View in EDS

Thinking is Believing.

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Title: Thinking is Believing.
Authors: Mandelbaum, Eric1 (AUTHOR) eric.mandelbaum@gmail.com
Source: Inquiry. Feb2014, Vol. 57 Issue 1, p55-96. 42p.
Subject Terms: *Ideology, *Reason, *Belief & doubt, Proposition (Logic), Psychology
Abstract: The idea that people can entertain propositions without believing them is widespread, intuitive, and most probably false. The main goal of this essay is to argue against the claim that people can entertain a proposition without believing it. Evidence is presented demonstrating that we cannot withhold assent from any proposition we happen to consider. A model of belief fixation is then sketched and used to explain hitherto disparate, recalcitrant and somewhat mysterious psychological phenomena. The proposed model is one where beliefs are the automatic output of a computationally null belief acquisition reflex. In short, the model holds that the mere activation of a mentally represented truth apt proposition leads to immediately believing it. The essay concludes by considering some consequences that the proposed model of belief acquisition has for our concept of rationality. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]
Copyright of Inquiry is the property of Taylor & Francis Ltd and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)
Database: Education Research Complete
FullText Text:
  Availability: 0
Header DbId: ehh
DbLabel: Education Research Complete
An: 93350760
AccessLevel: 6
PubType: Academic Journal
PubTypeId: academicJournal
PreciseRelevancyScore: 0
IllustrationInfo
Items – Name: Title
  Label: Title
  Group: Ti
  Data: Thinking is Believing.
– Name: Author
  Label: Authors
  Group: Au
  Data: <searchLink fieldCode="AR" term="%22Mandelbaum%2C+Eric%22">Mandelbaum, Eric</searchLink><relatesTo>1</relatesTo> (AUTHOR)<i> eric.mandelbaum@gmail.com</i>
– Name: TitleSource
  Label: Source
  Group: Src
  Data: <searchLink fieldCode="JN" term="%22Inquiry%22">Inquiry</searchLink>. Feb2014, Vol. 57 Issue 1, p55-96. 42p.
– Name: Subject
  Label: Subject Terms
  Group: Su
  Data: *<searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Ideology%22">Ideology</searchLink><br />*<searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Reason%22">Reason</searchLink><br />*<searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Belief+%26+doubt%22">Belief & doubt</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Proposition+%28Logic%29%22">Proposition (Logic)</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Psychology%22">Psychology</searchLink>
– Name: Abstract
  Label: Abstract
  Group: Ab
  Data: The idea that people can entertain propositions without believing them is widespread, intuitive, and most probably false. The main goal of this essay is to argue against the claim that people can entertain a proposition without believing it. Evidence is presented demonstrating that we cannot withhold assent from any proposition we happen to consider. A model of belief fixation is then sketched and used to explain hitherto disparate, recalcitrant and somewhat mysterious psychological phenomena. The proposed model is one where beliefs are the automatic output of a computationally null belief acquisition reflex. In short, the model holds that the mere activation of a mentally represented truth apt proposition leads to immediately believing it. The essay concludes by considering some consequences that the proposed model of belief acquisition has for our concept of rationality. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]
– Name: AbstractSuppliedCopyright
  Label:
  Group: Ab
  Data: <i>Copyright of Inquiry is the property of Taylor & Francis Ltd and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract.</i> (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)
PLink https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=ehh&AN=93350760
RecordInfo BibRecord:
  BibEntity:
    Identifiers:
      – Type: doi
        Value: 10.1080/0020174X.2014.858417
    Languages:
      – Code: eng
        Text: English
    PhysicalDescription:
      Pagination:
        PageCount: 42
        StartPage: 55
    Subjects:
      – SubjectFull: Ideology
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Reason
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Belief & doubt
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Proposition (Logic)
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Psychology
        Type: general
    Titles:
      – TitleFull: Thinking is Believing.
        Type: main
  BibRelationships:
    HasContributorRelationships:
      – PersonEntity:
          Name:
            NameFull: Mandelbaum, Eric
    IsPartOfRelationships:
      – BibEntity:
          Dates:
            – D: 01
              M: 02
              Text: Feb2014
              Type: published
              Y: 2014
          Identifiers:
            – Type: issn-print
              Value: 0020174X
          Numbering:
            – Type: volume
              Value: 57
            – Type: issue
              Value: 1
          Titles:
            – TitleFull: Inquiry
              Type: main
ResultId 1