View in EDS HTML Full Text PDF Full Text

Negative Affective States and Moral Judgment: A Closer Look at Their Joint Involvement

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Title: Negative Affective States and Moral Judgment: A Closer Look at Their Joint Involvement
Language: English
Authors: Derryberry, W. Pitt, Richardson, Sarah, Simpson, Anna, Wilson, Megan, Ambam, Andrea
Source: Journal of Moral Education. 2022 51(3):387-403.
Availability: Routledge. Available from: Taylor & Francis, Ltd. 530 Walnut Street Suite 850, Philadelphia, PA 19106. Tel: 800-354-1420; Tel: 215-625-8900; Fax: 215-207-0050; Web site: http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals
Peer Reviewed: Y
Page Count: 17
Publication Date: 2022
Document Type: Journal Articles
Reports - Research
Education Level: Higher Education
Postsecondary Education
Descriptors: Moral Values, Decision Making, Video Technology, Comparative Analysis, Moral Development, Developmental Stages, Affective Behavior, Values, Measures (Individuals), Natural Disasters, Hunger, Food, Trend Analysis, Crime, Cancer, Drug Therapy, State Universities, College Students, Psychological Patterns
Assessment and Survey Identifiers: Defining Issues Test
DOI: 10.1080/03057240.2021.1887831
ISSN: 0305-7240
1465-3877
Abstract: This paper considers two studies that address negative affective states and moral reasoning while taking the Defining Issues Tests (DIT, DIT2). Both studies confirmed earlier findings that the DIT dilemma, 'Heinz and the Drug,' and the DIT2 dilemma, 'Famine,' are related to increased anger and sadness and decreased moral reasoning. Similar findings were observed in the context of a video consideration of a real-life dilemma paralleling these two dilemmas (Study 1). Comparable findings pertaining to Famine were also observed among three samples of different moral judgment developmental levels, further implicating the role of dilemma content where the trends observed are concerned (Study 2). Overall, both studies illustrated similar patterns of affective states and moral reasoning across all considered DIT/DIT2 dilemmas thereby offering further evidence of the joint involvement of rational deliberation and affective states in the consideration of DIT/DIT2 dilemmas.
Abstractor: As Provided
Entry Date: 2023
Accession Number: EJ1365524
Database: ERIC
Full text is not displayed to guests.
FullText Links:
  – Type: pdflink
    Url: https://content.ebscohost.com/cds/retrieve?content=AQICAHj0k_4E0hTGH8RJwT4gCJyBsGNe_WN95AvKlDbXJGqwxwFbgG-pnOK7x2AcjeHlXuhvAAAA4zCB4AYJKoZIhvcNAQcGoIHSMIHPAgEAMIHJBgkqhkiG9w0BBwEwHgYJYIZIAWUDBAEuMBEEDBKmHQYalKVVaEyFbAIBEICBm1ja8AxCmFhNY0C4RAEzwK6Gn1oFHkJ4e5BH2fWO8880uACi4uBjPjGaGSdhUDZpxsqJbuklbJfo9STs6EVPv5idRN9IiyshhmxScwgW3qVd_6WIj1k-RWQyzGhlaYb8OVoBZtQrwDC0Ijp1God5LsxCDOXcJTb3lbf27sZpZLQqsfPKEzegVWVcB_OUgbH3YKXok7zbYf_6opT7
Text:
  Availability: 1
  Value: <anid>AN0158320155;moe01sep.22;2022Aug04.06:45;v2.2.500</anid> <title id="AN0158320155-1">Negative affective states and moral judgment: A closer look at their joint involvement </title> <p>This paper considers two studies that address negative affective states and moral reasoning while taking the Defining Issues Tests (DIT, DIT2). Both studies confirmed earlier findings that the DIT dilemma, 'Heinz and the Drug,' and the DIT2 dilemma, 'Famine,' are related to increased anger and sadness and decreased moral reasoning. Similar findings were observed in the context of a video consideration of a real-life dilemma paralleling these two dilemmas (Study 1). Comparable findings pertaining to Famine were also observed among three samples of different moral judgment developmental levels, further implicating the role of dilemma content where the trends observed are concerned (Study 2). Overall, both studies illustrated similar patterns of affective states and moral reasoning across all considered DIT/DIT2 dilemmas thereby offering further evidence of the joint involvement of rational deliberation and affective states in the consideration of DIT/DIT2 dilemmas.</p> <p>Keywords: Moral reasoning; moral judgment development; negative affect</p> <p>The study of moral judgment (and resultant moral reasoning) has a strong theoretical and empirical tradition. Numerous considerations exist addressing contributing processes (Killen & Smetana, [<reflink idref="bib16" id="ref1">16</reflink>]). Two processes commonly studied are cognitive processing outcomes including a) rational deliberation (i.e., stages and schemas) and b) affective states (i.e., anger, sadness, disgust, joy, etc.). Different theoretical traditions historically vary about the primacy of the aforementioned cognitive processing outcomes (noteworthy examples include Damasio, [<reflink idref="bib6" id="ref2">6</reflink>]; Greene et al., [<reflink idref="bib11" id="ref3">11</reflink>]; Haidt, [<reflink idref="bib14" id="ref4">14</reflink>]; Kohlberg, [<reflink idref="bib17" id="ref5">17</reflink>]; Thoma, [<reflink idref="bib29" id="ref6">29</reflink>]). However, a more prudent assertion is that both rational deliberation and affective states are involved where moral judgment is concerned (Monin et al., [<reflink idref="bib21" id="ref7">21</reflink>]). Thus, ignoring the contribution of one at the expense of the other is futile.</p> <p>The studies featured here acknowledge the importance and joint contributions of rational and affective products on moral judgment. In particular, the featured studies further explore the involvement of rational deliberation and negative affective states including anger and sadness during James Rest's measurements of moral judgment development, the Defining Issues Test (DIT; Rest et al., [<reflink idref="bib23" id="ref8">23</reflink>]) and Defining Issues Test-2 (DIT2; Thoma, [<reflink idref="bib29" id="ref9">29</reflink>]). Similar efforts have occurred previously including Barger and Derryberry ([<reflink idref="bib2" id="ref10">2</reflink>]), Olejnik and Larue ([<reflink idref="bib22" id="ref11">22</reflink>]) and Zarinpoush et al. ([<reflink idref="bib32" id="ref12">32</reflink>]). Such investigations are important given the emphasis that Rest's 'neo-Kohlbergian approach' (Rest et al. [<reflink idref="bib23" id="ref13">23</reflink>]) places on the importance of rational products on moral judgment.