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Trading-Off Monetary Rewards as Reinforcers to Enhance Task Motivation and Performance of Publication in Academia

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Title: Trading-Off Monetary Rewards as Reinforcers to Enhance Task Motivation and Performance of Publication in Academia
Language: English
Authors: Gaus, Nurdiana (ORCID 0000-0002-1411-7512), Jasruddin, Saleh, Arifin, Resnawaty, Risna, Paramma, Muhammad Azwar, Tanjung, Yurisna
Source: Higher Education Quarterly. Oct 2022 76(4):800-814.
Availability: Wiley. Available from: John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 111 River Street, Hoboken, NJ 07030. Tel: 800-835-6770; e-mail: cs-journals@wiley.com; Web site: https://www.wiley.com/en-us
Peer Reviewed: Y
Page Count: 15
Publication Date: 2022
Document Type: Journal Articles
Reports - Research
Education Level: Higher Education
Postsecondary Education
Descriptors: Foreign Countries, College Faculty, Faculty Publishing, Rewards, Motivation, Incentives, Economic Factors
Geographic Terms: Indonesia
DOI: 10.1111/hequ.12350
ISSN: 0951-5224
1468-2273
Abstract: This paper aims to examine how an inappropriate traded-off design scheme of monetary rewards as reinforcers to task motivation and performance can promote poor quality of publication in academia and create the potential 'hidden costs of rewards.' Six universities in the western and eastern regions of Indonesia were selected to investigate this issue, and 70 academics from different social science backgrounds were interviewed. Our research results show that the monetary rewards implemented by the Indonesian government only act as a trigger for the initial motivation and become a quantitative lever for journal publications, not a quality lever. Consequently, the quality of publication is still poor because of the low-powered incentive schemes that are designed based on task-completion, disregarding the 'synergistic effect' between the government's intentions and the academics' attributions. The implications of this study and recommendations to policymakers are provided in this paper.
Abstractor: As Provided
Entry Date: 2022
Accession Number: EJ1351112
Database: ERIC
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  Value: <anid>AN0159610166;d8501oct.22;2022Oct13.08:17;v2.2.500</anid> <title id="AN0159610166-1">Trading‐off monetary rewards as reinforcers to enhance task motivation and performance of publication in academia </title> <p>This paper aims to examine how an inappropriate traded‐off design scheme of monetary rewards as reinforcers to task motivation and performance can promote poor quality of publication in academia and create the potential 'hidden costs of rewards.' Six universities in the western and eastern regions of Indonesia were selected to investigate this issue, and 70 academics from different social science backgrounds were interviewed. Our research results show that the monetary rewards implemented by the Indonesian government only act as a trigger for the initial motivation and become a quantitative lever for journal publications, not a quality lever. Consequently, the quality of publication is still poor because of the low‐powered incentive schemes that are designed based on task‐completion, disregarding the 'synergistic effect' between the government's intentions and the academics' attributions. The implications of this study and recommendations to policymakers are provided in this paper.</p> <p>Paper ini bertujuan untuk mengkaji bagaimana skema desain penghargaan uang sebagai penguat untuk motivasi kerja dan kinerja yang didesain secara tidak tepat dapat menghasilkan kinerja dan kualitas publikasi yang buruk di universitas dan mengakibatkan terjadinya 'hidden cost of rewards'. Sebanyak enam universitas dari wilayah barat dan Timur Indonesia dipilih untuk mengkaji masalah ini, dan sebanyak 70 akademisi dari bidang ilmu sosial yang berbeda diwawancara. Hasil penelitian kami menunjukkan bahwa skema penghargaan uang yang diterapkan oleh pemerintah Indonesia bekerja sebagai pendogkrak motivasi awal bagi akademisi untuk lebih produktif dalam melakukan riset dan publikasi dan menjadi alat pengungkit jumlah tapi bukan kualitas. Akibatnya, kualitas publikasi masih sangat rendah disebabkan oleh skema insentif yang bersifat rendah kekuatannya yang mana didesain berdasarkan pada peneyelesaian tugas, mengesampingkan efek sinergitas antara maksud pemerintah dan atribusi yang diberikan oleh akademisi. terhadap maksud tersebut. Implikasi dari penelitian ini dan rekomendasi pada pembuat kebijakan disediakan didalam paper ini.</p> <p>Keywords: extrinsic motivations; hidden costs of rewards; higher education; incentives; Indonesia; monetary rewards; task motivation</p> <hd id="AN0159610166-2">INTRODUCTION</hd> <p>In the increased neoliberal practices of the knowledge economy across the globe, knowledge production previously based on democratic social values has shifted to one that is based on corporate values (Giroux, 2013). Following this, universities have been enmeshed in growing competition for good status in global rankings. As such, research and publication have gained greater importance as determinants for the prestige and rankings of universities to compete for the best students, best research, and best faculties (Taylor, 2001). However, research has indicated that the performance patterns of publication are skewed and poor across individuals, faculties, departments, institutions, gender, and countries (Fox, 2005). To boost publication productivity, many governments, mainly adopting corporate or economic principles of accountability, brought by New Public Management (NPM), have enacted a control mechanism that rewards and punishes academics. One of the means of motivating academics to publish in many countries is monetary rewards.</p> <p>In conventional economic theory, the thesis that people respond to incentives or positive consequences has led to the practice of utilizing monetary incentives as a behavioural reinforcer to motivate people to make an effort to do tasks and expected behaviours. However, some scholars argued that monetary rewards may pose negative reinforcers if they affect prosocial preferences, such as intrinsic motives, altruism, and ethical norms (Chen, 2019; Kohn, 1993), resulting in the impairment of performance. The negative effect of monetary rewards has mainly been linked to the notion that they diminish intrinsic motivation or in the economic perspective, this effect is referred to as 'the crowding out effect' (Frey, 1994). Because they diminish intrinsic motivation, their effect on task motivation and performance becomes counterproductive and sometimes backfire, leading to a condition of what Lepper and Greene (1978) called 'the hidden costs of rewards' (Erez et al., 1990; Frey, 1994).