A Consideration of the Seven Sins of Memory in the Context of Creative Cognition
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| Title: | A Consideration of the Seven Sins of Memory in the Context of Creative Cognition |
|---|---|
| Language: | English |
| Authors: | Ditta, Annie S., Storm, Benjamin C. |
| Source: | Creativity Research Journal. 2018 30(4):402-417. |
| Availability: | Routledge. Available from: Taylor & Francis, Ltd. 530 Walnut Street Suite 850, Philadelphia, PA 19106. Tel: 800-354-1420; Tel: 215-625-8900; Fax: 215-207-0050; Web site: http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals |
| Peer Reviewed: | Y |
| Page Count: | 16 |
| Publication Date: | 2018 |
| Document Type: | Journal Articles Reports - Descriptive |
| Descriptors: | Creativity, Schemata (Cognition), Memory, Guidelines, Role, Problem Solving, Creative Thinking, Barriers, Persistence |
| DOI: | 10.1080/10400419.2018.1530914?redirect=1 |
| ISSN: | 1040-0419 |
| Abstract: | Schacter's (2001) work on "The Seven Sins of Memory" conceptualized and communicated many of the failures of memory and their critical role in cognition. At the heart of the framework is the idea that memory often fails not because it is dysfunctional or maladaptive, but because it prioritizes flexibility and the ability to think and behave adaptively over the ability to retain and remember veraciously. This article adapts the 7 sins framework to a new domain--that of creative cognition. Each of the 7 sins are discussed in relation to how they might play a role in allowing people to generate new ideas, solve problems, and overcome the various barriers that hinder creative thought. Expanding upon the creative cognition approach, it is argued that memory and creativity are intrinsically interconnected and that one's ability to think and behave creatively relies in part on the ability to forget and misremember. |
| Abstractor: | As Provided |
| Number of References: | 248 |
| Entry Date: | 2018 |
| Accession Number: | EJ1200012 |
| Database: | ERIC |
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| FullText | Links: – Type: pdflink Url: https://content.ebscohost.com/cds/retrieve?content=AQICAHj0k_4E0hTGH8RJwT4gCJyBsGNe_WN95AvKlDbXJGqwxwFAvPURU5gB-pNxA9yQt0SDAAAA4zCB4AYJKoZIhvcNAQcGoIHSMIHPAgEAMIHJBgkqhkiG9w0BBwEwHgYJYIZIAWUDBAEuMBEEDN4zqeGGSmdQEE93tQIBEICBmxKDZ6KsL_Jyx8EvsqJB5N-1rgAK2faJrJ4oUKRSA7KS23JnLuCsVwivUTgvfaaGhpRXZXtZaXdH2zQ1ynpBAYaMqycgz5ORfa4SqFT7et2GiHnfqO96Y0diiWp13jxXlcFMr9ecS5Xz2ofZMNnIJl-ExnsIZMSpBBGJzX0KK1wRIpxu3CFyIzhKYKJXR0tlWMsxI8t9M50pgkVv Text: Availability: 1 Value: <anid>AN0133587422;7lo01oct.18;2018Dec18.14:06;v2.2.500</anid> <title id="AN0133587422-1">A Consideration of the Seven Sins of Memory in the Context of Creative Cognition </title> <p>Schacter's (2001) work on The Seven Sins of Memory conceptualized and communicated many of the failures of memory and their critical role in cognition. At the heart of the framework is the idea that memory often fails not because it is dysfunctional or maladaptive, but because it prioritizes flexibility and the ability to think and behave adaptively over the ability to retain and remember veraciously. This article adapts the 7 sins framework to a new domain—that of creative cognition. Each of the 7 sins are discussed in relation to how they might play a role in allowing people to generate new ideas, solve problems, and overcome the various barriers that hinder creative thought. Expanding upon the creative cognition approach, it is argued that memory and creativity are intrinsically interconnected and that one's ability to think and behave creatively relies in part on the ability to forget and misremember.</p> <p>When people think of creativity, they tend to think of artists such as Frida Kahlo, directors such as Steven Spielberg, and scientists such as Albert Einstein. These individuals are championed as creative geniuses because of the unique and highly influential works they produced and disseminated to the wider public. Yet, this is not all there is to creativity. As highlighted by the study of <emph>everyday creativity</emph>, ordinary individuals behave creatively all the time, such as when they solve problems, imagine nonexperienced futures, and produce novel associations and utterances (e.g., Cropley, 1990, 1997, 2016; Ivcevic &amp; Mayer, 2009; Nicholls, 1972; Richards, 2007; Richards, Kinney, Benet, &amp; Merzel, 1988). One framework for studying everyday creativity is the creative cognition approach, which seeks to understand both the cognitive processes that underlie creativity (e.g., mental imagery, analogical reasoning, priming, interference, retrieval, conceptual combination, self-generated thought), as well as the ways in which cognition is designed (in and of itself) to be creative (Finke, Ward, &amp; Smith, 1992; Smith, Ward, &amp; Finke, 1995; Ward, Smith, &amp; Finke, 1999). This article seeks to advance this approach by considering the relationship between creativity and aspects of memory often considered <emph>flaws</emph> or <emph>errors</emph>. Schacter's (1999, 2001) <emph>The Seven Sins of Memory</emph> offers a useful basis for this approach. According to Schacter, the sins of memory exist for good reason—rather than reflecting failures of a poorly designed system, the sins reflect the functioning of a system that is designed to behave adaptively and to provide certain cognitive advantages. Indeed, as discussed in more detail herein, one constellation of such advantages may relate directly to people's ability to think and behave creatively.</p> <hd id="AN0133587422-2">Creativity: What is it and Why is it Difficult?</hd> <p>Creativity can be defined in many ways (e.g., Csikszentmihalyi, 1999; Diedrich, Benedek, Jauk, &amp; Neubauer, 2015; Guilford, 1987; Kaufman &amp; Beghetto, 2009; Kim &amp; Pierce, 2013; Repucci, 1960; Runco &amp; Jaeger, 2012; Silvia et al., 2014; Sternberg, 1988, 2006; Taylor, 1988). According to most definitions, creativity reflects the ability to produce something—whether it is a solution to a problem, a piece of art, or a new idea or invention—that is both original and practical (although sometimes <emph>surprising</emph> or <emph>non-obvious</emph> is also included; Simonton, 2012). For something to be considered creative, therefore, it should be more than a simple reproduction or small extension of something that already exists, and it should fulfill some practical or directed purpose. Random or mostly useless ideas, therefore, even if highly unique or original, would not be considered creative. Of course, producing a new and practical idea can be difficult for a variety of reasons. Sometimes people become fixated on old ways of doing things. Other times they fail to identify when an idea or solution encountered in one context can be applied to a new context. People may also be unaware that they are approaching a problem with misconceptions or incorrect assumptions. Although these experiences may seem anecdotally familiar, such barriers to creativity have been well-documented in the literature (e.g., Ohlsson, 2011).</p> <p>Mental fixation can be defined as the limiting or constraining effect of existing ideas and solutions on a person's ability to think of new ideas and solutions. Fixation can be induced internally based on one's existing knowledge structures, or it can be induced externally through exposure to specific examples or cues (Agogué et al., 2014; Ezzat, Agogué, Le Masson, Weil, &amp; Cassotti, 2018; Gero, 2011; Goldschmidt, 2011; Purcell &amp; Gero, 1991; Sio &amp; Rudowicz, 2007; Smith, 2003). Interestingly, fixation effects are observed even if someone is warned that the information will not be helpful for completing a task at hand (Smith &amp; Tindell, 1997), and they are observed even among individuals who are presumably trained in occupations that rely on the production of novel ideas (Jansson &amp; Smith, 1991).