Autonomy and the Ethical Status of Comprehensive Education
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| Title: | Autonomy and the Ethical Status of Comprehensive Education |
|---|---|
| Language: | English |
| Authors: | Bailey, Adam D. |
| Source: | Educational Theory. Aug 2014 64(4):393-408. |
| Availability: | Wiley-Blackwell. 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148. Tel: 800-835-6770; Tel: 781-388-8598; Fax: 781-388-8232; e-mail: cs-journals@wiley.com; Web site: http://www.wiley.com/WileyCDA |
| Peer Reviewed: | Y |
| Page Count: | 16 |
| Publication Date: | 2014 |
| Document Type: | Journal Articles Opinion Papers Reports - Evaluative |
| Descriptors: | Educational Theories, Educational Practices, Role of Education, Personal Autonomy, Ethics |
| DOI: | 10.1111/edth.12070 |
| ISSN: | 0013-2004 |
| Abstract: | On grounds of autonomy, is comprehensive education -- an approach to education that attempts to facilitate the acceptance of certain beliefs and ways of life as being correct, and refuses to sympathetically expose students to contrary beliefs and ways of life -- ethically suspect? Recently, Bryan R. Warnick has argued that it is. In this essay, Adam D. Bailey critically evaluates Warnick's argument, and contends that it is unsuccessful. In particular, he argues that Warnick's argument from necessity does not succeed. Bailey then addresses a potential response to his critique of Warnick's argument -- that of developing an argument from facilitation rather than necessity -- and argues that, contrary to the argument from necessity, the argument from facilitation does provide support for the claim that comprehensive education is ethically suspect. However, Bailey attempts to show that even granting the facilitation argument, it is plausible to hold that, on grounds of autonomy, comprehensive education need not be seen as ethically suspect. |
| Abstractor: | As Provided |
| Entry Date: | 2014 |
| Accession Number: | EJ1032598 |
| Database: | ERIC |
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| FullText | Links: – Type: pdflink Url: https://content.ebscohost.com/cds/retrieve?content=AQICAHj0k_4E0hTGH8RJwT4gCJyBsGNe_WN95AvKlDbXJGqwxwEZ16K341-inGwAIa20aehJAAAA4jCB3wYJKoZIhvcNAQcGoIHRMIHOAgEAMIHIBgkqhkiG9w0BBwEwHgYJYIZIAWUDBAEuMBEEDJhWvf_szvf5q2JYVQIBEICBmgTh_maYYT5fZ1kRY_Mzw8HnHhnu6k22NujnqQzoHVeMpTC_nuMJHUHis0XadMQvJ7XpMv9HOg9bTEtrahTQvlHJfsxKBzCoXVBOT1O66brTTO8h4ycgIC-I1ZY5u1TmD_S2u-uNFfBRa-9pOBYFVhw8YH1Q2oWvvL1NouGCV9mkLk6GdwyHFQe-dBeOzh5GusW_U1fjsE8OELA= Text: Availability: 1 Value: <anid>AN0096986522;ety01aug.14;2018Jul06.12:30;v2.2.500</anid> <title id="AN0096986522-1">Autonomy and the Ethical Status of Comprehensive Education. </title> <p>On grounds of autonomy, is comprehensive education — an approach to education that attempts to facilitate the acceptance of certain beliefs and ways of life as being correct, and refuses to sympathetically expose students to contrary beliefs and ways of life — ethically suspect? Recently, Bryan R. Warnick has argued that it is. In this essay, Adam D. Bailey critically evaluates Warnick's argument, and contends that it is unsuccessful. In particular, he argues that Warnick's argument from necessity does not succeed. Bailey then addresses a potential response to his critique of Warnick's argument — that of developing an argument from facilitation rather than necessity — and argues that, contrary to the argument from necessity, the argument from facilitation does provide support for the claim that comprehensive education is ethically suspect. However, Bailey attempts to show that even granting the facilitation argument, it is plausible to hold that, on grounds of autonomy, comprehensive education need not be seen as ethically suspect.</p> <p>A central commitment of liberal education is that it is “essential” that students be sympathetically exposed to “beliefs [including “ethical beliefs”] and ways of life at odds with the culture of the family or religious or ethnic group into which [they are] born.”[<reflink idref="bib1" id="ref1">1</reflink>] In contrast, comprehensive education attempts to facilitate the acceptance of certain beliefs and ways of life as being correct,[<reflink idref="bib2" id="ref2">2</reflink>] and refuses to sympathetically expose students to “contrary” beliefs and ways of life (RE, 412).[<reflink idref="bib3" id="ref3">3</reflink>]</p> <p>Why sympathetically expose students to contrary beliefs and ways of life? Answers to this question are commonly grounded in the value of (individual) autonomy. (This should not be surprising, given that autonomy has often been set forth as a value that education ought to promote.)[<reflink idref="bib4" id="ref4">4</reflink>] A representative autonomy‐based answer can be put as follows: Sympathetic exposure is necessary for the development of autonomy, and autonomy is in turn necessary for a life to be truly good.[<reflink idref="bib5" id="ref5">5</reflink>] One difficulty with this answer, however, is that the claim that autonomy is necessary for a life to be truly good can reasonably be questioned.[<reflink idref="bib6" id="ref6">6</reflink>] A second, more cautious answer has been developed by Eamonn Callan: Sympathetic exposure is necessary for students to develop autonomy sufficient so as not to be ethically servile.[<reflink idref="bib7" id="ref7">7</reflink>]</p> <p>Not persuaded by Callan's arguments, Shelly Burtt has argued that comprehensive education is not necessarily “at odds with the development of individual autonomy.”[<reflink idref="bib8" id="ref8">8</reflink>] Her position requires that we reject the modern, liberal, “narrow conception of what autonomy requires” — autonomy as “free choice” — and replace it with a traditional, broader conception of autonomy — autonomy as “independent thought and action.”[<reflink idref="bib9" id="ref9">9</reflink>] Given this broad conception, Burtt contends, autonomy is “well within the reach” of those who receive a comprehensive education.[<reflink idref="bib10" id="ref10">10</reflink>]</p> <p>Recently, Bryan Warnick has criticized Burtt's argument. While he is willing to grant that comprehensive education can serve to facilitate the development of students' autonomy to a certain degree, he argues that it does not provide sufficient resources for the development of autonomy (proper) because it does not facilitate the development of a fundamental aspect of autonomy: “the ability to carefully examine [that is, “think critically about”] the goodness and justice of our own [beliefs and] traditions” (RE, 419 and 421).[<reflink idref="bib11" id="ref11">11</reflink>] The reason this is so, according to Warnick, is that the development of this aspect of autonomy requires that “students be [“sympathetically”] exposed to different beliefs and traditions” (RE, 414 and 425). Hence, Warnick claims that comprehensive education is “ethically suspect” because it is at odds with the development of students' autonomy (RE, 414).</p> <p>In this essay, I aim to advance the present debate regarding the ethical status of comprehensive education in light of its refusal to employ the method of sympathetic exposure. To do so, I proceed as follows. First, I critically evaluate Warnick's autonomy‐based argument and argue that it is unsuccessful. In particular, I contend that his argument from necessity does not succeed because his conclusions do not follow from the grounds from which he reasons — claims drawn from what he refers to as the “philosophy of exemplarity.” Second, I address a potential response to my critique of Warnick's argument — that of developing an argument from facilitation rather than necessity. I argue that, contrary to the argument from necessity, the argument from facilitation does provide support for the claim that comprehensive education is ethically suspect and thus succeeds in reaching the conclusion that Warnick failed to reach by arguing from necessity. Third, I aim to show that, even granting the facilitation argument, it is still plausible to hold that, on grounds of autonomy, comprehensive education need not be seen as ethically suspect. To make this defense of comprehensive education, I develop and rely on a distinction between what I refer to as “comparison‐based understanding” and “non–comparison‐based understanding.”