</p> <p>A limited number of studies from several countries, for example in Denmark, have shown that monetary rewards are effective in raising the number of publications of Danish universities (Andersen & Pallesen, 2008). On the other hand, albeit monetary rewards may help increase the rate of publication in China's universities, they affect the moral and ethics of academics in that academics seek and exercise manipulative strategies and behaviours to get the rewards (Chen, 2019; Quan et al., 2017). In Indonesian universities, academica have also conducted manipulative strategies to increase the rate of their publication (Gaus & Hall, 2015). A number of research (Boufarss & Laakso, 2020; Muller, 2017; Muthama & McKenna, 2020; Tomaselli, 2018) has also addressed the positive and negative impacts of financial incentives in academia. However, none of these studies examined such issues from the combined lens of economic and psychological perspectives, and how such impacts can be traded‐off through the design of appropriate schemes to obtain their optimum results and avoid the potential hidden costs of rewards (Lepper & Greene, 1978).</p> <p>Considering that monetary rewards have negative and positive impacts on task motivation and performance, some scholars have brought in a more moderated view (Benabou & Tirole, 2003; Bonner & Sprinkle, 2002; Bowles & Polanía‐Reyes, 2012; Eisenberger et al., 2011; Eisenberger & Rhoades, 2001), asserting that in an identifiable certain condition, monetary rewards can produce positive consequences, and thus their effect can be traded‐off via the use of an appropriate design of incentive schemes. Therefore, it is important to understand in what condition they are effective and what appropriate designs or schemes that will make them effective. Conflating these arguments, we argued that external rewards (money) can become an effective initial trigger to motivate academics to write and publish, traded‐off with, what we called in this study, the 'synergistic effect' of designs of incentive schemes (Benabou & Tirole, 2003; Bonner & Sprinkle, 2002; Bowles & Polanía‐Reyes, 2012; Eisenberger et al., 2011; Eisenberger & Rhoades, 2001). And the lack of such schemes would lead to counterproductive effect, causing low and poor quality of performance in publication. Such traded‐off schemes will shape the path of academics in learning about themselves in that they can understand and adjust their interpretation and behaviours (attribution) in accordance with what requested behaviour the government wishes (intentions) for them to perform. Therefore, given their positive effect (increase the rate), it is important to study the design to trade‐off their negative effects on quality, moral, and ethics.</p> <p>Following this, we are intrigued to examine the reinforcement attempt made by the Indonesian government to enhance the rate of academics' international publication in which the synergistic effect of the design of financial stimuli is lacking. Two research questions were formulated to study this, beginning by asking and exploring what has motivated academics to publish and how they have interpreted and aligned their behaviours (attribution) with the government's intentions as embedded in the schemes. More specifically, we formulated our sub‐research questions as follows:</p> <p></p> <ulist> <item> How and to what extent monetary rewards motivate academics to publish in international reputable journals?</item> <p></p> <item> How do they attribute these rewards to their behaviours and practices in publication and performance?</item> </ulist> <p>With these questions, our research contributes to the development of the theory of monetary rewards and work motivation in two ways: firstly, by considering the potential influence of monetary incentives as a source of external pleasure in undertaking the task of publishing, we concluded that they can become an effective initial lever to evoke academics to undertake the task and enhance performance. This can be an alternative way of understanding the role monetary rewards play in increasing task motivation and performance. Secondly, it offers an alternative way of designing appropriate reward mechanisms that seeks to emphasize the synergistic effect between the intentions or perspectives of the government and the attribution of academics to these intentions through which an integrated perceived locus of causality is constructed. With this, the design of monetary incentives should be based on the harmonious interpretation between the government's intentions and the interpretation of academics to these intentions (synergistic effect). This can be achieved through the delivery of those intentions by formulating clear instructions that explain in detail what the government wishes as requested behaviours for academics to perform, such as high, novel, and creative performance. In this way, monetary rewards may not crowd out intrinsic motivation, such that they do not stymie the enhancement of performance. So, the effect of hidden costs of rewards can be minimized.</p> <p>For practice, our research may inform managers and professionals who are responsible for the development of human resources, either inside or outside academia, about an effective design of monetary rewards to improve task motivation and performance to yield organizational effectiveness. For policymakers, university leaders and managers in Indonesia, the result of our study may become a reference to consider for the improvement of ways and methods for delivering incentives to gain simultaneous optimum results of quality and of high numbers of publication productivity.</p> <hd id="AN0159610166-3">INDONESIAN HIGHER EDUCATION, MONETARY INCENTIVE SCHEMES IN RESEARCH AND PUBLICATION PRACTICES</hd> <p>The most common 'buzzword' of the Indonesian government is the perception that research and innovation constitute one of the prerequisites for the country to advance and gain its economic competitive edge. Since higher education institutions (HEIs) in Indonesia have been put on the nation's political economy agenda, they have been seen as an engine of economic growth to increase the nation's economic competitive edge and to build national excellence. In this way, HEIs have been called on to optimize research and knowledge production and dissemination (The Law of HE No. 12, 2012). In addition, HEIs are also encouraged to keep up with other international universities in the competition to attract the best students, best research, and best faculties through gaining the status of world‐class universities. So, it is not surprising to see a widespread mission statement of becoming world‐class universities embraced by HEIs in Indonesia.</p> <p>One of the important indicators needed to materialize this mission is the performance of research and international publication. However, given the prolonged daunting academic, and research culture and system that are not sympathetic with the imposition of such a new practice, the government realized that this will need an intervention to manage and control the behaviours of academics in order to motivate them to undertake the target behaviours or the intentions of the government (Gaus & Hall, 2016). Such an intervention functions either as an 'operant condition' (Skinner, 1953) or a stimulus to influence academic behaviours. Adopting NPM principles, the government intends to optimize academics' and HEIs' performance through the implementation of control mechanisms manifested in a set of performance indicators to measure the performance of academics' works (Gaus & Hall, 2016).