View in EDS HTML Full Text PDF Full Text

Looks Like a Liar? Beliefs about Native and Non-Native Speakers' Deception

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Title: Looks Like a Liar? Beliefs about Native and Non-Native Speakers' Deception
Language: English
Authors: Leach, Amy-May (ORCID 0000-0002-9464-1284), Da Silva, Cayla S., Connors, Christina J., Vrantsidis, Michael R. T., Meissner, Christian A., Kassin, Saul M.
Source: Applied Cognitive Psychology. Mar-Apr 2020 34(2):387-396.
Availability: Wiley. Available from: John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 111 River Street, Hoboken, NJ 07030. Tel: 800-835-6770; e-mail: cs-journals@wiley.com; Web site: https://www.wiley.com/en-us
Peer Reviewed: Y
Page Count: 10
Publication Date: 2020
Document Type: Journal Articles
Reports - Research
Descriptors: Deception, Native Speakers, Second Languages, Language Proficiency, Nonverbal Communication, Verbal Communication, Beliefs, Cues, Prediction, Interviews
DOI: 10.1002/acp.3624
ISSN: 0888-4080
Abstract: We examined whether observers' beliefs about deception were affected by a speaker's language proficiency. Laypersons (N = 105) and police officers (N = 75) indicated which nonverbal and verbal behaviors were predictive of native versus non-native speakers' deception. In addition, they provided their beliefs about these speakers' interrogation experiences. Participants believed that native and non-native speakers would exhibit the same cues to deception. However, they did predict that non-native speakers would likely face several challenges during interrogations (e.g., longer interrogations and difficulties understanding the interrogator's questions). Police officers and laypersons also differed in their beliefs about cues to deception and interrogation experiences.
Abstractor: As Provided
Entry Date: 2020
Accession Number: EJ1261765
Database: ERIC
Full text is not displayed to guests.
FullText Links:
  – Type: pdflink
    Url: https://content.ebscohost.com/cds/retrieve?content=AQICAHj0k_4E0hTGH8RJwT4gCJyBsGNe_WN95AvKlDbXJGqwxwGvEf06pktWou_9e7nrr7DIAAAA4jCB3wYJKoZIhvcNAQcGoIHRMIHOAgEAMIHIBgkqhkiG9w0BBwEwHgYJYIZIAWUDBAEuMBEEDImVCIUgpRPLhuVHtQIBEICBmpX799yI09HINS_lEZXMrGhqI1QxVBrfqZgCKUyxPN-rPrBNWEmlOY1P8euUGdE3pWrc-N0zhsUFSsYs4t4tCvH9-NLtlwI0yihOcXsI5ZU1Ktc7ALuytLKwrbPoc5552uT2YSVprOKPKF_5qrvEUxdURELpCY9pV-mHbtCqouZAImgMvl-LQVH73cxsex9Au2RtR1dXlNmAAW4=
Text:
  Availability: 1
  Value: <anid>AN0142000279;bu801mar.20;2020Mar03.04:01;v2.2.500</anid> <title id="AN0142000279-1">Looks like a liar? Beliefs about native and non‐native speakers' deception </title> <p>Summary: We examined whether observers' beliefs about deception were affected by a speaker's language proficiency. Laypersons (N = 105) and police officers (N = 75) indicated which nonverbal and verbal behaviors were predictive of native versus non‐native speakers' deception. In addition, they provided their beliefs about these speakers' interrogation experiences. Participants believed that native and non‐native speakers would exhibit the same cues to deception. However, they did predict that non‐native speakers would likely face several challenges during interrogations (e.g., longer interrogations and difficulties understanding the interrogator's questions). Police officers and laypersons also differed in their beliefs about cues to deception and interrogation experiences.</p> <p>Keywords: bias; deception detection; interrogations; language proficiency; stereotypes</p> <hd id="AN0142000279-2">INTRODUCTION</hd> <p>Despite the importance of accurately assessing when someone is not being truthful, laypersons' and experts' abilities to detect deception are only slightly better than chance (Aamodt & Custer, 2006; Bond & DePaulo, [<reflink idref="bib6" id="ref1">6</reflink>]). Researchers have long speculated that incorrect stereotypes of lie‐tellers might underlie this inability to detect deception (see Hartwig & Bond, [<reflink idref="bib28" id="ref2">28</reflink>]). Indeed, both laypersons and police officers report inaccurate beliefs about the diagnosticity of cues (e.g., Akehurst, Kohnken, Vrij, & Bull, [<reflink idref="bib2" id="ref3">2</reflink>]; Bogaard, Meijer, Vrij, & Merckelbach, [<reflink idref="bib4" id="ref4">4</reflink>]; DePaulo et al., [<reflink idref="bib18" id="ref5">18</reflink>]; Masip & Herrero, [<reflink idref="bib38" id="ref6">38</reflink>]; The Global Deception Research Team, [<reflink idref="bib45" id="ref7">45</reflink>]; Vrij, Hartwig, & Granhag, [<reflink idref="bib47" id="ref8">47</reflink>]). For example, gaze aversion is a commonly cited cue to deceit, even though it is not actually indicative of deception (e.g., Bogaard et al., [<reflink idref="bib4" id="ref9">4</reflink>]). Knowledge of deception stereotypes is incomplete, however, in that the majority of studies to date have focused on native speakers (see Bond & DePaulo, [<reflink idref="bib6" id="ref10">6</reflink>] for a review). Relatively little is known about whether beliefs about deception generalize to diverse linguistic populations.</p> <p>Research on non‐native speakers—and their deception—is particularly timely because linguistic diversity is on the rise. In fact, in Canada alone, the number of people who reported speaking a native language that was not English rose by 13.3% from 2011 to 2016 (Statistics Canada, [<reflink idref="bib44" id="ref11">44</reflink>]). In the United States, 20% of the population speaks a language other than English at home (Ryan, [<reflink idref="bib42" id="ref12">42</reflink>]). Thus, there are a number of contexts, such as border crossings or intelligence interviews, in which individuals may be required to communicate with people in authority in their non‐native languages.</p> <p>As a result, there has been an increased focus on the impact of language proficiency on deception decisions. Two central findings have emerged after over a decade of research on the topic. First, discrimination between lie‐ and truth‐tellers can be affected by speakers' levels of language proficiency, but the pattern of results has been mixed. One way to interpret these findings is in terms of the populations sampled. When non‐native speakers have been university students or community members, their deception has been accurately detected by laypersons at rates equal to (Castillo, Tyson, & Mallard, [<reflink idref="bib12" id="ref13">12</reflink>]; Cheng & Broadhurst, [<reflink idref="bib13" id="ref14">13</reflink>]; Evans & Michael, [<reflink idref="bib23" id="ref15">23</reflink>]) or greater than (Evans, Michael, Meissner, & Brandon, [<reflink idref="bib24" id="ref16">24</reflink>]; Evans, Pimentel, Pena, & Michael, [<reflink idref="bib25" id="ref17">25</reflink>]) that of native speakers. Conversely, observers have been consistently less able to detect the deception of non‐native speakers who have been recruited from official English as a Second Language programs (i.e., those who, arguably, possessed lower levels of objectively‐assessed proficiency; see Akehurst, Arnhold, Figueiredo, Turtle, & Leach, [<reflink idref="bib1" id="ref18">1</reflink>]; Elliot & Leach, Elliott & Leach, [<reflink idref="bib21" id="ref19">21</reflink>]; Da Silva & Leach, [<reflink idref="bib16" id="ref20">16</reflink>]). On the whole, previous work suggests that proficiency effects on discrimination exist, even if the exact direction of those effects remains unclear.</p> <p>Second, speakers' language proficiencies can affect observers' biases. There has been greater consistency across studies in this area. Typically, observers exhibit a truth bias toward native speakers: when attempting to detect deception, they are more likely to indicate that a speaker is telling the truth than lying (Bond & DePaulo, [<reflink idref="bib6" id="ref21">6</reflink>]). The same consideration does not appear to be afforded to non‐native speakers, however. Across several studies, non‐native speakers are viewed less positively than native speakers, either because they are less likely to be labeled truth‐tellers or they tend to be labeled lie‐tellers (e.g., Akehurst et al., [<reflink idref="bib1" id="ref22">1</reflink>]; Da Silva & Leach, [<reflink idref="bib16" id="ref23">16</reflink>]; Evans & Michael, [<reflink idref="bib23" id="ref24">23</reflink>]).</p> <p>In a new phase in the field, researchers have begun to examine the factors unpinning these differences in decision‐making. For example, speakers' accents (Akehurst et al., [<reflink idref="bib1" id="ref25">1</reflink>]), the demands of the deception task (Evans et al., [<reflink idref="bib25" id="ref26">25</reflink>]), and observers' familiarity with non‐native speech (e.g., Evans & Michael, [<reflink idref="bib23" id="ref27">23</reflink>]; Leach, Snellings, & Gazaille, [<reflink idref="bib33" id="ref28">33</reflink>]) have been tested as moderators of proficiency effects. The role of cognitive load has also received significant empirical attention (e.g., Evans et al., [<reflink idref="bib24" id="ref29">24</reflink>]). Lying requires mental effort; lie‐tellers are expected to exert executive functions—such as working memory, inhibitory control, and cognitive flexibility—to a greater extent than truth‐tellers (e.g., Sporer, [<reflink idref="bib43" id="ref30">43</reflink>]; Walczyk, Harris, Duck, & Mulay, [<reflink idref="bib48" id="ref31">48</reflink>]; Zuckerman, DePaulo, & Rosenthal, 1981). Similarly, although bilingualism has been associated with several advantages in terms of cognitive functioning, processing information in a non‐native (vs. native) language is more effortful (see Bialystok, Craik, Green, & Gollan, 2009). To the extent that executive function and perceptual resources are limited (Broadbent, [<reflink idref="bib8" id="ref32">8</reflink>]; Marois & Ivanoff, [<reflink idref="bib37" id="ref33">37</reflink>]), carryingout two demanding cognitive tasks simultaneously should negatively affect performance (Briggs, Peters, & Fisher, [<reflink idref="bib7" id="ref34">7</reflink>]; Johnston, Greenberg, Fisher, & Martin, [<reflink idref="bib29" id="ref35">29</reflink>]). The cognitive load approach to deception detection predicts that differences between lie‐ and truth‐tellers should be exacerbated under these conditions (Vrij, Fisher, Mann, & Leal, [<reflink idref="bib46" id="ref36">46</reflink>]). Thus, non‐native speakers might simply exhibit more cues to deception due to the heightened cognitive demands associated with both lying and speaking a less proficient language (e.g., Akehurst et al., [<reflink idref="bib1" id="ref37">1</reflink>]; Elliott & Leach, [<reflink idref="bib21" id="ref38">21</reflink>]). The Psychologically‐based Credibility Assessment Tool (PBCAT)—which is employed by minimally trained observers to identify 11 cues to deception—has yielded the most consistent findings about the leakage of non‐native speakers' deception (Evans et al., [<reflink idref="bib24" id="ref39">24</reflink>]). Across several studies and linguistic groups, the PBCAT has exhibited greater utility in discriminating between lie‐ and truth‐telling non‐native speakers than native speakers (Evans et al., [<reflink idref="bib24" id="ref40">24</reflink>]; Evans & Michael, [<reflink idref="bib23" id="ref41">23</reflink>]). That is, speakers with poorer language proficiencies exhibit more cognitive cues (e.g., fewer narrative details, less admitted lack of memory, thinking harder, and slower rate of speech) and affective cues (e.g., nervousness and negativity) to deception.