</p> <hd id="AN0096986522-2">Arguing from Necessity</hd> <p>According to Warnick, comprehensive education is “ethically suspect” because it is at odds with autonomy (RE, 414 and 420–421). Why is comprehensive education at odds with autonomy? I suggest that the following argument captures the basic line of thought that underlies Warnick's autonomy‐based objection to comprehensive education:</p> <p>Schools have a moral responsibility to promote students' autonomy (wherein autonomy is conceived of as “the ability to envision alternatives to how one should live, to critically evaluate reasons for and against the alternatives, and to be disposed to follow the reasoning where it leads” [RE, 412]).</p> <p>“The development of autonomy demands that students be [“sympathetically”] exposed to different beliefs and traditions” (RE, 414).</p> <p>Comprehensive education “does not sympathetically expose students to [different beliefs and traditions]” (RE, 414).</p> <p>Therefore, schools that employ comprehensive education fail to fulfill their moral responsibility to promote students' autonomy (RE, 412 and 414).</p> <p>Of the various features of comprehensive education, this argument centers on one feature in particular: that it does not sympathetically expose students to different (beliefs and) traditions.</p> <p>As noted previously, Warnick acknowledges that comprehensive education can foster the development of some degree of autonomy; however, it does not address an aspect of autonomy that he considers fundamental: the ability to critically evaluate the goodness and justice of one's own beliefs and traditions.[<reflink idref="bib12" id="ref12">12</reflink>] By noting and specifying this aspect of autonomy, a modified argument from autonomy can be sketched as follows:</p> <p>Autonomy includes “the ability to carefully examine [that is, “think critically about”] the goodness and justice of our own [beliefs and] traditions” (RE, 419 and 421).</p> <p>The development of the ability to think critically about the goodness and justice of our own beliefs and traditions requires “a broad … field of comparison” of the sort that can only be provided through the kind of sympathetic exposure to different beliefs and traditions that liberal but not comprehensive education provides (RE, 421).</p> <p>Therefore, the field of comparison provided by comprehensive education is not sufficiently broad for the development of autonomy.</p> <p>But even if autonomy includes the ability to think critically about the goodness and justice of our own beliefs and traditions, why is a broad field of comparison of the sort that, presumably, can only be provided by sympathetic exposure necessary for the development of this ability? In other words, even if the first premise of the modified argument from autonomy is accepted, what reason do we have to accept the second?</p> <p>Warnick's attempt to substantiate the claim of the necessity of sympathetic exposure captured in the second premise centers on the employment of the following set of claims from what he refers to as the “philosophy of exemplarity” (RE, 418):</p> <p>Using sets of squares (some shaded and some not) and circles (some shaded and some not), [Douglas] Arrell shows how a square can be taken as an example of different traits depending on the field of comparison that surrounds it. A black square next to a white square becomes an example of “blackness,” while the same square next to a black circle becomes an example of “squareness.” The square itself has not changed (it is still a black square), but what the square exemplifies (either “blackness” or “squareness”) has changed dramatically because of the context in which it is found. What something exemplifies, what we notice and what is salient about a thing, depends in large part on the field of comparison that surrounds it. We think in terms of differentiation, a process that directs our attention to some features of items and away from others. (RE, 419–420)</p> <p>Let us assume that these claims, which I will refer to as the “exemplarity claims,” are correct. With this assumption in place, we can inquire whether the claims that Warnick makes by employing these claims are warranted.</p> <p>Recall that Warnick employs the exemplarity claims to support the claim that sympathetic exposure is necessary for autonomy, which he then combines with the claim that autonomy includes the ability to think critically about the goodness and justice of our own (beliefs and) traditions, and he thereby concludes that the field of comparison provided by comprehensive education is not sufficiently broad for the development of autonomy. Reasoning by analogy, Warnick employs the exemplarity claims to make the following claims:</p> <p>If there is a limited field of comparison, … it follows that we will simply be unable to notice important facets of the traditions we have been raised in. The process of differentiation, central to critical thought, is nullified. Without exterior comparisons, it is true that one will be able to identify contradictions within a tradition, but one will never be able to more fully address the question of “Is my tradition just?” Some considerations relevant to whether a tradition is good or bad are only revealed within a particular field of comparison.</p> <p>For the sake of self‐criticism, then, schools should provide students with a diverse field of comparison that will make cultural features salient. (RE, 420)</p> <p>Given the exemplarity claims, are these claims regarding the necessity of sympathetic exposure warranted?</p> <p>Consider Warnick's first claim: “If there is a limited field of comparison, … it follows that we will simply be unable to notice important facets of the traditions we have been raised in. The process of differentiation, central to critical thought, is nullified.” This claim is not warranted. Even if it is granted that “[w]hat something exemplifies, what we notice and what is salient about a thing, depends in large part on the field of comparison that surrounds it,” it does not follow that what “facets” or features we are able to notice depend on the comparison that is made. For instance, we can grant that what will likely be noticed about a black square when it is compared to a white square will be its blackness, and that what will likely be noticed about a black square when compared with a black circle will be its squareness, and still hold that we can notice the squareness of the black square in the former comparison, and the blackness of the black square in the latter comparison. With respect to these comparisons, there is no reason why persons will necessarily be unable to notice both that the square is black and that it is square, even if, due to the comparison being made, one of the features is more easily noticed and thereby more likely to be noticed. Indeed, even with no comparisons at all — even if, for instance, the only object that is on display is the black square — there is no reason to think that (typical) persons would be unable to notice both the blackness and the squareness of the square. If there is no sense in which differentiation is nullified even if there is no field of comparison, there is certainly no sense in which differentiation is nullified if the field of comparison is limited.</p> <p>Consider Warnick's next claim: “Without exterior comparisons, it is true that one will be able to identify contradictions within a tradition, but one will never be able to more fully address the question of ‘Is my tradition just?’ Some considerations relevant to whether a tradition is good or bad are only revealed within a particular field of comparison.” On grounds of the exemplarity claims, this claim is not warranted. In making this claim, Warnick, as I understand him, is reasoning along the following lines: Comparing a black square to a white square enables the blackness of the black square to be noticed, whereas comparing a black square to a black circle enables the squareness of the black square to be noticed. Therefore, “[s]ome considerations … are only revealed within a particular field of comparison.” Likewise, then, reasoning by analogy, “[s]ome considerations relevant to whether a tradition is good or bad are only revealed within a particular field of comparison.” This line of reasoning warrants rejection, however, because it is based on a mistaken reading of the exemplarity claims. As I pointed out in my critique of Warnick's first claim, even if it is granted that a given comparison facilitates the noticing of a given feature, it does not follow that the comparison is necessary for the feature to be noticed. Indeed, as I argued, we have reason to believe that no comparisons are necessary for the mere noticing of features.</p> <p>The last claim that Warnick draws on the exemplarity claims to set forth is this: “For the sake of self‐criticism, then, schools should provide students with a diverse field of comparison that will make cultural features salient.” The criticisms I have leveled against Warnick's two other claims are sufficient to show that this claim is not warranted. The exemplarity claims are not sufficient to show that any comparisons are necessary for relevant features or aspects to be noticed. Thus they certainly cannot be employed to show that a “diverse field of comparison” is needed.</p> <p>While, according to Warnick, the field of comparison provided by comprehensive education is not sufficiently broad for the development of autonomy, the claims set forth to substantiate the central premise of the argument that supports this claim — that is, the premise stating that the development of the ability to think critically about the goodness and justice of our own traditions requires “a broad … field of comparison” of the sort that can only be provided through sympathetic exposure — are not warranted because they do not follow from the exemplarity claims that Warnick employs.[<reflink idref="bib13" id="ref13">13</reflink>] Hence, on grounds of the exemplarity claims, we have no reason to accept the claim that the field of comparison provided by comprehensive education is not sufficiently broad for the development of autonomy. Accordingly, we also do not have reason to accept the claim that comprehensive education is ethically suspect because it is at odds with the development of students' autonomy.</p> <hd id="AN0096986522-3">The Facilitation Argument</hd> <p>Even if the argument of the previous section is accepted, it is still possible to hold that comprehensive education is ethically suspect on grounds of autonomy. One reason for this is that even if sympathetic exposure is not necessary for the development of autonomy, it could nevertheless be an important means of facilitating its development. Accordingly, comprehensive education could be held to be ethically suspect because it refuses to use this means. Thus a possible response to my criticism of the argument from necessity would be to develop an alternative argument — an argument from facilitation. Reasoning by analogy, an argument from facilitation can be developed as follows:</p> <p>Comparisons of objects that have different features, such as colors (white, black) and shapes (square, round), facilitate understanding of their features.</p> <p>The process that facilitates our understanding of the features of our own beliefs and traditions, thus enabling us to evaluate their goodness and justice, parallels the process that facilitates our understanding of the features (such as color and shape) of objects.</p> <p>Therefore, comparison of our own beliefs and traditions to different beliefs and traditions facilitates understanding of their features and thus enables us to assess the goodness and justice of our own beliefs and traditions.</p> <p>I will refer to this as the “facilitation argument.” Assuming that education ought to promote autonomy, and that a fundamental feature of autonomy is the ability to think critically about the goodness and justice of our own beliefs and traditions, then the facilitation argument, while less ambitious than the argument from necessity, is plausibly held to be all that is needed to show that comprehensive education is ethically suspect, and thus it warrants further scrutiny.</p> <p>The facilitation argument seems plausible for a number of reasons. For one, the claim that comparing the features (such as color and shape) of objects facilitates our understanding of these features is plausible. For another, the analogy that is the core of the argument appears to be apt (at least there is no obviously apparent reason why it is not apt), and therefore to bring to light the plausibility of the claim that comparing our own beliefs and traditions to other beliefs and traditions facilitates understanding of the features of our own beliefs and traditions and thus enables us to think critically about their goodness and justice.</p> <p>Nevertheless, one possible response to the facilitation argument that is open to proponents of comprehensive education is to take issue with the ambiguity of the first premise and argue that while such comparisons may facilitate understanding, they do not necessarily do so. For instance, consider the following example. Kevin is an intelligent young man, but he has been raised by a devious family in which he has been taught, and over time come to believe, that white is black, black is white, square is round, and round is square. In this case, it is not plausible to hold that observing comparisons such as that of a white square and a black square, or a black square and a black circle, would facilitate his understanding. If anything, these comparisons alone would reinforce his incorrect beliefs rather than facilitate his understanding. If this is the case, then the general or universal claim that comparison of objects that have different features such as color (blackness, whiteness) and shape (roundness, squareness) facilitates understanding of such features is not plausible. As this example illustrates, at least some degree of correct (or sound) “foundational” understanding of the features that the comparisons (potentially) facilitate an understanding of (for instance, some degree of correct understanding of what it is to be black, white, round, or square) is necessary if such comparisons are plausibly to be held to facilitate understanding.</p> <p>The claim that at least some degree of correct foundational understanding of the features that the comparisons (potentially) facilitate an understanding of is necessary if such comparisons are plausibly to be held to facilitate understanding does not entail that comparisons can never facilitate understanding. Indeed, one can consistently accept this claim and also accept that such comparisons can facilitate understanding if students already have at least some degree of correct foundational understanding of the features. Further, the claim being made here is not that such comparisons cannot facilitate increases or improvements in understanding. One can consistently accept the claim that is being made and also accept, say, that the comparison of a square to a circle will enable students with a basic understanding of these shapes to achieve a fuller, more sophisticated understanding. The claim then is simply that in the absence of at least some degree of correct foundational understanding of the features of interest (if only a rudimentary understanding), such comparisons themselves cannot plausibly be held to facilitate understanding. So, for example, with respect to the comparison of a square to a circle, maybe all that will be needed for the comparison to facilitate understanding is to understand what a “corner” is and to be told that, of the two objects, the square is the one that has corners; nevertheless, something (some degree of correct foundational understanding) is plausibly held to be needed.