</p> <p>With this, came reward incentives, surveillance, deadlines, threat of punishment in the ways academics go about their scholarly activities (Gaus & Hall, 2016). A wide range of support is given to assist them to write and publish articles in most reputable international journals (In Indonesia, these kinds of journals are those indexed in Scopus). To strengthen the behaviours of academics, the government set up its intentions embodied in the monetary incentives, which are designed and promised based on the standard of that of 'Scopus‐indexed‐international journals'. Academics who are successful in publishing their articles in Scopus‐indexed journals would be rewarded with a certain amount of money and it goes directly to their pocket. Hence, academics can use it at their disposal. Such a standard is also used as a measure for promotions of academics into a higher ladder in academic ranks, for payment of certified academics, and for honorary allowance for professoriates. These are considered an operant condition or what we call an intervention attached to the application of monetary rewards to elicit motivation in exercising the target behaviours or intentions set up by the government. A threat of termination of financial allowances and ongoing research grants, and delay in promotions, all of which function as a control of behaviours. That is not all, the obligation to publish articles in reputable international journals has become integrated into doctoral programs and serves as a requirement to be met prior to the completion of the study. Deadlines are determined and the consequence of failing to meet this will be the delay of the completion of the study. Doctoral students cannot graduate unless they can publish one or two articles in Scopus‐indexed journals.</p> <p>Besides enforcing the stimulus of behavioural control, the government also provides assistance with academic writing in the form of workshops. A wide range of workshops has been held across Indonesian HEIs with a great amount of money having been allocated. In 2019, the government allocated Rp. 3.6 billion to run workshops throughout Indonesia. The results of these workshops are not clearly known yet, despite a significant rise in the number of Indonesian academics' publication recorded in Scopus's database. In 2015, the rate of publications of Indonesia stood at around 8350, and this rose to 50,145 in 2020 (Scimago, 2020). This is a good sign of the development of Indonesian academics' capacity for publication. Although this rise is significant, it is not followed by the quality of publication of articles in journals. According to the data released by the then Ministry of Research, Technology, and Higher Education (MoRTHE), of total publications in the Scopus database, approximately 70% is composed of proceedings in low quality outlets of journals or conferences, and only 30% is published in journals but mostly in lower quality journals (SINTA,[<reflink idref="bib1" id="ref1">1</reflink>] 2020). This evidence implies that despite much effort has been put to strengthen academics' behaviours through monetary rewards, their performance of publications only increases in number, not in quality. In regard to this, we are intrigued to find out why the monetary rewards applied have not worked as expected. This subsequently forms the rationale of our study.</p> <hd id="AN0159610166-4">MONETARY REWARDS AND THE TRADED‐OFF INCENTIVE SCHEMES</hd> <p>The most debated issue over the efficacy of monetary incentives either in the field of economics and psychology has revolved around the idea that monetary rewards may undermine intrinsic motivation and this reduces performance. Intrinsic motivation is the prototypic 'manifestation of human tendency towards learning and creativity' (Ryan & Deci, 2000, p. 69) that is assumed to be the most authentic motive to move people to act, and it has influential positive effects on enhancing performance. Such a motive arouses original interests leading to an enjoyable and engaged behaviour of people to doing their tasks or activities, such that the performance and creativity can be enhanced (Amabile et al., 1986). In such a situation, the attitude of people will be expected to change and produce true and ever‐lasting commitment and compliance. By contrast, extrinsic motivation is driven by external, inauthentic motive and thus, it can only change the behaviours but not the attitude, resulting in a mere temporary commitment and compliance (Kohn, 1993). Therefore, the debate over the effect of external motives on the undermining of intrinsic motivation has been pervasive and intense.</p> <p>In a more negative tone, psychologists and sociologists argued that financial incentives may adversely affect moral, ethics, and commitment and they have a potential effect on creating what Bandura called 'a moral disengagement' (Bandura, 1991, as cited in Bowles & Polanía‐Reyes, 2012). Such a disengagement occurs when people are motivated to undertake an activity with the focus on the pursuit of the incentives, ignoring the very nature of the importance of prosocial preferences as the drives of doing an activity, and this potentially evokes people to adopt what Richard Titmuss (1971) called 'market mentality'. Titmuss portrayed how the altruistic motives in helping others could be undermined by such mentality via the example of paying people for blood.</p> <p>In academia, the market mentality has led academics to pursue scholarly activities in economic values and objectives that create the practice of 'academic capitalism' (Rhoades & Slaughter, 2010) or 'rent seekers' (Muller, 2017). This situation may give rise to the unintended and undesirable outcomes of the incentives as have originally been intended by the incentives' designers (governments), which may create 'the hidden costs of rewards' (Lepper & Greene, 1978) or what (Tomaselli, 2018) termed it 'perverse incentives.' The hidden costs of rewards means that the costs spent to motivate people to perform a target behaviour are not equivalent with the expected results.</p> <p>Because disseminating knowledge constitutes a democratic social mission of universities to better the lives of society (Giroux, 2013), expecting rewards for the exchange of it is considered unethical (Muthama & McKenna, 2020). The potential risk of such a practice may impact on academics' intrinsic motivation in that it leads academics to focus only on the rewards by pursuing bibliometric outcomes, such as the rate of publications and <emph>h</emph>‐index. Also, this practice may lead academics to think that the purposes of publication are not for knowledge dissemination but for securing careers and obtaining financial benefits. In the attempt to achieve the rewards, academics may be tempted to commit manipulative strategies (Taylor, 2001) by focusing quantity at the expense of quality. In this situation, academics may find a shortcut to publish their paper in predatory journals and proceedings, low quality open access; do plagiarism, and data fabrication. Such misconducts have resulted in the increasing rates of retraction of papers from journals (De Vries et al., 2006; Fang et al., 2012; Moylan & Kowalczuk, 2016; Wager & Williams, 2011). The manipulative strategies have been reported to have existed in many countries, such as in South Africa (Muthama & McKenna, 2020; Tomaselli, 2018), in the United Arab Emirate (Boufarss & Laakso, 2020), in China (Chen, 2019; Quan et al., 2017). Such condition may cause the effects of monetary rewards are counterproductive or backfire.