Hardware-in-the-Loop Implementation of Grid-Forming Inverter Controls for Microgrid Resilience to Disturbances and Cyber Attacks.
Saved in:
| Title: | Hardware-in-the-Loop Implementation of Grid-Forming Inverter Controls for Microgrid Resilience to Disturbances and Cyber Attacks. |
|---|---|
| Authors: | Ibrahim, Ahmed M.1 (AUTHOR), Rafin, S. M. Sajjad Hossain1 (AUTHOR), Moustafa, Sara H.1 (AUTHOR), Mohammed, Osama A.1 (AUTHOR) mohammed@fiu.edu |
| Source: | Energies (19961073). Feb2026, Vol. 19 Issue 3, p710. 33p. |
| Subject Terms: | *Hardware-in-the-loop simulation, *Falsification of data, *Renewable energy sources, *Synchronous generators, *Cyberterrorism |
| Abstract: | As renewable energy integration accelerates, the displacement of synchronous generators by inverter-based resources (IBRs) necessitates advanced grid-forming (GFM) control strategies to maintain system stability. While techniques such as Droop control, Virtual Synchronous Generator (VSG), and Dispatchable Virtual Oscillator Control (dVOC) are well-established, their comparative performance under coordinated cyber-physical stress remains underexplored. This paper presents a comprehensive Controller Hardware-in-the-Loop (CHIL) assessment of these three GFM strategies within a networked microgrid environment. Utilizing a co-simulation framework that integrates an OPAL-RT real-time simulator with the EXata CPS network emulator, we evaluate the dynamic resilience of each controller under islanded, parallel, and fault-induced reconfiguration scenarios. Experimental results demonstrate that the VSG strategy offers superior transient performance, characterized by faster settling times and enhanced fault-ride-through capabilities compared to the Droop and dVOC strategies. Furthermore, recognizing the vulnerability of connected microgrids to cyber threats, this study investigates the impact of False Data Injection (FDI) attacks on the control layer. To address this, a model-reference resilience layer is proposed and validated on a TI C2000 DSP. The results confirm that this protection mechanism effectively detects and mitigates attacks on control references and feedback measurements, ensuring stable operation despite cyber-physical disturbances. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] |
| Database: | Energy & Power Source |
|
Full text is not displayed to guests.
Login for full access.
|
|
| Abstract: | As renewable energy integration accelerates, the displacement of synchronous generators by inverter-based resources (IBRs) necessitates advanced grid-forming (GFM) control strategies to maintain system stability. While techniques such as Droop control, Virtual Synchronous Generator (VSG), and Dispatchable Virtual Oscillator Control (dVOC) are well-established, their comparative performance under coordinated cyber-physical stress remains underexplored. This paper presents a comprehensive Controller Hardware-in-the-Loop (CHIL) assessment of these three GFM strategies within a networked microgrid environment. Utilizing a co-simulation framework that integrates an OPAL-RT real-time simulator with the EXata CPS network emulator, we evaluate the dynamic resilience of each controller under islanded, parallel, and fault-induced reconfiguration scenarios. Experimental results demonstrate that the VSG strategy offers superior transient performance, characterized by faster settling times and enhanced fault-ride-through capabilities compared to the Droop and dVOC strategies. Furthermore, recognizing the vulnerability of connected microgrids to cyber threats, this study investigates the impact of False Data Injection (FDI) attacks on the control layer. To address this, a model-reference resilience layer is proposed and validated on a TI C2000 DSP. The results confirm that this protection mechanism effectively detects and mitigates attacks on control references and feedback measurements, ensuring stable operation despite cyber-physical disturbances. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] |
|---|---|
| ISSN: | 19961073 |
| DOI: | 10.3390/en19030710 |
