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Implications of Illinois Teacher Evaluation Reforms: Insights from Principals

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Title: Implications of Illinois Teacher Evaluation Reforms: Insights from Principals
Language: English
Authors: Conrad, David L. (ORCID 0000-0002-3741-4675), Hackmann, Donald G. (ORCID 0000-0002-3869-1201)
Source: Leadership and Policy in Schools. 2022 21(3):565-584.
Availability: Routledge. Available from: Taylor & Francis, Ltd. 530 Walnut Street Suite 850, Philadelphia, PA 19106. Tel: 800-354-1420; Tel: 215-625-8900; Fax: 215-207-0050; Web site: http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals
Peer Reviewed: Y
Page Count: 20
Publication Date: 2022
Document Type: Journal Articles
Reports - Research
Education Level: Elementary Secondary Education
Descriptors: Teacher Evaluation, Educational Change, Principals, Administrator Attitudes, Educational Policy, Policy Analysis, Public Schools, Politics of Education, Evaluation Methods, Scores, Summative Evaluation, Educational Improvement, Accountability, Teacher Effectiveness, Identification, Elementary Secondary Education, Administrator Characteristics
Geographic Terms: Illinois
DOI: 10.1080/15700763.2020.1802761
ISSN: 1570-0763
1744-5043
Abstract: This study investigated principals' perceptions of Illinois teacher evaluation reforms, applying education policy implementation theory and micropolitics of personnel evaluation as conceptual frameworks. Interviews were conducted with 20 Illinois public school principals. Findings revealed micropolitics influenced the development and implementation of local evaluation procedures that were favorable to educators. Principals perceived student growth scores unduly inflated summative ratings, hindering them from rating educators as underperforming and subsequently assigning improvement plans. Despite challenges, participants believed improvement plans were important levers to hold educators accountable for improving their performance.
Abstractor: As Provided
Entry Date: 2022
Accession Number: EJ1359184
Database: ERIC
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  Value: <anid>AN0158144950;o8o01jul.22;2022Jul26.06:59;v2.2.500</anid> <title id="AN0158144950-1">Implications of Illinois Teacher Evaluation Reforms: Insights from Principals </title> <p>This study investigated principals' perceptions of Illinois teacher evaluation reforms, applying education policy implementation theory and micropolitics of personnel evaluation as conceptual frameworks. Interviews were conducted with 20 Illinois public school principals. Findings revealed micropolitics influenced the development and implementation of local evaluation procedures that were favorable to educators. Principals perceived student growth scores unduly inflated summative ratings, hindering them from rating educators as underperforming and subsequently assigning improvement plans. Despite challenges, participants believed improvement plans were important levers to hold educators accountable for improving their performance.</p> <p>Implications of Illinois Teacher Evaluation Reforms: Insights from Principals</p> <p>Public education reforms have been influenced by a growing national trend focusing on educator and principal accountability – with greater focus on educators' influence on student learning along with new evaluation processes to measure the performance of educators and principals (Ravitch, [<reflink idref="bib47" id="ref1">47</reflink>]). Reforms have been influenced by national reports of underperforming public school educators and administrators' inability or unwillingness to improve or remove these educators (Weisberg et al., [<reflink idref="bib54" id="ref2">54</reflink>]). Illinois was one of several states that restructured their teacher evaluation processes following a federal call for education reforms (Howell, [<reflink idref="bib24" id="ref3">24</reflink>]). These policy revisions increased school leadership demands, as principals implemented the comprehensive evaluation procedures while continuing to address myriad instructional and non-instructional responsibilities of their leadership positions (Donaldson & Mavrogordato, [<reflink idref="bib56" id="ref4">56</reflink>]; Drake et al., [<reflink idref="bib16" id="ref5">16</reflink>]; Grubb & Flessa, [<reflink idref="bib18" id="ref6">18</reflink>]; Lavigne & Chamberlain, [<reflink idref="bib36" id="ref7">36</reflink>]). To understand how evaluation policy reforms affected principals' roles, this study investigated principals' perceptions of Illinois' teacher evaluation reforms and the identification of underperforming educators, focusing on the micropolitical interactions of the actors involved in implementing the local procedures, including principals, educators, and unions. We explored this research question: How have micropolitical factors influenced principals in the identification of underperforming educators in Illinois since the implementation of teacher evaluation reforms?</p> <hd id="AN0158144950-2">Background</hd> <p>Following reports such as <emph>A Nation at Risk</emph> (National Commission on Excellence in Education, [<reflink idref="bib43" id="ref8">43</reflink>]) and passage of federal education reforms such as the No Child Left Behind Act of [<reflink idref="bib44" id="ref9">44</reflink>], teacher evaluation processes increasingly have been regulated by federal and state policy. During this period, several important milestones occurred. First, teacher evaluation processes were aligned to professional standards of practice. Charlotte Danielson first published her comprehensive teaching framework in 1996 – the most detailed and popular teaching model used in U.S. schools today (Marzano et al., [<reflink idref="bib39" id="ref10">39</reflink>]). Second, frameworks such as leadership for learning (Copland & Knapp, [<reflink idref="bib8" id="ref11">8</reflink>]) redefined principals as learning-focused leaders who focus their efforts on improving student learning, shifting away from traditional management duties (Donaldson & Papay, [<reflink idref="bib14" id="ref12">14</reflink>]; Hallinger et al., [<reflink idref="bib20" id="ref13">20</reflink>]). Third, emerging research has strengthened connections between educator effectiveness and student learning outcomes (Marzano et al., [<reflink idref="bib39" id="ref14">39</reflink>]). Effective educators provide "strong instruction that enables a wide range of students to learn" (Darling-Hammond, [<reflink idref="bib11" id="ref15">11</reflink>], p. 12). Fourth, between 2008 and 2013, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation funded the Measures of Effective Teaching (MET) project to observe over 3,000 teachers to define teaching quality and improve educator preparation, evaluation, and professional development (Phillips, [<reflink idref="bib46" id="ref16">46</reflink>]). MET and other research promoted the development of systems to increase the validity and reliability of tools for measuring teaching performance (Ruzek et al., [<reflink idref="bib51" id="ref17">51</reflink>]). Finally, in 2009, the U.S. Congress enacted the Race to the Top (RttT) competitive grant program. As a precondition to applying, states were required to reform their teacher evaluation and accountability policies to include student growth measures as a significant factor in teacher evaluation processes (Howell, [<reflink idref="bib24" id="ref18">24</reflink>]).</p> <p>In Illinois, the state legislature responded to RttT by passing two complementary education reforms: the Performance Evaluation Reform Act (PERA) in January 2010, followed by Senate Bill 7 (SB7) in June 2011. Among the changes in the legislation were the inclusion of student growth measures in summative evaluation ratings; expansion of evaluation ratings (<emph>excellent, satisfactory, unsatisfactory</emph>) to four categories to include <emph>needs improvement</emph>, which would require creating a Professional Development Plan; and enhanced training for evaluators using the Danielson teaching framework (Illinois State Board of Education [ISBE], [<reflink idref="bib25" id="ref19">25</reflink>]). Advocates hoped thesereforms would improve student achievement by increasing the identification, improvement, and/or removal of underperforming educators (Regenstein, [<reflink idref="bib48" id="ref20">48</reflink>]). The Illinois legislation provided significant local discretion by allowing school districts to appoint joint committees of school administrators and teachers' union representatives to collaboratively design their evaluation processes.</p> <p>The Illinois State Board of Education (ISBE) designed a staggered implementation schedule for evaluation reforms, beginning with the Chicago Public School District in 2012–13, followed by those districts with the lowest-achieving schools. By the beginning of the 2016–17 school year, all of the state's 852 public school districts were required to have new evaluation systems negotiated and in place. The need exists to explore how district policies and practices have changed as a result of these teacher evaluation mandates in Illinois public school districts. Therefore, the purpose of this study was to understand, from the perspective of school principals, how Illinois' evaluation reforms were implemented at the local school district level and the extent to which they have influenced principals' abilities to identify underperforming educators. Our study was framed by two complementary conceptual frameworks. First, education policy implementation theory (Honig, [<reflink idref="bib23" id="ref21">23</reflink>]) conceptualizes how implementation of state and national education policy is influenced by the local school context, including the policies, people, and places that shape implementation at the local district level. Second, the micropolitics of personnel evaluation framework (Bridges & Groves, [<reflink idref="bib5" id="ref22">5</reflink>]) considers teacher evaluation decisions using micropolitics – the transactions between local policy actors who seek influence and power in local decision making (Kirst & Wirt, [<reflink idref="bib32" id="ref23">32</reflink>]).</p> <p>Illinois presents an interesting case because of the partnership with unions in the crafting and local implementation of reform policy, which was described as a new model for union engagement in education reform in the state (Regenstein, [<reflink idref="bib48" id="ref24">48</reflink>]). Illinois has a long history of union influence in statewide policymaking and legislation. Therefore, during the initial stages of statewide policy discussion, policy advocates actively engaged the two teachers' unions – Illinois Education Association and Illinois Federation of Teachers – among myriad stakeholders who collaborated to craft the legislation. Policy officials chose this partnership to increase the likelihood the unions would support the proposed teacher evaluation legislation (Regenstein, [<reflink idref="bib48" id="ref25">48</reflink>]). Teachers' unions are sometimes conflicted by efforts to connect student outcomes to their traditional collective bargaining and employee protection work, and policymakers may not legitimize the role of teachers' unions as education reformers in state policy conversations (DeMitchell, [<reflink idref="bib12" id="ref26">12</reflink>]; Kerchner & Koppich, [<reflink idref="bib30" id="ref27">30</reflink>]). In a traditional industrial union model, teachers' unions typically resist participation in management decisions, maintaining a clear demarcation between the roles of educators and management (Kerchner & Koppich, [<reflink idref="bib30" id="ref28">30</reflink>]). PERA required joint committees consisting of school administrators and union members in each school district with shared governance responsibilities to create the local evaluation procedures (ISBE, [<reflink idref="bib25" id="ref29">25</reflink>]). In the industrial model, joint committees could be viewed by union membership as assuming a conflicted management role: participating in the design and implementation of local procedures that honored the statewide policy while endorsing management decisions to reduce the employment rights of the educators they represented (Kerchner & Koppich, [<reflink idref="bib30" id="ref30">30</reflink>]).