</p> <p>In understanding the counterproductive effects of monetary rewards on task motivation and performance, Frey (1997) introduced 'the crowding effect' of monetary incentives, using the economic theory of crowd out and crowd in effect of price mechanisms. Theoretically, the economic law premises that by increasing incentives will increase supply, known as the crowd in effect. Yet, some studies demonstrated the opposite results in that monetary rewards have been counterproductive and have caused the crowding out effect on the diminishing of intrinsic task motivation and performance. In arguing the cause of such an issue, Ryan and Deci (2000) asserted that when monetary rewards control the behaviour of people and restrict autonomy, they will reduce performance and creativity. Because of this, he recommended investigating why there has been a dissonance between the theory and practice.</p> <p>More recent analyses and studies both in psychology and economics have foregrounded a notion that there are certain conditions in which monetary rewards work or crowd in (increase intrinsic motivation), and thus it is important to design an appropriate design or scheme of incentives. In this way, incentives and social preferences become complement rather than substitutes (Bowles & Polanía‐Reyes, 2012): Recent research has also addressed that intrinsic and extrinsic motivation share joint influences on enhanced performance and creativity (Gong et al., 2017; Mehta et al., 2017).</p> <p>With regard to extrinsic motivation (Money), Locke and Schattke (2019), on the contrary, perceived that extrinsic motivation can also become the source of pleasure that motivates people to undertake a task, and thus, it does not detriment intrinsic motivation. So, pleasure in doing an activity does not always derive from intrinsic motivation. Such a perception is influenced by the capitalist's ideas where the importance of financial factors in living a happy life is foregrounded. In a similar fashion, (Eisenberger et al., 1999) also contended that monetary rewards do not control behaviour, instead they increase self‐determination. And the design of incentive schemes valuing high performance instead of tasks‐completion contingent reward schemes, will make the rewards effective.</p> <p>Although a large number of research findings reported negative impacts monetary incentives have on the interrelated aspects of intrinsic motivation, creativity, and performance, they have potential positive impacts too, and according to some scholars (Bonner & Sprinkle, 2002; Bowles & Polanía‐Reyes, 2012), these can be maximized or traded‐off. This can be done from understanding the effect of the rewards via examining conceptual frameworks coupled with the understanding of mediating factors existing in 'incentive‐effort relations' (Bonner & Sprinkle, 2002, p. 3040). And such factors can be conceptualized through a tenet of building a harmony between the instructions of what types of target's behaviours the principals expect from the agents and the interpretation of the agents of what kind of target's behaviour they are expected to perform, as (Bowles & Polanía‐Reyes, 2012) pointed:</p> <p>Of course when an incentive provides good news about the principal's intentions or type when rewards are offered, for example, rather than fines, it may recruit the target's social preferences to work synergistically with the direct effect of the incentive. In this case, incentives and social preferences become complements rather than substitutes. (p. 373)</p> <p>In literature, the interpretation and implementation of such a tenet have been contextualized in the ways of designing of rewards in which appropriate presentations or instructions of target's behaviour are fully elaborated in ways of underlining novel, high, and creative performance. Research has shown that extrinsic motivation, if it is appropriately applied will not be detrimental to intrinsic motivation, and thus enhance performance and creativity (Ryan & Deci, 2000).</p> <p>Following this, a handful of studies have examined under what condition monetary rewards do not increment intrinsic motivation and reduce performance. In line with this, the design that involves the harmonious interaction between principals' intention and the agents' attribution to it is proffered, encompassing the ways in which such rewards are presented, intervened, and elaborated. In doing so, it is expected that it may compromise the negative and positive impacts of such rewards on intrinsic motivation and performance (Amabile, 2012; Erez et al., 1990). Following this, for monetary rewards to be effective, they are necessarily designed based on the principals' intentions of requested target's behaviours framed within that of creative and high performance, not on the target's behaviours of completion of the task per se (Baer et al., 2003; Hennessey, 1989). Previous studies revealed that monetary rewards promised for high performance (the high‐performance‐contingent rewards) (Hennessey, 1989), increase perceived self‐determination and perceived competence. This situation is different when such rewards are presented in simple presentations or interventions framed within the task‐completion contingent rewards (Eisenberger & Cameron, 1996; Eisenberger & Rhoades, 2001; Eisenberger et al., 1999, 2011).</p> <p>These types of interventions are further expanded by behaviourists' researchers into specific forms of communication and presentation of rewards: they are (<reflink idref="bib1" id="ref2">1</reflink>) high‐performance‐contingent rewards; (<reflink idref="bib2" id="ref3">2</reflink>) high‐competence‐contingent rewards; (<reflink idref="bib3" id="ref4">3</reflink>) creativity‐contingent rewards; and (<reflink idref="bib4" id="ref5">4</reflink>) novel‐performance‐contingent rewards. Such interventions imply the extent to which the givers of rewards (principals) communicate their intentions of requested target's behaviours for agents to perform, and the extent to which these agents form their self‐understanding about themselves or perceived locus of causality through the interpretation of those intentions. Such interventions above signal how competence is highly valued and appreciated. In this way, it is expected that people do not comply to perform tasks because of promised rewards but they are moved to do so because they see their competence is respected and appreciated, such that they feel that the rewards are important personally. Frey (1997) asserted that when monetary rewards are perceived as something important, their effects would be positive to intrinsic motivation and performance and vice versa. Research by Yoon et al. (2015), Eisenberger and Rhoades (2001), Li et al. (2018) confirm that extrinsic rewards highly contingent on creativity and high performance increase creative performance when these rewards are perceived important by people and when there is a feeling of autonomy. Furthermore, novel‐performance–contingent reward that is mediated by salient rewards enhanced creativity without being detrimental to intrinsic motivation (Eisenberger & Armeli, 1997; Mehta et al., 2017).