</p> <p>Barger and Derryberry's ([<reflink idref="bib2" id="ref14">2</reflink>]) investigation appears unique in the joint study of rational and affective products because it did so <emph>within</emph> the context of the DIT. Specifically, Olejnik and Larue ([<reflink idref="bib22" id="ref15">22</reflink>]) and Zarinpoush et al. ([<reflink idref="bib32" id="ref16">32</reflink>]) maintained that affective states that accompany taking the DIT alter scores. Barger and Derryberry found that DIT moral dilemma content impacts affective states thereby disputing Olejnik and Larue and Zarinpoush et al. Barger and Derryberry found that DIT moral dilemmas elicit affective state change thereby potentially reducing any prior accompanying affective state. Barger and Derryberry also found that a particular dilemma (i.e., <emph>Heinz and the Drug</emph>) a) related to higher levels of reported anger and sadness and b) illustrated significantly lower moral reasoning among samples relative to other considered moral dilemmas. These findings occurred even in conditions where different affective states were induced. Barger and Derryberry concluded that the affective content of certain DIT dilemmas is enough for individuals to deviate from reasoning characteristic of their modal moral judgment schema regardless of the affective state experienced beforehand.</p> <p>As Barger and Derryberry ([<reflink idref="bib2" id="ref17">2</reflink>]) supported, the deviation in moral reasoning observed in response to <emph>Heinz and the Drug</emph> is in accordance with Rest's neo-Kohlbergian approach due to its support of a 'soft-stage/schema-based' approach. Thus, Barger and Derryberry note that, 'it is not unusual for individuals to reason and make judgments below or above their modal moral judgment developmental schema (Rest et al., [<reflink idref="bib23" id="ref18">23</reflink>]) in certain situations and instances' (p. 457). For Barger and Derryberry, dilemma content eliciting changes in multiple negative affective states may be a reason for this.</p> <hd id="AN0158320155-2">Purpose and goals of the presented studies</hd> <p>Barger and Derryberry ([<reflink idref="bib2" id="ref19">2</reflink>]) supported Monin et al.'s ([<reflink idref="bib21" id="ref20">21</reflink>]) assertion on the concert contributions of rational deliberative and affective products within the context of Rest's DIT. Their findings on the joint contributions of both cognitive processes echo recent studies pertaining to other contexts and considerations of moral development (Aybek et al., [<reflink idref="bib1" id="ref21">1</reflink>]; Landmann & Hess, [<reflink idref="bib19" id="ref22">19</reflink>]; Surdel & Klimenko, [<reflink idref="bib26" id="ref23">26</reflink>]). Nonetheless, additional study is necessary for the context of Rest's DIT. Thus, the purpose of the two studies considered here is to further understand how rational deliberative and affective products are involved in consideration of other DIT dilemmas and dilemmas similar to DIT dilemmas.</p> <p>In so doing, Study 1 considers how moral reasoning and negative affective states are involved in DIT dilemmas and dilemma formats and mediums that Barger and Derryberry did not consider. The goal of Study 1, then, is to determine whether Barger and Derryberry's findings are unique to the dilemmas and dilemma formats they considered. Study 2 accounts for the relationship between moral judgment development and experienced anger and sadness and moral reasoning across each DIT-2 dilemma. Therefore, the goal of Study 2 is to ascertain whether moral judgment development pertains to experienced negative affect and the nature of moral reasoning in response to DIT dilemmas.</p> <hd id="AN0158320155-3">Study 1</hd> <p>The type or format of dilemma of <emph>Heinz and the Drug</emph> may be a factor pertaining to Barger and Derryberry's ([<reflink idref="bib2" id="ref24">2</reflink>]) findings. DIT dilemmas are hypothetical and considered in response to a survey rather than a real-life situation. Thus, the time available for rational deliberation is increased and the magnitude of the affective response may be less strong than in a real-life situation. Supporting this are considerations addressing how processing of real-life dilemmas differs from hypothetical (Derryberry & Thoma, [<reflink idref="bib7" id="ref25">7</reflink>]; Skoe et al., [<reflink idref="bib25" id="ref26">25</reflink>]; Walker et al., [<reflink idref="bib31" id="ref27">31</reflink>]).</p> <p>The focus of study 1 is to consider the role of negative affect and moral reasoning in response to a 'real-life' moral dilemma (i.e., a dilemma that was actually faced). Additionally, study 1 examines whether rational deliberation and affective processing are similar to what occurs after the <emph>Heinz and the Drug</emph> dilemma and its parallel dilemma, <emph>Famine</emph> from the DIT2 (Thoma, [<reflink idref="bib29" id="ref28">29</reflink>]). The real-life moral dilemma used in Study 1 is a nationally reported incident in which a man robbed a bank in order to pay for his daughter's chemotherapy. Thus, this event is an actual occurrence containing similar elements and content of the <emph>Heinz and the Drug</emph> and <emph>Famine</emph> as the protagonists must decide whether to steal to save loved ones.</p> <p>Because this event was reported nationally and produced segments of such reports are available online (see <ulink href="http://abcnews.go.com/Health/accused-bank-robber-stole-daughters-chemotherapy-treatment/story?id=33330902),">http://abcnews.go.com/Health/accused-bank-robber-stole-daughters-chemotherapy-treatment/story?id=33330902),</ulink> Study 1's consideration of it presents a unique format for affective response and moral reasoning. In particular, participants consider the dilemma in video format rather than paper-and-pencil. The format, therefore, creates an opportunity to accentuate the experienced affect as video is known to be more powerful in eliciting affective states than written media (Bradley et al., [<reflink idref="bib5" id="ref29">5</reflink>]). If increased negative affect were observed relative to what has been reported after the <emph>Heinz and the Drug</emph> and the <emph>Famine</emph> dilemmas, decreased moral reasoning may be observed. Bodenhausen et al.'s ([<reflink idref="bib4" id="ref30">4</reflink>]) contention that negative affect is associated with looser information processing supports the plausibility of this.