The Algorithm Advantage: Ranked Application Systems Outperform Decentralized and Common Applications in Boston and Beyond. Working Paper 34207
Saved in:
| Title: | The Algorithm Advantage: Ranked Application Systems Outperform Decentralized and Common Applications in Boston and Beyond. Working Paper 34207 |
|---|---|
| Language: | English |
| Authors: | Christopher Avery, Geoffrey Kocks, Parag A. Pathak, National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) |
| Source: | National Bureau of Economic Research. 2025. |
| Availability: | National Bureau of Economic Research. 1050 Massachusetts Avenue, Cambridge, MA 02138-5398. Tel: 617-588-0343; Web site: http://www.nber.org |
| Peer Reviewed: | N |
| Publication Date: | 2025 |
| Sponsoring Agency: | National Science Foundation (NSF), Graduate Research Fellowship Program (GRFP) |
| Contract Number: | 2141064 |
| Document Type: | Reports - Research |
| Descriptors: | Charter Schools, School Choice, Algorithms, Preferences, Access to Education, Economic Factors, Admission (School), Student Placement |
| Geographic Terms: | Massachusetts (Boston) |
| Abstract: | School choice systems increasingly use common applications, where students can apply to multiple schools on a single form, though schools make admission decisions independently. We model three application systems: a common application, a decentralized system with costly separate applications, and a ranked-choice system using a matching algorithm. Our model shows that while a common application may expand access, it increases competition and may produce worse matches than a decentralized system where application costs encourage more selective applications. Ranked-choice systems combine reduced application costs with preference-based matching that reduce mismatches. We examine these predictions by analyzing how Boston's charter school sector was affected when it adopted an online common application. Counterfactual simulations suggest the common application performs no better than alternatives on several metrics and did little to increase access for disadvantaged groups. A ranked system consistently outperforms a common application across various levels of competition and assumptions on preference stability between application and enrollment stages. |
| Abstractor: | As Provided |
| Entry Date: | 2025 |
| Access URL: | https://www.nber.org/papers/w34207 |
| Accession Number: | ED676490 |
| Database: | ERIC |
| FullText | Text: Availability: 0 |
|---|---|
| Header | DbId: eric DbLabel: ERIC An: ED676490 AccessLevel: 3 PubType: Report PubTypeId: report PreciseRelevancyScore: 0 |
| IllustrationInfo | |
| Items | – Name: Title Label: Title Group: Ti Data: The Algorithm Advantage: Ranked Application Systems Outperform Decentralized and Common Applications in Boston and Beyond. Working Paper 34207 – Name: Language Label: Language Group: Lang Data: English – Name: Author Label: Authors Group: Au Data: <searchLink fieldCode="AR" term="%22Christopher+Avery%22">Christopher Avery</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="AR" term="%22Geoffrey+Kocks%22">Geoffrey Kocks</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="AR" term="%22Parag+A%2E+Pathak%22">Parag A. Pathak</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="AR" term="%22National+Bureau+of+Economic+Research+%28NBER%29%22">National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)</searchLink> – Name: TitleSource Label: Source Group: Src Data: <searchLink fieldCode="SO" term="%22National+Bureau+of+Economic+Research%22"><i>National Bureau of Economic Research</i></searchLink>. 2025. – Name: Avail Label: Availability Group: Avail Data: National Bureau of Economic Research. 1050 Massachusetts Avenue, Cambridge, MA 02138-5398. Tel: 617-588-0343; Web site: http://www.nber.org – Name: PeerReviewed Label: Peer Reviewed Group: SrcInfo Data: N – Name: DatePubCY Label: Publication Date Group: Date Data: 2025 – Name: SourceSuprt Label: Sponsoring Agency Group: SrcSuprt Data: National Science Foundation (NSF), Graduate Research Fellowship Program (GRFP) – Name: NumberContract Label: Contract Number Group: NumCntrct Data: 2141064 – Name: TypeDocument Label: Document Type Group: TypDoc Data: Reports - Research – Name: Subject Label: Descriptors Group: Su Data: <searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Charter+Schools%22">Charter Schools</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22School+Choice%22">School Choice</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Algorithms%22">Algorithms</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Preferences%22">Preferences</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Access+to+Education%22">Access to Education</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Economic+Factors%22">Economic Factors</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Admission+%28School%29%22">Admission (School)</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Student+Placement%22">Student Placement</searchLink> – Name: Subject Label: Geographic Terms Group: Su Data: <searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Massachusetts+%28Boston%29%22">Massachusetts (Boston)</searchLink> – Name: Abstract Label: Abstract Group: Ab Data: School choice systems increasingly use common applications, where students can apply to multiple schools on a single form, though schools make admission decisions independently. We model three application systems: a common application, a decentralized system with costly separate applications, and a ranked-choice system using a matching algorithm. Our model shows that while a common application may expand access, it increases competition and may produce worse matches than a decentralized system where application costs encourage more selective applications. Ranked-choice systems combine reduced application costs with preference-based matching that reduce mismatches. We examine these predictions by analyzing how Boston's charter school sector was affected when it adopted an online common application. Counterfactual simulations suggest the common application performs no better than alternatives on several metrics and did little to increase access for disadvantaged groups. A ranked system consistently outperforms a common application across various levels of competition and assumptions on preference stability between application and enrollment stages. – Name: AbstractInfo Label: Abstractor Group: Ab Data: As Provided – Name: DateEntry Label: Entry Date Group: Date Data: 2025 – Name: URL Label: Access URL Group: URL Data: <link linkTarget="URL" linkTerm="https://www.nber.org/papers/w34207" linkWindow="_blank">https://www.nber.org/papers/w34207</link> – Name: AN Label: Accession Number Group: ID Data: ED676490 |
| PLink | https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=eric&AN=ED676490 |
| RecordInfo | BibRecord: BibEntity: Languages: – Text: English Subjects: – SubjectFull: Charter Schools Type: general – SubjectFull: School Choice Type: general – SubjectFull: Algorithms Type: general – SubjectFull: Preferences Type: general – SubjectFull: Access to Education Type: general – SubjectFull: Economic Factors Type: general – SubjectFull: Admission (School) Type: general – SubjectFull: Student Placement Type: general – SubjectFull: Massachusetts (Boston) Type: general Titles: – TitleFull: The Algorithm Advantage: Ranked Application Systems Outperform Decentralized and Common Applications in Boston and Beyond. Working Paper 34207 Type: main BibRelationships: HasContributorRelationships: – PersonEntity: Name: NameFull: National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) – PersonEntity: Name: NameFull: Christopher Avery – PersonEntity: Name: NameFull: Geoffrey Kocks – PersonEntity: Name: NameFull: Parag A. Pathak IsPartOfRelationships: – BibEntity: Dates: – D: 01 M: 09 Type: published Y: 2025 Titles: – TitleFull: National Bureau of Economic Research Type: main |
| ResultId | 1 |