</p> <p>Furthermore, if the nature of rewards given to potential recipients by the givers of rewards is not contracted for, such rewards may bring about the feeling of autonomy (Amabile et al., 1986). This is because such rewards contain no control of the givers of rewards over those potential recipients of rewards, such that such recipients may still possess freedom to accept or to decline to act the requested tasks. And competence without autonomy will not enhance intrinsic motivation (Ryan & Deci, 2000). Hue et al. pointed out how autonomy in choosing preferred tasks in the interaction with general creative personality may help bring about originality for creativity. Spivack and Milosevic (2018) contended that perceived locus of autonomy (PLA) increased intrinsic motivation, and thus, it increases productivity and well‐being.</p> <hd id="AN0159610166-5">METHODOLOGY</hd> <p>Our research purpose is to yield deep, rich, and comprehensive data pertinent to the experiences, actions, and perceptions of respondents towards monetary rewards and how they are motivated by these, and how they learn about themselves through the government's intentions as stated in the monetary incentives' schemes or interventions to optimize the productivity of publication in Indonesian HEIs. Creswell (2014) suggested that the selection of research methodology is vested in the 'fitness of purpose'. Referring to this, we chose a qualitative research approach to study the issue.</p> <hd id="AN0159610166-6">METHOD</hd> <p>Our research is part of our large project funded by the Indonesian Endowment Fund for Education (LPDP) focusing on the strategic and creative model of writing manuscripts for publications, particularly in social sciences. The focus on social sciences is because the academic performance of publication from these domains is low (Gaus et al., 2021). Following this, we conducted nine (<reflink idref="bib9" id="ref6">9</reflink>) workshops in six universities (public and private) across Indonesia in which academics from various backgrounds of social sciences participated. We did not set up specific criteria for participants to attend the workshops, instead we accepted both experienced and inexperienced participants in publishing in reputable international journals. Our participants came from two broad faculties; political and social sciences, and economic and business. From political and social sciences, participants came from disciplines of public administration, social welfare, and international relations. From the economic and business, disciplines from management, accounting, and economic sciences participated. With these features, we assume that these groups of workshops represent the 'heterogeneity' and 'homogeneity' (Bryman, 2012) or maximum variation (Patton, 1990), of our respondents and universities.</p> <p>On these bases, we conducted a cluster sampling and sampled our respondents from these workshops. Cluster sampling is one of the random selection techniques for selecting specific clusters or groups rather than people or items (Denscombe, 2010). Our reason for taking such a sampling is placed on the assumption of a cost‐effective way to select respondents and HEIs across Indonesia. One of the requirements to undertake such a sampling is that the clusters must be pre‐existing or naturally occurring groups, such as schools, 'work‐groups, community meetings or any occasion where there will be a (naturally) occurring collections of people' (Denscombe, 2010, p. 16).</p> <p>The respondents of our study were those who attended the workshops. The workshops are considered naturally occurring groups or collections of people representing heterogeneity and homogeneity of the entire population (academics and HEIs in Indonesia) in terms of geographic location, disciplines and gender. From the clusters of nine workshops, we involved 70 respondents out of 100 who attended the workshop that consisted of 25 males and 45 females from a range of disciplines in social sciences. The number of respondents from the faculty of social and political sciences is 30 (ten from social welfare; 30 from public administration, and five from international relations). As for respondents from the faculty of economic and business, the respondents are 40 (five from accounting; 15 from management, and 20 from economic sciences). Those 70 respondents were selected based on the criteria we set in advance that are based on two characteristics, such as: those who have published papers in Scopus, and males and females.</p> <p>Semi‐structured interviews were the instruments to collect data, and they were conducted with the respondents after the completion of each workshop run. We asked questions of our respondents pertinent to what has motivated them to publish, and how they have attributed the contents and meanings of those rewards and how they have manifested that attribution to their practices and behaviours of choosing about which journals are to submit their papers. The interviews were held in the venues of each of the workshops held. The interviews were arranged into a set of series where in each series we interviewed two to three respondents, lasting for 45 to 60 min.</p> <p>The data from the interviews were transcribed by two researchers (the first and the second co‐author). The first author is a female, and the second co‐author is a male from different disciplines of social sciences. We transcribed the original Indonesian data and translated only those of representative excerpts and are provided in the finding section. Both of the transcribers conducted an inter‐member check to check the results of our transcription and interpretation of the data. This practice may reduce bias and enhance the trustworthiness of our research.</p> <p>In the process of data analysis, we borrowed the practice of grounded theory's systematic data analysis. Following this, we began by labelling each text to seek core themes. After labelling the text and identifying the core themes, we then collated such themes into some concepts, and their sub‐categories. We generated 40 labels and themes that we reduced into two categories, they are: (<reflink idref="bib1" id="ref7">1</reflink>) How do monetary rewards motivate academics to publish in international reputable journals? (<reflink idref="bib2" id="ref8">2</reflink>) How do they attribute these rewards to their behaviour and practice of publication and performance?</p> <hd id="AN0159610166-7">FINDINGS</hd> <p></p> <hd id="AN0159610166-8">How do monetary rewards motivate academics to publish in international reputable journals?