</p> <p>In the literature review that follows, we provide a brief overview of supervision and evaluation, including the influence of RttT on redefining the evaluation process. Next, we explain the history of evaluation policy in Illinois and describe the reforms legislated by PERA and SB7. Finally, we review recent research on the formal identification of underperforming educators and micropolitical factors that influence identification. We note that for the purpose of this study, the terms "teacher" and "educator" are interchangeable, as both describe certificated personnel including teachers, librarians, counselors, and other school support personnel.</p> <hd id="AN0158144950-3">Review of literature</hd> <p></p> <hd id="AN0158144950-4">Supervision and evaluation defined</hd> <p>Supervision is intended to be a nonjudgmental, formative process for improving educator quality, with a goal to positively influence student learning (Hazi & Rucinski, [<reflink idref="bib21" id="ref31">21</reflink>]; Marzano et al., [<reflink idref="bib39" id="ref32">39</reflink>]). Mette et al. ([<reflink idref="bib42" id="ref33">42</reflink>]) described the supervisory process as a continuous cycle of "ongoing support, teacher improvement, and teacher professional growth" (p. 710). Until the early 1800s, supervisors were local committees of laypersons who inspected schools and provided feedback to help teachers improve (Tracy, [<reflink idref="bib53" id="ref34">53</reflink>]). As teaching evolved into a profession – especially in urban schools – supervision evolved as persons with specific training in education or the content matter provided training to groups of educators. By the 1900s, a scientific era of supervision emerged as principles of factory management introduced data collection and test practices in schools. Later, by the 1930s and 1940s, the current model of teacher evaluation emerged: a principal or other school leader observes the educator, uses a ratings tool to record and rate observations, and meets with the educator to discuss the strengths and weaknesses of the lesson observed (Tracy, [<reflink idref="bib53" id="ref35">53</reflink>]).</p> <p>As supervisors, principals choose the audience and scope of improvement efforts, ranging from strategies to improve the entire school faculty to smaller, focused efforts with one or a few targeted educators (Hallinger et al., [<reflink idref="bib20" id="ref36">20</reflink>]; May & Supovitz, [<reflink idref="bib40" id="ref37">40</reflink>]). Principals may utilize schoolwide efforts to improve the instructional practices of all teachers through broad professional development such as helping educators study educational practices (Blase & Blase, [<reflink idref="bib3" id="ref38">3</reflink>]), promoting collaboration and peer observation (Marzano et al., [<reflink idref="bib39" id="ref39">39</reflink>]; Reinhorn et al., [<reflink idref="bib49" id="ref40">49</reflink>]), and revising curriculum and changing instructional programs (Blase & Blase, [<reflink idref="bib3" id="ref41">3</reflink>]; Marzano et al., [<reflink idref="bib39" id="ref42">39</reflink>]). In addition, improvement efforts may focus on individual teacher improvement as principals engage in professional conversations to suggest changes (Blase & Blase, [<reflink idref="bib3" id="ref43">3</reflink>]); feedback from observations with identified action items (Hallinger et al., [<reflink idref="bib20" id="ref44">20</reflink>]; Marzano et al., [<reflink idref="bib39" id="ref45">39</reflink>]); and models and examples of quality instruction, peer feedback, and praising desired instructional behaviors (Blase & Blase, [<reflink idref="bib3" id="ref46">3</reflink>]; Marzano et al., [<reflink idref="bib39" id="ref47">39</reflink>]). Promoting research-based improvements, Danielson ([<reflink idref="bib10" id="ref48">10</reflink>]) encouraged conversations that connected "a common understanding of good teaching ... around evidence of that teaching" (p. 39). Research suggests targeted improvement efforts with individuals or small groups are more likely to result in changes in educator performance. The amount of time principals devote to the targeted improvement of individual educators is directly related to educators' perceptions of their instructional changes (May & Supovitz, [<reflink idref="bib40" id="ref49">40</reflink>]). Finally, in circumstances of ineffective teaching – when warranted – principals may implement improvement levers contained in local and state policy, including remediation plans and dismissal procedures.</p> <p>In contrast to supervision, evaluation is a legally-regulated personnel function for observing educators, assigning summative ratings of professional performance as measured over a defined time period, and determining continuing employment status including tenure acquisition. Although the terms are often intermingled, evaluation and supervision are separate processes (Hallinger et al., [<reflink idref="bib20" id="ref50">20</reflink>]; Hazi & Rucinski, [<reflink idref="bib21" id="ref51">21</reflink>]; Lane, [<reflink idref="bib35" id="ref52">35</reflink>]). Haefele ([<reflink idref="bib19" id="ref53">19</reflink>]) noted evaluation serves five purposes. First, summative evaluation screenseducators for continuing employment decisions, including decisions on whether to grant tenure rights. Second, evaluations provide specific feedback to educators about their performance. Third, evaluation informs decisions about the professional development needed to improve teaching and learning. Fourth, summative evaluation rating provides evidence to dismiss underperforming educators. Finally, evaluation provides a common language or framework to define quality teaching and provide a unified vision of teaching expectations. The accountability lever of evaluation may influence teachers to use the framework to implement meaningful instructional improvement (Lane, [<reflink idref="bib35" id="ref54">35</reflink>]; Wieczorek et al., [<reflink idref="bib56" id="ref55">56</reflink>]). However, teachers may emphasize "pleasing the principal" (Lane, [<reflink idref="bib35" id="ref56">35</reflink>], p. 22) by learning the individual preferences of their evaluator and making the moderate changes most likely to earn the highest evaluation rating.</p> <p>Critics of evaluation processes cite a concern with the accuracy and reliability of evaluation instruments, which are confounded by accountability measures that use data to make objective decisions about educators and their impact on learning (Hazi & Rucinski, [<reflink idref="bib21" id="ref57">21</reflink>]). This emphasis on accountability may diminish principals' supervisory practices of coaching educator improvement. When teacher evaluation is connected to high-stakes employment decisions such as promotion and retention, principals must balance two conflicting roles: as the evaluator who makes performance judgments about educators and as a supervisor who coaches educators for improvement in a supportive and non-judgmental fashion (Wieczorek et al., [<reflink idref="bib56" id="ref58">56</reflink>]). In addition, principals' improvement efforts outside of evaluation processes may produce more improvement than efforts using evaluation systems as an improvement lever (Hallinger et al., [<reflink idref="bib20" id="ref59">20</reflink>]; Lane, [<reflink idref="bib35" id="ref60">35</reflink>]; Wieczorek et al., [<reflink idref="bib56" id="ref61">56</reflink>]). Therefore, principals may emphasize the formative roles of teacher evaluation to influence improvement and professional growth, placing less emphasis on the fidelity of the summative rating and accountability functions of teacher evaluation (Reinhorn et al., [<reflink idref="bib49" id="ref62">49</reflink>]). Overall, the effectiveness of evaluation processes relies on the skills and training of the principal to implement evaluation policies and procedures with fidelity (Hallinger et al., [<reflink idref="bib20" id="ref63">20</reflink>]; Kimball & Milanowski, [<reflink idref="bib31" id="ref64">31</reflink>]; Reinhorn et al., [<reflink idref="bib49" id="ref65">49</reflink>]).</p> <hd id="AN0158144950-5">Formal identification of underperforming educators</hd> <p>A national report on teacher evaluations, <emph>The Widget Effect</emph> (Weisberg et al., [<reflink idref="bib54" id="ref66">54</reflink>]), was used by Illinois policy advocates as evidence that too many teachers were underperforming and policy reforms were needed. The New Teacher Project examined evaluation ratings in 12 urban school districts with low academic performance, including the Illinois districts of Elgin, Rockford, and Chicago, finding that half did not dismiss any tenured educators during the study period. In addition, 99% of educators received positive performance ratings. Recent research by Kraft and Gilmour ([<reflink idref="bib34" id="ref67">34</reflink>]) supports these findings: analyzing five years of summative ratings in 19 states, they found only 2.7% of educators were rated as underperforming. In follow-up interviews in one district, principals perceived 27.8% of their educators as underperforming but had rated only 6.5% as underperforming on their summative evaluations.</p> <p>Several factors have been presented as reasons for this disparity. First, growing accountability demands have increased the complexity of the principalship. Due to states' evaluation reforms, supervision and evaluation tasks require more attention from principals – especially the time, commitment, and resources necessary to create and implement remediation and improvement plans (Donaldson & Mavrogordato, [<reflink idref="bib13" id="ref68">13</reflink>]; Drake et al., [<reflink idref="bib16" id="ref69">16</reflink>]; Kraft & Gilmour, [<reflink idref="bib34" id="ref70">34</reflink>]; Reinhorn et al., [<reflink idref="bib49" id="ref71">49</reflink>]). Yet, principals express low confidence in the effectiveness of educator improvement levers (Kraft & Gilmour, [<reflink idref="bib33" id="ref72">33</reflink>]). Collective bargaining agreements and state tenure laws have created extensive protections for underperforming educators, resulting in expensive legal costs to enact remediations and dismissals (Bireda, [<reflink idref="bib2" id="ref73">2</reflink>]; Kerchner & Koppich, [<reflink idref="bib30" id="ref74">30</reflink>]). Additionally, principals express concerns that the school culture and staff relationships could deteriorate when educators are placed on improvement plans. Consequently, rather than address the underperformance and risk disrupting the environment, some principals choose to maintain the status quo and inflate teachers' summative evaluation ratings (Blase & Blase, [<reflink idref="bib4" id="ref75">4</reflink>]; Kimball & Milanowski, [<reflink idref="bib31" id="ref76">31</reflink>]; Kraft & Gilmour, [<reflink idref="bib33" id="ref77">33</reflink>]; Mead et al., [<reflink idref="bib41" id="ref78">41</reflink>]).