</p> <p>Given the analogy upon which the facilitation argument turns, and given this criticism of the first premise, the facilitation argument can be revised along the following lines: just as the comparison of objects that differ with respect to the features of color and shape can plausibly be held to facilitate understanding of such features only if the observers already have at least some degree of correct foundational understanding of these features, so too comparison of our beliefs and traditions to different beliefs and traditions can plausibly be held to facilitate our understanding of the features of our beliefs and traditions that enable us to think critically about their goodness and justice only if we already have at least some degree of correct foundational knowledge of the features that are relevant to their goodness and justice. Therefore, the general or universal claim that comparisons of our own beliefs and traditions to other beliefs and traditions facilitate understanding of the features of our own beliefs and traditions that enable us to think critically about their goodness and justice is not plausible. This claim only seems to be plausible because of an implicit assumption that the observers already have at least some degree of correct foundational understanding of the features that the comparisons facilitate an understanding of.</p> <p>If this is so, the claim that liberal education (wherein sympathetic exposure is employed so as to make possible comparisons of students' own beliefs and traditions to other, contrary beliefs and traditions) facilitates the development of autonomy is plausible only on the assumption that students already have at least some degree of correct foundational understanding of the features relevant to the goodness and justice of their beliefs and traditions that is parallel to the understanding students must have for comparisons of objects of different colors and shapes to facilitate their understanding of the colors and shapes of objects. What does this mean? One possibility is that they must already have an understanding parallel to, say, “the object with corners is a square,” “crows are black,” or “snow is white.” What would the parallel foundational understanding be in the case of understanding features that enable students to think critically about the goodness and justice of their beliefs and traditions? One possibility is that it is basic understandings of goodness and justice such as, say, “friendship is good,” “knowledge is good,” “enmity is bad,” “ignorance is bad,” “equal treatment is just,” and “racism is unjust.” This has plausibility.[<reflink idref="bib14" id="ref14">14</reflink>] For instance, it is plausible that such foundational understandings of goodness and justice would be sufficient to enable students to begin to pick out differences in the goodness and justice of different beliefs and traditions, but that without any such foundational understandings this evaluative process would be forestalled.</p> <p>In response to this argument, however, proponents of liberal education can grant that at least some degree of correct understanding of the features relevant to the goodness and justice of beliefs and traditions is necessary before it is plausible to hold that sympathetic exposure will facilitate understanding (and thereby facilitate the development of autonomy), and still maintain that proponents of comprehensive education have gained little if any ground by pointing this out. The reason for this is that they can plausibly hold that once students have reached the level of maturity at which it is reasonable to introduce sympathetic exposure, they can be expected to already have at least some degree of correct understanding of the features relevant to the goodness and justice of their beliefs and traditions.[<reflink idref="bib15" id="ref15">15</reflink>] Yet proponents of comprehensive education can respond by pointing out that this seemingly small concession is all that is needed for the moral acceptability — indeed, the moral necessity — of comprehensive education to be established. In particular, they can claim that if at least some degree of correct understanding of the features relevant to the goodness and justice of beliefs and traditions is necessary before it is plausible to hold that sympathetic exposure will facilitate understanding (and thereby facilitate the development of autonomy), comprehensive education itself provides the foundation that must be in place before liberal education can be expected to facilitate autonomy.</p> <p>The idea underlying this response is that acquiring the necessary degree of correct understanding requires comprehensive education: students must be taught that certain (foundational) beliefs are correct, and contrary beliefs must not be put forward as being morally acceptable alternatives. If this is so, it can be argued that comprehensive education provides a necessary foundation for liberal education (and the method of sympathetic exposure in particular).[<reflink idref="bib16" id="ref16">16</reflink>] Specifically, it can be argued that comprehensive education is necessary to provide the foundational understanding that is itself required if the comparisons that sympathetic exposure involves are plausibly to be held to facilitate students' understanding of the features of their own beliefs and traditions that enable them to think critically about the goodness and justice of their own beliefs and traditions, and therefore to facilitate the development of their autonomy. Hence, proponents of comprehensive education could attempt to turn the tables and argue that rather than showing that comprehensive education is ethically suspect, the facilitation argument instead shows that comprehensive education is ethically necessary, given the assumptions that education ought to promote autonomy and that a fundamental feature of autonomy is the ability to think critically about the goodness and justice of our own beliefs and traditions.</p> <p>In response, proponents of liberal education can take issue with the empirical claim that comprehensive education (or some sort of comprehensive‐education‐like approach) is necessary for the development of the requisite degree of correct understanding. Alternatively, if they are willing to grant the empirical considerations (at least for sake of argument), they can still take issue with the way the phrase “comprehensive education” is being used. In particular, they can argue that it is a mistake (and it is misleading) to refer to what is merely the first stage of a two‐stage approach to education as “comprehensive education,” especially when the second stage is patently liberal education (and as such includes sympathetic exposure). Instead, they can argue, the phrase “comprehensive education” is appropriately applied only when the approach to education both attempts to facilitate the acceptance of certain beliefs and ways of life as being correct, and refuses to ever (even at a later stage) sympathetically expose students to beliefs and ways of life that are contrary to “correct” beliefs and ways of life.</p> <p>Further, proponents of liberal education can point to various two‐stage models of education that fall within the scope of liberal education, but in which the first stage could be seen as being comprehensive‐education–like. For instance, Elmer John Thiessen has argued that a “transmissionist” approach to education is a necessary foundation for a “critical rationalist” approach to education.[<reflink idref="bib17" id="ref17">17</reflink>] Underlying his argument is a line of thought developed by R. S. Peters, that “[c]ritical thought without content is vacuous,” and thus that the transmissionist stage provides content upon which critical thought can be exercised.[<reflink idref="bib18" id="ref18">18</reflink>] It is plausible to hold that even though this model involves a transmissionist, comprehensive‐education–like stage, it would still not properly be referred to as comprehensive education, but rather should be seen as an example of liberal education if, during the critical rationalist stage, sympathetic exposure is introduced.