</hd> <p></p> <ulist> <item> Monetary rewards function as an initial trigger to break amotivated academics</item> </ulist> <p>Academics in this study in general are so excited about conducting research and publication because of the monetary rewards being promised. The responses are similar across genders, and disciplines. Most of them see that monetary rewards function as an initial tool to ignite their motivation to do the task, as acknowledged by one female respondent:</p> <p>In my institution, international publication in Scopus‐indexed journals will be rewarded with monetary rewards. The amount of which will vary depending on the quartile of the journals. This is good, I think, because it can pump our spirit to perform more research and publication.</p> <p>Before incentives were introduced, academics in our study were not active and unmotivated in writing for international publication, resulting in the absence of articles published in international reputable journals as indexed in Scopus. One female respondent acknowledged: 'This is the first time I feel enthusiastic about writing because our government and my institution provide financial incentives to value our work. Before this, I did not even care to internationally publish my papers.'</p> <p>When we asked about how the reward systems were implemented, mostly academics acknowledged that the rewards are promised and granted upon the success of completion of the task: 'The rewards are promised and given to those who successfully publish their articles in Scopus' (a male respondent).</p> <hd id="AN0159610166-9">How do they attribute these rewards to their behaviour and practice of publication and perfor...</hd> <p></p> <ulist> <item> Publishing in open access with a quick review process</item> </ulist> <p>Since monetary rewards are solely based on the one simple instruction on 'Scopus‐indexed journals', most academics responded in a way that it accords with this. Consequently, this influences academics to publish their articles in any kinds of journals that are indexed in Scopus, 'since there is only one requirement set up, I just submitted my manuscript to any kinds of journals. Most importantly, they are in Scopus' (a male academic).</p> <p>Following this, one form of journal outlet they chose is open access journals because of the quick and easy chances of being accepted and published. Unfortunately, when submitting and deciding about which of open access journals to publish their articles, most academics do not pay attention to the journals' quality, as a female respondent argued 'No, I do not care about the quality of the journals. Most importantly is that they are indexed by Scopus, and are publishing our article in fast manner.' The same tone is expressed by another male respondent who said that 'the reward given to academics in his institution is simply based on the Scopus‐indexed journals irrespective of the quality, the credibility of publishers, and credibility of the review process.'</p> <p></p> <ulist> <item> Publishing in a cheaper open access journal</item> </ulist> <p>In addition to the fast review process, academics choose open access journals for a reason that they charge a cheaper fee, as expressed by a male respondent: I have no other choices but cheaper open access journals. This is because they are fast and cheaper. Ironically, indeed, most of the respondents are not aware of the credibility of those journals 'I published in one of the journals last year and I was so surprised that the journal was gone from the database of Scopus this year'.</p> <p>Almost all academics have no knowledge about the availability of subscribed journals that do not need fees for publication. They assumed that all journals are charged and open access in nature, like a male respondent uttered 'I have just known that there are non‐charged journals other than charged open access'.</p> <p></p> <ulist> <item> Publishing in the proceedings</item> </ulist> <p>Most academics in this study also responded to these reward mechanisms by choosing to publish in proceedings that are in Scopus too. This is because articles submitted to these outlets are more easily accepted, as acknowledged by a female respondent' the easiest way to have your article in the Scopus database is by submitting it to proceedings. 'It is much easier to get accepted than that of journals'. A male respondent also confirmed that he would also prefer to submit his paper in such outlets because it is easy to get accepted.</p> <hd id="AN0159610166-10">DISCUSSION</hd> <p>The data from the interviews show that Indonesian academics were passive, indifferent, and not engaged in writing and publishing. This situation is clearly depicted as an amotivated people (Ryan & Deci, 2000). Such a condition had persisted until the government introduced financial stimuli to motivate academics to publish. Ryan and Deci (2000) contended that the self‐motivation of humans can be positive in that it can be proactive and active to conduct an activity; and it can also be negative or amotivated in that it can be alienated and indolent to perform an activity or a task. To motivate people or to arouse positive motivation to undertake the requested task, people must be given a stimulus or an operant condition. While, intrinsic motivation has been assumed as the authentic motives and interests to bring about joy and engagement to doing an activity, Locke and Schattke (2019), on the contrary, proposed that monetary rewards can also make people get enthusiastic about undertaking tasks, because people may find pleasure in such rewards. This could be a good initial state that brings people to get into their tasks, leading to enjoyment and engagement with the task or activity. Although expecting rewards and paying academics for publication are contradictory with the democratic social roles and functions of universities, such rewards and the pleasure they bring to academics are important. This is particularly in organizations in which organizational and research culture and systems are poor and daunting, and in which research and publication culture constitutes a newly introduced practice, like that of Indonesia (Gaus & Hall, 2016). Therefore, stimuli to motivate indolent academics to undertake research and publication are needed. So, in the context of academics in our study, monetary rewards work as an initial tool to break the amotivated state of being. This situation implies that enthusiastic academics have self‐determination to undertake research and publication in a way that does not crowd out or undermine intrinsic motivation. With this, it is not overly clear if we agree with Eisenberger et al. (1999), asserting that monetary rewards without controlling effect on behaviours may increase self‐determination.