</p> <p>In one compelling demonstration, Smith, Ward, and Schumacher (1993) asked participants to produce alien creatures and designs for new toys. Participants were shown several examples that all shared similar features (e.g., for the alien creatures, the examples all had four legs, a tail, and two antennae). Participants were then asked to create their own creatures. Unsurprisingly, participants who had been shown the examples were more likely to include the example features in their own creations than those who had not been shown the examples, demonstrating evidence of fixation. Perhaps more surprisingly, this effect was observed even when participants were explicitly told to avoid copying the examples and to make their own creatures as different as possible from the examples—in fact, under these conditions the fixation effect numerically increased. The researchers concluded that fixation can occur regardless of a person's intentions to avoid it (but see also George, Wiley, Koppel, &amp; Storm, in press, for an examination of how examples and fixation can enhance creativity).</p> <p>The phenomenon of fixation extends far beyond becoming hyper-focused on provided examples; indeed, it can manifest in a number of different ways (Purcell &amp; Gero, 1991). One particular case of mental fixation is that of <emph>functional fixedness</emph>, a phenomenon reflected by a person's tendency to focus on the canonical use for an object when attempting to solve a problem as opposed to other potentially more helpful or appropriate uses (Duncker &amp; Lees, 1945; Maier, 1931). When thinking of unusual uses for a light bulb, for example, people tend to think of uses that involve lighting a strange place, rather than heating things, because the typical use of a lightbulb is to provide light, not heat. Of course, fixation need not only occur for particular pieces of problems. <emph>Einstellung</emph>, which is defined as the tendency to mechanistically continue to solve problems in a manner that has worked previously despite the fact that a more efficient solution has become available (Luchins &amp; Luchins, 1959), can be thought of as fixation on a particular problem-solving method. Luchins (1942) demonstrated <emph>Einstellung</emph> by introducing a set of problems that could be solved with one approach before introducing a new problem that could be solved either with that same approach or with a quicker, more optimal approach, and showed that participants continue to use the nonoptimal approach instead of taking the time to search for the shortcut (Mayer, 1995). Researchers have argued that such fixation occurs due to repeated experiences with a problem or aspects of a problem that lead to automatization in responses that prevent the search for and production of new responses (Gick &amp; Lockhart, 1995).</p> <p>Another type of fixation is incorrect problem structuring, which can occur when someone becomes fixated on a particular way of viewing a problem, whether it is due to a lack of information about the problem space or an implicit bias about the way a problem must be approached. The nine-dot problem, for example, requires participants to connect a 3 × 3 matrix of dots using only four lines without picking up the pencil (Maier, 1930). This problem is difficult because people implicitly assume that every line must stop at a presented dot; however, one must overcome this implicit assumption and extend the lines beyond the nine-dot grid. Achieving the best solution to a given problem may often require a certain amount of restructuring, yet people are often implicitly resistant to questioning the usefulness or validity of their existing problem space.</p> <p>Knoblich, Ohlsson, Haider, and Rhenius (1999) examined the factors that play into problem restructuring through the use of matchstick problems, which present participants with an array of matchsticks arranged such that they form a false equation in Roman numerals (i.e., each line of the equation, including the operation sign, is comprised of a single matchstick; e.g., IV = III + III). The goal of these problems is to make the equation true in a limited set of movements of the matchsticks. Through examining participants' solving attempts, the researchers outlined the concepts of <emph>constraint relaxation</emph> (relaxing the rules of the problem, as previously discussed in the nine-dot problem) and <emph>chunk decomposition</emph> (breaking apart automatically formed chunks that are unhelpful for solving a problem). Chunk decomposition differs as a function of tight or loose chunks, where it is more difficult to break apart tight chunks. The chunk <emph>IV</emph> is loose, for example, because it can easily be broken into its component pieces <emph>I</emph> and <emph>V</emph>. The <emph>V</emph> itself is a tight chunk, however, as it tends to be seen as one value (<reflink idref="bib5" id="ref1">5</reflink>) that is more difficult to break up. Though it is certainly possible for people to reach the correct insight into how to restructure insight problems such as the nine-dot and matchstick on their own through random restructuring, such occurrences are rare, and people seem to benefit from explicit training on problem restructuring (also called <emph>breaking frame</emph>; Cunningham &amp; MacGregor, 2008; DeYoung, Flanders, &amp; Peterson, 2008; Dow &amp; Mayer, 2004; Lung &amp; Dominowski, 1985; Peterson et al., 2013; Schilling, 2005).</p> <p>A final example of a barrier to creative cognition reflects the necessity of analogical thinking in generating creative ideas and solutions to problems (e.g., Ball &amp; Christensen, 2009; Christensen &amp; Schunn, 2007; Kennedy, Miller, &amp; Niewiarowski, 2018; Welling, 2007). Analogical transfer occurs when an idea or solution encountered in one context is adapted or transferred to another context (Gick &amp; Holyoak, 1980; Holyoak, 1985; Linsey, Wood, &amp; Markman, 2008; Mak &amp; Shu, 2004). In one well-studied paradigm, participants are asked to read a story about an army attempting to attack a castle in which roads surrounding the castle have been equipped with land mines, so the entire army cannot approach from any one road without triggering an explosion. Unless the army attacks the castle full force, however, they will not be able to overtake it. To get around this problem, the army is split up into several smaller groups that approach the castle from several angles without triggering the mines, thus allowing them to overtake the castle when they arrive simultaneously. After reading the story, participants are presented with a problem about an inoperable tumor that can only be removed via laser therapy. The participant can solve the problem by realizing the analogy between the two situations. Such analogical reasoning requires a variety of memory processes, from encoding and retrieving the relevant example to mapping the structure of the first problem onto the second problem, in order to achieve insight.</p> <p>Research on spontaneous analogical transfer has been mixed (Barnett &amp; Ceci, 2002). Evidence suggests, however, that people are generally poor at such transfer tasks unless they are either given specific hints that direct attention to the similar structures of the problems or several different examples from which to develop relevant problem schemas (Gick &amp; Holyoak, 1980, 1983; Holyoak &amp; Koh, 1987). Several studies have demonstrated that thinking about the relationships between problems at a deeper level, rather than a surface level, for example, can result in more analogical transfer (e.g., Bernardo, 2001; Catrambone &amp; Holyoak, 1989; Cummins Dellarosa, 1992; Halpern, Hansen, &amp; Riefer, 1990; Needham &amp; Begg, 1991; Novick, 1988), though the superficiality bias of considering only the surface level is difficult to overcome (Gentner, Rattermann, &amp; Forbus, 1993; Keane, 1987; Trench &amp; Minervino, 2015). Additionally, recent work on analogical retrieval has shown that people are able to overcome the superficiality bias that often blocks analogical thinking if they are explicitly told to search for ideas that are outside of the target domain in which they are working (Trench, Olguín, &amp; Minervino, 2016)—a finding that has been supported by other, more naturalistic studies of analogical transfer (Dunbar, 2001; Hofstadter &amp; Sander, 2013).