</p> <p>T. H. McLaughlin has likewise developed a two‐stage model of education. He claims that the student's “commitment is sought now [in the first stage], not so that when he is in a position to make appropriate evaluations and decisions he will ‘firmly adhere’ to the beliefs of his family, but so that he has a substantive base from which to launch his personal search for truth.” McLaughlin further explains,</p> <p>It is true that in seeking to provide their child with a stable set of initial beliefs, parents may well have to urge their children to engage significantly with practices and ideas which are not immediately or continuously congenial to them, and which may go against their current inclinations or beliefs. But this is with the aim of ensuring for the child a significant engagement with the beliefs, so that their subsequent assessment — and perhaps rejection — of them will be based on appropriate understanding and acquaintance.[<reflink idref="bib19" id="ref19">19</reflink>]</p> <p>According to McLaughlin, “[i]t is from this basis of substantiality of belief and value that the child's capacity for reason and autonomy is developed.”[<reflink idref="bib20" id="ref20">20</reflink>] The idea here is that the first stage makes possible the sort of deep engagement that is needed so that the student can eventually effectively evaluate the beliefs taught in the first stage — evaluate them deeply rather than superficially. Again, it seems plausible to hold that even though this model involves a comprehensive‐education–like first stage, it would still be more accurate to refer to it as liberal education (rather than comprehensive education) as long as sympathetic exposure is introduced during the subsequent critical stage.</p> <p>Richard Rorty also sets forth a two‐stage model of education. The first stage, “socialization,” is akin to Thiessen's transmissionist stage and is to take place (ideally) during primary and secondary education. At this stage the aim is that of “familiarizing the young with what their elders take to be true, whether it is true or not.”[<reflink idref="bib21" id="ref21">21</reflink>] This then (ideally) is followed by the second stage, “individualization,” which is to take place in college. Rorty views the first stage as providing the needed foundation for the second, the aim of which is to “incit[e] doubt and stimulat[e] imagination, thereby challenging the prevailing consensus,” which in turn facilitates the achievement of the central Deweyan aim of education, “growth.”[<reflink idref="bib22" id="ref22">22</reflink>] Again, here it seems plausible to hold that even though this model involves a comprehensive‐education–like stage, it would still not be properly categorized as comprehensive education, but should instead be seen as an example of liberal education if the individualization stage includes sympathetic exposure.[<reflink idref="bib23" id="ref23">23</reflink>]</p> <p>It is reasonable for proponents of liberal education to demand that the phrase “comprehensive education” be employed only if the approach to education both attempts to facilitate the acceptance of certain beliefs and ways of life as being correct and refuses to sympathetically expose students to beliefs and ways of life that are contrary to “correct” beliefs and ways of life. Without this constraint, approaches to education that clearly are liberal (such as Rorty's, for instance) could be claimed to be instances of comprehensive education. Thus it is reasonable to hold that an approach to education that eventually employs sympathetic exposure is appropriately referred to as liberal education, even if it is a two‐stage approach in which the first stage is comprehensive‐education–like. If this is so, then it is a mistake to think that the facilitation argument shows that comprehensive education is ethically necessary. At most, it shows that a comprehensive‐education–like stage of education is ethically necessary. (But even this claim can be resisted on empirical grounds.) Hence, the facilitation argument provides a plausible rationale for why comprehensive education is ethically suspect on grounds of autonomy. Comprehensive education is ethically suspect because it refuses to employ a means for educating students (sympathetic exposure) that plausibly would facilitate the development of their autonomy.[<reflink idref="bib24" id="ref24">24</reflink>]</p> <hd id="AN0096986522-4">Rescuing Comprehensive Education</hd> <p>In response to the facilitation argument, a number of options are available to proponents of comprehensive education. One is to follow Burtt and adopt an alternative definition of autonomy. However, this solution is theoretically costly and runs the risk of being perceived as an instance of avoiding rather than confronting the issue of the compatibility of autonomy and comprehensive education. A second option is to accept a two‐stage model of liberal education of the sort that was noted in the previous section, on grounds that the various considerations that had led them to be proponents of comprehensive education are sufficiently addressed by such an approach. Perhaps, for instance, they are not opposed to sympathetic exposure on principle, but rather they just do not want it to occur in the absence of a sufficient foundational understanding of the good, right, and just.</p> <p>A third option is to refuse to adopt even a two‐stage model of liberal education of this sort. One reason for such a refusal could be the moral risks that sympathetic exposure presents, even if it is introduced only after a preliminary, comprehensive‐education‐like stage. One such risk could be that of introducing sympathetic exposure too soon for some students (those whose moral development lags behind their peers), which possibly could hinder rather than facilitate their understanding of the features relevant to the goodness and justice of their beliefs and traditions because a too‐early introduction to contrary beliefs and traditions would lead to confusion. Another risk is that, in practice, sympathetic exposure could end up typically being too complex to serve the desired end. To illustrate, suppose that sympathetic exposure to different beliefs and traditions is generally more akin to introducing students to a continuum of color (from white to black, with numerous shades of gray in between) or shapes (from square to round, with a large number of almost square and almost round shapes in between) than to simple comparisons such as those between black and white objects or square and round objects. If this is the case, sympathetic exposure could confuse students and thereby hinder rather than facilitate their understanding. The thought here is that for students who have merely a basic understanding of what it is to be black and what it is to be white to be presented with a black object and, say, an object very close to black (on the color spectrum running from black to white), such a comparison could hinder rather than facilitate their understanding because they may perceive that both are black when, in fact, the former but not the latter is black. If the differences between different features of beliefs and traditions that are relevant to their goodness and justice are likewise fine‐grained and complex, then sympathetic exposure could possibly hinder rather than facilitate understanding.</p> <p>However, ardent defenders of liberal education and sympathetic exposure cannot be expected to be persuaded that any such risks outweigh the moral badness of the lack of autonomy (and the ethical servility) that presumably will obtain in the absence of sympathetic exposure. Suppose, then, that proponents of comprehensive education set aside the risk‐based approach to defending their position. Given the assumptions that education ought to promote autonomy and that a fundamental feature of autonomy is the ability to think critically about the goodness and justice of our own beliefs and traditions, are there any grounds left for defending comprehensive education, especially in light of the option of adopting a two‐stage model of liberal education wherein the first stage is a comprehensive‐education–like stage?