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Golden Parachutes: CEOs and the Exercise of Social Influence.

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Title: Golden Parachutes: CEOs and the Exercise of Social Influence.
Authors: Wade, James1, O'Reilly, III, Charles A.1, Chandratat, Ike1
Source: Administrative Science Quarterly. Dec90, Vol. 35 Issue 4, p587-603. 17p. 3 Charts.
Subject Terms: Golden parachutes (Executive compensation), Agency theory, Chief executive officers, Outside directors of corporations, Corporate governance, Social influence, Compensation management, Executive compensation, Economic impact, Mergers & acquisitions, Risk exposure
Abstract: Using an agency theory framework and data on 89 Fortune 500 firms, we assess whether the granting of golden parachutes to chief executive officers is the result of an economically rational process or determined by the social influence of the CEO. While increased takeover risk is associated with a higher incidence of GPs, as predicted by economic theory, CEOs who are able to appoint more outsiders to their board are also more likely to have GPs. These results suggest that both economic and social influence perspectives have merit and that the importance of each may depend on the ownership structure of the firm. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
Copyright of Administrative Science Quarterly is the property of Administrative Science Quarterly and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)
Database: Education Research Complete
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  Data: Golden Parachutes: CEOs and the Exercise of Social Influence.
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  Data: <searchLink fieldCode="JN" term="%22Administrative+Science+Quarterly%22">Administrative Science Quarterly</searchLink>. Dec90, Vol. 35 Issue 4, p587-603. 17p. 3 Charts.
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  Data: Using an agency theory framework and data on 89 Fortune 500 firms, we assess whether the granting of golden parachutes to chief executive officers is the result of an economically rational process or determined by the social influence of the CEO. While increased takeover risk is associated with a higher incidence of GPs, as predicted by economic theory, CEOs who are able to appoint more outsiders to their board are also more likely to have GPs. These results suggest that both economic and social influence perspectives have merit and that the importance of each may depend on the ownership structure of the firm. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
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  Data: <i>Copyright of Administrative Science Quarterly is the property of Administrative Science Quarterly and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract.</i> (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)
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        Value: 10.2307/2393510
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        Text: English
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        StartPage: 587
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        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Agency theory
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Chief executive officers
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      – SubjectFull: Outside directors of corporations
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      – SubjectFull: Corporate governance
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      – SubjectFull: Social influence
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      – SubjectFull: Compensation management
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      – SubjectFull: Executive compensation
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      – SubjectFull: Economic impact
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      – SubjectFull: Mergers & acquisitions
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      – SubjectFull: Risk exposure
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      – TitleFull: Golden Parachutes: CEOs and the Exercise of Social Influence.
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            NameFull: Wade, James
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            NameFull: O'Reilly, III, Charles A.
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              Text: Dec90
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