</p> <hd id="AN0133587422-3">The Seven Sins of Memory in the Context of Creative Cognition</hd> <p>Clearly there are many barriers to creative cognition, with the examples previously discussed representing just a few of the many factors that can stymie a person's ability to think and behave creatively. But how are such barriers overcome? To answer this question, at least in part, one should turn to research on memory, as the creative cognition approach identifies memory as one of the key components underlying creativity (Finke et al., 1992). More specifically, Schacter's (1999, 2001, 2013) seven sins of memory (i.e., transience, absentmindedness, blocking, misattribution, suggestibility, bias, and persistence) provides a useful framework with which to explore the relationships between memory and creativity. Schacter has argued that people suffer from memory "errors" because they make it possible for memory to function as flexibly and efficiently as it does. In this way, the <emph>sins</emph> can be considered <emph>virtues</emph>. In what follows, the argument is expanded to address the ways in which the seven sins are important not only for memory, but for creativity. To that end, each sin is introduced and the potential ways in which a person's capacity to be creative would falter if they were not susceptible to that sin are described. Such a discussion highlights the important linkages between memory and creative cognition.</p> <hd id="AN0133587422-4">The sins of omission—forgetting and inaccessibility</hd> <p>The seven sins are often grouped into errors of omission and errors of commission. Errors of omission—transience, absentmindedness, and blocking—refer to errors that involve the absence of a memory. For example, an experience might be poorly encoded or lost over time, such that it is rendered inaccessible when one wishes to recall it; or information may be known but momentarily inaccessible due to other information getting in the way. Such experiences are common and frustrating, but as will be discussed in more detail below, they can also facilitate a person's ability to think of new and creative ideas.</p> <hd id="AN0133587422-5">Transience</hd> <p>A memory accessible now may not be accessible in the future—an experience with which most people are highly familiar. <emph>Transience</emph> refers to the loss of a memory over time. Such forgetting can reflect a loss of access or a loss of storage (Tulving &amp; Pearlstone, 1966). Although frustrating, transience can be considered adaptive and beneficial for the general functioning of memory (Anderson &amp; Milson, 1989; Bjork &amp; Bjork, 1988; Storm, 2011). If every bit of information ever encoded was simultaneously accessible, it would become increasingly difficult—if not impossibly difficulty—to find the particular piece of information being sought at a particular point in time.</p> <p>One particularly famous case of a person who had difficulty forgetting was Luria's mnemonist S (Luria, 1968), or Solomon Shereshevsky, who was said to be able to remember in detail almost everything he experienced. Luria reported that although Shereshevsky's memory was indeed remarkable, he nevertheless experienced extreme difficulty functioning in everyday life, often becoming distracted and confused by the constant bombardment and accumulation of information, seeming to be particularly impaired in his ability to abstract general patterns from his experiences. Presumably, because Shereshevsky remembered everything as it occurred, he was unable to see similarities or make generalizations—he simply remembered each event as an isolated instance unrelated to other, similar instances. Being able to draw inferences from several different encountered sources is crucial for creative cognition, as one must be able to produce something new rather than simply reiterate what came before. In this way, remembering everything as it occurred is likely to impair one's ability to make novel associations and combine abstract principles in memory.</p> <p>The loss of <emph>access</emph> to existing memories, as opposed to <emph>storage</emph>, would seem particularly adaptive in the context of creative cognition. Although people may want to temporarily forget fixating information that gets in the way of producing new ideas, they would not want to forget such information in the more permanent sense, as it could be useful for solving different problems in the future. And indeed, whereas retrieval capacity is often severely limited, storage capacity is assumed to be effectively limitless (e.g., Bjork &amp; Bjork, 1992). Transience may also help shape the formation of new ideas. By rendering particular aspects of memories inaccessible, ideas can be changed and reshaped over time through processes of reconsolidation as new information is encountered (Alberini &amp; LeDoux, 2013; Hupbach, Gomez, &amp; Nadel, 2009; Lee, 2009; Lee, Nader, &amp; Schiller, 2017; Schiller et al., 2010). Information in memory needs to evolve and be applied to new scenarios, a need that may be accomplished, in part, by a memory system that is designed to forget. The forgetting of old, possibly irrelevant or unhelpful, material helps people break away from earlier ideas, helping them to overcome inappropriate mental sets associated with mental fixation, <emph>Einstellung</emph>, and superficial relationships that obscure the noticing and mapping of analogous solutions.</p> <p>To provide a more concrete example, consider the case of mental fixation. As previously discussed, fixation must often be overcome for new ideas or solutions to be produced. One way in which overcoming fixation has been examined is through incubation. An incubation effect occurs when time spent away from a problem (i.e., an incubation period; Wallas, 1926) results in better performance on that problem than what would have occurred without time spent away (Smith &amp; Blankenship, 1989, 1991; for a review, see Sio &amp; Ormerod, 2009a). There are many theories regarding how an incubation period benefits problem solving and divergent thinking (e.g., Beeftink, Van Eerde, &amp; Rutte, 2008; Ellwood, Pallier, Snyder, &amp; Gallate, 2009; Lehrer, 2008; Miller &amp; Cohen, 2001; Morrison, McCarthy, &amp; Molony, 2017; Ohlsson, 1984, 1992; Scheerer, 1963; Segal, 2004; Weisberg, 1995, 2006, 2013); according to the forgetting fixation hypothesis, however, incubation effects can occur because taking time away from a problem allows fixating information to become inaccessible and thus less likely to limit or constrain creative thinking (Kohn &amp; Smith, 2009; Smith, 1995; Smith &amp; Blankenship, 1989; Smith &amp; Linsey, 2011). In the remote associates test, for example, participants are presented with three seemingly unrelated words and asked to find a new word that forms a relationship with each of the words (e.g. elephant—lapse—vivid; solution: memory; Bowden &amp; Jung-Beeman, 2003; Mednick &amp; Mednick, 1971). An incubation period helps participants forget nontarget associations to each of the cue words to help them generate a solution (Chiang &amp; Chen, 2017; Koppel &amp; Storm, 2014; Penaloza &amp; Calvillo, 2012; Smith &amp; Blankenship, 1989).