[<reflink idref="bib25" id="ref25">25</reflink>]</p> <p>I believe that such grounds are available. I will turn again to simple examples of the sort that the exemplarity claims involve and to reasoning by analogy. Suppose I want to determine whether an object that some claim is a square really is a square. Further, suppose I know what it is for an object to be a square: it has four equal angles and four equal sides. Given this understanding, no comparison to other shapes is needed to understand whether the object is a square. I can gain this understanding simply by examining the object itself. Further, if by this method I determine that it is (or is not) a square, then nothing will be gained (with respect to understanding whether it is a square) by comparing it to another object, or even to many other objects. Similarly, suppose I want to determine whether an object that some claim is a circle really is a circle. Suppose as well that I know what it is for an object to be a circle: every point of its perimeter (circumference) is equidistant from its center. Given this understanding, no comparison to other shapes is needed to understand whether the object is a circle. I can gain this understanding simply by examining the object itself. Further, if by this method I determine that it is (or is not) a circle, then nothing will be gained (with respect to understanding whether it is a circle) by comparing it to another object.</p> <p>Given this analysis, it is possible to draw a distinction between what can be referred to as “comparison‐based understanding” and “non–comparison‐based understanding.” By employing this distinction and reasoning by analogy, even if it is granted that if the understanding that is necessary for evaluating the goodness and justice of our beliefs and traditions is comparison‐based understanding, which in turn means that sympathetic exposure is necessary for the development of autonomy (and, as well, for the development of autonomy sufficient so as not to be ethically servile), it can still coherently be held that sympathetic exposure is not necessary for the development of autonomy (and thereby the avoidance of ethical servility) if non–comparison‐based understanding is all that is necessary for us to be able to “carefully examine [that is, “think critically about”] the goodness and justice of our own [beliefs and] traditions” (RE, 419 and 421). The weakness, then, with the autonomy‐based arguments that have been set forth in defense of sympathetic exposure, such as those developed by Callan, Warnick, and others, is that they rely on an implicit and undefended assumption that such understanding necessarily is comparison‐based understanding. Thus, one strategy that is open for defending comprehensive education is to point out this undefended implicit assumption, as I have here done, and then put its plausibility into question.</p> <p>One way to put the plausibility of this assumption into question is to provide examples of persons who both cannot plausibly be held to lack autonomy (or to be ethically servile) — and, in particular, who cannot plausibly be held to lack the ability to think critically about the goodness and justice of their own beliefs and traditions — but who also have not been sympathetically exposed to contrary beliefs and traditions. Such examples are not impossible to come by; consider, for instance, Nicolaus Copernicus, Martin Luther, and Mary Wollstonecraft.[<reflink idref="bib26" id="ref26">26</reflink>] The distinction between comparison‐based and non–comparison‐based understanding can then be drawn upon to explain both why autonomy‐based arguments for sympathetic exposure have been compelling to so many over the years, and why, at the same time, there are those who, although they have not been sympathetically exposed to alternative beliefs and traditions, cannot plausibly be held to lack autonomy (and to be ethically servile). Once the distinction between comparison‐based and non–comparison‐based understanding is brought to the fore, it is possible to see that non–comparison‐based understanding may be all that is necessary for the development of the requisite autonomy. Moreover, if non–comparison‐based understanding is all that is necessary for the development of the requisite autonomy, then, on grounds of autonomy, comprehensive education need not be seen as ethically suspect due to its refusal to sympathetically expose students to contrary beliefs and traditions.</p> <p>An alternative way to put the plausibility of the assumption that the understanding that is necessary to evaluate the goodness and justice of our beliefs and traditions is comparison‐based understanding can be set forth as follows. As argued earlier, reasoning about the goodness and justice of our beliefs and traditions requires at least some degree of correct foundational understanding, possibly of the concepts of goodness and justice themselves, or at least some concepts relevant to understanding goodness and justice. Such reasoning requires something akin to, say, “the object with corners is a square,” “crows are black,” or “snow is white” — perhaps basic understandings such as “friendship is good,” “knowledge is good,” “enmity is bad,” “ignorance is bad,” “equal treatment is just,” and “racism is unjust.” If it is the case that some such degree of correct foundational understanding is necessary for reasoning about the goodness and justice of our beliefs and traditions, it is plausible to hold that such foundational understandings can provide the needed measure for understanding the goodness and justice of our own beliefs and traditions, even in the absence of comparisons to other, contrary beliefs and traditions.</p> <p>For instance, suppose I know that unequal treatment is unjust. Suppose further that I am raised in a society that ascribes to long‐held traditions that involve providing male children with greater opportunities and resources than female children, and as a result I accept these traditions without really considering whether they are ethically sound. It is plausible to believe that were I to be taught using the method of sympathetic exposure, this would serve to enable me to understand aspects of my traditions that are relevant to their goodness and justice, and thereby the development of my autonomy would be facilitated. However, it is also plausible to hold that such comparisons, while helpful, would not be necessary. For example, further reflection on what unequal treatment is, or on the morally important ways in which men and women are equal, or both, is plausibly held to be sufficient to enable me to see the injustice of my own traditions. If this is the case, then we have a second reason for questioning the assumption that comparison‐based understanding is necessary for the development of autonomy (in particular, the ability to think critically about the goodness and justice of our own beliefs and traditions).</p> <hd id="AN0096986522-5">Conclusion</hd> <p>I have tried to show that even if we keep in place the conception of autonomy that is employed by proponents of liberal education, it is plausible to hold that comprehensive education need not be seen as ethically suspect on grounds of autonomy once we (<reflink idref="bib1" id="ref27">1</reflink>) take into account a distinction between comparison‐based and non–comparison‐based understanding, and (<reflink idref="bib2" id="ref28">2</reflink>) recognize the plausibility of doubting that comparison‐based understanding is necessary for being able to critically think about the goodness and justice of our own beliefs and traditions. I hope that my arguments have accomplished the task of showing that, even on grounds of autonomy of the sort that proponents of liberal education commonly put forth as an important end of education, the moral acceptability of comprehensive education is still an open question and one worthy of further consideration.</p> <p>THE EDITOR AND THREE REVIEWERS for Educational Theory have provided me with extensive and insightful feedback on an earlier draft for which I am very grateful.