Demand Aware Dynamic Pricing for Smart Grid Communication Networks: A Stackelberg Game Approach.
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| Title: | Demand Aware Dynamic Pricing for Smart Grid Communication Networks: A Stackelberg Game Approach. |
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| Authors: | Feng, Xingxing1 (AUTHOR), Gu, Haitong1,2 (AUTHOR), Guo, Bin1 (AUTHOR), Wu, Xiaoqiang1,2 (AUTHOR), Dong, Jun1 (AUTHOR), Lin, Jingbo1 (AUTHOR), Wang, Weidong2 (AUTHOR) acwweidwang@163.com, Guan, Quansheng2 (AUTHOR) |
| Source: | Energies (19961073). Jun2026, Vol. 19 Issue 12, p2846. 26p. |
| Subject Terms: | *Game theory, *Software-defined networking, *Bandwidth allocation, *Resource allocation, *Telecommunication systems, *Smart power grids, *Time-based pricing |
| Abstract: | Smart grid communication services often have heterogeneous and time-varying bandwidth demands, which makes fixed resource allocation and flat pricing less suitable for on-demand service provisioning. This paper studies a demand-aware dynamic pricing problem in a resource-allocable communication network enabled by software-defined networking, where service requests observe network resource status and purchase bandwidth according to the announced price. Unlike pricing models that mainly describe the price–quantity tradeoff, the proposed model incorporates the minimum acceptable bandwidth demand of each request as a service-side acceptance threshold. A Stackelberg game is formulated in which the communication resource manager acts as the leader and service requests act as followers. We define the utility and revenue functions, analyze the existence of equilibrium, and derive the follower-side best response through backward induction. The resulting response is piecewise, which makes exact equilibrium characterization difficult in multi-user settings. Therefore, a distributed iterative algorithm and a backward-induction-based genetic algorithm are developed for different information settings. Simulation results show how service-side parameters affect pricing behavior and evaluate the proposed methods under heterogeneous-user, multi-user, and capacity-limited scenarios. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] |
| Database: | Energy & Power Source |
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| Abstract: | Smart grid communication services often have heterogeneous and time-varying bandwidth demands, which makes fixed resource allocation and flat pricing less suitable for on-demand service provisioning. This paper studies a demand-aware dynamic pricing problem in a resource-allocable communication network enabled by software-defined networking, where service requests observe network resource status and purchase bandwidth according to the announced price. Unlike pricing models that mainly describe the price–quantity tradeoff, the proposed model incorporates the minimum acceptable bandwidth demand of each request as a service-side acceptance threshold. A Stackelberg game is formulated in which the communication resource manager acts as the leader and service requests act as followers. We define the utility and revenue functions, analyze the existence of equilibrium, and derive the follower-side best response through backward induction. The resulting response is piecewise, which makes exact equilibrium characterization difficult in multi-user settings. Therefore, a distributed iterative algorithm and a backward-induction-based genetic algorithm are developed for different information settings. Simulation results show how service-side parameters affect pricing behavior and evaluate the proposed methods under heterogeneous-user, multi-user, and capacity-limited scenarios. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] |
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| ISSN: | 19961073 |
| DOI: | 10.3390/en19122846 |