</p> <p>Transience can be beneficial for creative problem solving even in situations where an incubation period is not provided. Storm and Angello (2010), for example, found a correlation between retrieval-induced forgetting, a phenomenon that has been argued to reflect the adaptive forgetting of irrelevant or contextually inappropriate information in memory (Anderson, 2003; Storm &amp; Levy, 2012), and the ability to overcome fixation on the remote associates test. Indeed, in work analogous to retrieval-induced forgetting, research has shown that attempting to solve a problem or think of a new idea can cause the forgetting of outdated or irrelevant solutions and ideas (Ditta &amp; Storm, 2017; Storm, Angello, &amp; Bjork, 2011; Storm &amp; Patel, 2014), suggesting that the mechanisms responsible for transience may be at least partially built into the cognitive processes underlying creativity.</p> <hd id="AN0133587422-6">Absentmindedness</hd> <p>People often do things so automatically that they fail to encode or remember exactly what they did or what they need to do in the future. Such absentmindedness typically occurs when people do not need to consciously attend to the task at hand, leading to failures of encoding and errors in behavior that can be referred to as action slips (Craik, Govoni, Naveh-Benjamin, &amp; Anderson, 1996; Reason &amp; Mycielska, 1982). Schacter argued that, although frustrating, absentmindedness can be thought of as a natural side effect of making the most of a limited set of mental resources. Specifically, by not consciously attending to a task that can be accomplished automatically, people are able to devote attentional resources to other tasks. If people devoted full attention to everything they did, they would be unable to live beyond a particular moment. People would be unable to think of new research ideas while driving, or plan what tomorrow might be like while brushing their teeth. As such, it is useful to have a system that becomes automatized with repeated practice so that less attention needs to be devoted to such activities and can be directed elsewhere.</p> <p>With respect to creative problem solving, the tendency for attention to drift away from a specific problem or task may induce cognitive flexibility and provide people with the possibility of being exposed to new idea spaces that could be helpful for solving the problem. Indeed, a recent study by Kennedy et al. (2018) found that people were able to produce more creative ideas when they were instructed to use far-field (i.e., distantly-related) analogies to aid their thinking—particularly when such analogies were biologically based. Even though the problem space involved product development in industry, considering ideas in biology, a field seemingly unrelated at the surface level, positively affected creative idea production. In a similar way, people have a tendency to become fixated on within-domain information when attempting to solve problems. Information from outside of the domain, as might be encountered via instances of absentmindedness, can therefore be helpful in allowing people to transform their thinking in a way that allows them to reach new viable solutions (Goldschmidt, 2011). Obviously, people are unlikely to always drift toward ideas and spaces that are useful, but they may do so occasionally, and the potential benefits of happening upon a new and truly creative connection may more than outweigh the potential costs of more frequently happening upon something that is not useful. Indeed, some creativity research has argued that people are able to come to new insight through the unconscious spreading activation from one idea to another (e.g., Morrison et al., 2017; Sio &amp; Ormerod, 2009b; Sio &amp; Rudowicz, 2007; Yaniv &amp; Meyer, 1987).</p> <p>The benefits of absentmindedness can also be observed in the context of <emph>mind wandering</emph>, or the tendency for one's train of thought to wander from the task at hand. Mind wandering, even without conscious awareness, can lead to moments of insight as the mind mulls over a problem that had been left behind. Baird et al. (2012), for example, found that mind wandering during an incubation period correlated positively with creative insight. They asked participants to work on alternative uses task (AUT) problems for 2 min (i.e., think of as many new uses for an object as possible) and then either to continue working on the problems or to take a break that involved one of three things: resting, an undemanding task, or a demanding task. Results showed that participants who took a break involving an undemanding task, which prompted the most mind wandering, improved the most in their ability to generate novel ideas on the same AUT problems (importantly, it did not alter their ability to generate novel ideas on new AUT problems). Mind wandering may allow people to explore new connections and get away from earlier ideas causing fixation, thereby facilitating creative thinking. More generally, incubation tasks that are very different from the problem at hand have been shown to be particularly helpful in promoting problem-solving performance (Gilhooly, Georgiou, &amp; Devery, 2013), a finding that speaks well to the idea that a memory system that allows people to drift away from a problem may be more beneficial in the context of creative cognition than one that makes people remain incessantly focused.</p> <p>Many researchers have investigated the benefits of entertaining a wider search space—often referred to as a wide <emph>breadth of attention</emph>—during creative problem solving (Friedman, Fishbach, Förster, &amp; Werth, 2003; Kasof, 1997; Martindale, 1995; Mendelsohn, 1976; Nęcka, 1999; Rastogi &amp; Sharma, 2010; Tidikis, Ash, &amp; Collier, 2017). The argument is that individuals who have a wider, compared to a narrower, focus of attention are better able to consider remote information that could be relevant, even if such information may not seem particularly useful at first glance. Research on the ways to potentially improve creative ability in real-world contexts has provided support for this idea by demonstrating that encouraging a wider breadth of attention can increase creative performance in a team sports task (Memmert, 2007). Specifically, children who were not given any instructions on how to perform a given sports task (broadening attention) demonstrated significantly more creativity in the context of their sport than children who were told explicitly how to perform that sports task (narrowing attention).</p> <p>Wiley (1998) provided another example of the potential benefits of entertaining a wider search space during creative problem solving. Although it can be helpful to have some degree of domain knowledge, such knowledge can be detrimental if it leads to fixation on unhelpful information. In a series of experiments, baseball novices and experts attempted to solve baseball-related RAT problems for which the target solutions were not related to baseball. The results showed that baseball experts solved fewer baseball-related problems than baseball novices. Wiley argued that expertise can cause experts to search unnecessarily confined search spaces in their problem-solving attempts. Novices, in comparison, were relatively less constrained, and thus more likely to happen upon appropriate solutions. In fact, later work found that experts with high working memory capacity were particularly vulnerable to becoming fixated, presumably because they were less able to consider solutions unrelated to baseball (Ricks, Turley-Ames, &amp; Wiley, 2007). This work, in combination with many other studies, supports the idea that expertise can make people become rigid in their thinking patterns, which can hinder creativity under certain circumstances; this suggests that the flexibility that comes with a lack of expertise can be sometimes beneficial for creativity (Cubukcu &amp; Cetintahra, 2010; Frensch &amp; Sternberg, 1989; McLaughlin, 2001; Rubenson &amp; Runco, 1992, 1995; Simonton, 1995; Sternberg &amp; Frensch, 1992; Sternberg &amp; Lubart, 1991, 1995).