</p> <p>In addition, there is indirect evidence that verbal and behavioral correlates of non‐native speech can impact decision‐making. Omitting audio information eliminates proficiency effects in lie‐detection tasks (i.e., the detection of native and non‐native speakers' deception becomes similar; Akehurst et al., [<reflink idref="bib1" id="ref42">1</reflink>]). Research from other fields also suggests that, in general, non‐native speakers look and sound different from native speakers, and may be viewed more negatively as a result (Fuertes, Gottdiener, Martin, Gilbert, & Giles, [<reflink idref="bib26" id="ref43">26</reflink>]; Lev‐Ari & Keysar, [<reflink idref="bib34" id="ref44">34</reflink>]). For example, non‐native speakers tend to speak more slowly, pause longer, and say less than native speakers (Kormos & Denes, [<reflink idref="bib30" id="ref45">30</reflink>]). Anxiety due to personal knowledge of lack of proficiency may be manifested in nonverbal behaviors, such as gaze aversion and the appearance of nervousness, as well (Gregersen, [<reflink idref="bib27" id="ref46">27</reflink>]). As mentioned, these are stereotypical cues commonly thought to be associated with deception (e.g., The Global Deception Research Team, [<reflink idref="bib45" id="ref47">45</reflink>]). Furthermore, less proficient non‐native speakers are considered less competent and intelligent than more fluent speakers, and face more negative employment‐related decisions (Lippi‐Green, [<reflink idref="bib35" id="ref48">35</reflink>]; White & Li, [<reflink idref="bib49" id="ref49">49</reflink>]).</p> <p>According to expectancy violation theory, deviations from expected verbal and/or nonverbal behavior can arouse and distract observers; in particular, attention can be drawn from the content of a message to focus on characteristics of the target (Burgoon, [<reflink idref="bib9" id="ref50">9</reflink>]). Norm violations can, thus, affect the nature of the interaction between communicators, their impressions of each other, and even the outcomes of their interaction. Importantly, violations are also less likely to be tolerated in the absence of preexisting positive relationships (e.g., when the observer and target do not know each other). Expectancy violation theory has been applied to a variety of communicative contexts, including deception detection (e.g., Burgoon, Blair, & Strom, [<reflink idref="bib10" id="ref51">10</reflink>]). Indeed, verbal and behavioral violations of norms—which are more likely to occur in cross‐cultural contexts—can become indicators of deception and impact evaluations of credibility (Bond et al., [<reflink idref="bib5" id="ref52">5</reflink>]; Castillo & Mallard, [<reflink idref="bib11" id="ref53">11</reflink>]). We posited that failing to calibrate one's beliefs with diagnostic cues to deception or general deficits associated with poor language proficiency (e.g., reduced comprehension) could account for inaccurate decision‐making and biases.</p> <hd id="AN0142000279-3">PRESENT RESEARCH</hd> <p>We examined individuals' beliefs about either native or non‐native speakers' (<reflink idref="bib1" id="ref54">1</reflink>) cues to deception and (<reflink idref="bib2" id="ref55">2</reflink>) interrogation experiences. Stereotypes about lie‐tellers are remarkably consistent across countries (The Global Deception Research Team, [<reflink idref="bib45" id="ref56">45</reflink>]); however, language proficiency can affect decision‐making (e.g., Da Silva & Leach, [<reflink idref="bib16" id="ref57">16</reflink>]; Evans et al., [<reflink idref="bib24" id="ref58">24</reflink>]; Lippi‐Green, [<reflink idref="bib35" id="ref59">35</reflink>]). Thus, we entertained two competing hypotheses: (<reflink idref="bib1" id="ref60">1</reflink>) individuals could apply their beliefs about native‐language speakers to non‐native speakers (i.e., beliefs about the frequency and intensity of cues to deception would be the same across language proficiencies) or (<reflink idref="bib2" id="ref61">2</reflink>) individuals could believe that non‐native speakers would behave differently than native speakers (i.e., exhibit traces of heightened cognitive load, such as more frequent pauses) due to the cognitive complexities associated with lying and speaking in a less proficient language. Both hypotheses were consistent with the deception detection literature, and we did not have a priori hypotheses about the accuracy of participants' beliefs. A fixed stereotype of deceivers could account for observers' biased and inaccurate decision‐making toward non‐native speakers (e.g., Da Silva & Leach, [<reflink idref="bib16" id="ref62">16</reflink>]) because group members might unwittingly violate perceived norms associated with truth‐telling when simply communicating. Even if participants adjusted their beliefs when judging non‐native speakers, their expectations may not be accurate or complete. Again, violated expectancies would produce the patterns of findings observed in previous deception detection studies.</p> <p>We also considered whether effects were moderated by expertise.[<reflink idref="bib1" id="ref63">1</reflink>] Experts differ from novices in several respects. For example, they demonstrate greater domain‐specific knowledge, and better detect meaningful patterns in information (Glaser & Chi, 1989). We would expect, then, that police officers (presumed deception detection experts) and laypersons (presumed deception detection novices) would differ in terms of their knowledge about deceivers. Yet both groups have reported similar stereotypes about lie‐tellers (e.g., Akehurst et al., [<reflink idref="bib2" id="ref64">2</reflink>]; Bogaard & Meijer, [<reflink idref="bib3" id="ref65">3</reflink>]; Bogaard et al., [<reflink idref="bib4" id="ref66">4</reflink>]; Delmas et al., [<reflink idref="bib17" id="ref67">17</reflink>]), leading some researchers to question whether the cues that trained professionals often use merely codify common sense (Masip, Herrero, Garrido, & Barba, [<reflink idref="bib39" id="ref68">39</reflink>]). It was not clear whether this pattern would replicate when deceivers were non‐native speakers. Due to the lack of differences between presumed novices and experts in terms of the detection of non‐native speakers' detection (Leach & Da Silva, [<reflink idref="bib31" id="ref69">31</reflink>]), one might predict that they would report similar beliefs towards this group, as well. However, experts can be more sensitive to context than novices (Chi, [<reflink idref="bib14" id="ref70">14</reflink>]). Given that legal measures have been put in place to protect non‐native speakers (e.g., R. v. Tran, [<reflink idref="bib41" id="ref71">41</reflink>])—signaling that they are a potentially vulnerable group—language proficiency should be an important contextual cue for law enforcement officials. Police officers may be more likely to modify their representations of lie‐tellers when they are non‐native (vs. native) speakers than laypersons. We conducted exploratory analyses to examine these hypotheses.</p> <hd id="AN0142000279-4">METHOD</hd> <p></p> <hd id="AN0142000279-5">Participants</hd> <p></p> <hd id="AN0142000279-6">Laypersons</hd> <p>One hundred and five students (56 females, 49 males; <emph>M</emph><subs>age</subs> = 21.70, <emph>SD</emph> = 5.09) from a midsized Canadian university completed the study in exchange for course credit. They self‐identified as belonging to the following ethnic groups: Arab/West Asian (<emph>n</emph> = 5), Black (<emph>n</emph> = 11), Caucasian (<emph>n</emph> = 36), Chinese (<emph>n</emph> = 10), Filipino (<emph>n</emph> = 8), Korean (<emph>n</emph> = 1), South Asian (<emph>n</emph> = 13), South East Asian (<emph>n</emph> = 6), and Other (<emph>n</emph> = 15). Seventy‐one students (i.e., 67%) reported that their first language was English, whereas the remainder indicated that their first language was Filipino (<emph>n</emph> = 4), Tamil (<emph>n</emph> = 3), Bangla (<emph>n</emph> = 2), Chinese (<emph>n</emph> = 2), Gujrati (<emph>n</emph> = 2), French (<emph>n =</emph> 2), Ino (<emph>n</emph> = 2), or 19 other individual languages.</p> <hd id="AN0142000279-7">Police officers</hd> <p>Seventy‐five police officers (15 females, 60 males; <emph>M</emph><subs>age</subs> = 39.07, <emph>SD</emph> = 9.04) were recruited from departments within the university's catchment area. They were not compensated for their participation. The average number of years that they had worked in law enforcement was 15 (<emph>SD</emph> = 9.5), and 48 officers (i.e., 64%) noted that they had previously taken at least one course on deception detection. Officers self‐identified as belonging to the following ethnic groups: Aboriginal (<emph>n</emph> = 2), Black (<emph>n</emph> = 6), Caucasian (<emph>n</emph> = 59), Chinese (<emph>n</emph> = 4), Japanese (<emph>n</emph> = 1), and South East Asian (<emph>n</emph> = 3). Seventy‐two police officers (i.e., 96%) reported that English was their first language, with the remaining three indicating that either French, Hindi, or Cantonese was their first language.</p> <hd id="AN0142000279-8">Design</hd> <p>We employed a 2 (Expertise: laypersons vs. police officers) × 2 (Target Proficiency: native‐language speakers vs. non‐native speakers) between‐participants design. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the two proficiency conditions at the beginning of the study. That is, participants were specifically instructed to think about either native speakers or non‐native speakers[<reflink idref="bib2" id="ref72">2</reflink>] when completing the two beliefs questionnaires.</p> <hd id="AN0142000279-9">MATERIALS</hd> <p></p> <hd id="AN0142000279-10">Beliefs about deception cues questionnaire</hd> <p>In the first section, participants considered a situation in which they were attempting to discern whether a person was lying or telling the truth. They were asked to indicate the extent to which they believed that 33 cues would increase or decrease if the person were lying, using a seven‐point scale (<emph>−</emph>3 <emph>= decreases during deception</emph>; <emph>+</emph>3 <emph>= increases during deception</emph>). All cues are provided in Table (Cronbach alpha coefficient =.78). These cues were derived from the list of verbal and nonverbal behaviors that were included in a previous study of individuals' beliefs (i.e., Akehurst et al., [<reflink idref="bib2" id="ref73">2</reflink>]), as well as DePaulo et al.'s ([<reflink idref="bib18" id="ref74">18</reflink>]) meta‐analysis of empirically validated cues to deception. We took this, more exhaustive, approach to capture a range of inaccurate and accurate stereotypes that could be held about both deceivers and non‐native speakers.</p> <p>Mean beliefs about cues to deception by occupation and proficiency</p> <p> <ephtml> <table><thead valign="bottom"><tr><th align="left">Cues to deception</th><th align="left">Layperson</th><th align="left">Police Officer</th><th align="left" /><th align="left">Actual (DePaulo et al., <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="bibr18">18</xref>)</th></tr><tr><th align="left">Native‐language speakers <italic>M</italic> (<italic>SD</italic>)</th><th align="left">Second‐language speakers <italic>M</italic> (<italic>SD</italic>)</th><th align="left">Native‐language speakers <italic>M</italic> (<italic>SD</italic>)</th><th align="left">Second‐language speakers <italic>M</italic> (<italic>SD</italic>)</th><th align="left">Overall <italic>M</italic> (<italic>SD</italic>)</th></tr></thead><tbody valign="top"><tr><td>Gaze aversion</td><td>−1.37 (2.00)</td><td>−1.24(1.98)</td><td>−0.97 (2.18)</td><td>−0.70 (1.98)</td><td>−1.08<xref ref-type="fn" rid="tfn2" /> (2.02)</td><td>‐‐</td></tr><tr><td>Blinking</td><td>0.96 (1.25)</td><td>0.53 (1.41)</td><td>0.35 (1.28)</td><td>0.70 (.92)</td><td>0.65<xref ref-type="fn" rid="tfn2" /> (1.24)</td><td>‐‐</td></tr><tr><td>Pupil dilation</td><td>0.69 (1.28)</td><td>0.47 (1.19)</td><td>−.03 (.94)</td><td>0.18 (.95)</td><td>0.38<xref ref-type="fn" rid="tfn2" /> (1.14)</td><td>></td></tr><tr><td>Smiling</td><td>−.04 (1.69)</td><td>0.06 (1.29)</td><td>0.23 (1.07)</td><td>0.30 (1.21)</td><td>1.07 (1.36)</td><td>‐‐</td></tr><tr><td>Covering mouth or eyes</td><td>1.06 (1.42)</td><td>0.82 (1.31)</td><td>0.91 (1.50)</td><td>0.63 (1.27)</td><td>0.85<xref ref-type="fn" rid="tfn2" /> (1.37)</td><td>‐‐</td></tr><tr><td>Facial expressiveness</td><td>−0.04 (1.79)</td><td>0.31 (1.70)</td><td>−.12 (1.39)</td><td>0.30 (1.40)</td><td>0.12 (1.60)</td><td>‐‐</td></tr><tr><td>Unfriendly facial expressions</td><td>0.12 (1.44)</td><td>0.16 (1.27)</td><td>0.29 (.87)</td><td>−0.03 (1.02)</td><td>0.13 (1.18)</td><td>></td></tr><tr><td>Shifts in posture</td><td>1.23 (1.18)</td><td>1.45 (1.08)</td><td>1.50 (1.19)</td><td>1.18 (1.29)</td><td>1.35<xref ref-type="fn" rid="tfn2" /> (1.17)</td><td>‐‐</td></tr><tr><td>Self‐manipulations</td><td>1.56 (1.14)</td><td>1.52 (1.00)</td><td>1.41 (1.33)</td><td>1.24 (1.41)</td><td>1.43<xref ref-type="fn" rid="tfn2" /> (1.19)</td><td>‐‐</td></tr><tr><td>Leg and foot movements</td><td>1.29 (1.09)</td><td>1.11 (1.37)</td><td>1.18 (1.14)</td><td>1.09 (1.26)</td><td>1.17<xref ref-type="fn" rid="tfn2" /> (1.19)</td><td>‐‐</td></tr><tr><td>Arm and hand movements</td><td>−0.12 (1.45)</td><td>−0.22 (1.25)</td><td>−0.18 (.94)</td><td>−0.42 (1.03)</td><td>−0.20 (1.22)</td><td><</td></tr><tr><td>Fidgeting</td><td>1.46 (1.16)</td><td>1.33 (1.18)</td><td>1.38 (1.39)</td><td>1.21 (1.60)</td><td>1.36<xref ref-type="fn" rid="tfn2" /> (1.29)</td><td>></td></tr><tr><td>Overall nervousness</td><td>2.10 (1.03)</td><td>2.12 (1.05)</td><td>1.24 (1.23)</td><td>1.21 (1.34)</td><td>1.77<xref ref-type="fn" rid="tfn2" /> (1.20)</td><td>></td></tr><tr><td>Stuttering</td><td>1.48 (1.20)</td><td>1.22 (1.21)</td><td>0.68 (.81)</td><td>0.55 (.94)</td><td>1.03<xref ref-type="fn" rid="tfn2" /> (1.14)</td><td>‐‐</td></tr><tr><td>Grammatical errors</td><td>0.42 (1.27)</td><td>0.53 (.95)</td><td>0.29 (.72)</td><td>0.45 (.94)</td><td>0.42 (1.00)</td><td>‐‐</td></tr><tr><td>Word or phrase repetitions</td><td>1.31 (1.20)</td><td>0.76 (1.11)</td><td>0.71 (1.09)</td><td>0.76 (1.44)</td><td>0.92<xref ref-type="fn" rid="tfn2" /> (1.21)</td><td>></td></tr><tr><td>Pitch</td><td>0.96 (1.25)</td><td>1.04 (1.25)</td><td>0.88 (1.15)</td><td>0.82 (1.07)</td><td>0.94<xref ref-type="fn" rid="tfn2" /> (1.18)</td><td>></td></tr><tr><td>Vocal tension</td><td>1.52 (.92)</td><td>1.39 (1.20)</td><td>0.94 (1.07)</td><td>0.88 (1.11)</td><td>1.25<xref ref-type="fn" rid="tfn2" /> (1.10)</td><td>></td></tr><tr><td>Speech rate</td><td>0.63 (1.53)</td><td>0.75 (1.37)</td><td>0.53 (1.24)</td><td>0.61 (1.32)</td><td>0.64<xref ref-type="fn" rid="tfn2" /> (1.36)</td><td>‐‐</td></tr><tr><td>Speech hesitations</td><td>1.44 (1.53)</td><td>1.47 (1.12)</td><td>1.21 (1.53)</td><td>1.09 (1.38)</td><td>1.35<xref ref-type="fn" rid="tfn2" /> (1.38)</td><td /></tr><tr><td>Number of pauses</td><td>1.04 (1.41)</td><td>1.14 (1.43)</td><td>1.09 (1.08)</td><td>0.79 (1.41)</td><td>1.01<xref ref-type="fn" rid="tfn2" /> (1.35)</td><td>‐‐</td></tr><tr><td>Length of pauses</td><td>1.37 (1.24)</td><td>1.18 (1.29)</td><td>1.29 (1.17)</td><td>0.79 (1.29)</td><td>1.18<xref ref-type="fn" rid="tfn2" /> (1.25)</td><td>‐‐</td></tr><tr><td>Coherence</td><td>−0.38 (1.72)</td><td>−0.18 (1.65)</td><td>−0.65 (1.72)</td><td>−0.52 (1.68)</td><td>−0.40<xref ref-type="fn" rid="tfn2" /> (1.66)</td><td><</td></tr><tr><td>Amount of detail</td><td>−0.14(1.85)</td><td>0.04 (1.91)</td><td>−0.74 (1.88)</td><td>−0.85 (1.60)</td><td>−0.34 (1.86)</td><td><</td></tr><tr><td>Unusual details</td><td>1.19 (1.63)</td><td>0.94 (1.36)</td><td>0.29 (2.00)</td><td>0.33 (1.87)</td><td>0.78<xref ref-type="fn" rid="tfn2" /> (1.72)</td><td>‐‐</td></tr><tr><td>Spontaneous corrections</td><td>1.21 (1.34)</td><td>1.14 (1.52)</td><td>0.56 (1.73)</td><td>0.61 (1.27)</td><td>0.93<xref ref-type="fn" rid="tfn2" /> (1.48)</td><td><</td></tr><tr><td>Admitted lack of memory</td><td>0.62 (1.59)</td><td>0.86 (1.23)</td><td>0.79 (1.61)</td><td>0.70 (1.38)</td><td>0.72<xref ref-type="fn" rid="tfn2" /> (1.46)</td><td><</td></tr><tr><td>Inconsistencies</td><td>1.94 (1.21)</td><td>2.16 (1.21)</td><td>1.91 (1.38)</td><td>1.48 (1.58)</td><td>1.90<xref ref-type="fn" rid="tfn2" /> (1.32)</td><td>></td></tr><tr><td>Generalizations</td><td>0.81 (1.05)</td><td>1.11 (1.16)</td><td>1.24 (1.07)</td><td>0.64 (1.25)</td><td>0.94<xref ref-type="fn" rid="tfn2" /> (1.13)</td><td>‐‐</td></tr><tr><td>Vagueness</td><td>1.08 (1.15)</td><td>1.08 (1.54)</td><td>1.56 (1.26)</td><td>1.09 (1.35)</td><td>1.20<xref ref-type="fn" rid="tfn2" /> (1.33)</td><td /></tr><tr><td>Negative statements</td><td>0.17 (1.32)</td><td>0.29 (1.36)</td><td>0.50 (.99)</td><td>0.27 (1.13)</td><td>0.31<xref ref-type="fn" rid="tfn2" /> (1.23)</td><td>></td></tr><tr><td>Cooperativeness</td><td>−0.46 (1.60)</td><td>−0.33 (1.49)</td><td>−0.59 (1.40)</td><td>0.09 (1.38)</td><td>−0.27 (1.51)</td><td><</td></tr></tbody></table> </ephtml> </p> <p>1 <emph>Note</emph>. Cues for which police officers' and laypersons' beliefs significantly differed (<emph>p</emph> < .001) are shown in boldface. Actual cues to deception, according to DePaulo et al.'s ([<reflink idref="bib18" id="ref75">18</reflink>]) meta‐analysis, are indicated with > (increases during deception), < (decreases during deception), and ‐‐ (no change during deception). Blank cells denote cues that were not explicitly investigated as unique variables in the meta‐analysis.</p> <p>2 Overall means that were significantly different at <emph>p</emph> ≤ .002 from 0 ("neither increases, nor decreases during deception").</p> <hd id="AN0142000279-11">Beliefs about interrogation experiences questionnaire</hd> <p>In the second section, using a five‐point scale (1 <emph>= strongly disagree</emph>; 5 <emph>= strongly agree)</emph>, participants were asked to indicate whether they agreed or disagreed with 18 statements about the contexts in which individuals are interrogated by law enforcement officials (see Table for the full list; Cronbach alpha coefficient =.63[<reflink idref="bib3" id="ref76">3</reflink>]).</p> <p>Mean beliefs about interrogation experiences by occupation and proficiency</p> <p> <ephtml> <table><thead valign="bottom"><tr><th align="left">Interrogation Experiences</th><th align="left">Layperson</th><th align="left">Police Officer</th><th align="left">Overall <italic>M</italic> (<italic>SD</italic>)</th></tr><tr><th align="left">Native‐language speakers <italic>M</italic> (<italic>SD</italic>)</th><th align="left">Second‐language speakers <italic>M</italic> (<italic>SD</italic>)</th><th align="left">Native‐language speakers <italic>M</italic> (<italic>SD</italic>)</th><th align="left">Second‐language speakers <italic>M</italic> (<italic>SD</italic>)</th></tr></thead><tbody valign="top"><tr><td>They tell the truth in response to questions.</td><td>3.17 (0.92)</td><td>3.25 (0.96)</td><td>3.14 (0.97)</td><td>3.54 (0.80)</td><td>3.27 (0.92)</td></tr><tr><td>They understand the difference between telling the truth and lying.</td><td>4.42 (0.75)</td><td>4.04 (0.94)</td><td>4.51 (0.61)</td><td>4.46 (0.84)</td><td>4.34 (0.82)</td></tr><tr><td>They intend to tell the truth.</td><td>3.31 (1.08)</td><td>3.52 (0.86)</td><td>3.40 (0.77)</td><td>3.43 (0.83)</td><td>3.42 (0.91)</td></tr><tr><td>They intentionally lie in response to (at least some of) the questions.</td><td>3.52 (1.02)</td><td>2.96 (1.02)</td><td>3.51 (0.85)</td><td>3.11 (1.02)</td><td>3.27 (1.01)</td></tr><tr><td>They are motivated to lie.</td><td>2.87 (1.03)</td><td>2.71 (1.01)</td><td>3.17 (0.82)</td><td>2.57 (0.80)</td><td>2.82 (0.95)</td></tr><tr><td>They understand the questions asked.