subjects: Social evolution, Information theory, Cooperation, Social interaction, Organizational structure, Social psychology
Abstract: The evolution of cooperation in nature and human societies depends crucially on how the benefits from cooperation are divided and whether individuals have complete information about their pay-offs. We tackle these questions by adopting a methodology from economics called mechanism design. Focusing on reproductive skew as a case study, we show that full cooperation may not be achievable due to private information over individuals' outside options, regardless of the details of the specific biological or social interaction. Further, we consider how the structure of the interaction can evolve to promote the maximum amount of cooperation in the face of the informational constraints. Our results point to a distinct avenue for investigating how cooperation can evolve when the division of benefits is flexible and individuals have private information. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
Copyright of Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America is the property of National Academy of Sciences and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)
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  Data: <searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Social+evolution%22">Social evolution</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Information+theory%22">Information theory</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Cooperation%22">Cooperation</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Social+interaction%22">Social interaction</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Organizational+structure%22">Organizational structure</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Social+psychology%22">Social psychology</searchLink>
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  Data: The evolution of cooperation in nature and human societies depends crucially on how the benefits from cooperation are divided and whether individuals have complete information about their pay-offs. We tackle these questions by adopting a methodology from economics called mechanism design. Focusing on reproductive skew as a case study, we show that full cooperation may not be achievable due to private information over individuals' outside options, regardless of the details of the specific biological or social interaction. Further, we consider how the structure of the interaction can evolve to promote the maximum amount of cooperation in the face of the informational constraints. Our results point to a distinct avenue for investigating how cooperation can evolve when the division of benefits is flexible and individuals have private information. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
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  Data: <i>Copyright of Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America is the property of National Academy of Sciences and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract.</i> (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)
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              Text: 9/11/2012
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