</p> <p>More generally, there are many examples in the creativity literature of factors and individual differences related to having reduced attentional control being predictive of better creative performance (Ansburg &amp; Hill, 2003; Carson, Peterson, &amp; Higgins, 2003; Chrysikou et al., 2013; White &amp; Shah, 2006). In one particularly fun example, Jarosz, Colflesh, and Wiley (2012) asked participants to drink vodka-cranberry cocktails until their blood-alcohol concentration reached.075. Intoxicated participants, who presumably enjoyed less of a tendency to control the focus of their attention, were significantly more likely to solve RAT problems than a matched set of sober participants, suggesting that considering wider search spaces—something that is aided by people's tendency to be absentminded—can be beneficial for creative cognition.</p> <hd id="AN0133587422-7">Blocking</hd> <p> <emph>Blocking</emph> occurs when information becomes temporarily inaccessible due to interference caused by the existence or accessibility of other information in memory (e.g., Anderson, 1974; McGeoch, 1936; Mensink &amp; Raaijmakers, 1988; Reason &amp; Lucas, 1984; Roediger &amp; Neely, 1982; Watkins, 1975). Schacter argued that it can be beneficial to be susceptible to blocking because weaker or more remote information is prevented from coming to mind, thus ensuring (at least most of the time) that access to more salient and contextually appropriate information is prioritized. On occasion, as discussed previously with regard to mental fixation, the processes that lead to blocking can cause people to become overly fixated or constrained in the information they bring to bear during creative thinking and problem solving. In most situations, however, being susceptible to blocking and being fixated on a certain problem can be advantageous, focusing people toward the information that is most likely to be helpful or appropriate and limiting the extent to which people are inundated by the avalanche of irrelevant and unhelpful information that is perpetually available in memory.</p> <p>The argument for blocking being beneficial for creativity can be illustrated in the context of expertise. Though the argument has been made that expertise can hurt creativity, as discussed earlier, other work has found that expertise can benefit creativity in the form of domain-specific knowledge by providing a basis from which to generate relevant and useful ideas (Baer, 2015; Vincent, Decker, &amp; Mumford, 2002). To improve creative performance, people need to be able to focus on the information that is most likely to be helpful and block out the information that is less likely to be helpful. Rietzschel, Nijstad, and Stroebe (2007) provided evidence for the benefit of a focused search space when people are tasked with thinking of new ideas by having participants brainstorm about ways they could improve their health. Before engaging in the task, the participants were primed with particular subcategories related to health (i.e., nutrition, hygiene, or sports). Participants produced more original ideas within the primed subcategory than they would have produced otherwise. The researchers argued that the priming manipulation caused participants to focus on ideas within that particular subcategory, leading to a deep search in that area, instead of a shallow search across a wider range of areas.</p> <p>Admittedly, the benefits of blocking appear to contradict the benefits of absentmindedness. That is, on one hand it is better to be fixated and constrained; on the other, it is better to be unanchored and free to explore. This sort of trade-off has been studied extensively in the context of convergent versus divergent creative tasks (e.g., Brophy, 2001; Colzato, Ozturk, &amp; Hommel, 2012; Dewhurst, Thorley, Hammond, &amp; Ormerod, 2011; Gabora, 2010; Jauk, Benedek, &amp; Neubauer, 2012; Madore, Addis, &amp; Schacter, 2015; Pepler &amp; Ross, 1981; Razoumnikova, 2000), dual-process theory with system 1 versus system 2 thinking (Allen &amp; Thomas, 2011; Lin &amp; Lien, 2013; Sowden, Pringle, &amp; Gabora, 2015), and more generally in terms of flexibility versus persistence, as has been briefly discussed already (Nijstad, De Dreu, Rietzschel, &amp; Baas, 2010). Smith et al. (1995) also discussed the <emph>geneplore</emph> model of creative thinking, in which people must first generate many ideas (flexibility), and then narrow down to a small set of ideas to explore more thoroughly (persistence/blocking) to produce an idea that is ultimately both novel and useful based on the problem constraints. The creative process can also function by taking advantage of blocking and absentmindedness in reverse; that is, by making people first focus on and exhaust a small set of solutions, they may eventually be able to branch out into a more diverse search space (though this seems to occur in individuals with high need for cognitive closure; Ong &amp; Leung, 2013).</p> <p>Ultimately, both absentmindedness and blocking seem to be important for creativity, if not simultaneously then definitely in the context of specific types of tasks. There are instances in which one needs to focus narrowly on a given problem and not get distracted, and there are instances in which one needs to be free and unconstrained. Perhaps more important, people may be at their most creative when they are able to flexibly alternate between these two ways of thinking, giving them the benefits of both in a way that could not be accomplished by one alone (Bristol &amp; Viskontas, 2006). Such dynamics have been explored more formally in the context of the default and executive control networks (Beaty, Benedek, Kaufman, &amp; Silvia, 2015; Beaty, Benedek, Silvia, &amp; Schacter, 2016). Whereas the default network, which tends to be involved in spontaneous cognitive processes related to self-generated thought, is critical for retrieving and generating elements from long-term memory, the control network is needed to adaptively constrain, modify, and evaluate such elements on the basis of the context-specific goals of the task at hand. Thus, it may be in this way that default and executive processes work together to maximize creative cognition.</p> <hd id="AN0133587422-8">The sins of commission—construction, distortion, and incorporation</hd> <p>The <emph>sins of commission</emph> (misattribution, suggestibility, and bias) refer to errors involving the distortion of memory or the insertion of false information into one's recollection of a given experience. <emph>Misattribution</emph> occurs when something is remembered but attributed to the wrong source. Someone might think they saw something firsthand, for example, even though they were exposed to it on the news. Misattribution has been shown to play a critical role in contexts such as false memory formation (Loftus, 2005), imagination inflation (Goff &amp; Roediger, 1998), and cryptomnesia (Brown &amp; Murphy, 1989; Dow, 2015), all of which typically involve a failure of source memory. <emph>Suggestibility</emph> occurs when false information is implanted—often unmaliciously and unintentionally—into a person's recollection of an experience by someone or something else. Loftus and Pickrell (1995), for example, led participants to believe they had been lost in a mall as children by exposing them to a false vignette that was presumably provided by the participant's relative. Although participants at first denied having had such an experience, over time and with repeated efforts to remember, many eventually came to believe they did, often reporting vivid details of events that never actually occurred. Recent work has shown that people can even be led to believe they did something as egregious as commit a crime (Shaw &amp; Porter, 2015)! The last error of commission, <emph>bias</emph>, refers to the tendency for pre-existing knowledge and beliefs to influence the manner in which information is encoded and retrieved. For example, what people remember about themselves and others is constantly influenced by the beliefs and preconceptions they hold and the incessant need to maintain an adaptive sense of coherence (Banaji &amp; Greenwald, 1995; Conway &amp; Pleydell-Pearce, 2000).