</p> <p>Though Study 1 considers the <emph>Heinz and the Drug</emph> dilemma, Study 1 (and Study 2) primarily addresses moral reasoning and affective responses in the context of the DIT2. Barger and Derryberry ([<reflink idref="bib2" id="ref31">2</reflink>]) acknowledged studying affective responses during the DIT2 and reported similar findings with <emph>Famine</emph> but did not report their findings due to space restrictions. Because Barger and Derryberry did not include its findings pertaining to the DIT2 and because the DIT2 is considered a more updated version of the DIT (Thoma, [<reflink idref="bib29" id="ref32">29</reflink>]), both studies in this manuscript involve the DIT2 and its dilemmas. However, a subsample (n = 69) of participants also considered <emph>Heinz and the Drug</emph>—in addition to the DIT2 dilemmas and the bank robbery news report—in order to determine whether Barger and Derryberry's findings concerning <emph>Heinz and the Drug</emph> are unique to their study.</p> <p>Study 1, therefore, addresses the following research question:</p> <p>Are there differences in a) experienced anger and sadness and b) moral reasoning after viewing the news report about the bank robbery versus reading dilemmas with parallel content?</p> <hd id="AN0158320155-4">Method</hd> <p></p> <hd id="AN0158320155-5">Participants</hd> <p>Participants included 236 participants from a Southeastern regional public comprehensive university. For gender, 161 were female, 69 were male and 6 did not indicate. For class year, there were 9 freshmen, 18 sophomores, 23 juniors, 35 seniors and 13 did not indicate. For ethnicity, 175 classified themselves as White, 25 as Black, 8 as Asian, 2 as American Indian, 1 as Native Hawaiian, 5 as Other and 11 did not indicate. Average age was 19.68 years (<emph>SD </emph>= 2.44).</p> <hd id="AN0158320155-6">Materials</hd> <p></p> <hd id="AN0158320155-7">Defining Issues Test 2</hd> <p>The Defining Issues Test-2 (DIT2; Thoma, [<reflink idref="bib29" id="ref33">29</reflink>]) measured moral judgment. On the DIT2, participants read and respond to five different moral dilemmas (<emph>Famine, Reporter, School Board, Cancer</emph> and <emph>Demonstration</emph>) whereupon a protagonist must make a decision. After reading a dilemma, participants choose what the protagonist should do. Following this, participants rate and rank 12 items in terms of their overall importance in making their choice. Based on a participant's ratings and rankings overall, indices are generated indicating the relative importance given to the personal interests (i.e., akin to Kohlberg's stages 2 and 3; operationalized as the PI score), maintaining norms (i.e., akin to Kohlberg's stage 4; operationalized as the MN score) and postconventional (i.e., akin to Kohlberg's stages 5 and 6; operationalized as the P score) moral judgment schema. PI (α =.70, ω =.71), MN (α =.69, ω =.74) and P (α =.70, ω =.74) scores range from 0 to 95 with higher scores indicating greater perceived importance of reasoning from the personal interests, maintaining norms and postconventional schema respectively.</p> <p>Indices for each DIT2 dilemma were created following procedures Barger and Derryberry ([<reflink idref="bib2" id="ref34">2</reflink>]) used in order to reflect moral reasoning in response to each dilemma. These indices range from 0 to 6. Scores of 0, 3 and 6 indicate a strong preference for moral reasoning according to the personal interests, maintaining norms and postconventional moral judgment schema, respectively. Other scores indicate mixture between two schema. A score of 1 indicates mixture between personal interests and maintaining norms reasoning but a preference for personal interest. A score of 2 indicates mixture between personal interests and maintaining norms reasoning but a preference for maintaining norms. A score of 4 indicates mixture between maintaining norms and postconventional reasoning but a preference for maintaining norms. A score of 5 indicates mixture between maintaining norms and postconventional reasoning but a preference for postconventional. Computation of these indices is the result of provided ranking information after each dilemma. The top two ranked items are considered. Although the DIT2 asks the participant to rank the four most important items, only the top two ranked items are considered because there are only two items reflecting schema related reasoning for certain dilemmas. Ranked postconventional items are given a value of 2, ranked maintaining norms items are given a value of 1 and ranked personal items values are given a value of 0. Any ranked items that do not pertain to the three schema are given values of 0. The values of items that are ranked first are doubled.</p> <p>Convergent and discriminant validity of these scores is supported with consistently negative and significant correlations (<emph>p</emph> <.001) between each dilemma N2 score and PI scores (<emph>r</emph>'s ranging from −.32 to.37) and positive and significant correlations (<emph>p</emph> <.001) between each dilemma N2 score and P scores (<emph>r</emph>'s ranging from.28 to.55). Evidence, therefore, exists that high scores for each dilemma N2 score are associated with a high P score and a low PI score (and also the inverse), though the magnitude of each <emph>r</emph> supports that unshared variance remains.</p> <hd id="AN0158320155-8">Bank Robbery Video dilemma</hd> <p>Participants viewed a news report about a man who robbed a bank in order to pay for his daughter's chemotherapy (see <ulink href="http://abcnews.go.com/Health/accused-bank-robber-stole-daughters-chemotherapy-treatment/story?id=33330902">http://abcnews.go.com/Health/accused-bank-robber-stole-daughters-chemotherapy-treatment/story?id=33330902</ulink>). As on the DIT and DIT2, participants indicate whether they agree with the protagonist's action choice and then rate and rank the importance of 12 items. Because this scenario is similar in content and context to the <emph>Heinz and the Drug</emph> and <emph>Famine</emph> dilemmas, the items rated and ranked were adapted from these dilemmas. A dilemma N2 score is created using Barger and Derryberry's ([<reflink idref="bib2" id="ref35">2</reflink>]) methodology mentioned previously. Like the DIT2 dilemma N2 scores, scores range from 0 to 6, are computed in the same manner outlined above, and reflect the same information and moral judgment schema preference.