</td><td>3.87 (1.16)</td><td>2.75 (0.98)</td><td>4.14 (0.85)</td><td>3.51 (0.84)</td><td>3.52 (1.11)</td></tr><tr><td>They understand more than they reveal.</td><td>3.87 (0.91)</td><td>3.45 (0.97)</td><td>3.94 (0.73)</td><td>3.62 (0.76)</td><td>3.71 (0.88)</td></tr><tr><td>They are capable of understanding the alleged events.</td><td>4.00 (0.74)</td><td>3.84 (0.86)</td><td>4.20 (0.68)</td><td>3.92 (0.80)</td><td>3.97 (0.79)</td></tr><tr><td>They are capable of remembering the alleged events.</td><td>3.83 (1.03)</td><td>3.94 (0.96)</td><td>4.03 (0.79)</td><td>4.17 (0.83)</td><td>3.97 (0.96)</td></tr><tr><td>They are capable of describing the alleged events clearly.</td><td>3.68 (1.01)</td><td>3.00 (1.03)</td><td>3.71 (0.86)</td><td>3.46 (0.99)</td><td>3.44 (1.02)</td></tr><tr><td>They are knowledgeable about the events reported.</td><td>3.48 (0.85)</td><td>3.73 (0.80)</td><td>3.69 (0.72)</td><td>3.97 (0.76)</td><td>3.70 (0.81)</td></tr><tr><td>They intentionally choose to communicate in their weaker language.</td><td>2.81 (1.12)</td><td>2.73 (1.11)</td><td>3.26 (1.01)</td><td>3.08 (0.86)</td><td>2.93 (1.06)</td></tr><tr><td>They intentionally misunderstand questions.</td><td>2.85 (1.14)</td><td>2.65 (1.13)</td><td>3.37 (1.03)</td><td>2.97 (1.01)</td><td>2.92 (1.11)</td></tr><tr><td>They give the impression that they are lying.</td><td>2.85 (1.11)</td><td>3.31 (1.10)</td><td>3.29 (0.79)</td><td>3.14 (0.86)</td><td>3.13 (0.99)</td></tr><tr><td>They are interviewed longer.</td><td>3.44 (0.75)</td><td>4.06 (.81)</td><td>3.46 (0.66)</td><td>3.73 (0.77)</td><td>3.69 (0.79)</td></tr><tr><td>They understand their rights.</td><td>3.21 (1.21)</td><td>2.76 (1.19)</td><td>4.17 (0.71)</td><td>3.89 (0.66)</td><td>3.42 (1.15)</td></tr><tr><td>They confess to a crime if they are guilty.</td><td>2.31 (0.90)</td><td>2.55 (1.05)</td><td>2.69 (0.72)</td><td>2.84 (0.83)</td><td>2.57 (0.91)</td></tr><tr><td>They falsely confess (i.e., say that they committed a crime that they did not).</td><td>2.23 (1.04)</td><td>2.39 (1.15)</td><td>2.29 (0.86)</td><td>2.05 (0.97)</td><td>2.25 (1.03)</td></tr></tbody></table> </ephtml> </p> <p>3 <emph>Note</emph>. Police officers' and laypersons' beliefs significantly differed (<emph>p</emph> < .01) on statements shown in boldface. Significant differences (<emph>p</emph> < .01) in beliefs about native‐ and second‐language speakers appear in italics.</p> <hd id="AN0142000279-12">Manipulation questionnaire</hd> <p>Participants were asked about the context that they had pictured when completing the beliefs questionnaires. Specifically, they indicated whether they had pictured the person speaking a specific language and whether they had pictured a specific scenario. Participants who gave affirmative responses were asked to describe what they had pictured.</p> <hd id="AN0142000279-13">Demographics</hd> <p>Participants were asked to provide basic demographic information, including age, race, gender, language history and preferences, occupation, and training.</p> <hd id="AN0142000279-14">Procedure</hd> <p>All participants completed the questionnaires individually—either alone or in small groups—in a quiet room. After providing consent, they were given the native or the non‐native language version of the beliefs questionnaires. Upon completing all questionnaires and providing demographic information, participants were debriefed. The entire session took less than 45 minutes.</p> <hd id="AN0142000279-15">RESULTS</hd> <p></p> <hd id="AN0142000279-16">Manipulation questionnaire</hd> <p>Slightly more than half of the participants (i.e., 52.8%) indicated that they had pictured the person speaking a specific language; 65.7% of this group envisioned an English speaker. Similarly, half of the participants (i.e., 50.4%) reported picturing a specific situation when responding to the questionnaires. A close examination of the qualitative data revealed that the majority of participants failed to provide sufficient information to classify their responses according to the deceptive context (e.g., "Situation in which a person was not telling the truth."; "Asking the person a question and he was looking to his left and right and thinking.").</p> <hd id="AN0142000279-17">Beliefs about deception cues</hd> <p>We conducted a between‐participants multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA)[<reflink idref="bib4" id="ref77">4</reflink>] on the 33 possible cues to deception, with expertise and proficiency level as independent variables. There was no main effect of proficiency on the combined dependent variables, <emph>F</emph>(<reflink idref="bib33" id="ref78">33</reflink>, 134) = 0.74, <emph>p</emph> =.841; Pillai's Trace = 0.15 η<subs>p</subs><sups>2</sups> = 0.15, nor an interaction between proficiency and expertise, <emph>F</emph>(<reflink idref="bib33" id="ref79">33</reflink>, 134) = 1.00, <emph>p</emph> =.472; Pillai's Trace = 0.20 η<subs>p</subs><sups>2</sups> = 0.20. There was a main effect of expertise, however, indicating statistically significant differences between police officers and laypersons, <emph>F</emph>(<reflink idref="bib33" id="ref80">33</reflink>, 134) = 2.08, <emph>p</emph> =.002; Pillai's Trace = 0.34 η<subs>p</subs><sups>2</sups> = 0.34. We examined the univariate effects more closely using a Bonferroni adjusted alpha level of.002 (see Table). Compared with police officers, laypersons were more likely to indicate that <emph>stuttering</emph>, <emph>F</emph>(<reflink idref="bib1" id="ref81">1</reflink>,<reflink idref="bib166" id="ref82">166</reflink>) = 18.76, <emph>p</emph> < .000, η<subs>p</subs><sups>2</sups> = 0.10; <emph>vocal tension</emph>, <emph>F</emph>(<reflink idref="bib1" id="ref83">1</reflink>, 166) = 10.42, <emph>p</emph> =.002, η<subs>p</subs><sups>2</sups> = 0.06; and <emph>overall nervousness</emph>, <emph>F</emph>(<reflink idref="bib1" id="ref84">1</reflink>,<reflink idref="bib166" id="ref85">166</reflink>) = 24.17, <emph>p</emph> < .001, η<subs>p</subs><sups>2</sups> = 0.13 increased during deception.</p> <p>As a check on participants' responding (i.e., to ensure that they were not simply consistently using the midpoint), we used one‐sample <emph>t</emph> tests to compare mean ratings for each of the 33 cues to 0 (labeled "neither increases nor decreases during deception"). Due to the number of cues examined, results were assessed using a Bonferroni adjusted alpha level of.002 (see Table). Participants indicated that <emph>blinking</emph>, <emph>pupil dilation</emph>, <emph>mouth and eye covering</emph>, <emph>posture shifts</emph>, <emph>self‐manipulations</emph>, <emph>leg and foot movements</emph>, <emph>fidgeting</emph>, <emph>stuttering, grammatical errors</emph>, <emph>repetitions of words or phrases</emph>, <emph>pitch</emph>, <emph>vocal tension</emph>, <emph>rate of speech, hesitations</emph>, <emph>number of pauses</emph>, <emph>length of pauses</emph>, <emph>unusual details</emph>, <emph>spontaneous corrections</emph>, <emph>admitted lack of memory</emph>, <emph>inconsistencies</emph>, <emph>generalizations</emph>, <emph>vagueness</emph>, <emph>negative statements</emph>, and <emph>overall nervousness</emph> increased during deception (all <emph>p</emph>s ≤ .002). They believed that <emph>eye contact</emph> and the <emph>coherence of the account</emph> decreased during deception (all <emph>p</emph>s < .002). To allow readers to compare participants' beliefs to empirically‐supported cues to deception (see DePaulo et al., [<reflink idref="bib18" id="ref86">18</reflink>]), we have provided the latter in Table. Examining this table reveals that participants were correct about the diagnosticity and direction of effects for 12 cues to deceit.</p> <hd id="AN0142000279-18">Beliefs about interrogation experiences</hd> <p>We conducted a between‐participants Expertise × Proficiency MANOVA on participants' beliefs about individuals' interrogations. There was no significant interaction between expertise and proficiency, <emph>F</emph>(<reflink idref="bib18" id="ref87">18</reflink>, 154) = 0.95, <emph>p</emph> =.527; Pillai's Trace = 0.10 η<subs>p</subs><sups>2</sups> = 0.10. Rather, there was a significant main effect of proficiency, <emph>F</emph>(<reflink idref="bib18" id="ref88">18</reflink>, 154) = 4.05, <emph>p</emph> < .001; Pillai's Trace = 0.32, η<subs>p</subs><sups>2</sups> = 0.32. A closer examination, using a Bonferroni adjusted alpha level of.003, revealed several statistically significant differences (see Table). Participants believed that, during an interrogation, non‐native speakers were less likely to <emph>understand the questions asked</emph>, <emph>F</emph>(<reflink idref="bib1" id="ref89">1</reflink>, 171) = 33.54, <emph>p</emph> < .001, η<subs>p</subs><sups>2</sups> =.16, and to <emph>intentionally lie in response to questions</emph>, <emph>F</emph>(<reflink idref="bib1" id="ref90">1</reflink>, 171) = 10.08, <emph>p</emph> =.002, η<subs>p</subs><sups>2</sups> =.06, than native speakers. In addition, participants indicated that non‐native speakers were likely to be <emph>interviewed longer</emph> than native speakers, <emph>F</emph>(<reflink idref="bib1" id="ref91">1</reflink>, 171) = 14.66, <emph>p</emph> < .001, η<subs>p</subs><sups>2</sups> = 0.08.</p> <p>There was also a statistically significant difference in laypersons' and police officers' beliefs about interrogation experiences, <emph>F</emph>(<reflink idref="bib18" id="ref92">18</reflink>, 154) = 3.54, <emph>p</emph> < .001; Pillai's Trace = 0.29, η<subs>p</subs><sups>2</sups> = 0.29. Using a Bonferroni adjusted alpha level of.003 revealed that police officers were more likely than laypersons to believe that individuals <emph>understand their rights</emph>, <emph>F</emph>(<reflink idref="bib1" id="ref93">1</reflink>, 171) = 44.21, <emph>p</emph> < .001, η<subs>p</subs><sups>2</sups> = 0.21 and <emph>understand the questions being asked</emph>, <emph>F</emph>(<reflink idref="bib1" id="ref94">1</reflink>, 171) = 11.99, <emph>p</emph> =.001, η<subs>p</subs><sups>2</sups> = 0.07. There was no significant interaction between expertise and proficiency, <emph>F</emph>(<reflink idref="bib18" id="ref95">18</reflink>, 154) = 0.95, <emph>p</emph> =.527; Pillai's Trace = 0.10 η<subs>p</subs><sups>2</sups> = 0.10.