</p> <p>There are many reasons why it is advantageous to have a memory system that is susceptible to the sins of commission. One particularly important reason reflects the need to rely on gist-based schemas instead of verbatim details when encoding new experiences and recollecting the past (Bartlett, 1932; Brainerd &amp; Reyna, 2002). To sort and to remember all of life's day-to-day experiences would be untenable and, ultimately, unproductive. Rather than having a memory system that devotes its resources to remembering every detail of every experience, memories are synthesized into schemas (Alba &amp; Hasher, 1983), helping to boil down to the gist in ways that allows people to think and make decisions more quickly and more efficiently than they would be otherwise. Moreover, because schemas can be flexibly modified and built upon when new information comes to light, they allow people to more accurately represent the most salient or overarching themes of the past (McClelland, 1995). The unfortunate side effect of relying on schemas and gist-based representations, however, is that memory will often be become distorted, deviating from reality. People might remember a given experience, for example, in a way that is consistent with the gist of what happened (i.e., misattribution), or in a way that is influenced by their personal beliefs or attitudes (i.e., bias), but that may differ from what actually happened.</p> <p>Interestingly, research has shown that individuals who suffer relatively more gist-based false memories are also more likely to solve problems that require the noticing or activation of semantic associations. In one study, Dewhurst et al. (2011) gave participants a classic memory test known as the DRM (Deese/Roediger-McDermott; Deese, 1959; Roediger &amp; McDermott, 1995). In the DRM, participants are presented with lists of words, each consisting of associates related to a nonpresented critical lure. If participants later recognize the nonpresented critical lure as having been presented, then they are said to have experienced a false memory. Dewhurst et al. found that participants who experienced more false memories on the DRM were more likely to solve RAT problems than participants who experienced fewer false memories—a finding also demonstrated in children (Howe, Garner, Charlesworth, &amp; Knott, 2011). Presumably this correlation was observed because the tendency to synthesize a gist united by a given theme increased the likelihood of both falsely remembering the nonpresented words on the DRM and activating the necessary associations for solving the problems on the RAT.</p> <p>More generally, creative processes are thought to rely heavily on the way information is encoded and synthesized into coherent categories (Chrysikou, 2006; Davidson, Deuser, &amp; Sternberg, 1994; Dow, 2015; Mumford, Baughman, Supinski, &amp; Maher, 1996; Mumford &amp; Whetzel, 1996; Newell &amp; Simon, 1972; Sternberg &amp; Davidson, 1998). Creative performance, for example, often relies on the ability of individuals to perceive and represent the appropriate problem space. Without this ability, it would be difficult to identify or encode the elements of a problem in a way that would facilitate the generation of appropriate insights. Moreover, by synthesizing information into gist-based representations, people are more likely to encode problem spaces within the structures of long-term memory, thus allowing them to use such structures to make inferences. Indeed, the use of gist-based representations, as opposed to verbatim representations, may be particularly important in the context of spontaneous analogical transfer, where people often need to bypass the surface level details that distract them from seeing the underlying similarities or deeper analogies between disparate contexts (Root-Bernstein, 1991; Root-Bernstein &amp; Root-Bernstein, 1999; Welling, 2007).</p> <p>Schemas create useful starting points from which new ideas and solutions can be generated (Ward, 1994; Ward, Patterson, Sifonis, Dodds, &amp; Saunders, 2002). Prior work has shown that people tend to approach problems by drawing upon that which they already know. Doing so allows access to a large amount of information that may be relevant and that would not be available otherwise (Barsalou, 1991). In fact, training people to rely more heavily on preexisting schemas when producing ideas has been shown to increase the quality and originality of those ideas (though increases in originality tend to occur when people are encouraged to combine schemas together; Hunter, Bedell-Avers, Hunsicker, Mumford, &amp; Ligon, 2008). In other words, a reliance on schemas, even if it leads to errors such as misattribution and bias, may in many instances reflect a productive form of mental fixation—one that may be necessary for creative cognition to be grounded by the goals and needs of the individual. Finally, integrating new information into preexisting schemas may also be beneficial for solving problems that remain unsolved. By encoding new information in a way that is biased by existing knowledge structures, new information will be more likely to connect to the particular problems and concerns that are most salient and most in need of being addressed.</p> <p>The fact that people are suggestible is also likely to be useful in a number of creative contexts. Specifically, to be receptive to helpful information when it is encountered, people need to be able to apply newly encountered information to the problems they are trying to solve. This sort of information integration cannot rely entirely on the conscious noticing of a match or relationship between new information and a particular problem, making it important for new information to find its way into the creative process without a person's conscious knowledge or awareness. Being suggestible allows people to effortlessly incorporate other ideas into their own—a process by which new perspectives or combinations of ideas may become possible. Indeed, there are many examples in the literature of people becoming significantly more likely to solve a problem after being exposed (often implicitly) to useful information (Burnham &amp; Davis, 1969; Dominowski &amp; Jenrick, 1972; Grant &amp; Spivey, 2003; Hattori, Sloman, &amp; Orita, 2013; Thomas &amp; Lleras, 2009a, 2009b; Youmans, 2011). Interestingly, when people benefit from such exposure, they rarely attribute their insight or success to that exposure. Instead, they often report that the solution simply came to them (Gruber, 1988, 1995; Koriat, 2000; Topolinski &amp; Reber, 2010; Wallace, 1991; but also see, Kounios &amp; Beeman, 2009).</p> <p>Similar dynamics may also be at play in the context of incubation. According to the opportunistic assimilation hypothesis (Seifert, Meyer, Davidson, Patalano, &amp; Yaniv, 1994; Sio &amp; Ormerod, 2009b), when people fail to solve a problem initially, they become primed or prepared to receive new information related to that problem encountered later on. In other words, initial problem-solving attempts set up a sort of <emph>web</emph> that is ready to ensnare relevant information when it becomes available, thus allowing that information to be integrated with prior knowledge in a way that helps the person solve the problem at hand. Along these lines, giving participants clues or hints after a problem-solving failure can help them solve the problem, especially if participants are made aware of the connection between the clues or hints and the problem they are trying to solve (Christensen &amp; Schunn, 2005; Dodds, Smith, &amp; Ward, 2002; Moss, 2002; Moss, Kotovsky, &amp; Cagan, 2011; Smith &amp; Linsey, 2011). If memory was not structured to be flexible and susceptible to bias or suggestibility, then people would be less likely to incorporate the new and potentially valuable information to which they are exposed.