</p> <p>Convergent and discriminant validity of the video dilemma N2 score is supported by negative and significant correlations with PI scores (<emph>r</emph> = −.20, <emph>p</emph> <.005), a positive and significant correlation with P scores (<emph>r</emph> =.26, <emph>p</emph> <.001) and a positive and significant correlation with <emph>Famine</emph> N2 scores (<emph>r</emph> =.21, <emph>p</emph> <.005). Therefore, evidence exists that high scores for the video dilemma N2 score are associated with a high P score and a low PI score (and also the inverse) and a high <emph>Famine</emph> N2 score, though the magnitude of each <emph>r</emph> supports that unshared variance remains.</p> <hd id="AN0158320155-9">Heinz and the Drug dilemma</hd> <p>A subset of the sample (<emph>n</emph> = 69) also considered the DIT's <emph>Heinz and the Drug</emph>. Because <emph>Heinz and the Drug, Famine</emph> and the <emph>Bank Robbery Video</emph> dilemmas are similar in content and context, it was determined that the inclusion of <emph>Heinz and the Drug</emph> for all participants, rather than a subset, could create monotony and disinterest for participants. This could potentially impact performance and also unnecessarily lengthen the time demanded thereby increasing fatigue. Nonetheless, consideration of this dilemma along with the other materials among just over a fourth of the sample allows for possible a) replication of Barger and Derryberry's ([<reflink idref="bib2" id="ref36">2</reflink>]) findings concerning <emph>Heinz and the Drug</emph> and b) confirmation of their contentions that reactions to <emph>Heinz and the Drug</emph> and <emph>Famine</emph> are similar.</p> <p>A <emph>Heinz and the Drug</emph> N2 score was created according to the specifications mentioned previously. Some support for the convergent and discriminant validity of this index is seen as a result of negative and significant correlations with PI scores (<emph>r</emph> = −.27, <emph>p</emph> <.05) and a positive and significant correlation with P scores (<emph>r</emph> =.27, <emph>p</emph> <.05).</p> <hd id="AN0158320155-10">Emotion questionnaire</hd> <p>An emotion questionnaire identical to what Barger and Derryberry ([<reflink idref="bib2" id="ref37">2</reflink>]) used was completed at the start of the study and was also completed after each of the considered dilemmas. The questionnaire indicates emotions felt on a 5-point scale (1 = not at all to 5 = extremely). Emotion adjectives on the questionnaire included love, joy, surprise, anger, sadness and fear. Research supports that in the U.S. these six terms represent broad emotion categories that other feelings are likely to be primarily related (Shaver et al., [<reflink idref="bib24" id="ref38">24</reflink>]). Anger (α =.79, ω =.86) and sadness (α =.73, ω =.78) are only considered in the analyses.</p> <hd id="AN0158320155-11">Procedure</hd> <p>Materials were completed in a supervised, controlled and quiet lab environment. Participants first completed the emotion questionnaire as a baseline. Then, the <emph>Bank Robbery Video Dilemma</emph> was considered and the DIT2 was completed in counterbalanced orders. The emotion questionnaire was completed after consideration of each dilemma.</p> <hd id="AN0158320155-12">Planned analyses</hd> <p>Separate repeated measures analyses of variance (ANOVA) will be considered. A 2-level (i.e., dilemma and emotion) multivariate repeated-measures analysis of variance (MANOVA) will address variation among baseline reports and dilemmas in anger and sadness. A repeated-measures ANOVA will address variability among dilemma N2 scores.</p> <hd id="AN0158320155-13">Results</hd> <p>P (<emph>M</emph> = 30.38, <emph>SD</emph> = 15.78), MN (<emph>M</emph> = 27.50, <emph>SD</emph> = 10.63) and PI (<emph>M</emph> = 31.57, <emph>SD</emph> = 11.01) scores reveal the sample as modal at the personal interests schema (i.e., favors personal interests reasoning). This indicates a slight difference from Barger and Derryberry ([<reflink idref="bib2" id="ref39">2</reflink>]) as theirs was modal at the maintaining norms schema. MN and PI scores here support the other two moral judgment schemas remain influential thereby supporting that there is not a drastic difference between this study and what Barger and Derryberry reported. Reports of anger and sadness in response to dilemmas were similar to what Barger and Derryberry reported as scores ranged from 1.19 to 2.23. Correlations comparing ratings of sadness and anger with P, MN and PI scores were non-significant.</p> <p>The 2-level MANOVA (see Figure 1) revealed significant changes in sadness and anger (<emph>F</emph> [<reflink idref="bib6" id="ref40">6</reflink>, 1140] = 26.652, <emph>p</emph> <.000, <emph>η</emph>2 =.12). A significant difference favoring sadness was observed for emotion (<emph>F</emph> [<reflink idref="bib1" id="ref41">1</reflink>, 190] = 11.656, <emph>p</emph> <.001, <emph>η</emph>2 =.06). A significant interaction was observed at the <emph>School Board</emph> and <emph>Cancer</emph> dilemmas (<emph>F</emph> [<reflink idref="bib6" id="ref42">6</reflink>, 1140] = 20.944, <emph>p</emph> <.000, <emph>η</emph>2 =.10). Bonferroni pairwise comparisons revealed statistically significant differences in comparing emotional responses to the video with the baseline and each DIT2 dilemma (<emph>p</emph> <.001). Statistically significant differences were also observed in comparing emotional responses to <emph>Famine</emph> with the baseline and the <emph>School Board</emph> and <emph>Reporter</emph> dilemmas (p <.001). Statistically significant differences in emotional responses were also observed in comparing the <emph>Cancer</emph> dilemma to baseline and also the <emph>School Board</emph> and <emph>Reporter</emph> dilemmas (<emph>p</emph> <.05).</p> <p>PHOTO (COLOR): Figure 1. Study 1 reported sadness and anger at baseline and in response to video and DIT 2 dilemmas.</p> <p>The repeated-measures ANOVA (see Figure 2) revealed significant changes (<emph>F</emph> [<reflink idref="bib5" id="ref43">5</reflink>, 1005] = 28.455, <emph>p</emph> <.001, <emph>η</emph><sups>2</sups> =.12) across the video dilemma and the five DIT2 dilemma N2 scores. Bonferonni pairwise comparisons found that 1) the <emph>Bank Robbery Video, Famine</emph> and <emph>Reporter</emph> dilemma N2 scores were each significantly lower than the <emph>School Board, Cancer</emph> and <emph>Demonstration</emph> dilemma N2 scores (<emph>p</emph> <.001).