</p> <p>Albeit, a wide range of literature reported the effect of monetary rewards on the undermining of intrinsic motivation and performance or the counterproductive effect, the designing of the delivering types of such rewards may mitigate such effects. Monetary rewards that are promised (ex‐ante) (Benabou & Tirole, 2003) and are not contracted for, may not diminish autonomy, as they do not control the behaviour of academics as potential reward recipients. In this study, mostly academics acknowledged that the rewards are promised and granted upon the success of completion of the task. This type of reward does not control the behaviour of academics, so academics remain have full discretion to get into the practice or opt out from it. And such a design would help reduce the adverse effect of market mentality of homo economicus that may ruin ethicality and morality. This can be traded‐off through the designing of schemes in which a harmonious link between the government's intentions and academic interpretation of these intentions is built.</p> <p>However, the data demonstrate how the design of incentive schemes set up by the Indonesian government has produced unintended consequences. Such a design has turned academics to find manipulative strategies to get their paper published. This is because the design is merely focused on the intentions of 'Scopus‐indexed journals' that has led academics to adopt behaviours led by the principle on 'most importantly indexed by Scopus'. Such schemes reflect the target's behaviours the government wishes for academics to perform. Such behaviours are subsequently taken in by academics to learn about themselves, known as a 'looking‐glass self' (Cooley, 1902, as cited in Benabou & Tirole, 2003). Through the looking‐glass self, academics see and learn that the only behaviour they are expected to perform is publishing in journals indexed in Scopus. Consequently, academics publish their articles in any Scopus‐indexed journals at the expense of the quality. This phenomenon has indicated that the schemes have been designed with a low‐powered incentives (Benabou & Tirole, 2003). The low‐powered incentives are related to the design of incentives where it has caused negative impacts on the motivation of people.</p> <p>In line with this, it is interesting to notice how academics adjusted their interpretations to the government's intentions, reflected in the ways and journal outlets they chose to publish their articles in ways that neglected the quality of journals. Here, the efficacy of monetary rewards in motivating previously unmotivated academics has been marred with manipulative strategies by choosing low quality open access, and proceedings. This can be seen from the orientation and behaviours of academics who find an easy and fast way of getting their articles accepted and published. They tended to choose journals indexed in Scopus that sit in the lower ranks and even with poor quality in that they sometimes disappear from the database of Scopus. The Indonesian most favourite journals are those with open access with cheaper submission fees and fast review processes. In addition to open access, Indonesian academics most often publish their articles in proceedings because the acceptance rate is high and papers are far easier to be accepted compared with publishing in journals. The huge number of publications of Indonesian academics in proceedings has been considered a unique pattern in that it is different from the international norms and practices (Achwan et al., 2020; Purnell, 2019). With all of this evidence, it is therefore not surprising to see the low and poor quality of academic publications in Indonesia. Based on the literature, such schemes have missed to surface the importance of designing schemes that can represent the respect and appreciation of competence through which the feeling of being competent is elicited. Because of the lack of this, there is a possibility for academics to see such rewards as something unimportant.</p> <p>Following this, therefore, we assume that the incentive schemes applied to a lesser degree, may not be helpful to enhance Indonesian academics' publication performance apart from the large amount of money allocated. And this indicates that the phenomenon of the 'hidden costs of reward' (Lepper & Greene, 1978) has highlighted the Indonesian incentives program in order to increase academics' task motivation and performance in research and publication.</p> <hd id="AN0159610166-11">CONCLUSION</hd> <p>This study has examined how the Indonesian government has implemented monetary incentives as reinforcers to motivate academics to enhance their publication. The data have shown that such rewards have a positive impact on arousing the motivation of academics to undertake research and publication. While such rewards have been evidenced that they are able to lift up the initial spirit of academics to conduct research and publication, their designing, which is only based on the simple intention or intervention pertaining to the government's target behaviour—Scopus‐indexed Journals, has made monetary incentives schemes in Indonesia ineffective and has created of what is called the hidden costs of rewards. Such a design disregards the inclusion of high, novel, and creative performance as the manifestation of the government's intentions. With such an exclusion, a synergistic effect between the rewards and the willingness of academics to undertake the task is missing. As a result, academics have attributed their interpretation of the rewards as a mere completion of publishing in any kinds of journals indexed in Scopus apart from the consideration of the quality. Consequently, academics have performed their own way or strategy of publishing through the easiest, fastest, cheapest open access journals and proceedings.</p> <p>Although many scholars both in psychology and economics realms have been concerned about the adversary effect of external rewards on intrinsic motivation and performance, the result of our study revealed that they are an important means, at least, as a breaker of amotivated academics. This thesis that we would like to put forward as an alternative perspective on seeing the function of monetary rewards as reinforcers to task performance, particularly publication performance in academia. Accordingly, we proposed our alternative interrelated supposition in understanding the importance of monetary rewards that says 'to maximize the effectiveness of monetary rewards to enhance the performance of publication in academia, there should be a mediating aspect of appropriate reward mechanisms recognizing the importance of the synergistic effect between the government's intentions or interventions and the academics' attribution in interpreting or taking in what lies behind those intentions. Therefore, for the Indonesian government, we recommend that it revisits its current monetary reward mechanisms by considering the intentions or interventions of target's behaviour that has to do with high, novel, and creative performance.