</p> <hd id="AN0142000279-19">DISCUSSION</hd> <p>We focused on observers' stereotypes about deception within a cross‐linguistic context. Specifically, we examined laypersons' and police officers' beliefs about native and non‐native speakers' cues to deception and interrogation experiences. Although there were no differences in the two groups' beliefs about verbal and nonverbal deceptive behavioral patterns, participants were sensitive to language proficiency effects on interrogations.</p> <hd id="AN0142000279-20">Beliefs about deception cues</hd> <p>As hypothesized, language proficiency had no significant effect on participants' beliefs about cues to deception. The strength and universality of many stereotypes about deception has been well‐established (e.g., Akehurst et al., [<reflink idref="bib2" id="ref96">2</reflink>]; Mann, Vrij, & Bull, [<reflink idref="bib36" id="ref97">36</reflink>]; The Global Deception Research Team, [<reflink idref="bib45" id="ref98">45</reflink>]). It is reasonable, then, that participants—the majority of whom identified as English‐speaking Caucasians—would simply generalize their beliefs to different linguistic groups (e.g., non‐native speakers).</p> <p>This broad application of stereotypes of deceivers can also explain previous findings in the deception detection literature. It is possible that laypersons' and police officers' heuristics were accurate: Elliott and Leach ([<reflink idref="bib21" id="ref99">21</reflink>]) failed to find differences between deceptive native and non‐native speakers in terms of behavioral cues. However, we consider this explanation unlikely. Proficiency‐related differences have been found in objective behavioral analyses of deceptive accounts, deceivers' self‐reports, and PBCAT scores (e.g., Cheng & Broadhurst, [<reflink idref="bib13" id="ref100">13</reflink>]; Evans et al., [<reflink idref="bib24" id="ref101">24</reflink>]). Thus, it is likely that behavioral differences between native and non‐native speakers exist, but they have not been incorporated into laypersons' and police officers' conceptualizations of deceivers. This could explain observers' relative inability to discriminate between lie‐ and truth‐telling non‐native speakers (e.g., Da Silva & Leach, [<reflink idref="bib16" id="ref102">16</reflink>]).</p> <p>It could also explain observer bias. When expectations about how a speaker should behave are violated, suspicion can be aroused (e.g., Bond et al., [<reflink idref="bib5" id="ref103">5</reflink>]). Non‐native speakers report and overtly display signs of nervousness and cognitive demands during interviews (e.g., speech hesitations and phrase repetition; Akehurst et al., [<reflink idref="bib1" id="ref104">1</reflink>]; Elliott & Leach, [<reflink idref="bib21" id="ref105">21</reflink>]; Gregersen, [<reflink idref="bib27" id="ref106">27</reflink>]). Thus, observers' negative biases when judging non‐native speakers (e.g., Da Silva & Leach, [<reflink idref="bib16" id="ref107">16</reflink>]; Evans & Michael, [<reflink idref="bib23" id="ref108">23</reflink>]) could be explained by this failure to adjust expectations in keeping with speakers' language proficiencies.</p> <p>We did consider whether these similar stereotypes about deceivers were due to biased response patterns (i.e., neutral responding) or a failure to report any firm beliefs about deception whatsoever. That did not appear to be the case; in total, 26 cues were believed to be significantly diagnostic of deception. Comparisons with DePaulo et al.'s ([<reflink idref="bib18" id="ref109">18</reflink>]) seminal work on actual indicators of deception revealed that participants only correctly identified both the diagnosticity and directionality of 12 verbal and nonverbal cues. Generally, their beliefs echoed many of the inaccurate and accurate deception stereotypes commonly reported in the literature (e.g., gaze aversion; Bogaard et al., [<reflink idref="bib4" id="ref110">4</reflink>]). Thus, we replicated previous work and demonstrated that it extends to other linguistic populations.</p> <hd id="AN0142000279-21">Beliefs about interrogation experiences</hd> <p>Police officers and laypersons were not completely insensitive to proficiency effects. They believed that, compared with native speakers, non‐native speakers would be less likely to understand the questions asked during an interrogation. Their intuitions appear to be correct. In deception detection studies, non‐native speakers reported having more difficulty understanding the experimenter's questions and made more overt requests for clarification than native speakers (Da Silva & Leach, [<reflink idref="bib16" id="ref111">16</reflink>]; Elliott & Leach, [<reflink idref="bib21" id="ref112">21</reflink>]). These issues were not limited to those with the lowest language proficiencies, even intermediate non‐native speakers expressed comprehension concerns. It is unlikely that participants gained their knowledge through training or coursework because findings about non‐native deception had not yet been widely disseminated when questionnaires were administered. Rather, they may have inferred that interpreters' presence in legal proceedings was intended to remedy non‐native speakers' comprehension issues. Regardless of its source, it is important that officers and potential jurors, who encounter suspects and witnesses from a range of linguistic backgrounds in the justice system, possess knowledge of the challenges facing non‐native speakers. It remains unclear whether this knowledge actually has an impact on their judgments or approaches to interrogation.</p> <p>Participants did anticipate that non‐native speakers' interviews would be longer than those with native speakers. This expectation may have been based on demands on the speakers, changes in interrogation structure, or a combination of the two. Perhaps it is relevant to consider this issue in light of participants' beliefs, and non‐native speakers' reports, that those with reduced language proficiency have more difficulty understanding interviewers' questions (Elliott & Leach, [<reflink idref="bib21" id="ref113">21</reflink>]). These individuals might take longer to process information and formulate responses, provide irrelevant responses (necessitating that a question be asked again), or ask for clarification (see Da Silva & Leach, [<reflink idref="bib16" id="ref114">16</reflink>]). In response, an interrogator might speak more slowly, provide unsolicited clarification, or modify and repeat questions All of these tactics could increase the length of an interrogation. To date, researchers have not examined the effect of language proficiency on interview length and its underpinnings in actual interrogations. These issues should be explored in future research, as longer interrogations have been associated with the greater likelihood of false confessions (e.g., Drizin & Leo, [<reflink idref="bib19" id="ref115">19</reflink>]). Our findings suggest that neither laypersons nor police officers anticipate a link: they did not expect language proficiency to affect false confessions.</p> <p>Interestingly, participants reported that non‐language speakers were less likely to intentionally lie in response to questions than native speakers. That expectation was inconsistent with the deception detection literature, as observers tend to exhibit a lie bias toward non‐native speakers (e.g., Da Silva & Leach, [<reflink idref="bib16" id="ref116">16</reflink>]; Evans & Michael, [<reflink idref="bib23" id="ref117">23</reflink>]). Closely considering the questionnaire item offers an explanation for the discrepancy between self‐report and decision‐making. Perhaps participants focused on intent: if non‐native speakers would have difficulty understanding questions and be subjected to the demands of longer interviews, they could be more prone to accidentally making errors.</p> <hd id="AN0142000279-22">The role of expertise</hd> <p>Overall, law enforcement experience was related to beliefs about cues to deception and interrogations. That is, experts demonstrated domain‐specific knowledge. Police officers were more likely than laypersons to believe that individuals understood their rights and the questions being asked. In addition, they were less likely to believe that stuttering, vocal tension, and overall nervousness increased during deception. Their intuitions were partially correct. DePaulo et al.'s ([<reflink idref="bib18" id="ref118">18</reflink>]) meta‐analysis indicated that vocal tension and overall nervousness were diagnostic of deception, whereas stuttering was not. Thus, both groups held accurate and inaccurate beliefs about the cues to deception. Yet in keeping with previous research (e.g., Akehurst et al., [<reflink idref="bib2" id="ref119">2</reflink>]), there were few differences between law enforcement officials' and laypersons' beliefs: their responses differed on only 3/33 cues to deception and 2/18 interrogation experiences. That may be why their deception detection performance is similar, as well (Aamodt & Custer, 2006).</p> <hd id="AN0142000279-23">Limitations</hd> <p>Whenever there are null findings, alternative explanations should be considered. We did examine whether the study lacked power. An a priori power analysis conducted using G*Power 3.1.3 indicated that the sample surpassed the minimum requirement of 100 participants. We also considered manipulation failure. Absent a formal check of the language proficiency manipulation, we can only speculate about how participants operationalized each group (e.g., the envisioned proficiency of non‐native speakers). Yet the pattern of results coincides with Evans et al.'s ([<reflink idref="bib24" id="ref120">24</reflink>]) cues to deception and there were significant proficiency‐related differences on some of the measures. Thus, participants appeared to follow study instructions regarding communicative ability, which was our primary goal.</p> <p>It remains possible that the envisioned ethnicities and languages of the non‐native and native speakers affected the pattern of results. Our manipulation questionnaire offered little insight: half of the participants failed to indicate that they had pictured a specific language or deceptive context. Of those who did respond, the majority envisioned an English speaker, but contextual information was insufficient for analysis. That may reflect question ambiguity: "Did you picture the person speaking a specific language" could have referred to the language in which the interaction took place or the speaker's actual native language, for example. Regardless, it is not clear that the speakers' characteristics (e.g., language and ethnicity) should affect participants' beliefs about deception. The seminal work on this topic suggests that there is a pancultural, panlinguistic stereotype of lie‐tellers (The Global Deception Research Team, [<reflink idref="bib45" id="ref121">45</reflink>]).