</p> <p>Graph: Figure 2. Study 2 video and DIT2 dilemma N2 scores.</p> <p>Identical analyses were conducted for the subset that also considered the DIT's <emph>Heinz and the Drug</emph> dilemma. Reported anger and sadness and <emph>Heinz and the Drug</emph> dilemma N2 were similar to that which Barger and Derryberry ([<reflink idref="bib2" id="ref44">2</reflink>]) reported. There were no statistically significant differences among <emph>Heinz and the Drug, Famine</emph> and the <emph>Bank Robbery Video</emph> dilemmas for reported Anger and Sadness and dilemma N2 scores.</p> <hd id="AN0158320155-14">Discussion</hd> <p>Like Barger and Derryberry ([<reflink idref="bib2" id="ref45">2</reflink>]), this study supports that certain dilemmas are associated with increased reports of anger and sadness and decreased moral reasoning relative to other dilemmas. This study replicated Barger and Derryberry's findings concerning increased negative affective responses and decreased moral reasoning after the <emph>Heinz and the Drug</emph> dilemma. It also confirmed that such outcomes are similar in response to the DIT2 <emph>Famine</emph> dilemma.</p> <p>Unique to this study are similar findings for the <emph>Bank Robbery</emph> dilemma viewed on video. Specifically, anger and sadness were significantly increased relative to <emph>Famine</emph> and were also increased, though not significantly, to that which occurs in response to <emph>Heinz and the Drug</emph>. This finding supports Bradley et al.'s ([<reflink idref="bib5" id="ref46">5</reflink>]) contention that video can increase the likelihood of affective state change. The increases in negative affect following the video dilemma also support those (i.e., Derryberry & Thoma, [<reflink idref="bib7" id="ref47">7</reflink>]; Skoe et al., [<reflink idref="bib25" id="ref48">25</reflink>]; Walker et al., [<reflink idref="bib31" id="ref49">31</reflink>]) who maintain that processing in response to real-life dilemmas is distinguished from that of hypothetical dilemmas. This study did not find that such a distinction occurs in terms of different reasoning given the similar reasoning observed across the three parallel dilemmas.</p> <p>Although this study supports that dilemma format can be associated with increased negative affective reactions, there was no evidence that such an increase relates to decreased moral reasoning beyond that observed in response to similar dilemmas of different formats. To be sure, Barger and Derryberry ([<reflink idref="bib2" id="ref50">2</reflink>]) supported in one of their studies that increased affective states prior to taking the DIT do not impact DIT scores overall or change trends in response to reasoning on its individual dilemmas. However, what is reported here is different in that the increased negative affect state is assumedly the product of the format of the dilemma and also its content. Therefore, there may be a limit pertaining to the degree to which negative affect deters moral reasoning.</p> <hd id="AN0158320155-15">Study 2</hd> <p>An issue associated with both Barger and Derryberry ([<reflink idref="bib2" id="ref51">2</reflink>]) and Study 1 is that moral reasoning is somewhat low. Indeed, moral judgment development and other constructs of moral functioning like empathy have been cited as decreasing among college students (Konrath et al., [<reflink idref="bib18" id="ref52">18</reflink>]; Thoma & Bebeau, [<reflink idref="bib30" id="ref53">30</reflink>]). Therefore, these descriptive statistics are not surprising. Nonetheless, there is a need to ascertain whether observed increases in negative affect and decreases in moral reasoning occur in samples where higher moral reasoning exists. This is the purpose of Study 2.</p> <p>Research addressing benefits of advanced moral reasoning infer the possibility that the trends observed in Barger and Derryberry ([<reflink idref="bib2" id="ref54">2</reflink>]) and Study 1 would not occur in samples with increased moral reasoning. For example, advanced moral reasoning has been validated as being qualitatively better than low levels (Rest et al., [<reflink idref="bib23" id="ref55">23</reflink>]). As such, it would be unsurprising if changes in moral reasoning were not observed in samples with advanced moral reasoning even if increased negative affect was reported in response to dilemmas. Advanced moral reasoning has also been recognized as contributing to moral and non-moral action (Derryberry & Thoma, [<reflink idref="bib7" id="ref56">7</reflink>]; Eisenberg et al., [<reflink idref="bib8" id="ref57">8</reflink>]; Rest et al. [<reflink idref="bib23" id="ref58">23</reflink>]). This is in part due to the assumption that advanced moral reasoning prioritizes moral criteria and appeals to an ideal (Rest et al. [<reflink idref="bib23" id="ref59">23</reflink>]). Therefore, advanced moral reasoning can be instrumental in preventing distraction so that action does not deviate from the understood criteria and ideals. If such were the case, it is plausible to expect that deliberation from advanced moral reasoning can minimize the influence of the felt negative affect.</p> <p>The following research question is addressed in Study 2:</p> <p>Are there differences in a) experienced anger and sadness and b) moral reasoning in response to dilemmas from the DIT2 among samples with differing developmental levels of moral judgment development?</p> <hd id="AN0158320155-16">Method</hd> <p></p> <hd id="AN0158320155-17">Participants</hd> <p>Participants included 318 participants from a Southeastern regional public comprehensive university. Among the participants that provided demographic data, 192 were female and 91 were male; 156 were freshmen, 64 were sophomores, 32 were juniors and 32 were seniors; 200 classified themselves as White, 46 as Black, 18 as Hispanic, 6 as Asian and 11 as Other. Average age was 19.69 years (<emph>SD </emph>= 2.68).