</p> <hd id="AN0158144950-6">Race to the Top and its influence on teacher evaluation in Illinois</hd> <p>Responding to calls for federal economic stimulus during the Great Recession, the U.S. Congress passed the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of [<reflink idref="bib1" id="ref79">1</reflink>], which included 5 USD billion for Race to the Top (RttT), a competitive grant incentivizing states to adopt education policy reforms and initiatives for low-performing schools, educator effectiveness, data management, and college readiness. In response to RttT, states reformed teacher evaluation policies – attaching student growth results to summative evaluation ratings, increasing the rigor and reliability of teacher evaluation instruments, and addressing methods of identifying and improving educator underperformance. RttT dramatically influenced education reform; in educator effectiveness alone, two thirds of states enacted teacher evaluation modifications. The Illinois RttT proposal was awarded 42.8 USD million in education funding (Howell, [<reflink idref="bib24" id="ref80">24</reflink>]).</p> <p>Five phases define the evolution of Illinois evaluation policies. Until 1975, school boards had wide discretion for evaluations and educator dismissals. However, the Illinois legislature passed Article 24–12 in 1975, adding a hearing officer to review a local board's educator dismissal actions. In 1986, the Illinois legislature passed additional evaluation reforms, requiring districts to rate educators on a three-tiered scale of <emph>excellent, satisfactory</emph>, and <emph>unsatisfactory</emph>, and a 180-day remediation plan was required for tenured educators rated <emph>unsatisfactory</emph>. This remediation plan was shortened to 90 days in December 1997 when the Illinois legislature lengthened tenure acquisition from 2 to 4 years (London, [<reflink idref="bib37" id="ref81">37</reflink>]). The current Illinois evaluation reforms began in 2009 with the enactment of PERA in 2010 and SB7 and 2011.</p> <hd id="AN0158144950-7">Conceptual frameworks</hd> <p>We applied two conceptual frameworks to this study: education policy implementation theory (Honig, [<reflink idref="bib23" id="ref82">23</reflink>]) and micropolitics of personnel evaluation (Bridges & Groves, [<reflink idref="bib5" id="ref83">5</reflink>]). Research on policy implementation must extend beyond the structural policy itself and examine the localized conditions and processes in which the policy succeeded or failed. First, the policy itself may influence implementation (Malen, [<reflink idref="bib38" id="ref84">38</reflink>]). For example, the language of policy influences implementation of reforms, especially when terminology lacks precision. Actors may interpret the policy's language in differing ways, resulting in implementation that is misaligned to the policy's intent (Hill, [<reflink idref="bib22" id="ref85">22</reflink>]; Reinhorn et al., [<reflink idref="bib49" id="ref86">49</reflink>]). In addition, the location and local context of reform activities affect policy implementation (Malen, [<reflink idref="bib38" id="ref87">38</reflink>]).</p> <p>Policies are also influenced by political challenges that accompany change, which occur throughout implementation (Malen, [<reflink idref="bib38" id="ref88">38</reflink>]). Politics has been defined as "decisions related to the allocation of values for a given society or social organization; that is who gets what, when, and how" (Blase & Blase, [<reflink idref="bib4" id="ref89">4</reflink>], p. 7). To examine the politics occurring in local contexts, micropolitics describes the public and private transactions that occur between actors who seek power and influence over decisions (Kirst & Wirt, [<reflink idref="bib32" id="ref90">32</reflink>]). Micropolitics appears often in the education literature to describe factors influencing decision making at the local level. As democratic organizations, schools are localized venues for political debate and lobbying by actors who influence decision making and policy outcomes (Malen, [<reflink idref="bib38" id="ref91">38</reflink>]). In their personnel evaluation framework, Bridges and Groves ([<reflink idref="bib5" id="ref92">5</reflink>]) defined the micropolitics of teacher evaluation as a political process through the decisions, interests, and outcomes of school actors:</p> <p>We argue that each type of personnel evaluation decision involves multiple actors with access to these decisions and particular interests and goals. When the interests of actors conflict, the opposing parties mobilize their power, form coalitions, and pursue strategies to affect the outcome. The outcomes of the conflict reflect the interests of those actors with the greatest power and most effective strategies. These outcomes may limit the discretion that can be exercised regarding future decisions, or they may lead to unanticipated negative consequences that trigger a new round of decisions. (p. 322)</p> <p>In this study, we illuminated education policy implementation by using a micropolitics of personnel evaluation lens to understand the decisions, actors, and outcomes of evaluation policy implementation at local school and district sites. Honig ([<reflink idref="bib23" id="ref93">23</reflink>]) described a complementary relationship between politics and policy implementation, noting researchers are challenged "to unpack how politics creates policy, and to uncover how policy creates politics" (p. 85). Micropolitics provides an important lens on local conditions that influence the creation and implementation of local procedures that evolve from state and national policies. As a tool for analyzing personnel issues, Bridges and Groves ([<reflink idref="bib5" id="ref94">5</reflink>]) suggested five general questions for researchers to answer when investigating the influence of micropolitics on school personnel issues, including teacher evaluation. These questions informed our research methods:</p> <p></p> <ulist> <item> How have the ground rules, procedures, and performance evaluations changed over time?</item> <p></p> <item> Whose interests have predominated or been frustrated by these changes?</item> <p></p> <item> How have the sources and levels of power, coalitions, and strategies of various actors stimulated these changes?</item> <p></p> <item> To what extent have the excesses and abuses of dominant actors stimulated these changes?</item> <p></p> <item> What political forces, if any, eventually lead to ground rules, procedures, and performance evaluations that more adequately balance the interests of prime beneficiaries (i.e., parents and students) in quality and the interests of employees in job security and fair treatment? (p. 336)</item> </ulist> <hd id="AN0158144950-8">Research methods</hd> <p>We begin the research methods section by providing a brief description of the Illinois evaluation reforms. The PERA legislation and regulatory changes required Illinois public schools to redesign their educator and principal evaluation systems. PERA required the formation of local district joint committees, comprised equally of school leaders and teachers' union representatives, to design the local procedures. Once the joint committees began meeting, they were required to reach agreement within 180 days; lacking an agreement, their local evaluation plan would default to the state-provided model. PERA required student growth ratings to comprise a minimum of 30% of educator's summative ratings, although joint committees could choose a higher weighting, and the default state model apportioned 50% of the summative rating to student growth (ISBE, [<reflink idref="bib25" id="ref95">25</reflink>]). Summative ratings were expanded to four categories (<emph>excellent, proficient, needs improvement</emph>, and <emph>unsatisfactory</emph>); a Professional Development Plan process was mandated for tenured educators rated <emph>needs improvement</emph>. Consistent with past legislation, tenured educators rated <emph>unsatisfactory</emph> were placed on remediation plans and subject to termination if their performance did not improve. Second, although tenured educators continued on 2-year evaluation cycles, those with <emph>needs improvement</emph> or <emph>unsatisfactory</emph> ratings were evaluated annually. Tenured educators receiving two unsatisfactory ratings within a 36-month time period could be terminated by their school board without an additional remediation period, although they must follow state-mandated due process. In the first year of the district's implementation of student growth measures, student growth scores must account for a minimum of 25% of the summative rating calculations, moving to a minimum of 30% in years two and beyond. Principals' evaluations also were required to incorporate student growth measures. Finally, although districts were allowed to select their own research-based performance indicators, ISBE recommended Danielson's framework as the default model and evaluators statewide received training on this framework (ISBE, [<reflink idref="bib25" id="ref96">25</reflink>]).</p> <p>The second reform, SB7, and subsequent regulatory changes, further modified the evaluation process and educator employment rights. First, the law permitted educators who did not hold administrative licensure but who passed the state's required evaluator training to evaluate their peer educators, provided that the district teachers' union approved. Second, Reduction in Force (RIF) procedures were connected to evaluation scores, with educators categorized into four groups based upon summative ratings rather than seniority. As a result, should a district initiate RIF processes, those with the lowest summative ratings – including tenured educators – would be released first. The state also now provided two options to accelerate tenure over typically required 4-year timeframe: (a) granting tenure after two years for educators who were previously tenured in another district, and (b) awarding tenure after three years for educators earning three consecutive <emph>excellent</emph> summative ratings. Another reform required districts to annually report teacher and principal evaluation ratings (ISBE, [<reflink idref="bib25" id="ref97">25</reflink>]).</p> <p>This qualitative study involved semi-structured interviews with 20 Illinois public school principals to examine micropolitical factors that influenced them as they implemented evaluation reforms in their schools. Purposeful criterion-i sampling (Palinkas et al., [<reflink idref="bib45" id="ref98">45</reflink>]) was used to identify currently practicing principals with at least seven years of evaluation experience in the state and at least one experience identifying an underperforming educator. These criteria ensured participants had evaluation experiences prior to and after the evaluation reforms were enacted and that they could speak to the influence of the reforms on educator underperformance. Using school directory information provided by ISBE ([<reflink idref="bib26" id="ref99">26</reflink>]), e-mail invitations were sent to all Illinois public school principals (<emph>n</emph> = 4,016) in October 2017.