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Tripartite evolutionary game analysis of carbon emission reduction behavior strategies under government regulation.

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Title: Tripartite evolutionary game analysis of carbon emission reduction behavior strategies under government regulation.
Authors: Wei, Jie1 (AUTHOR), Li, Yining1 (AUTHOR) m13777857102_1@163.com, Liu, Yushun1 (AUTHOR)
Source: Environment, Development & Sustainability. Jan2026, Vol. 28 Issue 1, p999-1031. 33p.
Subject Terms: *Government regulation, *Game theory, *Carbon offsetting, *Carbon dioxide mitigation, *Environmental policy, *Supply chain management, *Sustainable development
Abstract: Promoting corporate carbon reduction is key to achieving sustainable development, and carbon trading policies are important institutional choices for governments of various countries to promote green development and actively respond to climate change. This paper constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model involving the government, high-carbon emission manufacturers and carbon quota suppliers, and subsequent simulation analyses were conducted. The main results of the study are as follows: (1) The evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) of the three stakeholders is as follows: loose regulation by the government, active emission reduction by manufacturers, and in-chain trading by suppliers. (2) The increase of excess carbon emissions inhibits manufacturers' choice of active emission reduction and suppliers' choice of in-chain trading and promotes the government's choice of strict regulation. Strict government regulation can improve the degree of cooperation between manufacturers and suppliers to achieve carbon reduction targets at a faster speed. (3) There is a critical value for the probability of manufacturers actively reducing emissions. Above this critical value, suppliers tend to choose off-chain transactions, otherwise, suppliers tend to choose in-chain transactions. The results of this study can serve as a reference for the decarbonization path of supply chain member enterprises and offer valuable suggestions for the government to achieve a low-carbon society. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
Database: Energy & Power Source
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Header DbId: enr
DbLabel: Energy & Power Source
An: 191807196
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PubTypeId: academicJournal
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Items – Name: Title
  Label: Title
  Group: Ti
  Data: Tripartite evolutionary game analysis of carbon emission reduction behavior strategies under government regulation.
– Name: Author
  Label: Authors
  Group: Au
  Data: <searchLink fieldCode="AR" term="%22Wei%2C+Jie%22">Wei, Jie</searchLink><relatesTo>1</relatesTo> (AUTHOR)<br /><searchLink fieldCode="AR" term="%22Li%2C+Yining%22">Li, Yining</searchLink><relatesTo>1</relatesTo> (AUTHOR)<i> m13777857102_1@163.com</i><br /><searchLink fieldCode="AR" term="%22Liu%2C+Yushun%22">Liu, Yushun</searchLink><relatesTo>1</relatesTo> (AUTHOR)
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  Data: <searchLink fieldCode="JN" term="%22Environment%2C+Development+%26+Sustainability%22">Environment, Development & Sustainability</searchLink>. Jan2026, Vol. 28 Issue 1, p999-1031. 33p.
– Name: Subject
  Label: Subject Terms
  Group: Su
  Data: *<searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Government+regulation%22">Government regulation</searchLink><br />*<searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Game+theory%22">Game theory</searchLink><br />*<searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Carbon+offsetting%22">Carbon offsetting</searchLink><br />*<searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Carbon+dioxide+mitigation%22">Carbon dioxide mitigation</searchLink><br />*<searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Environmental+policy%22">Environmental policy</searchLink><br />*<searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Supply+chain+management%22">Supply chain management</searchLink><br />*<searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Sustainable+development%22">Sustainable development</searchLink>
– Name: Abstract
  Label: Abstract
  Group: Ab
  Data: Promoting corporate carbon reduction is key to achieving sustainable development, and carbon trading policies are important institutional choices for governments of various countries to promote green development and actively respond to climate change. This paper constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model involving the government, high-carbon emission manufacturers and carbon quota suppliers, and subsequent simulation analyses were conducted. The main results of the study are as follows: (1) The evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) of the three stakeholders is as follows: loose regulation by the government, active emission reduction by manufacturers, and in-chain trading by suppliers. (2) The increase of excess carbon emissions inhibits manufacturers' choice of active emission reduction and suppliers' choice of in-chain trading and promotes the government's choice of strict regulation. Strict government regulation can improve the degree of cooperation between manufacturers and suppliers to achieve carbon reduction targets at a faster speed. (3) There is a critical value for the probability of manufacturers actively reducing emissions. Above this critical value, suppliers tend to choose off-chain transactions, otherwise, suppliers tend to choose in-chain transactions. The results of this study can serve as a reference for the decarbonization path of supply chain member enterprises and offer valuable suggestions for the government to achieve a low-carbon society. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
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RecordInfo BibRecord:
  BibEntity:
    Identifiers:
      – Type: doi
        Value: 10.1007/s10668-024-04972-0
    Languages:
      – Code: eng
        Text: English
    PhysicalDescription:
      Pagination:
        PageCount: 33
        StartPage: 999
    Subjects:
      – SubjectFull: Government regulation
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Game theory
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Carbon offsetting
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Carbon dioxide mitigation
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Environmental policy
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Supply chain management
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Sustainable development
        Type: general
    Titles:
      – TitleFull: Tripartite evolutionary game analysis of carbon emission reduction behavior strategies under government regulation.
        Type: main
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            NameFull: Wei, Jie
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            NameFull: Li, Yining
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            NameFull: Liu, Yushun
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            – D: 01
              M: 01
              Text: Jan2026
              Type: published
              Y: 2026
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              Value: 1387585X
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              Value: 28
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            – TitleFull: Environment, Development & Sustainability
              Type: main
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