</p> <hd id="AN0159610166-12">Strength and limitation of the research</hd> <p>This research has used psychological and economic perspectives in perceiving the effects of monetary rewards as reinforcers of behaviours to enhance the task motivation of academics to publish, and the ways to trade‐off their positive and negative impacts to obtain an optimum quality of academics' publication. With this, our research can be expected to disentangle contestations as to whether such rewards are effective or ineffective reinforcers on task motivation and performance. With our supposition that monetary rewards can become an effective tool to increase task motivation and performance in publication through a design in which the synergistic effect is utilized, it, then, may raise a question related to morales and commitments to work. Yet, we imagine that such an issue can be traded‐off through the role of leaders and managers navigating and nourishing spiritual values to perceiving the essence and existence of life in more spiritual codes. Accordingly, this idea, forms our suggestion for future research.</p> <p>Our research though only covers one type of many types of external rewards. A larger focus of research is needed in order to understand more how each type of reward's delivery is responded to by academics and how it affects academics in particular effort, like publication.</p> <hd id="AN0159610166-13">ACKNOWLEDGEMENT</hd> <p>We would like to express our great gratitude to the Indonesian Endowment Fund for Education (LPDP) for funding our research.</p> <hd id="AN0159610166-14">DATA AVAILABILITY STATEMENT</hd> <p>The data that support the findings of this study are available on request from the corresponding author. The data are not publicly available due to privacy or ethical restrictions.</p> <hd id="AN0159610166-15">CONFLICT OF INTEREST</hd> <p>No conflict of interest to be declared.</p> <ref id="AN0159610166-16"> <title> Footnotes </title> <blist> <bibl id="bib1" idref="ref1" type="bt">1</bibl> <bibtext> The database of Science and technology index of the Ministry of Research and Technology.</bibtext> </blist> </ref> <ref id="AN0159610166-17"> <title> REFERENCES </title> <blist> <bibtext> Achwan, R., Ganie‐Rochman, M., Alamsyah, A. R., & Triana, L. (2020). University reform and the development of social sciences in Indonesia. International Journal of Educational Development, 78, 102269. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijedudev.2020.102269</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibl id="bib2" idref="ref3" type="bt">2</bibl> <bibtext> Amabile, T. M. (2012). Componential theory of creativity. In H. K. Eric (Ed.), Encyclopedia of management theory (pp. 134 – 139). 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  Label: Peer Reviewed
  Group: SrcInfo
  Data: Y
– Name: Pages
  Label: Page Count
  Group: Src
  Data: 15
– Name: DatePubCY
  Label: Publication Date
  Group: Date
  Data: 2022
– Name: TypeDocument
  Label: Document Type
  Group: TypDoc
  Data: Journal Articles<br />Reports - Research
– Name: Audience
  Label: Education Level
  Group: Audnce
  Data: <searchLink fieldCode="EL" term="%22Higher+Education%22">Higher Education</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="EL" term="%22Postsecondary+Education%22">Postsecondary Education</searchLink>
– Name: Subject
  Label: Descriptors
  Group: Su
  Data: <searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Foreign+Countries%22">Foreign Countries</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22College+Faculty%22">College Faculty</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Faculty+Publishing%22">Faculty Publishing</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Rewards%22">Rewards</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Motivation%22">Motivation</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Incentives%22">Incentives</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Economic+Factors%22">Economic Factors</searchLink>
– Name: Subject
  Label: Geographic Terms
  Group: Su
  Data: <searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Indonesia%22">Indonesia</searchLink>
– Name: DOI
  Label: DOI
  Group: ID
  Data: 10.1111/hequ.12350
– Name: ISSN
  Label: ISSN
  Group: ISSN
  Data: 0951-5224<br />1468-2273
– Name: Abstract
  Label: Abstract
  Group: Ab
  Data: This paper aims to examine how an inappropriate traded-off design scheme of monetary rewards as reinforcers to task motivation and performance can promote poor quality of publication in academia and create the potential 'hidden costs of rewards.' Six universities in the western and eastern regions of Indonesia were selected to investigate this issue, and 70 academics from different social science backgrounds were interviewed. Our research results show that the monetary rewards implemented by the Indonesian government only act as a trigger for the initial motivation and become a quantitative lever for journal publications, not a quality lever. Consequently, the quality of publication is still poor because of the low-powered incentive schemes that are designed based on task-completion, disregarding the 'synergistic effect' between the government's intentions and the academics' attributions. The implications of this study and recommendations to policymakers are provided in this paper.
– Name: AbstractInfo
  Label: Abstractor
  Group: Ab
  Data: As Provided
– Name: DateEntry
  Label: Entry Date
  Group: Date
  Data: 2022
– Name: AN
  Label: Accession Number
  Group: ID
  Data: EJ1351112
PLink https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=eric&AN=EJ1351112
RecordInfo BibRecord:
  BibEntity:
    Identifiers:
      – Type: doi
        Value: 10.1111/hequ.12350
    Languages:
      – Text: English
    PhysicalDescription:
      Pagination:
        PageCount: 15
        StartPage: 800
    Subjects:
      – SubjectFull: Foreign Countries
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: College Faculty
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Faculty Publishing
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Rewards
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Motivation
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Incentives
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Economic Factors
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Indonesia
        Type: general
    Titles:
      – TitleFull: Trading-Off Monetary Rewards as Reinforcers to Enhance Task Motivation and Performance of Publication in Academia
        Type: main
  BibRelationships:
    HasContributorRelationships:
      – PersonEntity:
          Name:
            NameFull: Gaus, Nurdiana
      – PersonEntity:
          Name:
            NameFull: Jasruddin
      – PersonEntity:
          Name:
            NameFull: Saleh, Arifin
      – PersonEntity:
          Name:
            NameFull: Resnawaty, Risna
      – PersonEntity:
          Name:
            NameFull: Paramma, Muhammad Azwar
      – PersonEntity:
          Name:
            NameFull: Tanjung, Yurisna
    IsPartOfRelationships:
      – BibEntity:
          Dates:
            – D: 01
              M: 10
              Type: published
              Y: 2022
          Identifiers:
            – Type: issn-print
              Value: 0951-5224
            – Type: issn-electronic
              Value: 1468-2273
          Numbering:
            – Type: volume
              Value: 76
            – Type: issue
              Value: 4
          Titles:
            – TitleFull: Higher Education Quarterly
              Type: main
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