</p> <ref id="AN0096986522-6"> <title>Footnotes</title> <blist> <bibl id="bib1" idref="ref1" type="bt">1</bibl> <bibtext>Eamonn Callan, Creating Citizens: Political Education and Liberal Democracy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 132–133. See also Eamonn Callan, “The Great Sphere: Education Against Servility,” Journal of Philosophy of Education 31, no. 2 (1997): 221–222. Such sympathetic exposure includes, for one, “some experience of entering imaginatively into ways of life that are strange, even repugnant” (Callan, Creating Citizens, 133). In this essay, I use “liberal education” in the modern sense (following Callan), and thus I use it in a way that differs from the more traditional sense wherein liberal education was simply wide exposure to the arts and literature. I thank the editor for pointing out the presentism that underlies my thinking. </bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibl id="bib2" idref="ref2" type="bt">2</bibl> <bibtext>Shelley Burtt, “Comprehensive Educations and the Liberal Understanding of Autonomy,” in Citizenship and Education in Liberal‐Democratic Societies: Teaching for Cosmopolitan Values and Collective Identities, ed. Kevin McDonough and Walter Feinberg (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 179; and Bryan R. Warnick, “Rethinking Education for Autonomy in Pluralistic Societies,” Educational Theory 62, no. 4 (2012): 412. The latter work will be cited in the text as RE for all aubsequent references. </bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibl id="bib3" idref="ref3" type="bt">3</bibl> <bibtext>One way of defending the moral acceptability of comprehensive education is to argue from the rights of parents. See T. H. McLaughlin, “Parental Rights and the Religious Upbringing of Children,” Journal of Philosophy of Education 18, no. 1 (1984): 75–83. However, according to Callan, even if it is granted that parents have such a right, the choice by parents not to permit sympathetic exposure falls beyond the legitimate scope of this right (see Callan, “The Great Sphere,” 222). In this essay, I will not address this rights‐based approach. </bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibl id="bib4" idref="ref4" type="bt">4</bibl> <bibtext>For instance, see Harry Brighouse, On Education (New York: Routledge, 2006); Callan, Creating Citizens; Amy Gutmann, Democractic Education, rev. ed. (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1999); Meira Levinson, The Demands of Liberal Education (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999); Ian MacMullen, Faith in Schools? Autonomy, Citizenship, and Religious Education in the Liberal State (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2007); McLaughlin, “Parental Rights and the Religious Upbringing of Children”; T. H. McLaughlin, “Religion, Upbringing, and Liberal Values: A Rejoinder to Eamonn Callan,” Journal of Philosophy of Education 19, no. 1 (1985): 119–127; and Rob Reich, Bridging Liberalism and Multiculturalism in American Education (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002). However, there is not complete consensus regarding autonomy as a proper end of education; see, for instance, Lucas Swaine, “The False Right to Autonomy in Education,” Educational Theory 62, no. 1 (2012): 107–124. </bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibl id="bib5" idref="ref5" type="bt">5</bibl> <bibtext>Burtt, “Comprehensive Educations and the Liberal Understanding of Autonomy,” 194 and 197. An alternative rationale focuses on the desirability of autonomy for the functioning of the state. </bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibl id="bib6" idref="ref6" type="bt">6</bibl> <bibtext>See, for instance, Callan, Creating Citizens, 67–69; and Brighouse, On Education, 15. </bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibl id="bib7" idref="ref7" type="bt">7</bibl> <bibtext>Callan, Creating Citizens, 152–157; and Callan, “The Great Sphere,” 224–228 and 230. </bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibl id="bib8" idref="ref8" type="bt">8</bibl> <bibtext>Burtt, “Comprehensive Educations and the Liberal Understanding of Autonomy,” 180. </bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibl id="bib9" idref="ref9" type="bt">9</bibl> <bibtext>Ibid., 184. </bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibl id="bib10" idref="ref10" type="bt">10</bibl> <bibtext>Ibid., 182. </bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibl id="bib11" idref="ref11" type="bt">11</bibl> <bibtext>In adding the “beliefs and” here, I believe that I stay true to the spirit of Warnick's argument and that this addition is not something that he would object to. As will be seen, Warnick uses the phrase “beliefs and traditions” when addressing sympathetic exposure. I thank Bryan Warnick for taking time to examine and comment on my summary and exposition of his argument. </bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibl id="bib12" idref="ref12" type="bt">12</bibl> <bibtext>Warnick levels this criticism against Burtt (RE, 418–422). </bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibl id="bib13" idref="ref13" type="bt">13</bibl> <bibtext>Here it may help to note explicitly that I am not arguing that Warnick's claims about the necessity of a diverse field of comparison cannot be supported. I am merely arguing that they are not supported by the grounds of support he relies on — the exemplarity claims. </bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibl id="bib14" idref="ref14" type="bt">14</bibl> <bibtext>I thank an anonymous reviewer for Educational Theory for suggesting the plausibility of holding that there are certain fundamental or necessary understandings with respect to the concept of justice. </bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibl id="bib15" idref="ref15" type="bt">15</bibl> <bibtext>Possibly such proponents could here make reference to the “two moral powers” specified by John Rawls: “a capacity for a sense of justice and for a conception of the good”; John Rawls, Political Liberalism, expanded ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), 19. They could also make reference to the developmental psychology literature. For instance, if all goes as it should with respect to an individual's moral development, such foundational understandings may be gained at an early age. Michael Tomasello and Amrisha Vaish note, “Four‐ and 5‐year‐old children … operate with an agent‐neutral, norm‐based morality in which all individuals, including themselves, are equal players. Moreover, they come to self‐regulate their behavior in accordance with these norms”; Michael Tomasello and Amrisha Vaish, “Origins of Human Cooperation and Morality,” Annual Review of Psychology 64 (2013): 249. </bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibl id="bib16" idref="ref16" type="bt">16</bibl> <bibtext>An additional possible option is that human nature is such that persons naturally already have such foundational moral knowledge. While in my view it is plausible that this could be true, it can still coherently be held that persons nevertheless need a foundation that only an approach akin to comprehensive education can provide. The line of thought here is that of Aquinas — basically that while persons naturally have a knowledge of the most basic precepts of the moral law, instruction is still generally necessary for persons to grasp the further precepts of moral law that are derived from these basic precepts. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica (Notre Dame, Indiana: Christian Classics, 1981), I–II, q. 100, a. 1. Be that as it may, I do not believe that I need to address this option here because those who are opposed to comprehensive education are most likely committed to the belief that morality is conventional rather than natural, and this commitment may underlie their opposition to comprehensive education in the first place. </bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibl id="bib17" idref="ref17" type="bt">17</bibl> <bibtext>Elmer John Thiessen, “Two Concepts or Two Phases of Liberal Education?,” Journal of Philosophy of Education 21, no. 2 (1987): 228 and 231. </bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibl id="bib18" idref="ref18" type="bt">18</bibl> <bibtext>Ibid., 229. </bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibl id="bib19" idref="ref19" type="bt">19</bibl> <bibtext>McLaughlin, “Religion, Upbringing and Liberal Values,” 121. </bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibl id="bib20" idref="ref20" type="bt">20</bibl> <bibtext>Ibid., 125. </bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibl id="bib21" idref="ref21" type="bt">21</bibl> <bibtext>Richard Rorty, “Education as Socialization and as Individualization,” in Philosophy and Social Hope (London: Penguin Books, 1999), 118. </bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibl id="bib22" idref="ref22" type="bt">22</bibl> <bibtext>Ibid. </bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibl id="bib23" idref="ref23" type="bt">23</bibl> <bibtext>Other proponents of liberal education have also recognized a need for some sort of preliminary or ground‐setting stage that provides the foundation for liberal education. For instance, Callan has claimed that “some secure sense of the meaning of their own culture” is needed prior to sympathetic exposure (Callan, “The Great Sphere,” 221). Similarly, Meira Levinson has claimed that “membership in a community and embeddedness within a cultural and normative framework” is “an essential prerequisite for autonomy” (Levinson, The Demands of Liberal Education, 56). </bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibl id="bib24" idref="ref24" type="bt">24</bibl> <bibtext>I want to briefly address a hypothetical question. Suppose that it is the case that a comprehensive‐education–like stage of education is necessary in order to provide the degree of correct understanding that is necessary for comparisons to facilitate understanding, and thus for sympathetic exposure to facilitate autonomy. What might be some implications for how liberal education should be carried out? Here I will not attempt to defend these possible implications; I merely want to note them and thereby possibly seed future inquiry. One may be that liberal education ought to consist of at least two stages, with sympathetic exposure being preceded by a comprehensive‐education–like stage; one possible implication of this approach is that educators ought to take notice of whether the first stage has successfully yielded the needed foundational understanding before introducing sympathetic exposure. A second implication may be that sympathetic exposure should not be carried out in a way that puts all moral beliefs and traditions on equal grounds, for some beliefs and traditions may not measure up in light of even the minimally sufficient degree of correct understanding of the features relevant to whether beliefs and traditions are just. A third implication may be that the possibilities of sympathetic exposure are more limited than some may have supposed. For instance, if a student's beliefs and traditions are basically sound, there may be few, if any, beliefs and traditions that are (significantly) contrary to or “at odds” with his or her beliefs and traditions that can also plausibly be held to be alternative morally acceptable beliefs and traditions. </bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibl id="bib25" idref="ref25" type="bt">25</bibl> <bibtext>One option, of course, is to defend comprehensive education on a range of values (not only autonomy) such as to argue that, when all relevant values are considered, while comprehensive education fares worse than liberal education with respect to the value of autonomy, it fares better overall. However, in this essay, I focus on the value of autonomy alone, addressing the moral status of comprehensive education from the perspective of the value of autonomy, rather than all things considered. </bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibl id="bib26" idref="ref26" type="bt">26</bibl> <bibtext>I thank an anonymous reviewer for Educational Theory for providing me with these examples. It should also be noted here that in a more recent work, Callan seems more open to the possibility of autonomy developing outside of liberal education. I tentatively draw this conclusion from my reading of Neil Burtonwood's account: Neil Burtonwood, Cultural Diversity, Liberal Pluralism, and Schools: Isaiah Berlin and Education (London: Routledge, 2006), 30. </bibtext> </blist> </ref> <aug> <p>By Adam D. Bailey</p> <p></p> <p>ADAM D. BAILEY is Assistant Professor in the School of Business at Black Hills State University, Meier Hall 327, 1200 University St., Spearfish, SD 57799; e‐mail. His research focuses primarily on philosophical aspects of ethical challenges faced by business and government executives.</p> </aug> |
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| Items | – Name: Title Label: Title Group: Ti Data: Autonomy and the Ethical Status of Comprehensive Education – Name: Language Label: Language Group: Lang Data: English – Name: Author Label: Authors Group: Au Data: <searchLink fieldCode="AR" term="%22Bailey%2C+Adam+D%2E%22">Bailey, Adam D.</searchLink> – Name: TitleSource Label: Source Group: Src Data: <searchLink fieldCode="SO" term="%22Educational+Theory%22"><i>Educational Theory</i></searchLink>. Aug 2014 64(4):393-408. – Name: Avail Label: Availability Group: Avail Data: Wiley-Blackwell. 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148. Tel: 800-835-6770; Tel: 781-388-8598; Fax: 781-388-8232; e-mail: cs-journals@wiley.com; Web site: http://www.wiley.com/WileyCDA – Name: PeerReviewed Label: Peer Reviewed Group: SrcInfo Data: Y – Name: Pages Label: Page Count Group: Src Data: 16 – Name: DatePubCY Label: Publication Date Group: Date Data: 2014 – Name: TypeDocument Label: Document Type Group: TypDoc Data: Journal Articles<br />Opinion Papers<br />Reports - Evaluative – Name: Subject Label: Descriptors Group: Su Data: <searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Educational+Theories%22">Educational Theories</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Educational+Practices%22">Educational Practices</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Role+of+Education%22">Role of Education</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Personal+Autonomy%22">Personal Autonomy</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Ethics%22">Ethics</searchLink> – Name: DOI Label: DOI Group: ID Data: 10.1111/edth.12070 – Name: ISSN Label: ISSN Group: ISSN Data: 0013-2004 – Name: Abstract Label: Abstract Group: Ab Data: On grounds of autonomy, is comprehensive education -- an approach to education that attempts to facilitate the acceptance of certain beliefs and ways of life as being correct, and refuses to sympathetically expose students to contrary beliefs and ways of life -- ethically suspect? Recently, Bryan R. Warnick has argued that it is. In this essay, Adam D. Bailey critically evaluates Warnick's argument, and contends that it is unsuccessful. In particular, he argues that Warnick's argument from necessity does not succeed. Bailey then addresses a potential response to his critique of Warnick's argument -- that of developing an argument from facilitation rather than necessity -- and argues that, contrary to the argument from necessity, the argument from facilitation does provide support for the claim that comprehensive education is ethically suspect. However, Bailey attempts to show that even granting the facilitation argument, it is plausible to hold that, on grounds of autonomy, comprehensive education need not be seen as ethically suspect. – Name: AbstractInfo Label: Abstractor Group: Ab Data: As Provided – Name: DateEntry Label: Entry Date Group: Date Data: 2014 – Name: AN Label: Accession Number Group: ID Data: EJ1032598 |
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| RecordInfo | BibRecord: BibEntity: Identifiers: – Type: doi Value: 10.1111/edth.12070 Languages: – Text: English PhysicalDescription: Pagination: PageCount: 16 StartPage: 393 Subjects: – SubjectFull: Educational Theories Type: general – SubjectFull: Educational Practices Type: general – SubjectFull: Role of Education Type: general – SubjectFull: Personal Autonomy Type: general – SubjectFull: Ethics Type: general Titles: – TitleFull: Autonomy and the Ethical Status of Comprehensive Education Type: main BibRelationships: HasContributorRelationships: – PersonEntity: Name: NameFull: Bailey, Adam D. IsPartOfRelationships: – BibEntity: Dates: – D: 01 M: 08 Type: published Y: 2014 Identifiers: – Type: issn-print Value: 0013-2004 Numbering: – Type: volume Value: 64 – Type: issue Value: 4 Titles: – TitleFull: Educational Theory Type: main |
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