Why Are Bureaucrats More Left-Wing? EdWorkingPaper No. 26-1511

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Bibliographic Details
Title: Why Are Bureaucrats More Left-Wing? EdWorkingPaper No. 26-1511
Language: English
Authors: Julia Coyoli, Emmerich Davies, Leslie K. Finger, Jonathan Phillips, Annenberg Institute for School Reform at Brown University
Source: Annenberg Institute for School Reform at Brown University. 2026.
Availability: Annenberg Institute for School Reform at Brown University. Brown University Box 1985, Providence, RI 02912. Tel: 401-863-7990; Fax: 401-863-1290; e-mail: annenberg@brown.edu; Web site: https://annenberg.brown.edu/
Peer Reviewed: N
Page Count: 95
Publication Date: 2026
Document Type: Reports - Research
Tests/Questionnaires
Descriptors: Government Employees, Employee Attitudes, Political Attitudes, Beliefs, Foreign Countries, Teacher Attitudes, Socialization, Unions, Citizenship, Low Income Groups, Wages, Public Sector, Ideology, Public Opinion
Geographic Terms: Brazil
Abstract: Government employees often have policy beliefs that do not reflect those of the public. Civil servants are frequently more supportive of redistribution, which critics attribute to a state that socializes employees to be self-interested. But left-leaning citizens may instead self-select into public jobs. We test these two explanations using the case of Brazilian teachers. Leveraging selection rules where a meritocratic exam determines employment, we use a regression discontinuity design to compare those who become bureaucrats with those who tried but were unsuccessful. We find that teachers are significantly more left-leaning than the average citizen, but public employment has no further effect on political attitudes, and even makes teachers more conservative on some indicators. Comparing exam-takers, regardless of the outcome, to the Brazilian population, we find that right-leaning citizens simply do not apply. While bureaucrats' political attitudes are unrepresentative of the population, claims attributing their attitudes to state employment overlook self-selection. [This project was funded by the Lemann Foundation and the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs at Harvard University.]
Abstractor: As Provided
Entry Date: 2026
Accession Number: ED681917
Database: ERIC
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