</p> <p>Screening interviews were conducted in November 2017 with 28 individuals who responded to the e-mail solicitation. Using expert judgment (Robinson, [<reflink idref="bib50" id="ref100">50</reflink>]) upon reviewing these volunteers, 20 participants were selected for participation based on the study criteria and their potential to illuminate the research question. In addition, participants were selected to represent diverse gender, race/ethnicity, geographic location, and district demographics, including school type (elementary, middle, high school). Participants represented regions across the state, generally mirroring the population distribution of Illinois. Participant demographics (Table 1) closely matched the race and ethnicity of Illinois principals (Brown & White, [<reflink idref="bib6" id="ref101">6</reflink>]). Eighteen telephone interviews were conducted and two were conducted in-person. All participants were principals, although one served in a dual principal/superintendent role. (See Table 2 for participant demographics, including information on school district types.)</p> <p>Table 1. Participant characteristics compared to Illinois state principal demographics.</p> <p> <ephtml> <table><thead><tr><td>Demographic information</td><td>Number of participants</td><td>Percentage of participants</td><td>Statewide in 2008</td></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td><bold>Race</bold></td><td /><td /><td /></tr><tr><td>Hispanic/Latino</td><td>1</td><td>5%</td><td>3.9%</td></tr><tr><td>Not Hispanic/Not Latino</td><td>19</td><td>95%</td><td>94.1%</td></tr><tr><td><bold>Ethnicity</bold></td><td /><td /><td /></tr><tr><td>American Indian or AlaskaNative</td><td>0</td><td>0%</td><td>< 0%</td></tr><tr><td>Asian</td><td>1</td><td>5%</td><td>0.5%</td></tr><tr><td>Black or African-American </td><td>2</td><td>10%</td><td>14.8%</td></tr><tr><td>Native Hawaiian</td><td>0</td><td>0%</td><td>n/a</td></tr><tr><td>White</td><td>16</td><td>80%</td><td>80.1%</td></tr><tr><td>Hispanic/Latino</td><td>1</td><td>5%</td><td>3.9%</td></tr><tr><td><bold>Gender</bold></td><td /><td /><td /></tr><tr><td>Male</td><td>10</td><td>50%</td><td>52%</td></tr><tr><td>Female</td><td>10</td><td>50%</td><td>48%</td></tr></tbody></table> </ephtml> </p> <p>1 Data from Brown and White ([<reflink idref="bib6" id="ref102">6</reflink>]).</p> <p>Table 2. Participant demographics.</p> <p> <ephtml> <table><thead><tr><td>Participant</td><td>Gender</td><td>Race/ethnicity</td><td>Years as evaluator</td><td>District size/type</td></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Aidan</td><td>Male</td><td>White Not Hispanic/Not Latino</td><td>11</td><td>Large Elementary</td></tr><tr><td>Amanda</td><td>Female</td><td>White Not Hispanic/Not Latino</td><td>9</td><td>Medium Unit</td></tr><tr><td>Ann</td><td>Female</td><td>White Not Hispanic/Not Latino</td><td>17</td><td>Large Unit</td></tr><tr><td>Charlie</td><td>Male</td><td>White Hispanic/Latino</td><td>10</td><td>Large Elementary</td></tr><tr><td>Corey</td><td>Male</td><td>White Not Hispanic/Not Latino</td><td>14</td><td>Large Unit</td></tr><tr><td>Diana</td><td>Female</td><td>White Not Hispanic/Not Latino</td><td>17</td><td>Large Unit</td></tr><tr><td>Dustin</td><td>Male</td><td>White Not Hispanic/Not Latino</td><td>8</td><td>Large Unit</td></tr><tr><td>Emma</td><td>Female</td><td>White Not Hispanic/Not Latino</td><td>7</td><td>Large Elementary</td></tr><tr><td>Eric</td><td>Male</td><td>White Not Hispanic/Not Latino</td><td>9</td><td>Medium Elementary</td></tr><tr><td>Frank</td><td>Male</td><td>White Not Hispanic/Not Latino</td><td>17</td><td>Large Unit</td></tr><tr><td>Glen</td><td>Male</td><td>White Not Hispanic/Not Latino</td><td>17</td><td>Large Unit</td></tr><tr><td>Harold</td><td>Male</td><td>Black or African-American Not Hispanic/Not Latino</td><td>9</td><td>Large High School</td></tr><tr><td>Jeffrey</td><td>Male</td><td>Asian Not Hispanic/Not Latino</td><td>18</td><td>Large Unit</td></tr><tr><td>Jordyn</td><td>Female</td><td>Black or African-American Not Hispanic/Not Latino</td><td>10</td><td>Medium Elementary</td></tr><tr><td>Melody</td><td>Female</td><td>Not Hispanic/Not Latino White</td><td>10</td><td>Large Unit</td></tr><tr><td>Michelle</td><td>Female</td><td>White Not Hispanic/Not Latino</td><td>13</td><td>Large Unit</td></tr><tr><td>Molly</td><td>Female</td><td>White Not Hispanic/Not Latino</td><td>8</td><td>Small Elementary</td></tr><tr><td>Rebecca</td><td>Female</td><td>White Not Hispanic/Not Latino</td><td>10</td><td>Large Unit</td></tr><tr><td>Stephen</td><td>Male</td><td>White Not Hispanic/Not Latino</td><td>14</td><td>Medium Elementary</td></tr><tr><td>Vickie</td><td>Female</td><td>White Not Hispanic/Not Latino</td><td>15</td><td>Large Unit</td></tr></tbody></table> </ephtml> </p> <p>We employed a semi-structured interview protocol informed by the questions offered by Bridges and Groves ([<reflink idref="bib5" id="ref103">5</reflink>]). Interviews were recorded and subsequently transcribed by a professional transcription service. The verbatim transcripts were cataloged for coding using HyperRESEARCH version 3.7.3 software for the Windows platform. We used a categorical approach (Teddlie & Tashakkori, [<reflink idref="bib52" id="ref104">52</reflink>]) to organize the narratives in codes reflecting common themes. Each participant was provided a copy of the thematic analysis from their interview for member checking (Creswell, [<reflink idref="bib9" id="ref105">9</reflink>]) post-analysis. Follow-up questions were presented via e-mail to all 20 participants to obtain additional information, including participants' reactions to statewide evaluation data released by ISBE ([<reflink idref="bib27" id="ref106">27</reflink>]) during the study. Twelve participants provided additional written responses, which were incorporated into our thematic analysis.</p> <hd id="AN0158144950-9">Findings</hd> <p>Through our interviews, the 20 principals reported both positive and problematic aspects of their districts' implementation of the Illinois evaluation reforms. Themes identified included the following: the role of unions and peers in supporting educator improvement, improved professional interactions between principals and educators, additional time demands placed on principals, the influence of student growth procedures on summative ratings inflation, problems with inconsistency of summative ratings, and a discrepancy between participants' perceptions of educator underperformance in their school districts and the actual evaluation ratings.</p> <hd id="AN0158144950-10">Teachers' unions did not contest efforts to remediate underperformance</hd> <p>All 20 participants had implemented at least one improvement plan as an evaluator in Illinois. When asked if asked they would initiate these improvement plans again, all answered affirmatively. Jordyn explained why she valued improvement plans:</p> <p>I think it takes a lot out of the principal. It's a lot to do when you have so many aspects of the building to run. But I think it's worth it ....because, in this first case, when the moment that it was determined that she was (going) on a plan, I was actually meeting with her – a data meeting. She was not prepared, did not have anything in terms of expectations of what needed to happen. I just told her, "I cannot allow you to be a disservice to kids" ... She totally understood ... For me, it's all about kids. I can't knowingly know that you are not doing what's best for kids and say that's okay. No matter how much work it is for me, it is my duty to do that.</p> <p>Diana viewed improvement plans through a lens of fairness:</p> <p>It's not fair to have teachers underperforming in schools. It's not fair to the children. It's not fair to the teacher to not know how they're performing. It certainly is not fair to the other teachers who have to work with them. So yes, I will do remediation and Professional Development Plans if it needs to happen.</p> <p>Diana's description of fairness, through a micropolitical perspective, may explain why participants described union representatives' interactions with school administrators as neutral to positive when representing an ineffective educator during improvement plan processes. Although union representatives and other educators may initially "circle the wagons" to protect a colleague, participants reported both unions and school principals supported a mutual goal of promoting quality teaching. Union representatives asserted their power to ensure the processes and policies were followed, but they did not abuse their union roles to obstruct the goal of educator improvement. Diana worked with a union representative who shared the district's vision of educator quality: "The union representative clearly saw the weakness in the teacher .... the union's goal is also to not have weak teachers in our district." Thus, it seemed clear that union representatives, teachers, and administrators understood the accountability intent of the evaluation reform legislation and recognized that the implementation of this policy at the local level required a stronger emphasis on instructional quality.</p> <p>Molly described how a representative from the state teachers' union was helpful in selecting a mentor teacher for the improvement plan. Emma described how the union supported her efforts to improve an underperforming educator:</p> <p>I think they understood that at the heart of the plan we were trying to improve instruction and make sure that the individual was maintaining appropriate professional relationships. And so, I think on behalf of the union as a collective whole, they wanted what they saw was best for ... a safe and healthy building environment.</p> <p>Charlie offered a similar account of how a union representative supported his focus on improvement through coaching and mentoring:</p> <p>The guy that's still here in my school today, the reason he's still here today is because his union representative basically told him to shape up or ship out. And, she was done. She basically told him – which I really appreciate her .... She was mentoring him, and she basically told him, "Dude, either do this and do it right, or I'm out of here and you're on your own." .... Because she was pushing him, she was basically mentoring him. That was a great way of leadership from union representative coming through and coaching another teacher.</p> <p>Michael felt the union wanted to ensure the improvement process was implemented in a "humane manner" with supports and opportunities for improvement. Finally, Melody described how union representatives mediated the process between the principal and the educator and focused their power on the teacher's improvement efforts:</p> <p>They do not try and sway administrators in either direction. They will just sit and go through the facts between the teacher and the administrator. I know they meet a lot with the teacher behind the scenes, and they work with them a lot .... I think they're a positive support when it comes to remediation plans or underperforming.</p> <p>Thus, as Kirst and Wirt ([<reflink idref="bib32" id="ref107">32</reflink>]) noted, union and school district actors engaged in private transactions, while working collaboratively toward the shared goal of educator improvement.