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Behavioral Mechanism and Strategy Optimization of Non-Grain Utilization of Farmland Based on Evolutionary Game Theory and Simulation Analysis.

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Title: Behavioral Mechanism and Strategy Optimization of Non-Grain Utilization of Farmland Based on Evolutionary Game Theory and Simulation Analysis.
Alternate Title: 基于演化博弈和仿真分析的耕地"非粮化"行为机理与策略提升研究.
Authors: Qianru, CHEN1,2,3 xiehl2000@163.com, Yuying, CHEN1,3, Dan, FU1,3, Hualin, XIE1,2,3, Chumin, LIU1,3
Source: Journal of Resources & Ecology. May2026, Vol. 17 Issue 3, p802-818. 17p.
Subject Terms: *Game theory, *Simulation methods & models, *Multiagent systems, *Land management, *Subsidies, *Mathematical optimization, *Grain farming
Abstract (English): Effectively governing non-grain utilization of farmland requires balancing the complex interests of farmers, local governments, and enterprises. Traditional static models are ill-equipped to capture this dynamic. Through the lens of multi-agent collaborative governance, this study uses evolutionary game theory and simulation analysis to examine how decisions regarding non-grain utilization of farmland evolve dynamically and the key factors shaping these choices. The results reveal that: (1) In the farmer-local government two-party game model, when the sum of farmers' grain cultivation income and subsidies under the grain cultivation guidance approach exceeds the income from non-grain utilization, the strategy profile (grain cultivation, grain cultivation guidance) emerges as a stable equilibrium. Subsidies, central government penalties on local governments, local government compensation to farmers, and farmers' additional costs of non-grain utilization all influence the evolution of both parties' strategies. Among these factors, subsidies and additional costs have a more pronounced impact on farmers, while penalties and compensation exert a stronger driving effect on local governments' strategic choices. (2) In the tripartite evolutionary game of farmers-local governments-enterprises, including enterprises' large-scale operation decisions, the results indicate that rent has the most significant impact on farmers' land transfer willingness; mandatory costs dominate local governments' strategic choices; and subsidies and non-grain utilization penalties have comparable and mutually the strongest effects on enterprises' grain cultivation decisions. Based on these findings, we propose the following policy recommendations: optimizing subsidy mechanisms, implementing differentiated incentives for local governments, linking farmers' subsidies to actual grain cultivation, and establishing a dynamic land rent adjustment mechanism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
Abstract (Chinese): 有效治理耕地"非粮化"需要平衡农户、地方政府与企业之间的复杂利益关系。传统静态模型难以捕捉这一动态 过程。本文基于多主体协同治理视角, 运用演化博弈与仿真分析探究耕地"非粮化"决策的动态演化规律与关键影响因素。研究 结果表明：（1）"农户-地方政府"双方博弈模型中, 引导种粮方式下农户种粮收益与补贴之和大于非粮化收益时, （种粮行为, 引导种粮）会成为稳定均衡策略。补贴、中央对地方政府的惩罚、地方政府对农户的补偿及农户非粮化额外成本均会影响双方策 略的演化, 其中补贴和额外成本对农户的影响更显著, 惩罚和补偿对地方政府策略选择的驱动效果更强。（2）"农户-地方政府-企业"三方博弈中, 进一步纳入企业规模化经营决策, 结果表明租金对农户流转意愿影响最显著, 强制成本主导地方政府策略选 择, 补贴与非粮化惩罚对企业种粮决策的驱动效果相近且作用最强。基于此, 提出优化补贴发放机制、对地方政府施以差异化激 励、施行补贴与农户种粮挂钩机制、构建租金动态调整体系等政策建议. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
Database: Energy & Power Source
Description
Abstract:Effectively governing non-grain utilization of farmland requires balancing the complex interests of farmers, local governments, and enterprises. Traditional static models are ill-equipped to capture this dynamic. Through the lens of multi-agent collaborative governance, this study uses evolutionary game theory and simulation analysis to examine how decisions regarding non-grain utilization of farmland evolve dynamically and the key factors shaping these choices. The results reveal that: (1) In the farmer-local government two-party game model, when the sum of farmers' grain cultivation income and subsidies under the grain cultivation guidance approach exceeds the income from non-grain utilization, the strategy profile (grain cultivation, grain cultivation guidance) emerges as a stable equilibrium. Subsidies, central government penalties on local governments, local government compensation to farmers, and farmers' additional costs of non-grain utilization all influence the evolution of both parties' strategies. Among these factors, subsidies and additional costs have a more pronounced impact on farmers, while penalties and compensation exert a stronger driving effect on local governments' strategic choices. (2) In the tripartite evolutionary game of farmers-local governments-enterprises, including enterprises' large-scale operation decisions, the results indicate that rent has the most significant impact on farmers' land transfer willingness; mandatory costs dominate local governments' strategic choices; and subsidies and non-grain utilization penalties have comparable and mutually the strongest effects on enterprises' grain cultivation decisions. Based on these findings, we propose the following policy recommendations: optimizing subsidy mechanisms, implementing differentiated incentives for local governments, linking farmers' subsidies to actual grain cultivation, and establishing a dynamic land rent adjustment mechanism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
ISSN:1674764X
DOI:10.5814/j.issn.1674-764x.2026.03.012