</p> <p>The importance of considering information from external sources has been studied extensively in the creativity literature, often in the context of personality psychology. In particular, openness to experience (one of the <emph>Big 5</emph> personality traits), defined as one's tendency to have a wide variety of interests, hold unconventional values, and have a general curiosity about the world around them (John &amp; Srivastava, 1999), has been shown to be highly associated with creativity (Agnoli, Runco, Kirsch, &amp; Corazza, 2018; Dollinger, Urban, &amp; James, 2004; Leung &amp; Chiu, 2008; Li et al., 2014; McCrae, 1987; Mieg, Bedenk, Braun, &amp; Neyer, 2012; Prabhu, Sutton, &amp; Sauser, 2008; Simonton, 2000; cf. Silvia, Nusbaum, Berg, Martin, &amp; O'Connor, 2009). One eye-tracking study found that irrelevance processing may moderate the link between creativity and openness (Agnoli, Franchin, Rubaltelli, &amp; Corazza, 2015). In that study, participants engaged in a modified AUT in which photos of several objects surrounded a particular target object for which they were generating ideas. Participants with high levels of openness paid more attention to the surrounding irrelevant objects during the task and generated more creative ideas than participants with low levels of openness. Such results point to the idea that being more open to suggestions from external sources can help people incorporate alternative perspectives—an idea that harkens back to the argument that a wide breadth of attention can be beneficial for creative cognition.</p> <p>Finally, it deserves emphasis that memory is not only designed to recollect the past; it is designed to flexibly construct the future, envision new scenarios, and simulate novel connections and associations. If memory was not designed in this way, then cognition would be significantly limited in its capacity for flexibility, a limitation that would have profound implications not only for memory but for creativity. According to the <emph>constructive episodic simulation hypothesis</emph>, when people think about the future, they sample the contents of memory for relevant elements and then recombine those elements to simulate something that has never occurred (Schacter &amp; Addis, 2007; Schacter, Addis, &amp; Buckner, 2007; Szpunar, 2010). The cost of having a system capable of deviating from the past by combining and modifying elements in this way, however, is that people suffer from bias, suggestibility, and misattribution when they actually want to remember the past as it was experienced. In this and many other ways, the constructive episodic simulation hypothesis highlights the critical connection between memory and creativity (see e.g., Addis, Pan, Musicaro, &amp; Schacter, 2016; Duff, Kurczek, Rubin, Cohen, &amp; Tranel, 2013; Madore et al., 2015; Schacter &amp; Madore, 2016). Indeed, episodic simulations are involved in any number of creative tasks, from imagining the future to brainstorming to engaging in imagery-based exploration, and in each of these situations the person needs to be able to rely on a system flexible enough to tie together disparate ideas and experiences in a way that is relevant to current goals or to the demands of the task at hand, an ability that is not only important for adaptively representing the past, but for solving problems and generating new creative insights (De Brigard, 2014; Roberts et al., 2017).</p> <hd id="AN0133587422-9">The sin of persistence—unwanted and enduring</hd> <p>Finally, there is the sin of <emph>persistence</emph>. Persistence does not fit into the other broad categories of errors because it does not involve the forgetting or distortion of memory, but rather the unwanted intrusion of (usually) disturbing memories at inopportune times. If someone almost gets into a car accident but escapes unharmed, for example, they might continue to experience sudden and intense flashbacks of the event even if they were not injured. Such experiences have been well-documented in the literature (e.g., Herman, 1992; Krystal, Southwick, &amp; Charney, 1995), though memories do not have to be traumatic to be intrusive. Work by Wegner and colleagues, for example, has shown that when someone is told to not think about something (e.g., white bears), they tend to think about it more than they would have thought about it otherwise (e.g., Wegner, 1994). Persistence is thought to be adaptive in the sense that it keeps highly salient and informative experiences accessible and capable of affecting future behavior even if those experiences are painful to remember.</p> <p>Persistence, as it relates to creative cognition, can refer to the sudden remembering of unfinished or unsolved problems, which may then drive a person's desire to continue working on those problems in the future—a factor that has been noted to be involved with notably successful creative individuals (Adelson, 2003; Csikszentmihalyi, 1996a; Mieg et al., 2012; Renzulli, 1978). Even creative children show evidence of persistence, as higher levels of sleep disturbance have been shown to be positively related to creativity—presumably because such children were more susceptible to intrusive thoughts interrupting and preventing sleep (Healey &amp; Runco, 2006; see also Wicklow &amp; Espie, 2000). The problems that come to mind are those that are likely to be most salient, unfinished/interrupted, and/or have been deemed important. For example, if one is having difficulty coming to an agreement with a friend and needs to think of a creative compromise but fails to do so, it is often difficult to avoid thinking about the disagreement even after parting ways. Indeed, this intrusive remembering of tasks that are uncompleted and interrupted has been termed the <emph>Zeigarnik effect</emph> after the researcher who first noticed the phenomenon (Zeigarnik, 1927).</p> <p>The Zeigarnik effect has also been discussed with regard to the opportunistic assimilation hypothesis discussed earlier (Seifert et al., 1994). According to Seifert et al., engaging in an unsuccessful attempt to solve a problem sets people up in a way that guides their further search for solutions (Moss et al., 2011). Thus, a memory system susceptible to persistence may be critical for solving problems because when an interrupted problem goes unsolved, the mind becomes prepared to seek out or accept solutions when they are later encountered; that is, the unsolved problem persists in mind. Additionally, suffering from persistence necessarily results in previously unsolved problems being re-experienced in new situations in which new and potentially helpful information may be available (and in which old and unhelpful information may be less accessible), thus resulting in a fresh and potentially more productive perspective and problem space.</p> <p>More generally, persistence is likely to reflect a person's personal initiative, intrinsic motivation, and purpose, all of which are likely to relate to problem-solving ability and creativity when difficult obstacles or barriers must be overcome (Amabile, 1987; Csikszentmihalyi, 1996b; Frese &amp; Fay, 2001; Shalley &amp; Gilson, 2004; Simonton, 1988). In many contexts, creative work unfolds slowly over time as the result of purposeful effort dedicated toward developing ideas—an idea that has been called the <emph>evolving systems approach</emph> to creativity (Gruber, 1988). Persistence may underlie people's ability and desire to persevere and continue to work on problems even when it becomes difficult to do so, as it keeps unsolved problems at the forefront of thought. Finally, in at least some contexts, pursuing a single line of thinking more deeply, compared to sampling from multiple categories at a shallower level, may be particularly important for increasing the originality of ideas produced.