</p> <p>In addition, principals reported other educators often were relieved the improvement plan had been put into effect, explaining that this policy implementation strengthened the school culture by setting higher performance expectations for all faculty members. Dustin observed an increase in staff professionalism when educators observed their colleagues "who weren't doing what they were supposed to (do) receive the appropriate consequences." Glen believed he "set a bar for expectations that had not previously been set" by previous school leaders when he addressed underperformance, noting that his best educators expressed their appreciation to him for taking corrective action. Michelle concurred, sharing, "Last year, we had probably our worst performing teacher on a Professional Development Plan and people were thrilled about it .... I mean, people were happy that she was on a plan."</p> <hd id="AN0158144950-11">Professional interactions between principals and educators</hd> <p>Nine participants described how their professional conversations with educators about teaching and learning practices improved since the policy reforms were implemented in their districts. Nineteen participants' districts adopted the Danielson framework, which they perceived as beneficial because it provided specific criteria to define quality teaching. Frank explained:</p> <p>I think it provides some definite observable actions and the framework for people to be able to have conversations to improve, but also provides some specific behaviors and observations and data that people can look and see if things aren't happening. I think being able to clearly articulate some of those expectations, and then reflect on what is happening in the classroom and beyond is very helpful to be able to communicate with staff and help them continue to grow.</p> <p>Adoption of a district instructional framework created a uniform and shared vision of teaching, which permitted supervisors and educators to engage in improved professional conversations about quality teaching. The precise terminology of the framework provided a mechanism for teachers and administrators to reach a shared understanding of expectations for professional practices. Harold reported that educators needed assistance with interpreting and understanding the framework as it was applied within the local district:</p> <p>I think it makes it easier to identify. I think what is required, though, is some more understanding, more calibration around that. Really unpacking what some of those words mean, some of those descriptors. What if schools and districts take the time to really unpack those rubrics with teachers around Danielson? It makes it a lot easier. I don't think we've put enough time into helping teachers understand the rubrics.</p> <p>Diana felt the teaching framework "depersonalized" difficult conversations through the application of objective, concrete criteria.</p> <p>Yet, participants also explained that once an educator received a lower summative evaluation than expected, professional conversations became more challenging as the educator focused on the low score and its potential negative consequences. As Michelle explained,</p> <p>As soon as you give somebody an <emph>unsatisfactory</emph>, they're done. That's like the anti-Holy Grail .....if you issue an <emph>unsatisfactory</emph> in any component, the person is looking for a job the next day, which is probably fine, because it's pretty hard to get <emph>unsatisfactory</emph>. That then deteriorates the ability to coach.</p> <p>Amanda observed how a singular focus on the evaluation rating can impede educators' ability to discuss instructional performance and benefit from feedback during the evaluation conference:</p> <p>My teachers in the past, they can have a conversation about what has gone well and what needs to be improved upon. But it's a stupid rating of either <emph>excellent</emph> or <emph>proficient</emph> ..... they get hung up on the word and not what led to that rating. All they look at is that word. Whatever that score is ... the final word. I have teachers that turn right to that back page and just want to know what the final score is and what word they got, whether it was <emph>excellent</emph> or <emph>proficient</emph>. And if they got <emph>proficient</emph> instead of <emph>excellent</emph>, or they got <emph>needs improvement</emph> on a category instead of just <emph>excellent</emph>, their whole world falls apart!</p> <p>Thus, from a micropolitical perspective, although the school district leaders and teachers' union representatives who served on their joint committees had reached agreement on district policies and procedures, the principals observed that similar levels of understanding were not necessarily present with individual educators in their districts. Implementation of the evaluation reforms involved one-on-one conversations between principals and teachers, which could become challenging when educators were identified as needing improvements.</p> <p>Michelle also described "retaliatory efforts" from educators who were dissatisfied with low evaluation ratings. She explained that disgruntled educators in her building and throughout the district filed unfounded complaints with her district's human resources department, the state Inspector General, and the Equal Opportunities Compliance Office charging that Michelle and other principals were issuing unfair evaluation ratings. She also described educators who circumvented receiving a low summative rating by using a loophole the district's evaluation policy. Michelle perceived that some educators took unwarranted Family Medical Leave Act extended absences, preventing principals from issuing underperforming evaluation ratings because the employees did not meet the minimum threshold for days in attendance in order to receive summative evaluation ratings.</p> <p>One mediating factor in the relationship between educators and principals, however, was educators' ability to internalize and implement their district's teaching framework. Charlie explained how educators may strive for <emph>excellent</emph> ratings while only demonstrating a surface-level understanding of the teaching framework:</p> <p>For the general population of teachers, they don't understand it well enough. They think they do, but they really don't. And they can't get to that level, so they are not understanding that it's a pretty high demand in order to get that <emph>excellent</emph>. They still want to get that <emph>distinguished</emph> or <emph>excellent</emph> rating, even though they're not performing at that level on a regular basis, so they're not quite understanding the rubric.</p> <p>Harold added that districts should help educators understand the teaching framework as it becomes district policy and explain how it can improve their classroom practices.</p> <hd id="AN0158144950-12">Expansion of time demands for principals</hd> <p>As the evaluation reforms were implemented, a negative consequence was the additional time that was required for evaluators: Eleven participants reported increased workloads. Amanda reported the evaluation requirements impeded her ability to hold supportive conversations with educators that could assist them with improving their performance: "They're taking a lot more time; there's a lot more paperwork. I believe the paperwork is cutting down on the actual quality and time that principals and teachers meet to discuss the actual performance and ways to improve." Ann explained that teachers' union members on joint committees negotiated to create a complex evaluation system to reduce principals' power to assign low ratings.</p> <p>Eric described spending additional time outside normal work hours to complete the evaluation paperwork, explaining, "We're not willing to give up what we do in the classroom or in the building, so I'm not doing evaluations at school or during the school day. So, my workday has increased." Charlie quantified the meetings required to evaluate his caseload of educators:</p> <p>I have over 150 meetings in one year to evaluate approximately 14 teachers. And, when you really look at the amount of time being spent on the evaluation, that's a lot of time being taken away from kids and staff and walking around the classroom. I still try and get out at least to visit three or four teachers a day, as much as I can, whenever I can. But, that gets harder and harder to do when you gotta have three or four meetings a day for evaluation .... And, at the end of the day, teachers that are I know are proficient are still proficient. And teachers that I know are excellent – because they're just dynamic people and really do a great job – are still excellent. It doesn't take 150 meetings to determine what I already know is pretty much what it is.</p> <p>Some participants felt the expanded time demands may cause principals to issue inflated ratings to avoid being required to design, issue, and monitor an improvement plan. Considering the micropolitics involved with interacting with educators and determining the factors involved with identifying underperforming educators, Aiden reflected on how improvement plans placed additional pressures on the principal:</p> <p>There is a limit to what an administrator can actually do, because it requires a huge amount of work and a lot of meetings. In my case, attorneys on the phone, assistant superintendent in my office. It brings it to a whole other level of scrutiny once you do that. But in my case, these were some veteran teachers who were definitely underperforming and I had to make a decision: Is the effort I'm going to put in going to result in improvement or removal? And am I willing to take that step?</p> <p>Ann concurred, outlining the workload challenges she faced when implementing a remediation plan. The time commitment shifted her focus away from other duties:</p> <p>I basically didn't have a life from March. I truly was not doing my job; my superintendent tookover my building. Then I spent that whole summer ... It was basically about six months of just constant work, mostly writing and gathering evidence, but I'd do it again ....The remediation plan ended up being about 80 typed pages. It was very, very lengthy. No human being could have ever met the requirements of it. We had very, very good legal counsel that guided me. I pretty much stopped teaching or stopped running my building and I was working with the attorneys from March 1<sups>st</sups> almost on a daily basis.</p> <hd id="AN0158144950-13">Student growth inflated summative ratings</hd> <p>Fifteen participants noted concerns that when the evaluation reforms were implemented, the student growth processes overwhelmingly resulted in favorable assessments of student learning, which subsequently inflated educators' summative evaluation ratings. A controversial aspect of Illinois evaluation reform legislation was the mandate to include student growth as a significant component of educators' education ratings. At the local level, joint committees were empowered to design district evaluations processes, and principals observed that union representatives asserted their power to minimize the potential effects of student growth ratings for teachers. Principals reported that procedures designed by joint committees were structured in ways that highly favored educators, as unions strategically influenced policy creation. Vickie explained the student growth requirement "was accommodating on the teachers' ends. It was what they wanted and the administrators were to agree with."