How the political power of teacher unions affects education.
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| Title: | How the political power of teacher unions affects education. |
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| Authors: | Campillo Betancourt, Eduardo1 (AUTHOR), Maeba, Kensuke2 (AUTHOR) kmaeba@compasslexecon.com |
| Source: | Education Economics. Aug2026, Vol. 34 Issue 4, p510-528. 19p. |
| Subject Terms: | *Teachers' unions, *Education policy, *Achievement gains (Education), Political patronage, Pay for performance, Power (Social sciences), Employee promotions |
| Geographic Terms: | Mexico |
| Abstract: | This paper studies the effects of politically powerful teacher unions on public education by focusing on Mexico's largest corporatist teacher union and its use of a performance-pay program as a patronage tool. We find that after the 2006 presidential election, teacher promotions disproportionately increased in municipalities where the union-affiliated candidate received a plurality of votes. This pattern is consistent with the hypothesis that the program's implementation was distorted by the union's strengthened political alliance with the ruling party. We also show that the increased promotions negatively affected student learning outcomes by crowding out teachers' incentives to invest effort in teaching. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] |
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| Database: | Education Research Complete |
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| Abstract: | This paper studies the effects of politically powerful teacher unions on public education by focusing on Mexico's largest corporatist teacher union and its use of a performance-pay program as a patronage tool. We find that after the 2006 presidential election, teacher promotions disproportionately increased in municipalities where the union-affiliated candidate received a plurality of votes. This pattern is consistent with the hypothesis that the program's implementation was distorted by the union's strengthened political alliance with the ruling party. We also show that the increased promotions negatively affected student learning outcomes by crowding out teachers' incentives to invest effort in teaching. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] |
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| ISSN: | 09645292 |
| DOI: | 10.1080/09645292.2025.2544189 |