</p> <hd id="AN0158320155-18">Materials</hd> <p></p> <hd id="AN0158320155-19">Defining Issues Test 2</hd> <p>The Defining Issues Test 2 (DIT2; Thoma, [<reflink idref="bib29" id="ref60">29</reflink>]) was used in measuring moral reasoning and moral judgment development. See the Study 1 materials section for more information about the DIT2. Similar to Study 1, indices used included the PI (α =.59, ω =.64), MN (α =.69, ω =.70), P (α =.55, ω =.65) and dilemma N2 scores. Although these reported α's for PI and P scores are low, it is important to note that these scores reflect internal consistency where moral reasoning is concerned throughout the instrument as a whole and not moral reasoning at the individual dilemmas themselves, which is the primary focus of the current study.</p> <p>Support for the convergent and discriminant validity of the dilemma N2 scores is seen with a) consistently negative and significant correlations (<emph>p</emph> <.001) between each dilemma N2 score and PI scores (<emph>r</emph>'s ranging from −.38 to.50) and b) positive and significant correlations (<emph>p</emph> <.001) between each dilemma N2 score and P scores (<emph>r</emph>'s ranging from.46 to.56). This supports that high scores for each dilemma N2 score are associated with a high P score and a low PI score (and also the inverse), though the magnitude of each <emph>r</emph> supports that unshared variance remains.</p> <hd id="AN0158320155-20">Emotion questionnaire</hd> <p>An emotion questionnaire identical to what Barger and Derryberry ([<reflink idref="bib2" id="ref61">2</reflink>]) and Study 1 used was completed at the start of the study and was also completed after each of the considered dilemmas was considered. See Study 1 materials section for more information about this scale. Anger (α =.92, ω =.92) and sadness (α =.93, ω =.94), are only considered in the analyses.</p> <hd id="AN0158320155-21">Procedure</hd> <p>All materials were completed in a supervised, controlled and quiet lab environment. Participants first completed the emotion questionnaire to serve as a baseline. Then, the DIT2 was completed. The emotion questionnaire was completed after each DIT2 dilemma was considered. Dilemma presentation was counterbalanced.</p> <hd id="AN0158320155-22">Planned analyses</hd> <p>Data analysis first considers the moral judgment developmental differences in the sample through descriptive statistics accounting for the modal moral judgment schema. From these data, a between-groups multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) accounts for differences among groups on PI, MN and P scores among the observed modal groups. Separate repeated measures MANOVAs are considered next. A 2-level (i.e., dilemma and emotion) by 3-group (i.e., modal moral judgment schema) repeated-measures MANOVA assesses changes in reported anger and sadness with Bonferroni pairwise comparisons following. Then, a 3-group (modal moral judgment schema) repeated-measures MANOVA addressed changes among dilemma N2 scores with Bonferroni pairwise comparisons following.</p> <hd id="AN0158320155-23">Results</hd> <p>P (<emph>M</emph> = 31.78, <emph>SD</emph> = 16.44), MN (<emph>M</emph> = 26.68, <emph>SD</emph> = 11.4) and PI (<emph>M</emph> = 32.34, <emph>SD</emph> = 11.70) scores indicate that the sample is modal at the personal interests schema. Among the sample, three groups of participants were observed. These included: 1) 118 modal at the personal interests moral judgment schema (i.e., favors personal interests reasoning; P [<emph>M</emph> = 21.98, <emph>SD</emph> = 10.92], MN [<emph>M</emph> = 23.75, <emph>SD</emph> = 7.98] and PI [<emph>M</emph> = 43.41, <emph>SD</emph> = 7.41]); 2) 70 modal at the maintaining norms moral judgment schema (i.e., favors maintaining norms reasoning; P [<emph>M</emph> = 19.76, <emph>SD</emph> = 9.21], MN [<emph>M</emph> = 41.47, <emph>SD</emph> = 6.89] and PI [<emph>M</emph> = 27.61, <emph>SD</emph> = 6.82]); and 3) 126 modal at the postconventional moral judgment schema (i.e., favors postconventional reasoning; P [<emph>M</emph> = 47.63, <emph>SD</emph> = 9.66], MN [<emph>M</emph> = 21.21, <emph>SD</emph> = 8.9] and PI [<emph>M</emph> = 24.6, <emph>SD</emph> = 8.77]). The between-groups MANOVA on PI, MN and P scores supports these groups' developmental distinctiveness. Specifically, a multivariate main effect was observed (<emph>F</emph> [<reflink idref="bib3" id="ref62">3</reflink>, 310] = 201.076, <emph>p</emph> <.001, <emph>η<sups>2</sups></emph> =.66). Additionally, univariate main effects were also observed for PI scores (<emph>F</emph> [<reflink idref="bib2" id="ref63">2</reflink>, 311] = 190.596, <emph>p</emph> <.001, <emph>η<sups>2</sups></emph> =.55), MN scores (<emph>F</emph> [<reflink idref="bib2" id="ref64">2</reflink>, 311] = 151.598, <emph>p</emph> <.001, <emph>η<sups>2</sups></emph> =.49) and P scores (<emph>F</emph> [<reflink idref="bib2" id="ref65">2</reflink>, 311] = 262.203, <emph>p</emph> <.001, <emph>η<sups>2</sups></emph> =.63). The low internal consistency reported for PI and P scores supports that the observed distinctions should be treated cautiously.</p> <p>Reports of anger and sadness in response to dilemmas were similar to previous reports as scores ranged from 1.41 to 2.04. Correlations comparing ratings of sadness and anger with P, MN and PI scores were largely non-significant. One exception was a small correlation between reported sadness after demonstration and MN scores (<emph>r</emph> = −.13, <emph>p</emph> <.05).</p> <p>The 2-level by 3-group repeated-measures MANOVA revealed significant changes in sadness and anger ratings (<emph>F</emph> [<reflink idref="bib5" id="ref66">5</reflink>, 1550] = 22.835, <emph>p</emph> <.001, <emph>η<sups>2</sups></emph> =.07). A significant difference (<emph>F</emph> [<reflink idref="bib1" id="ref67">1</reflink>, 310] = 32.822, <emph>p</emph> <.001, <emph>η<sups>2</sups></emph> =.10) in the ratings of anger and sadness was observed (see Figure 3). A significant interaction was observed indicating the disaggregation of anger and sadness on certain scenarios (<emph>F</emph> [<reflink idref="bib5" id="ref68">5</reflink>, 1550] = 29.894, <emph>p</emph> <.001, <emph>η<sups>2</sups></emph> =.09). No statistically significant differences were observed among differing modal moral judgment schema.</p> <p>PHOTO (COLOR): Figure 3. Study 2 reported anger and sadness in response to DIT2 dilemmas among groups modal at personal interests, maintaining norms and postconventional moral judgment schemas.