</p> <p>Considered together, these ideas lend support to the claim that without persistence, unsolved problems—and particularly important or salient unsolved problems—would be left by the wayside and left uncompleted. Ultimately, a memory system susceptible to persistence serves multiple functions. It is likely to keep important problems and relevant pieces of information in mind so that they are repeatedly encountered in new scenarios in which helpful information not present in the original context may become available, and it is also likely to motivate people to continue to work on problems to achieve more creative solutions or ideas.</p> <hd id="AN0133587422-10">Conclusion</hd> <p>In sum, the human ability to think creatively relies, in part, on the ability to forget and misremember. Although there are certainly instances in which the failures of memory have the potential to directly enhance creative cognition, the more general relationship between memory and creativity being argued for here is a bit more nuanced. Specifically, it is not that memory errors themselves are necessarily beneficial for creative cognition—it is that having a memory system designed to suffer such errors puts people at an advantage, compared to having one that is not. Said differently, the argument is not that people will necessarily improve their creative performance by entering into scenarios in which they are more prone to suffering memory errors (though in certain circumstances, they certainly might)—rather, the argument is that the memory system is built to fail in certain ways because, if it were not, people would be worse off than they would have been otherwise, not only in the context of remembering, but in the context of thinking and behaving creatively.</p> <p>Finally, memory and creativity can be characterized as having a deeply symbiotic relationship. It would be impossible to understand one without the other. Although the focus of this article has been on the benefits of memory failures in the context of creative cognition, it should be emphasized that the failures of memory are likely to owe their existence, at least in part, to the need for people to be creative. Cognition is intrinsically generative and forward looking. In the grand scheme of things, a person's abilities to invent, imagine, and produce are likely to be as important, if not more important, than their abilities to retain and reproduce. In this way, the study of creativity is likely to not only benefit from a closer consideration of research on memory, but the study of memory is likely to benefit from a closer consideration of research on creativity.</p> <hd id="AN0133587422-11">ACKNOWLEDGMENTS</hd> <p>We thank N. Davidenko, J. Whitehead, and S. Whittaker for their comments on earlier versions of the manuscript.</p> <ref id="AN0133587422-12"> <title> REFERENCES </title> <blist> <bibl id="bib1" type="bt">1</bibl> <bibtext> Addis, D. R., Pan, L., Musicaro, R., &amp; Schacter, D. L. ( 2016 ). Divergent thinking and constructing episodic simulations. <emph>Memory</emph>, 24 ( 1 ), 89 - 97. doi: 10.1080/09658211.2014.985591</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibl id="bib2" type="bt">2</bibl> <bibtext> Adelson, B. ( 2003 ). 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| Items | – Name: Title Label: Title Group: Ti Data: A Consideration of the Seven Sins of Memory in the Context of Creative Cognition – Name: Language Label: Language Group: Lang Data: English – Name: Author Label: Authors Group: Au Data: <searchLink fieldCode="AR" term="%22Ditta%2C+Annie+S%2E%22">Ditta, Annie S.</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="AR" term="%22Storm%2C+Benjamin+C%2E%22">Storm, Benjamin C.</searchLink> – Name: TitleSource Label: Source Group: Src Data: <searchLink fieldCode="SO" term="%22Creativity+Research+Journal%22"><i>Creativity Research Journal</i></searchLink>. 2018 30(4):402-417. – Name: Avail Label: Availability Group: Avail Data: Routledge. Available from: Taylor & Francis, Ltd. 530 Walnut Street Suite 850, Philadelphia, PA 19106. Tel: 800-354-1420; Tel: 215-625-8900; Fax: 215-207-0050; Web site: http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals – Name: PeerReviewed Label: Peer Reviewed Group: SrcInfo Data: Y – Name: Pages Label: Page Count Group: Src Data: 16 – Name: DatePubCY Label: Publication Date Group: Date Data: 2018 – Name: TypeDocument Label: Document Type Group: TypDoc Data: Journal Articles<br />Reports - Descriptive – Name: Subject Label: Descriptors Group: Su Data: <searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Creativity%22">Creativity</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Schemata+%28Cognition%29%22">Schemata (Cognition)</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Memory%22">Memory</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Guidelines%22">Guidelines</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Role%22">Role</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Problem+Solving%22">Problem Solving</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Creative+Thinking%22">Creative Thinking</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Barriers%22">Barriers</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Persistence%22">Persistence</searchLink> – Name: DOI Label: DOI Group: ID Data: 10.1080/10400419.2018.1530914?redirect=1 – Name: ISSN Label: ISSN Group: ISSN Data: 1040-0419 – Name: Abstract Label: Abstract Group: Ab Data: Schacter's (2001) work on "The Seven Sins of Memory" conceptualized and communicated many of the failures of memory and their critical role in cognition. At the heart of the framework is the idea that memory often fails not because it is dysfunctional or maladaptive, but because it prioritizes flexibility and the ability to think and behave adaptively over the ability to retain and remember veraciously. This article adapts the 7 sins framework to a new domain--that of creative cognition. Each of the 7 sins are discussed in relation to how they might play a role in allowing people to generate new ideas, solve problems, and overcome the various barriers that hinder creative thought. Expanding upon the creative cognition approach, it is argued that memory and creativity are intrinsically interconnected and that one's ability to think and behave creatively relies in part on the ability to forget and misremember. – Name: AbstractInfo Label: Abstractor Group: Ab Data: As Provided – Name: Ref Label: Number of References Group: RefInfo Data: 248 – Name: DateEntry Label: Entry Date Group: Date Data: 2018 – Name: AN Label: Accession Number Group: ID Data: EJ1200012 |
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| RecordInfo | BibRecord: BibEntity: Identifiers: – Type: doi Value: 10.1080/10400419.2018.1530914?redirect=1 Languages: – Text: English PhysicalDescription: Pagination: PageCount: 16 StartPage: 402 Subjects: – SubjectFull: Creativity Type: general – SubjectFull: Schemata (Cognition) Type: general – SubjectFull: Memory Type: general – SubjectFull: Guidelines Type: general – SubjectFull: Role Type: general – SubjectFull: Problem Solving Type: general – SubjectFull: Creative Thinking Type: general – SubjectFull: Barriers Type: general – SubjectFull: Persistence Type: general Titles: – TitleFull: A Consideration of the Seven Sins of Memory in the Context of Creative Cognition Type: main BibRelationships: HasContributorRelationships: – PersonEntity: Name: NameFull: Ditta, Annie S. – PersonEntity: Name: NameFull: Storm, Benjamin C. IsPartOfRelationships: – BibEntity: Dates: – D: 01 M: 01 Type: published Y: 2018 Identifiers: – Type: issn-print Value: 1040-0419 Numbering: – Type: volume Value: 30 – Type: issue Value: 4 Titles: – TitleFull: Creativity Research Journal Type: main |
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