</p> <p>Finally, using stringent approaches to test our hypotheses may have obscured real between‐group differences. We relied on previous work (e.g., Akehurst et al., [<reflink idref="bib2" id="ref122">2</reflink>]) and the conceptual relatedness of the questionnaire items to guide our analyses (i.e., MANOVAs and Bonferroni corrections). Yet items were not actually statistically related. Thus, the sheer number of tests may be less of a concern (i.e., a typical <emph>p</emph> value and ANOVAs could be used). When <emph>p</emph> < .05 was considered the threshold for significance, a more nuanced view of non‐native speakers emerged: participants were less likely to believe that they <emph>understand more than they reveal</emph>, <emph>understand the difference between lie‐ and truth‐telling</emph>, <emph>are motivated to lie</emph>, and <emph>understand their rights</emph>. A discussion of the relative merits of statistical approaches is beyond the scope of this paper. However, it is worth mentioning because we deemed several effects non‐significant due to our more conservative approach.</p> <hd id="AN0142000279-24">Implications</hd> <p>Despite extensive research on the cues to deception (e.g., DePaulo et al., [<reflink idref="bib18" id="ref123">18</reflink>]), police officers' and laypersons' beliefs were generally similar. Thus, law enforcement experience, on its own, is not sufficient to overcome widely‐held beliefs about deception. This finding also suggests that training programs that incorporate empirical information about the behavioral changes associated with deception are either not available or impactful. Researchers should work with officials to address this issue; there is some evidence that cross‐cultural biases in deception judgments may be prevented or reduced by providing information about culture‐specific behavioral norms (Castillo & Mallard, [<reflink idref="bib11" id="ref124">11</reflink>]).</p> <p>There were a few expertise‐based differences in beliefs about interrogation experiences. Officers were more likely than laypersons to believe that, regardless of language proficiency, suspects understood their rights and the questions being asked. However, there is evidence that individuals do not fully understand police cautions (e.g., right to silence and right to counsel; e.g., Clare, Gudjonsson, & Harari, [<reflink idref="bib15" id="ref125">15</reflink>]; Eastwood & Snook, [<reflink idref="bib20" id="ref126">20</reflink>]). Combined, these beliefs could make officers more likely to employ guilt‐presumptive interrogation tactics and therein expose suspects to the risk of false confession (e.g., Kassin, 2005; Narchet, Meissner, & Russano, [<reflink idref="bib40" id="ref127">40</reflink>]). This issue is particularly problematic if officers are interviewing non‐native speakers with low levels of language proficiency.</p> <p>Finally, as noted, mistaken beliefs about the frequency/intensity of behaviors during deception might contribute to observers' detection of non‐native speakers' deception. This finding raises an interesting dilemma. Ideally, legal decision‐making would be free from bias; thus, the tendency to believe native speakers is problematic (Bond & DePaulo, [<reflink idref="bib6" id="ref128">6</reflink>]). If individuals incorrectly believe that certain cues are associated with non‐native speakers' deception overall, but that leads to the elimination of biased decision‐making, one could argue that intervention is not necessary. Alternatively, any context that places one group of individuals at a disadvantage would itself be considered inherently unjust and prompt human rights challenges. Of course, we would endorse promoting accurate beliefs about non‐native speakers' deception, once they are known. In the interim, it is imperative that law enforcement officials are informed that there should be naturally‐occurring differences between native‐ and non‐native speakers when they are simply speaking (e.g., the latter group should display greater gaze aversion and self‐manipulation; Gregersen, [<reflink idref="bib27" id="ref129">27</reflink>]). That might ensure that decision‐making toward both groups is more similar, even if it is inherently biased.</p> <hd id="AN0142000279-25">CONCLUSIONS</hd> <p>We examined laypersons' and police officers' beliefs about native and non‐native speakers. Although both groups took language proficiency into account when considering suspects' interrogation experiences, it did not appear to affect their stereotypes of deceivers. These findings might help to explain why observers tend to view non‐native speakers more negatively than native speakers (e.g., Da Silva & Leach, [<reflink idref="bib16" id="ref130">16</reflink>]; Evans & Michael, [<reflink idref="bib23" id="ref131">23</reflink>]). Additional research is needed to explore whether stereotypes of deceivers can be modified to eliminate these proficiency‐related biases.</p> <hd id="AN0142000279-26">DATA AVAILABILITY STATEMENT</hd> <p>The data that support the findings of this study (Leach, Da Silva, Connors, Vrantsidis, Meissner, & Kassin, [<reflink idref="bib32" id="ref132">32</reflink>]) are available from the corresponding author upon reasonable request.</p> <ref id="AN0142000279-27"> <title> Footnotes </title> <blist> <bibl id="bib1" idref="ref18" type="bt">1</bibl> <bibtext> Defined here as socially recognized expertise due to knowledge and skills acquired through experience and training (see Ericsson & Charness, [22], for a discussion of perceived versus actual experts, and the difficulties associated with assessing superior performance).</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibl id="bib2" idref="ref3" type="bt">2</bibl> <bibtext> The actual instructions were to think of a person speaking in his/her "second (or less fluent, non‐native) language" or "native (or first) language" to clearly emphasize proficiency to participants. However, to increase readability and maintain consistency across the literature, we are using the terms "non‐native speakers" and "native speakers" here.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibl id="bib3" idref="ref65" type="bt">3</bibl> <bibtext> Although the internal consistency was slightly below the preferred threshold of.70, we do not believe that this is a point of concern because our goal was not scale development, we did not have an a priori hypothesis that the items would be related, and we had not intended to tap into a single underlying construct (i.e., there were no internal consistency requirements).</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibl id="bib4" idref="ref4" type="bt">4</bibl> <bibtext> Preliminary analyses failed to indicate any consistent effects of participant gender. Thus, all analyses were collapsed across this factor.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibl id="bib5" idref="ref52" type="bt">5</bibl> <bibtext> Funding information University of Ontario Institute of Technology , Grant/Award Number: SSHRC Small Research Grant (Internal)</bibtext> </blist> </ref> <ref id="AN0142000279-28"> <title> REFERENCES </title> <blist> <bibtext> Akehurst, L., Arnhold, A., Figueiredo, I., Turtle, S., & Leach, A. M. (2018). Investigating deception in second language speakers: Interviewee and assessor perspectives. Legal and Criminological Psychology, 23 (2), 230 – 251. https://doi.org/10.1111/lcrp.12127</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Akehurst, L., Kohnken, G., Vrij, A., & Bull, R. (1996). Lay persons' and police officers' beliefs regarding deceptive behavior. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 10, 461 – 471. https://doi.org/10.1002/(SICI)1099-0720(199612)10:6<461::AID-ACP413>3.0.CO;2-2</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Bogaard, G., & Meijer, E. H. (2018). Self‐reported beliefs about verbal cues correlate with deception‐detection performance. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 32 (1), 129 – 137. https://doi.org/10.1002/acp.3378</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Bogaard, G., Meijer, E. H., Vrij, A., & Merckelbach, H. (2016). Strong, but wrong: Lay people's and police officers' beliefs about verbal and nonverbal cues to deception. PLoS One, 11 (6), e0156615. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0156615</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Bond, C. F., Atoum, O. A., Pitre, U., Lashley, B., Skaggs, L. M., & Kirk, C. T. (1992). Fishy‐looking liars: Deception judgment from expectancy violation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 63, 969 – 977. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.63.6.969</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibl id="bib6" idref="ref1" type="bt">6</bibl> <bibtext> Bond, C. F., & DePaulo, B. M. (2006). Accuracy of deception judgments. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 10, 214 – 234. https://doi.org/10.1207/s15327957pspr1003_2</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibl id="bib7" idref="ref34" type="bt">7</bibl> <bibtext> Briggs, G. E., Peters, G. L., & Fisher, R. P. (1972). On the locus of the divided‐attention effects. Perception & Psychophysics, 11, 315 – 320. https://doi.org/10.3758/BF03210386</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibl id="bib8" idref="ref32" type="bt">8</bibl> <bibtext> Broadbent, D. E. (1957). A mechanical model for human attention and immediate memory. Psychological Review, 64, 205 – 215. https://doi.org/10.1037/h0047313</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibl id="bib9" idref="ref50" type="bt">9</bibl> <bibtext> Burgoon, J. K. (1993). Interpersonal expectations, expectancy violations, and emotional communication. Journal of Language and Social Psychology, 12, 30 – 48. https://doi.org/10.1177/0261927X93121003</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Burgoon, J. K., Blair, J. P., & Strom, R. E. (2008). Cognitive biases and nonverbal cue availability in detecting deception. Human Communication Research, 34, 572 – 599. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2958.2008.00333.x</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Castillo, P. A., & Mallard, D. (2012). Preventing cross‐cultural bias in deception judgments: The role of expectancies about nonverbal behavior. Journal of Cross‐Cultural Psychology, 43 (6), 967 – 978. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022022111415672</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Castillo, P. A., Tyson, G., & Mallard, D. (2014). An investigation of accuracy and bias in cross‐cultural lie detection. Applied Psychology in Criminal Justice, 10, 66 – 82.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Cheng, K. H., & Broadhurst, R. G. (2005). Detection of deception: The effects of language on detection ability among Hong Kong Chinese. Psychiatry, Psychology and Law, 12, 107 – 118. https://doi.org/10.1375/pplt.2005.12.1.107</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Chi, M. T. H. (2006). Two approaches to the study of experts' characteristics. In K. A. Ericsson, N. Charness, P. J. Feltovich, & R. R. Hoffman (Eds.), The Cambridge handbook of expertise and expert performance (pp. 21 – 30). New York, NY, US : Cambridge University Press.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Clare, I. C. H., Gudjonsson, G. H., & Harari, P. M. (1998). Understanding of the current police caution (England and Wales). Journal of Community & Applied Social Psychology, 8, 323 – 329. https://doi.org/10.1002/(SICI)1099-1298(1998090)8:5<323::AID-CASP448>3.0.CO;2-2</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Da Silva, C. S., & Leach, A.‐M. (2013). Detecting deception in second‐language speakers. Legal and Criminological Psychology, 18, 115 – 127. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.2044-8333.2011.02030.x</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Delmas, H., Elissalde, B., Rochat, N., Demarchi, S., Tijus, C., & Urdapilleta, I. (2019). Policemen's and civilians' beliefs about facial cues of deception. Journal of Nonverbal Behavior, 43 (1), 59 – 90. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10919-018-0285-4</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> DePaulo, B. M., Lindsay, J. J., Malone, B. E., Muhlenbruck, L., Charlton, K., & Cooper, H. (2003). Cues to deception. Psychological Bulletin, 129, 74 – 118. https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.129.1.74</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Drizin, S. A., & Leo, R. (2004). The problem of false confession in the post DNA world. North Carolina Law Review, 82, 891 – 1007.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Eastwood, J., & Snook, B. (2010). Comprehending Canadian police cautions: Are the rights to silence and legal counsel understandable? Behavioral Sciences & the Law, 28, 366 – 377. https://doi.org/10.1002/bsl.898</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Elliott, E., & Leach, A. M. (2016). You must be lying because I don't understand you: Language proficiency and lie detection. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied, 22, 488 – 499. https://doi.org/10.1037/xap0000102</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Ericsson, K. A., & Charness, N. (1994). Expert performance: Its structure and acquisition. American Psychologist, 49, 725 – 747. https://doi.org/10.1037/0003-066X.49.8.725</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Evans, J. R., & Michael, S. W. (2014). Detecting deception in non‐native English speakers. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 28, 226 – 237. https://doi.org/10.1002/acp.2990</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Evans, J. R., Michael, S. W., Meissner, C. A., & Brandon, S. E. (2013). Validating a new assessment method for deception detection: Introducing a Psychologically Based Credibility Assessment Tool. Journal of Applied Research in Memory and Cognition, 2, 33 – 41. https://doi.org/10.1016/jarmac.2013.02.002</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Evans, J. R., Pimentel, P. S., Pena, M. M., & Michael, S. W. (2017). The ability to detect false statements as a function of the type of statement and the language proficiency of the statement provider. Psychology, Public Policy, and Law, 23, 290 – 300. https://doi.org/10.1037/law0000127</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Fuertes, J. N., Gottdiener, W. H., Martin, H., Gilbert, T. C., & Giles, H. (2012). A meta‐analysis of the effects of speakers' accents on interpersonal evaluations. European Journal of Social Psychology, 42 (1), 120 – 133. https://doi.org/10.1002/ejsp.862</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Gregersen, T. S. (2005). Nonverbal cues: Clues to the detection of foreign language anxiety. Foreign Language Annuals, 38 (3), 388 – 400. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1944-9720.2005.tb02225.x</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Hartwig, M., & Bond, C. F. (2011). Why do lie‐catchers fail? A lens model meta‐analysis of human lie judgments. Psychological Bulletin, 137 (4), 643 – 659. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0023589</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Johnston, W. A., Greenberg, S. N., Fisher, R. P., & Martin, D. W. (1970). Divided attention: A vehicle for monitoring memory processes. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 83, 164 – 171. https://doi.org/10.1037/h0028554</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Kormos, J., & Denes, M. (2004). Exploring measures and perceptions of fluency in the speech of second language learners. System: An International Journal of Educational Technology and Applied Linguistics, 32, 145 – 164. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.system.2004.01.001</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Leach, A.‐M., & Da Silva, C. S. (2013). Language proficiency and police officers' lie detection performance. Journal of Police and Criminal Psychology, 28, 48 – 53. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11896-012-9109-3</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Leach, A.‐M., Da Silva, C. S., Connors, C. J., Vrantsidis, M., Meissner, C. A., & Kassin, S. M. (2019). Looks like a liar? Beliefs about native and non‐native speakers' deception. Applied Cognitive Psychology. https://doi.org/10.1002/acp.3624</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Leach, A.‐M., Snellings, R. L., & Gazaille, M. (2017). Observers' language proficiencies and the detection of non‐native speakers' deception. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 31, 247 – 257. https://doi.org/10.1002/acp.3322</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Lev‐Ari, S., & Keysar, B. (2010). Why don't we believe non‐native speakers? The influence of accent on credibility. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 46 (6), 1093 – 1096. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2010.05.025</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Lippi‐Green, R. (1994). Accent, standard language ideology, and discriminatory pretext in the Courts. Language in Society, 23, 163 – 198.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Mann, S., Vrij, A., & Bull, R. (2004). Detecting true lies: Police officers' ability to detect suspects' lies. Journal of Applied Psychology, 89, 137 – 149. https://doi.org/10.1037/0021-9010.89.1.137</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Marois, R., & Ivanoff, J. (2005). Capacity limits of information processing in the brain. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 9, 296 – 305. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2005.04.010</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Masip, J., & Herrero, C. (2015). Police detection of deception: Beliefs about behavioral cues to deception are strong even though contextual evidence is more useful. Journal of Communication, 65, 125 – 145. https://doi.org/10.1111/jcom.12135</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Masip, J., Herrero, C., Garrido, E., & Barba, A. (2011). Is the behaviour analysis interview just common sense? Applied Cognitive Psychology, 25, 593 – 604. https://doi.org/10.1002/acp.1728</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Narchet, F. M., Meissner, C. A., & Russano, M. B. (2011). Modeling the influence of investigator bias on the elicitation of true and false confessions. Law and Human Behavior, 35 (6), 452 – 465. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10979-010-9257-x</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> R. v. Tran (1994). 2 S.C.R. 951</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Ryan, C. (2013). Language use in the United States: 2011 (Report No. ACS‐22). Retrieved from <ulink href="http://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2013/acs/acs-22.pdf">http://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2013/acs/acs-22.pdf</ulink></bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Sporer, S. L. (2016). Deception and cognitive load: Expanding our horizon with a working memory model. Frontiers in Psychology, 7, 420. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2016.00420</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Statistics Canada (2017). Linguistic diversity and multilingualism in Canadian homes. Statistics Canada. Retrieved [January 2019] from: https://www12.statcan.gc.ca/census-recensement/2016/as-sa/98-200-x/2016010/98-200-x2016010-eng.cfm</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> The Global Deception Research Team. (2006). A world of lies. Journal of Cross‐Cultural Psychology, 37, 60 – 74. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022022105282295</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Vrij, A., Fisher, R., Mann, S., & Leal, S. (2008). A cognitive load approach to lie detection. Journal of Investigative Psychology and Offender Profiling, 5, 39 – 43. https://doi.org/10.1002/jip.82</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Vrij, A., Hartwig, M., & Granhag, P. A. (2019). Reading lies: Nonverbal communication and deception. Annual Review of Psychology, 70, 295 – 317. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-psych-010418-103135</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Walczyk, J. J., Harris, L. L., Duck, T. K., & Mulay, D. (2014). A social‐cognitive framework for understanding serious lies: Activation‐decision‐construction‐action theory. New Ideas in Psychology, 34, 22 – 36. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.newideapsych.2014.03.001</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> White, M., & Li, Y. (1991). Second‐language fluency and person perception in China and the United States. Journal of Language and Social Psychology, 10, 99 – 113. https://doi.org/10.1177/0261927X91102002</bibtext> </blist> </ref> <aug> <p>By Amy‐May Leach; Cayla S. Da Silva; Christina J. Connors; Michael R. T. Vrantsidis; Christian A. Meissner and Saul M. Kassin</p> <p>Reported by Author; Author; Author; Author; Author; Author</p> </aug> <nolink nlid="nl1" bibid="bib28" firstref="ref2"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl2" bibid="bib18" firstref="ref5"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl3" bibid="bib38" firstref="ref6"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl4" bibid="bib45" firstref="ref7"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl5" bibid="bib47" firstref="ref8"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl6" bibid="bib44" firstref="ref11"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl7" bibid="bib42" firstref="ref12"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl8" bibid="bib12" firstref="ref13"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl9" bibid="bib13" firstref="ref14"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl10" bibid="bib23" firstref="ref15"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl11" bibid="bib24" firstref="ref16"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl12" bibid="bib25" firstref="ref17"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl13" bibid="bib21" firstref="ref19"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl14" bibid="bib16" firstref="ref20"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl15" bibid="bib33" firstref="ref28"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl16" bibid="bib43" firstref="ref30"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl17" bibid="bib48" firstref="ref31"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl18" bibid="bib37" firstref="ref33"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl19" bibid="bib29" firstref="ref35"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl20" bibid="bib46" firstref="ref36"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl21" bibid="bib26" firstref="ref43"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl22" bibid="bib34" firstref="ref44"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl23" bibid="bib30" firstref="ref45"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl24" bibid="bib27" firstref="ref46"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl25" bibid="bib35" firstref="ref48"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl26" bibid="bib49" firstref="ref49"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl27" bibid="bib10" firstref="ref51"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl28" bibid="bib11" firstref="ref53"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl29" bibid="bib17" firstref="ref67"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl30" bibid="bib39" firstref="ref68"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl31" bibid="bib31" firstref="ref69"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl32" bibid="bib14" firstref="ref70"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl33" bibid="bib41" firstref="ref71"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl34" bibid="bib166" firstref="ref82"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl35" bibid="bib36" firstref="ref97"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl36" bibid="bib19" firstref="ref115"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl37" bibid="bib15" firstref="ref125"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl38" bibid="bib20" firstref="ref126"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl39" bibid="bib40" firstref="ref127"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl40" bibid="bib32" firstref="ref132"></nolink>
Header DbId: eric
DbLabel: ERIC
An: EJ1261765
AccessLevel: 3
PubType: Academic Journal
PubTypeId: academicJournal
PreciseRelevancyScore: 0
IllustrationInfo
Items – Name: Title
  Label: Title
  Group: Ti
  Data: Looks Like a Liar? Beliefs about Native and Non-Native Speakers' Deception
– Name: Language
  Label: Language
  Group: Lang
  Data: English
– Name: Author
  Label: Authors
  Group: Au
  Data: <searchLink fieldCode="AR" term="%22Leach%2C+Amy-May%22">Leach, Amy-May</searchLink> (ORCID <externalLink term="https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9464-1284">0000-0002-9464-1284</externalLink>)<br /><searchLink fieldCode="AR" term="%22Da+Silva%2C+Cayla+S%2E%22">Da Silva, Cayla S.</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="AR" term="%22Connors%2C+Christina+J%2E%22">Connors, Christina J.</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="AR" term="%22Vrantsidis%2C+Michael+R%2E+T%2E%22">Vrantsidis, Michael R. T.</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="AR" term="%22Meissner%2C+Christian+A%2E%22">Meissner, Christian A.</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="AR" term="%22Kassin%2C+Saul+M%2E%22">Kassin, Saul M.</searchLink>
– Name: TitleSource
  Label: Source
  Group: Src
  Data: <searchLink fieldCode="SO" term="%22Applied+Cognitive+Psychology%22"><i>Applied Cognitive Psychology</i></searchLink>. Mar-Apr 2020 34(2):387-396.
– Name: Avail
  Label: Availability
  Group: Avail
  Data: Wiley. Available from: John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 111 River Street, Hoboken, NJ 07030. Tel: 800-835-6770; e-mail: cs-journals@wiley.com; Web site: https://www.wiley.com/en-us
– Name: PeerReviewed
  Label: Peer Reviewed
  Group: SrcInfo
  Data: Y
– Name: Pages
  Label: Page Count
  Group: Src
  Data: 10
– Name: DatePubCY
  Label: Publication Date
  Group: Date
  Data: 2020
– Name: TypeDocument
  Label: Document Type
  Group: TypDoc
  Data: Journal Articles<br />Reports - Research
– Name: Subject
  Label: Descriptors
  Group: Su
  Data: <searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Deception%22">Deception</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Native+Speakers%22">Native Speakers</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Second+Languages%22">Second Languages</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Language+Proficiency%22">Language Proficiency</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Nonverbal+Communication%22">Nonverbal Communication</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Verbal+Communication%22">Verbal Communication</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Beliefs%22">Beliefs</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Cues%22">Cues</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Prediction%22">Prediction</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Interviews%22">Interviews</searchLink>
– Name: DOI
  Label: DOI
  Group: ID
  Data: 10.1002/acp.3624
– Name: ISSN
  Label: ISSN
  Group: ISSN
  Data: 0888-4080
– Name: Abstract
  Label: Abstract
  Group: Ab
  Data: We examined whether observers' beliefs about deception were affected by a speaker's language proficiency. Laypersons (N = 105) and police officers (N = 75) indicated which nonverbal and verbal behaviors were predictive of native versus non-native speakers' deception. In addition, they provided their beliefs about these speakers' interrogation experiences. Participants believed that native and non-native speakers would exhibit the same cues to deception. However, they did predict that non-native speakers would likely face several challenges during interrogations (e.g., longer interrogations and difficulties understanding the interrogator's questions). Police officers and laypersons also differed in their beliefs about cues to deception and interrogation experiences.
– Name: AbstractInfo
  Label: Abstractor
  Group: Ab
  Data: As Provided
– Name: DateEntry
  Label: Entry Date
  Group: Date
  Data: 2020
– Name: AN
  Label: Accession Number
  Group: ID
  Data: EJ1261765
PLink https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=eric&AN=EJ1261765
RecordInfo BibRecord:
  BibEntity:
    Identifiers:
      – Type: doi
        Value: 10.1002/acp.3624
    Languages:
      – Text: English
    PhysicalDescription:
      Pagination:
        PageCount: 10
        StartPage: 387
    Subjects:
      – SubjectFull: Deception
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Native Speakers
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Second Languages
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Language Proficiency
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Nonverbal Communication
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Verbal Communication
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Beliefs
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Cues
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Prediction
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Interviews
        Type: general
    Titles:
      – TitleFull: Looks Like a Liar? Beliefs about Native and Non-Native Speakers' Deception
        Type: main
  BibRelationships:
    HasContributorRelationships:
      – PersonEntity:
          Name:
            NameFull: Leach, Amy-May
      – PersonEntity:
          Name:
            NameFull: Da Silva, Cayla S.
      – PersonEntity:
          Name:
            NameFull: Connors, Christina J.
      – PersonEntity:
          Name:
            NameFull: Vrantsidis, Michael R. T.
      – PersonEntity:
          Name:
            NameFull: Meissner, Christian A.
      – PersonEntity:
          Name:
            NameFull: Kassin, Saul M.
    IsPartOfRelationships:
      – BibEntity:
          Dates:
            – D: 01
              M: 01
              Type: published
              Y: 2020
          Identifiers:
            – Type: issn-print
              Value: 0888-4080
          Numbering:
            – Type: volume
              Value: 34
            – Type: issue
              Value: 2
          Titles:
            – TitleFull: Applied Cognitive Psychology
              Type: main
ResultId 1