</p> <hd id="AN0158144950-14">Joint committees created student growth procedures that were easy for educators to attain</hd> <p>Under the state's teacher evaluation rule, joint committees had discretion to identify the types of assessments used to measure student growth and how the educator and evaluator would set goals for student outcomes. For example, procedures might alloweducators to use two teacher-created classroom assessments or a combination of two assessments using one standardized test, one departmental/schoolwide assessment, and/or one teacher-created assessment. These procedural decisions were made by the joint committees and varied widely across districts. Amanda described the joint committee in her district as a "defensive process" in which the teachers' union used their power to protect member employment. She felt the resulting system was purposely complex to hinder school administrators from using unsatisfactory evaluation ratings to reduce the number of educators employed by the district.</p> <p>At the level of the individual teacher, principals described being relatively powerless to object when some educators set readily-attainable goals to increase their probability of earning the highest student growth ratings. Aiden's joint committee set low student growth targets but hoped educators would be encouraged to take risks with challenging assessments and growth goals for students. However, he believed that, rather than stretching themselves and their students to attain higher learning goals, teachers identified low targets because they feared potential repercussions of a low student growth score:</p> <p>The thinking for the teacher evaluation committee was – if you set the bar too high then people aren't going to be willing to take risks and really try something different and tinker with their assessments, because they'll feel like, "Well, geez, why am I gonna set a real rigorous goal with the kids and set a high standard when obviously it's going to put me at <emph>needs improvement</emph>?"</p> <p>Jeffrey described how educators approached the identification of student growth goals "like a game of just trying to meet the goal," questioning whether he should have encouraged more challenging goals. Thus, cognizant of the micropolitics involved with the implementation of the restructured teacher evaluation process, Jeffrey was cautious in exercising his formal authority to push teachers toward greater student growth goals. His work was complicated by decisions made by the joint committee to use only teacher-created assessments for student growth. The teachers' union had blocked the use of external, standardized assessments that might provide more rigor and accountability for student growth measures. Glen agreed educators who set challenging targets assumed risks that could lower their summative ratings:</p> <p>We use an SLO [Student Learning Objective] model in my district, and I think the initial thinking, as to why the PERA joint committee wanted to go with an SLO model was, they thought it would foster more in-depth conversations around student assessments, how we analyze students' assessments, and how teachers use those assessments to improve their instruction. All of which would be great practice, but I think tying that student growth model to their evaluation actually puts those certified teachers in harm's way when they try to create a rigorous SLO, because if they create one that's too rigorous, that may be negatively reflected on their evaluation.</p> <p>Ann recalled a comment by one of her teachers: "If a teacher isn't bright enough to figure out a way to show growth through this process, then they're not really bright enough to be teaching anybody!"</p> <hd id="AN0158144950-15">District methods of combining student growth and teaching performance ratings inflated overal...</hd> <p>Participants explained that their joint committees created procedures that favored educators through "easy" ways to attain higher ratings. Consequently, a high student growth rating when combined with a <emph>needs improvement</emph> teaching performance rating was sufficient to raise the educator's overall summative rating to <emph>proficient</emph>. Vickie felt student growth scores unduly influenced the summative rating for ineffective teachers: "If they get a high percentage on their student growth component, they won't be in the <emph>unsatisfactory</emph> or the <emph>needs improvement</emph> category." Harold expanded, describing how low classroom performance ratings would be overridden by student growth scores in the summative evaluation rating:</p> <p>Overall, ... the final determination of the category that they fall into now with the student growth segment of it – that is really left up to the teachers to control. They can essentially give themselves an <emph>excellent</emph> rating, with then offsets everything else that has been observed by the administration. They end up becoming <emph>proficient</emph> instead of <emph>needs improvement</emph> or <emph>unsatisfactory</emph>.</p> <p>Participants reported this scoring inflation made it more difficult to assign an underperforming summative rating to educators they perceived were performing below their districts' expected performance levels. Charlie explained, "It's a little bit more of a challenge to get someone into a PDP because they would have to be pretty significantly low on Danielson [teacher evaluation domains], and I don't see anyone really being classified that low."</p> <p>Corey added that his district's application of the Danielson framework confounded this issue by underweighting the domains most closely aligned to observable teaching performance:</p> <p>By the time you have averaged Domains 1 and 4 which are not very dependent on the actual performance in a classroom, and you have thrown in what is almost always – at least – proficient student growth ... it's like everybody comes out at proficient ... Even if you are underperforming in domains 2 and 3 – by the time you average everything else – you are usually coming out at proficient.</p> <hd id="AN0158144950-16">Educators were treated fairly but summative ratings were inconsistent</hd> <p>Most participants felt educators were treated fairly by principals who did not exceed their authority in implementing the evaluation systems. Participants shared several examples of efforts to ensure fairness. Eric initiated professional conversations with an administrator employed by a special education cooperative who evaluated their employees working in Eric's building. Eric strove to ensure the cooperative employees were evaluated consistently with the same criteria as those employed by his school district. Ann and Emma described how colleagues in their districts initially rated most educators as "excellent" until their superintendents intervened. Ann's joint committee also made changes to the evaluation process following implementation.</p> <p>Participants believed their districts' adoption of a teaching framework provided a uniform definition of teaching for both educators and administrators, establishing clear criteria that were fair to educators. Amanda noted this uniformity required principals to justify their observational ratings: "This new system puts more pressure on us as evaluators ... just as the teachers are defensive of what they received as a score ... we have to more or less prove to teachers." Participants described several efforts to improve consistency as the new policies and procedures were implemented, including mentoring of principals and district-provided professional development on the educator performance criteria. Emma intentionally mentored her assistant principals to ensure all evaluators in her school were calibrated and consistent throughout the evaluation processes. She led walk-through calibrations with her team to observe instruction together and debriefed about how lessons would be rated on the Danielson framework. Diana described her district's intentional efforts to improve interrater reliability:</p> <p>I feel that we've worked very hard to make sure that administrators have the support as well as the teachers .... We have several committees that work on interrater reliability and we look at our PERA practices every year, and changing what needs to be updated and tweaking.</p> <p>Vickie also shared examples of district-led training to calibrate evaluators throughout their district, while Eric was hopeful that ISBE retraining courses would promote evaluator consistency in his district.</p> <p>However, even with the state-mandated evaluator training and a teaching framework, principals reported issues with consistency. Harold felt evaluations, while fair to educators, were somewhat lenient, and suggested that principals needed training on holding difficult professional conversations with educators. Amanda described problems with evaluators in her district who failed to follow improvement plan procedures. Emma discovered two schools applied the Danielson framework differently, resulting in a wide disparity in the distribution of summative scores across the district. She emphasized that evaluators must consistently apply the framework to avoid this problem. Corey reported ratings inflation in one school in his district,</p> <p>Seeing an elementary school where all but one or two teachers were rated excellent, when the other elementary schools ... you see a normal distribution. Two years ago – it was the last time we met about it – in the entire district, one tenured teacher got a <emph>needs improvement</emph>. There is no way that could happen .... I think that school principal, for various reasons, was inflating a lot.</p> <p>Five principals described personal decisions to forgo underperforming summative evaluation ratings due to educators' seniority and/or proximity to retirement. Aiden weighed many factors when assigning a higher rating than was warranted to a soon-to-retire educator:</p> <p>I think where I've been guilty of backing off a bit is it's someone's – maybe it's their last few years, they've already put in their retirement papers and you're kind of like, "Is it really worth it?" That probably sounds terrible, but I think it's just trying to be respectful of where they are in their career and how do you coach 'em up a little bit and navigate that rather than, "Now we're going to go after you here and you've got two and a half years left before you retire."</p> <p>Corey justified a higher rating for a veteran educator when he realized the timeline for an improvement plan would conclude near the educator's retirement date. Michael rated an educator higher due to respect for her longevity, explaining, "I thought after 43 years she deserved the opportunity to go out on her own. She wasn't doing any harm to kids. If I was going strictly by the book, she would have been on a remediation plan."</p> <hd id="AN0158144950-17">Fewer underperforming educators were identified than participants estimated</hd> <p>We found that participants' estimates of educator underperformance rates in their districts did not match the number of educators who actually were assigned underperforming ratings. In November 2017, ISBE released the first statewide data to report summative evaluation ratings, which was required under SB7. The data reported the aggregate number of educators earning <emph>proficient</emph> and <emph>excellent</emph> summativeratings in each Illinois public school during the 2016–2017 school year. Statewide, 97% of educators were assigned the highest two summative ratings (ISBE, [<reflink idref="bib27" id="ref108">27</reflink>]). In this study, we compared the district-level data with participants' estimates of underperforming educators in their districts (ISBE, [<reflink idref="bib27" id="ref109">27</reflink>]). In 11 participants' districts, the principals had estimated more underperforming educators than educators who earned the lowest two summative ratings by 5 percentage points or more. Among those 11 participants, 4 participants perceived underperformance rates that exceed their district's actual rates by 15 percentage points or more (Table 3). Jeffrey's estimate was close to his district's data, but he explained how student growth measures explained the inflation of reported summative ratings:</p> <p>We didn't have an excessive number of <emph>excellent</emph> [summative ratings prior to PERA], but then when we did the (student growth) process as a district, they shared with us that for the first year, they said, "We have 80% of our teachers at <emph>excellent</emph>," and that's not a true reflection of what teachers are like."