Incentivizing Regulatory Participation: Effectiveness of a Fundraising Levy.

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Bibliographic Details
Title:	Incentivizing Regulatory Participation: Effectiveness of a Fundraising Levy.
Authors:	Rutherford, Alasdair C.¹ (AUTHOR) alasdair.rutherford@stir.ac.uk, McDonnell, Diarmuid² (AUTHOR) d.mcdonnell.1@bham.ac.uk, Hogg, Eddy³ (AUTHOR) e.hogg@kent.ac.uk
Source:	Public Administration Review. May2021, Vol. 81 Issue 3, p532-542. 11p. 2 Charts, 5 Graphs.
Subject Terms:	Fundraising laws, Administrative fees, Statutory remedies, Payment, Monetary incentives
Abstract:	In the absence of a statutory instrument to enforce payment of a regulatory fee, regulators must rely on a combination of "carrots" and "sticks" to encourage financial contributions by the organizations they oversee. In contrast to studies of public funding of nonprofits, this article empirically evaluates the effectiveness of a government policy to rely on nonprofit funding of statutory regulation. The authors exploit a sharp discontinuity in the eligibility threshold for charities contributing to the new Fundraising Regulator in England and Wales to estimate a causal effect of the levy on participation. The article shows that the regulator's threat to "name and shame" was effective at incentivizing regulatory participation and generating income, but it raises some concerns about the long‐term viability of this approach. The results are significant at a time when many jurisdictions are considering how best to fund the regulation of nonprofits. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
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Database:	Education Research Complete

Description
Abstract:	In the absence of a statutory instrument to enforce payment of a regulatory fee, regulators must rely on a combination of "carrots" and "sticks" to encourage financial contributions by the organizations they oversee. In contrast to studies of public funding of nonprofits, this article empirically evaluates the effectiveness of a government policy to rely on nonprofit funding of statutory regulation. The authors exploit a sharp discontinuity in the eligibility threshold for charities contributing to the new Fundraising Regulator in England and Wales to estimate a causal effect of the levy on participation. The article shows that the regulator's threat to "name and shame" was effective at incentivizing regulatory participation and generating income, but it raises some concerns about the long‐term viability of this approach. The results are significant at a time when many jurisdictions are considering how best to fund the regulation of nonprofits. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
ISSN:	00333352
DOI:	10.1111/puar.13176