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Five shades of green: Heterogeneous environmental attitudes in an evolutionary game model.

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Authors: Antoci, Angelo1 (AUTHOR), Borghesi, Simone2,3 (AUTHOR) simone.borghesi@eui.eu, Galdi, Giulio4 (AUTHOR)
Source: Journal of Evolutionary Economics. Sep2023, Vol. 33 Issue 4, p1345-1363. 19p. 4 Diagrams, 1 Chart.
Subject Terms: *Environmental policy, Attitudes toward the environment, Evolutionary models, Social norms
Abstract: An environmental policy to foster virtuous behaviour does not automatically establish a social norm in a population; that is, the policy might not be socially acceptable or enforceable. Some agents feel compelled to abide by environmental social norms and embrace them, but others do not. Some might want to imitate their peers, while others might prefer not to conform and play the role of a maverick. In this model, we describe the heterogeneity of preferences by proposing a taxonomy of five possible agent types that enrich the traditional triplet presented in the literature. We then employ a random matching model to study how a social norm spreads within a population when its composition changes. Considering three relevant population compositions (scenarios), we show that what is most important for the successful diffusion of social norms is not whether, but why agents abide by it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
Database: Entrepreneurial Studies Source
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  Data: <searchLink fieldCode="AR" term="%22Antoci%2C+Angelo%22">Antoci, Angelo</searchLink><relatesTo>1</relatesTo> (AUTHOR)<br /><searchLink fieldCode="AR" term="%22Borghesi%2C+Simone%22">Borghesi, Simone</searchLink><relatesTo>2,3</relatesTo> (AUTHOR)<i> simone.borghesi@eui.eu</i><br /><searchLink fieldCode="AR" term="%22Galdi%2C+Giulio%22">Galdi, Giulio</searchLink><relatesTo>4</relatesTo> (AUTHOR)
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  Data: <searchLink fieldCode="JN" term="%22Journal+of+Evolutionary+Economics%22">Journal of Evolutionary Economics</searchLink>. Sep2023, Vol. 33 Issue 4, p1345-1363. 19p. 4 Diagrams, 1 Chart.
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  Data: *<searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Environmental+policy%22">Environmental policy</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Attitudes+toward+the+environment%22">Attitudes toward the environment</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Evolutionary+models%22">Evolutionary models</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Social+norms%22">Social norms</searchLink>
– Name: Abstract
  Label: Abstract
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  Data: An environmental policy to foster virtuous behaviour does not automatically establish a social norm in a population; that is, the policy might not be socially acceptable or enforceable. Some agents feel compelled to abide by environmental social norms and embrace them, but others do not. Some might want to imitate their peers, while others might prefer not to conform and play the role of a maverick. In this model, we describe the heterogeneity of preferences by proposing a taxonomy of five possible agent types that enrich the traditional triplet presented in the literature. We then employ a random matching model to study how a social norm spreads within a population when its composition changes. Considering three relevant population compositions (scenarios), we show that what is most important for the successful diffusion of social norms is not whether, but why agents abide by it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
PLink https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=ent&AN=173491859
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      – Type: doi
        Value: 10.1007/s00191-023-00826-6
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      – Code: eng
        Text: English
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        PageCount: 19
        StartPage: 1345
    Subjects:
      – SubjectFull: Environmental policy
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Attitudes toward the environment
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Evolutionary models
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Social norms
        Type: general
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      – TitleFull: Five shades of green: Heterogeneous environmental attitudes in an evolutionary game model.
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          Name:
            NameFull: Antoci, Angelo
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            NameFull: Borghesi, Simone
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            NameFull: Galdi, Giulio
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            – D: 01
              M: 09
              Text: Sep2023
              Type: published
              Y: 2023
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              Value: 33
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            – TitleFull: Journal of Evolutionary Economics
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