</p> <p>Bonferroni pairwise comparisons assessed differences in ratings of anger and sadness after each DIT2 dilemma within each modal moral judgment schema group. Patterns observed in each group are depicted in Figure 3. Patterns include a) statistically significant increases in both anger and sadness in response to the <emph>Famine</emph> dilemma, b) peaks in sadness in response to the <emph>Cancer</emph> dilemma and c) statistically significant differences in reported anger and sadness in response to both the <emph>Famine</emph> and <emph>Cancer</emph> dilemmas in comparison to baseline reports and other dilemmas.</p> <p>The 3-group repeated-measures MANOVA revealed significant differences in dilemma N2 scores (<emph>F</emph> [<reflink idref="bib4" id="ref69">4</reflink>, 1240] = 53.667, <emph>p</emph> <.001, <emph>η<sups>2</sups></emph> =.15). A small but significant interaction was observed (<emph>F</emph> [<reflink idref="bib8" id="ref70">8</reflink>, 1240] = 2.252, <emph>p</emph> <.05, <emph>η<sups>2</sups></emph> =.01). A significant difference in dilemma N2 scores was observed among each group (<emph>F</emph> [<reflink idref="bib2" id="ref71">2</reflink>, 310] = 201.936, <emph>p</emph> <.001, <emph>η<sups>2</sups></emph> =.57). Bonferroni pairwise comparisons reveal where these differences exist within each modal moral judgment schema group (Figure 4). Bonferroni post hoc tests reveal that a statistically significant increase in dilemma N2 scores occurs across each successive modal schema. This reveals that the dilemma N2 scores of those modal at the Postconventional schema are greater than those modal at the Maintaining Norms schema (<emph>p</emph> <.001) and the Personal Interests schema (<emph>p</emph> <.001). Similarly, the dilemma N2 scores of those modal at the Maintaining norms schema are greater than those modal at the Personal Interests schema (<emph>p</emph> <.001).</p> <p>PHOTO (COLOR): Figure 4. Dilemma N2 scores at moral judgment schemas.</p> <hd id="AN0158320155-24">Discussion</hd> <p>Three distinct findings concerning negative affect and moral reasoning during the DIT2 were observed. First, similar to Barger and Derryberry ([<reflink idref="bib2" id="ref72">2</reflink>]) and Study 1, changes in affective states were observed after moral dilemmas. Unique to this study is that this occurs regardless of moral judgment development as similar trends were seen among those modal at each of the three moral judgment schema.</p> <p>The second unique finding is that there were no distinctions in reported emotion among the three groups. Thus, there was no evidence that modal moral judgment schema is related to decreased or increased magnitude of experienced affect. This study supports that negative affect is related to the content of the dilemma moreso than it is to rational processing or anything else.</p> <p>The third distinct finding is the uniform patterns of reasoning observed across the five DIT2 dilemmas at each moral judgment schema. As Figure 4 illustrates, moral reasoning is lowest at <emph>Famine</emph>, increases at <emph>Reporter</emph>, peaks at <emph>School Board</emph> and then drops (yet still exceeds what was observed at the first two dilemmas) at <emph>Cancer</emph> and <emph>Demonstration</emph>. At the same time, dilemma N2 scores are statistically distinct for each dilemma. Therefore, the patterns at each moral judgment schema are not only parallel, but the statistical differences among dilemma N2 scores support that the patterns are also developmentally distinct.</p> <p>Whereas the first two findings of this study help to confirm findings and address unanswered questions, the third finding opens questions and possibilities for further study. Indeed, the parallel trajectory yet developmental distinctiveness of reasoning across DIT2 dilemmas supports the validity and utility of the DIT2 as a measurement of the development of judgment. At the same time, questions remain. Specifically, what is it about these dilemmas that may cause the kind of variation observed regardless of developmental level? As such, future studies should consider the content of each dilemma. Possibilities are discussed in the general discussion that follows.</p> <hd id="AN0158320155-25">General discussion and conclusions</hd> <p>Consideration of both studies illustrates that affective states and rational deliberation are involved in consideration of the dilemmas of the DIT thereby supporting Monin et al.'s ([<reflink idref="bib21" id="ref73">21</reflink>]) contentions about both in the consideration of moral situations. A unique aspect of the findings from both studies is <emph>how</emph> rational deliberation and affective states are involved across differing moral dilemmas. For example, certain dilemmas consistently relate to increases in anger and sadness in conjunction with decreases in moral reasoning as seen in both studies for the parallel dilemmas of <emph>Heinz and the Drug, Famine</emph> and the <emph>Bank Robbery</emph>. There are other dilemmas that consistently relate to higher amounts of sadness but not anger in conjunction with moral reasoning typical of the mode, as was the case with <emph>Cancer</emph> (as Barger & Derryberry, [<reflink idref="bib2" id="ref74">2</reflink>] also reported for the parallel DIT dilemma, <emph>Doctor's Dilemma</emph>). Additionally, there are instances where reported negative affect is relatively low as seen in both studies for the <emph>Reporter, School Board</emph> and <emph>Demonstration</emph> dilemmas. Curiously, however, moral reasoning peaks in response to <emph>School Board</emph> yet is in line with the mode in response to <emph>Reporter</emph> and <emph>Demonstration</emph>.</p> <p>The question that remains is, 'Why is there variability across DIT dilemmas in affective states and moral reasoning (i.e., rational deliberation)?' Although Rest et al. ([<reflink idref="bib23" id="ref75">23</reflink>]) describe DIT dilemmas as addressing macromorality (i.e., 'concerns the formal structure of society as defined by, institutions, rules, and roles' [p. 292]), these dilemmas may also pertain to other areas of the moral domain. One noteworthy area that may offer further insights is moral foundation theory (MFT). As MFT research supports (Graham et al., [<reflink idref="bib10" id="ref76">10</reflink>]; Haidt & Joseph, [<reflink idref="bib13" id="ref77">13</reflink>], [<reflink idref="bib12" id="ref78">12</reflink>]), at least five intuitive systems exist through which people consider moral situations. These include Harm/Care, Fairness/Reciprocity, Ingroup/Loyalty, Authority/Respect and Purity/Sanctity. MFT research proposes links from each system to emotional reactions (Haidt & Joseph, [<reflink idref="bib13" id="ref79">13</reflink>], [<reflink idref="bib12" id="ref80">12</reflink>]; Landmann & Hess, [<reflink idref="bib19" id="ref81">19</reflink>]).