Situationism, subjunctive hypocrisy and standing to blame.
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| Title: | Situationism, subjunctive hypocrisy and standing to blame. |
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| Authors: | Piovarchy, Adam1 (AUTHOR) adam.piovarchy@sydney.edu.au |
| Source: | Inquiry. May2023, Vol. 66 Issue 4, p514-538. 25p. |
| Subject Terms: | *Communities, Values (Ethics), Blame, Philosophers, Hypocrisy, Obedience, Psychology |
| Abstract: | Philosophers have argued that subjects who act wrongly in the situationist psychology experiments are morally responsible for their actions. This paper argues that though the obedient subjects in Milgram's 'Obedience to Authority' experiments are blameworthy, since most of us would have acted in the same manner they did, it is inappropriate for most of us to blame them. On Todd's ([2019]. "A Unified Account of the Moral Standing to Blame." Noûs 53 (2): 347–374.) recent account of standing to blame, agents lack the standing to blame others for a wrong when they are not sufficiently committed to the moral values which would condemn that wrong. I argue that the obedient subjects lack sufficient commitment to the kinds of values which would condemn their wrongdoing. This is evidenced by the fact that the wrongdoing was severe, that the subjects had the capacity to avoid wrongdoing, and that there was very little cost to avoiding wrongdoing. Since these studies are very well-replicated, most of us in the moral community would have acted as they did for similar reasons. At least 80% of us therefore lack the standing to blame the obedient subjects. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] |
| Copyright of Inquiry is the property of Taylor & Francis Ltd and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.) | |
| Database: | Education Research Complete |
| FullText | Text: Availability: 0 |
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| Header | DbId: ehh DbLabel: Education Research Complete An: 163024949 AccessLevel: 6 PubType: Academic Journal PubTypeId: academicJournal PreciseRelevancyScore: 0 |
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| Items | – Name: Title Label: Title Group: Ti Data: Situationism, subjunctive hypocrisy and standing to blame. – Name: Author Label: Authors Group: Au Data: <searchLink fieldCode="AR" term="%22Piovarchy%2C+Adam%22">Piovarchy, Adam</searchLink><relatesTo>1</relatesTo> (AUTHOR)<i> adam.piovarchy@sydney.edu.au</i> – Name: TitleSource Label: Source Group: Src Data: <searchLink fieldCode="JN" term="%22Inquiry%22">Inquiry</searchLink>. May2023, Vol. 66 Issue 4, p514-538. 25p. – Name: Subject Label: Subject Terms Group: Su Data: *<searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Communities%22">Communities</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Values+%28Ethics%29%22">Values (Ethics)</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Blame%22">Blame</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Philosophers%22">Philosophers</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Hypocrisy%22">Hypocrisy</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Obedience%22">Obedience</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Psychology%22">Psychology</searchLink> – Name: Abstract Label: Abstract Group: Ab Data: Philosophers have argued that subjects who act wrongly in the situationist psychology experiments are morally responsible for their actions. This paper argues that though the obedient subjects in Milgram's 'Obedience to Authority' experiments are blameworthy, since most of us would have acted in the same manner they did, it is inappropriate for most of us to blame them. On Todd's ([2019]. "A Unified Account of the Moral Standing to Blame." Noûs 53 (2): 347–374.) recent account of standing to blame, agents lack the standing to blame others for a wrong when they are not sufficiently committed to the moral values which would condemn that wrong. I argue that the obedient subjects lack sufficient commitment to the kinds of values which would condemn their wrongdoing. This is evidenced by the fact that the wrongdoing was severe, that the subjects had the capacity to avoid wrongdoing, and that there was very little cost to avoiding wrongdoing. Since these studies are very well-replicated, most of us in the moral community would have acted as they did for similar reasons. At least 80% of us therefore lack the standing to blame the obedient subjects. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] – Name: AbstractSuppliedCopyright Label: Group: Ab Data: <i>Copyright of Inquiry is the property of Taylor & Francis Ltd and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract.</i> (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.) |
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| RecordInfo | BibRecord: BibEntity: Identifiers: – Type: doi Value: 10.1080/0020174X.2020.1712233 Languages: – Code: eng Text: English PhysicalDescription: Pagination: PageCount: 25 StartPage: 514 Subjects: – SubjectFull: Communities Type: general – SubjectFull: Values (Ethics) Type: general – SubjectFull: Blame Type: general – SubjectFull: Philosophers Type: general – SubjectFull: Hypocrisy Type: general – SubjectFull: Obedience Type: general – SubjectFull: Psychology Type: general Titles: – TitleFull: Situationism, subjunctive hypocrisy and standing to blame. Type: main BibRelationships: HasContributorRelationships: – PersonEntity: Name: NameFull: Piovarchy, Adam IsPartOfRelationships: – BibEntity: Dates: – D: 01 M: 05 Text: May2023 Type: published Y: 2023 Identifiers: – Type: issn-print Value: 0020174X Numbering: – Type: volume Value: 66 – Type: issue Value: 4 Titles: – TitleFull: Inquiry Type: main |
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