</p> <p>Table 3. Principals' estimates of underperformance and reported district 2016–17 evaluation data.</p> <p> <ephtml> <table><thead><tr><td>Participant</td><td>Participants' estimates of underperforming educators in participants' districts (%)</td><td>State reports of underperforming educators in participants' districts (%)</td></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Aidan</td><td>2%</td><td>1%</td></tr><tr><td>Amanda</td><td>< 5%</td><td>3%</td></tr><tr><td>Ann</td><td>5–10%</td><td>0%</td></tr><tr><td>Charlie</td><td>10–20%</td><td>1%</td></tr><tr><td>Corey</td><td>20%</td><td>1%</td></tr><tr><td>Diana</td><td>8–10%</td><td>1%</td></tr><tr><td>Dustin</td><td>15%</td><td>0%</td></tr><tr><td>Emma</td><td>15%</td><td>1%</td></tr><tr><td>Eric</td><td>< 5%</td><td>0%</td></tr><tr><td>Frank</td><td>1–2%</td><td>2%</td></tr><tr><td>Glen</td><td>10%</td><td>2%</td></tr><tr><td>Harold</td><td>5%</td><td>0%</td></tr><tr><td>Jeffrey</td><td>3%</td><td>2%</td></tr><tr><td>Jordyn</td><td>No opinion</td><td>10%</td></tr><tr><td>Melody</td><td>20%</td><td>1%</td></tr><tr><td>Michelle</td><td>15%</td><td>11%</td></tr><tr><td>Molly</td><td>0%</td><td>0%</td></tr><tr><td>Rebecca</td><td>15–20%</td><td>5%</td></tr><tr><td>Stephen</td><td>5–10%</td><td>17%</td></tr><tr><td>Vickie</td><td>2%</td><td>0%</td></tr></tbody></table> </ephtml> </p> <p>2 Reported data from Illinois State Board of Education ([<reflink idref="bib27" id="ref110">27</reflink>]).</p> <hd id="AN0158144950-18">Discussion and implications</hd> <p>In this study, we explored how micropolitics influenced the implementation of Illinois teacher evaluation reforms, utilizing the frameworks of education policy implementation theory (Honig, [<reflink idref="bib23" id="ref111">23</reflink>]) and micropolitics of personnel evaluation (Bridges & Groves, [<reflink idref="bib5" id="ref112">5</reflink>]) to guide our analysis. We found, although principals reported positive aspects of the evaluation mandates and acknowledged the legislators' intent to improve educator effectiveness in promoting student learning, micropolitical challenges with policy implementation of reforms at the local level limited their ability to identify and support underperforming educators. Educators on joint committees used their power to strategically protect their personal and professional interests, hindering the intended policy outcomes.</p> <p>Our study does have some limitations. We included 20 principals for interviews, which represents a small proportion of the total evaluators in the state of Illinois. These individuals volunteered to be interviewed; thus, our findings may have been influenced by self-selection bias (Robinson, [<reflink idref="bib50" id="ref113">50</reflink>]). In addition, interview questions could challenge participants to provide honest or complete answers, and participants who were concerned about school politics and sensitive information may have crafted their answers to fit expected norms rather than provide an answer that accurately portrayed their true feelings (Flessa, [<reflink idref="bib17" id="ref114">17</reflink>]). Finally, the conditions in Illinois may not be generalizable to other states, especially those without collective bargaining and/or robust teachers' union participation in policy development at the local level. Despite these limitations, findings from this study provide important insights and can be helpful to school leaders who are tasked with implementing teacher evaluation reforms in their buildings. In this section, we discuss key findings and their implications.</p> <p>Some principals observed that the culture within their schools improved when they determined it was necessary to place ineffective educators on improvement plans. In general, they found that their faculty collectively supported holding underperforming educators accountable for improving their performance and ultimately being dismissed, if termination was warranted. Although some leaders may be concerned that placing ineffective educators on improvement plans will negatively affect the school environment (Kimball & Milanowski, [<reflink idref="bib31" id="ref115">31</reflink>]; Kraft & Gilmour, [<reflink idref="bib34" id="ref116">34</reflink>]), our research suggests principals who avoid actions to remediate ineffective educators because they fear union and/or educator resistance should recognize that educators, the teachers' union, and the administration can share a common expectation of quality teaching and student learning. Administrators must not shy away from their responsibility to fairly and accurately evaluate educators, to maintain high academic press, and to hold educators accountable for their performance. Educators rely on the collective performance of their colleagues and are likely to support improvement or removal of a peer whose work impedes the work of others and/or who is ineffective in supporting students (Johnson, [<reflink idref="bib29" id="ref117">29</reflink>]).</p> <p>We found that union actors played important roles as partners in local policy as they collaborated with school leaders indesigning improvement levers. In many instances, teachers' unions influenced joint committee deliberations to create less stringent policies and procedures that helped educators to earn higher observation ratings than may be warranted by their teaching performance, which made it more difficult to principals to assign low summative evaluation ratings that would trigger improvement plans. Principals perceived that union representatives who served on the joint committees used their power assertively to protect educators'employment interests by implementing low challenge student growth procedures that did not fully meet the intent of the state legislation. These protective actions are consistent with research regarding educators' fears of job dismissals resulting from evaluations (Conley & Glasman, [<reflink idref="bib7" id="ref118">7</reflink>]; DeMitchell, [<reflink idref="bib12" id="ref119">12</reflink>]). Despite the fact that administrators and educators shared equal representation on joint committees, the climate of school micropolitics can promote conflict avoidance and collegiality, possibly contributing to policies and procedures favoring union advocates when district leaders are hesitant to challenge the union position (Flessa, [<reflink idref="bib17" id="ref120">17</reflink>]).</p> <p>Yet, once evaluation processes were approved andimplemented, principals found that their union representatives did not employ their powers to aggressively defend underperforming educators when improvement plans clearly were necessary. Principals reported that union officials were diligent in ensuring administrators complied with evaluation procedures, but they supported a shared goal of educator improvement or dismissal when such actions were documented and warranted. These findings are consistent with research by Donaldson and Mavrogordato ([<reflink idref="bib13" id="ref121">13</reflink>]) and Johnson ([<reflink idref="bib29" id="ref122">29</reflink>]), yet contradicts other research reporting that teachers' union officials assertively defended the job security of their members (DeMitchell, [<reflink idref="bib12" id="ref123">12</reflink>]; Mead et al., [<reflink idref="bib41" id="ref124">41</reflink>]). Given that teachers' union representatives were actively engaged in designing their district's evaluation systems, it is possible that union leaders felt a shared commitment in these processes and therefore were supportive of the administration when ineffective educators are identified (Donaldson & Mavrogordato, [<reflink idref="bib13" id="ref125">13</reflink>]). Given that the joint committees collaboratively designed systems that made it more difficult to assign summative evaluation ratings of <emph>needs improvement</emph> or <emph>unsatisfactory</emph> to tenured educators, it is also likely union leaders acknowledged that educators receiving these ratings unequivocally were ineffective and needed remediation.</p> <p>The aspect of reforms generating the most concerns in our research was principals' issues with implementation of the student growth component, including teachers' identification of nominal student growth targets, which parallel findings from research on teacher evaluation reforms in Chicago Public Schools (CPS) and elsewhere. Faced with the requirement to implement this requirement within their schools, principals were challenged to negotiate student growth goals with individual teachers, and several reported that they lacked the authority to push teachers to identify rigorous growth targets that would be beneficial for both students and teachers. Jiang et al. ([<reflink idref="bib28" id="ref126">28</reflink>]) reported that CPS educators mentioned the low rigor of the restructured evaluation process, including poorly designed student growth assessments and colleagues who were able to "game" the system to avoid low ratings. CPS educators reported finding little value in their teacher evaluation system and student growth requirement, as it ultimately was implemented in their district. Other research found educators' narrow focus on student growth scores interfered with their instructional improvement (Wieczorek et al., [<reflink idref="bib56" id="ref127">56</reflink>]). Our findings suggest some Illinois districts adopted student growth processes that, while meeting the spirit of the legislation, contained minimal expectations to improve teaching and learning and therefore did not fulfill the intent of legislators and policy advocates to hold educators accountable for student learning gains. As leaders for learning, principals are charged to provide the best learning conditions for students. Yet, policies that protect underperforming educators – ignoring deficiencies and permitting them to continue to function at low levels without mandated intervention to remediate their performance – can be detrimental to student learning (DeMitchell, [<reflink idref="bib12" id="ref128">12</reflink>]).</p> <p>Principals in this study perceived that administrators generally did not abuse their authority and treated educators fairly, yet also expressed concerns regarding evaluator consistency throughout their districts. Three factors illuminate why consistency is an important goal of policy reforms. First, the intent of Illinois state-mandated evaluator training was to create a common understanding of effective teaching practices and a uniform performance standard that would be applied to all evaluations, thereby ensuring consistent summative evaluation ratings within and across Illinois public school districts (White, [<reflink idref="bib55" id="ref129">55</reflink>]). This uniformity was desirable because of the accelerated tenure provisions inherent in the evaluation reform legislation. If school district leaders choose to offer accelerated tenure, some assurance of uniformity in evaluative approaches is needed, particularly when administrators hire educators who were tenured in other school districts. Second, teacher evaluation is strengthened by common criteria and definitions of learning (Haefele, [<reflink idref="bib19" id="ref130">19</reflink>]), so that professional learning conversations with educators can be more effective. Finally, using consistent procedures and standards is important to maintain teacher evaluation with both fidelity and fairness. Donaldson and Woulfin ([<reflink idref="bib15" id="ref131">15</reflink>]) found, while principals may use professional discretion in modifying processes or outcomes of evaluation systems, such efforts can undermine the goals of teacher evaluation. Lack of evaluator consistency may diminish educators' trust in school leaders and impair the relationships needed for productive educator-principal dialogue (Copland & Knapp, [<reflink idref="bib8" id="ref132">8</reflink>]).</p> <p>Participants in this study uniformly expressed concerns regarding the growing complexity of the principalship and increased time demands brought upon by evaluation reforms. Some teachers' unions used their power to strategically advocate for evaluation processes that would protect the employment of their members. This complexity burdened school leaders, not only through additional time requirements but also hampering their abilities to identify teachers as underperforming. The extra conferences that were required throughout the restructured evaluation cycle, as well as mandates for increased classroom observations and additional documentation, challenged them to effectively manage and balance their dual management and instructional leadership roles (Drake et al., [<reflink idref="bib16" id="ref133">16</reflink>]; Hallinger et al., [<reflink idref="bib20" id="ref134">20</reflink>]; Lavigne & Chamberlain, [<reflink idref="bib36" id="ref135">36</reflink>]). Research suggests that shared leadership structures, including such approaches as co-principals (Grubb & Flessa, [<reflink idref="bib18" id="ref136">18</reflink>]) or distributed leadership practices (Flessa, [<reflink idref="bib17" id="ref137">17</reflink>]), could help principals who need space within their worklives to focus on learning leadership and relief from the non-instructional aspects of their positions. Some principals in this study conceded that they intentionally avoided issuing summative evaluation ratings of <emph>needs improvement</emph> and <emph>unsatisfactory</emph> to their tenured educators because of the additional time required for them to develop and monitor Professional Development Plans and remediation plans. Research confirms that leaders need additional time to supervise underperforming educators (Kraft & Gilmour, [<reflink idref="bib34" id="ref138">34</reflink>]). If these workload demands remain unaddressed, principals may continue to avoid issuing improvement plans in an effort to preserve their personal control over their professional responsibilities, as well as to maintain work-life balance (Donaldson & Mavrogordato, [<reflink idref="bib13" id="ref139">13</reflink>]).</p> <hd id="AN0158144950-19">Recommendations for future research</hd> <p>We conclude by providing recommendations for future research. First, our research focused on principals, who are on the "front line" of teacher evaluations, but central office leaders establish the district's vision and accountability for evaluation policy implementation. Therefore, perspectives of central office leaders, including the superintendent, on the evaluation practices of the principals they supervise would inform the literature. In this study, the work of joint committees was often guided by central office leaders, who could provide insights into the micropolitics of the committee – including the composition, internal deliberations, and challenges – when reaching consensus on evaluation reforms. Next, our findings were limited by a small sample of 20 participants. Survey research with a larger population could test the generalizability and strength of these findings in Illinois, as well as other states that have implemented similar reforms. 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  Label: Title
  Group: Ti
  Data: Implications of Illinois Teacher Evaluation Reforms: Insights from Principals
– Name: Language
  Label: Language
  Group: Lang
  Data: English
– Name: Author
  Label: Authors
  Group: Au
  Data: <searchLink fieldCode="AR" term="%22Conrad%2C+David+L%2E%22">Conrad, David L.</searchLink> (ORCID <externalLink term="http://orcid.org/0000-0002-3741-4675">0000-0002-3741-4675</externalLink>)<br /><searchLink fieldCode="AR" term="%22Hackmann%2C+Donald+G%2E%22">Hackmann, Donald G.</searchLink> (ORCID <externalLink term="http://orcid.org/0000-0002-3869-1201">0000-0002-3869-1201</externalLink>)
– Name: TitleSource
  Label: Source
  Group: Src
  Data: <searchLink fieldCode="SO" term="%22Leadership+and+Policy+in+Schools%22"><i>Leadership and Policy in Schools</i></searchLink>. 2022 21(3):565-584.
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  Label: Availability
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  Data: Routledge. Available from: Taylor & Francis, Ltd. 530 Walnut Street Suite 850, Philadelphia, PA 19106. Tel: 800-354-1420; Tel: 215-625-8900; Fax: 215-207-0050; Web site: http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals
– Name: PeerReviewed
  Label: Peer Reviewed
  Group: SrcInfo
  Data: Y
– Name: Pages
  Label: Page Count
  Group: Src
  Data: 20
– Name: DatePubCY
  Label: Publication Date
  Group: Date
  Data: 2022
– Name: TypeDocument
  Label: Document Type
  Group: TypDoc
  Data: Journal Articles<br />Reports - Research
– Name: Audience
  Label: Education Level
  Group: Audnce
  Data: <searchLink fieldCode="EL" term="%22Elementary+Secondary+Education%22">Elementary Secondary Education</searchLink>
– Name: Subject
  Label: Descriptors
  Group: Su
  Data: <searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Teacher+Evaluation%22">Teacher Evaluation</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Educational+Change%22">Educational Change</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Principals%22">Principals</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Administrator+Attitudes%22">Administrator Attitudes</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Educational+Policy%22">Educational Policy</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Policy+Analysis%22">Policy Analysis</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Public+Schools%22">Public Schools</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Politics+of+Education%22">Politics of Education</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Evaluation+Methods%22">Evaluation Methods</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Scores%22">Scores</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Summative+Evaluation%22">Summative Evaluation</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Educational+Improvement%22">Educational Improvement</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Accountability%22">Accountability</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Teacher+Effectiveness%22">Teacher Effectiveness</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Identification%22">Identification</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Elementary+Secondary+Education%22">Elementary Secondary Education</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Administrator+Characteristics%22">Administrator Characteristics</searchLink>
– Name: Subject
  Label: Geographic Terms
  Group: Su
  Data: <searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Illinois%22">Illinois</searchLink>
– Name: DOI
  Label: DOI
  Group: ID
  Data: 10.1080/15700763.2020.1802761
– Name: ISSN
  Label: ISSN
  Group: ISSN
  Data: 1570-0763<br />1744-5043
– Name: Abstract
  Label: Abstract
  Group: Ab
  Data: This study investigated principals' perceptions of Illinois teacher evaluation reforms, applying education policy implementation theory and micropolitics of personnel evaluation as conceptual frameworks. Interviews were conducted with 20 Illinois public school principals. Findings revealed micropolitics influenced the development and implementation of local evaluation procedures that were favorable to educators. Principals perceived student growth scores unduly inflated summative ratings, hindering them from rating educators as underperforming and subsequently assigning improvement plans. Despite challenges, participants believed improvement plans were important levers to hold educators accountable for improving their performance.
– Name: AbstractInfo
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  Data: As Provided
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  Label: Entry Date
  Group: Date
  Data: 2022
– Name: AN
  Label: Accession Number
  Group: ID
  Data: EJ1359184
PLink https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=eric&AN=EJ1359184
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  BibEntity:
    Identifiers:
      – Type: doi
        Value: 10.1080/15700763.2020.1802761
    Languages:
      – Text: English
    PhysicalDescription:
      Pagination:
        PageCount: 20
        StartPage: 565
    Subjects:
      – SubjectFull: Teacher Evaluation
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Educational Change
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Principals
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Administrator Attitudes
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      – SubjectFull: Educational Policy
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      – SubjectFull: Policy Analysis
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      – SubjectFull: Public Schools
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Politics of Education
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Evaluation Methods
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      – SubjectFull: Scores
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      – SubjectFull: Summative Evaluation
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      – SubjectFull: Educational Improvement
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      – SubjectFull: Accountability
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      – SubjectFull: Teacher Effectiveness
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Identification
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Elementary Secondary Education
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      – SubjectFull: Administrator Characteristics
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      – SubjectFull: Illinois
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      – TitleFull: Implications of Illinois Teacher Evaluation Reforms: Insights from Principals
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            NameFull: Hackmann, Donald G.
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              Y: 2022
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            – TitleFull: Leadership and Policy in Schools
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