</p> <p>Scrutiny of DIT dilemmas suggests that MFT systems could plausibly pertain to how people respond to them. Consequently, the variability in affect and moral reasoning observed here and elsewhere on DIT dilemmas may be from particular dilemmas being interpreted within certain MFT systems and the type of affective responses that accompany each system. Though plausible, research is needed to understand whether this is the case, and, if so, how examinations of DIT dilemmas through the lenses of differing MFT systems translate to how provided reasoning choices are rated and ranked. To be sure, studies exist addressing how moral reasoning as measured on the DIT relates to preferred moral foundations (Baril & Wright, [<reflink idref="bib3" id="ref82">3</reflink>]; Glover et al., [<reflink idref="bib9" id="ref83">9</reflink>]). However, similar to what occurred in the current two studies, we suggest examining moral reasoning and negative affect in response to each individual dilemma in concert with the considered moral foundations of participants. As Graham et al. noted, 'People vary in the extent to which they endorse, value and use the five foundations,' ([<reflink idref="bib10" id="ref84">10</reflink>], p. 366). Thus, the nature of each dilemma could relate to the considered moral foundation.</p> <p>The suggestion of MFT systems being accessed in the context of moral dilemma consideration while taking the Defining Issues Tests is not intended as a challenge to the Rest et al. ([<reflink idref="bib23" id="ref85">23</reflink>]) neo-Kohlbergian approach. Furthermore, such an approach to processing would not invalidate the DIT or DIT2. Instead, this suggestion reflects an effort in the tradition of Monin et al. ([<reflink idref="bib21" id="ref86">21</reflink>]) to account for how important paradigms in the field can inform each other, rather than work against each other. The end result would be that the cognitive processing (i.e., both deliberative and affective) involved in the consideration of moral situations becomes more comprehensively understood. Indeed, both paradigms acknowledge that variability in the processing of a moral situation is to be expected. For example, Rest's neo-Kohlbergian approach supports a soft-stage, schema-based approach while MFT embraces variability with its commitment to multiple systems so that consumers have 'an opportunity to better understand moral diversity' (Graham et al., [<reflink idref="bib10" id="ref87">10</reflink>], p. 366).</p> <hd id="AN0158320155-26">Limitations</hd> <p>Limitations exist in both studies that future research should address. Principally, the sample was obtained through a convenience sample of college students. Although college contributes to moral judgment development (Mayhew et al., [<reflink idref="bib20" id="ref88">20</reflink>]), adults of a variety of ages and contexts should be considered in future studies so that a more complete and representative adult sample is obtained. Another limitation is that neither study relied upon a control group. This decision was primarily based on Barger and Derryberry's ([<reflink idref="bib2" id="ref89">2</reflink>]) findings that experienced anger and sadness is more the product of dilemma content than it is factors like elapsed time or prior emotional state. Also supporting this decision is other research of moral dilemmas finding that emotional states stem more from dilemma content than from other factors occurring while reading the dilemma. Examples include Greene et al. ([<reflink idref="bib11" id="ref90">11</reflink>]), Horne and Powell ([<reflink idref="bib15" id="ref91">15</reflink>]), Skoe et al. ([<reflink idref="bib25" id="ref92">25</reflink>]), Szekely and Miu ([<reflink idref="bib27" id="ref93">27</reflink>]) and Tasso et al. ([<reflink idref="bib28" id="ref94">28</reflink>]). Nonetheless, future studies should consider the use of control groups that address non-moral dilemmas to further account for the relationship between dilemma content and experienced affect. Another limitation is that neither study addressed the role of political or religious orientation, which pertains to both experienced affect (Graham et al., [<reflink idref="bib10" id="ref95">10</reflink>]) and DIT scores (Rest et al., [<reflink idref="bib23" id="ref96">23</reflink>]). Future research should therefore account for both variables as either could be a mediating or moderating variable. Additionally, this research is specific to moral reasoning in the context of the Defining Issues Test. As such, generalizations should not be made to other scenarios where moral reasoning occurs. As mentioned, the DIT and DIT2 address macromoral situations (Rest et al., [<reflink idref="bib23" id="ref97">23</reflink>]). However, Rest et al. acknowledge the importance of micromorality and do not assume that the reasoning (and cognitive processing in general) reflected on the DIT occurs similarly in micromoral situations. Finally, measuring affective states in these studies is rudimentary as it is the result of self-reports. Future, research should obtain affective state information via bio-physiological sources (i.e., EEG, ERP, skin conductance, etc.).</p> <hd id="AN0158320155-27">Conclusion</hd> <p>The considered studies offer further evidence that rational deliberation and affective states are involved in consideration of Defining Issues Test dilemmas thereby supporting Monin et al.'s ([<reflink idref="bib21" id="ref98">21</reflink>]) contentions on multiple processes. Noteworthy are findings that a) increased negative affect generated via a moral dilemma does not change moral reasoning beyond what has already been observed in parallel dilemmas, b) that moral judgment developmental differences do not coincide with the amount of experienced negative affect and c) that patterns of moral reasoning (i.e., increases and decreases) are similar across DIT2 dilemmas but developmentally distinct. From the variability observed in both moral reasoning and negative affective states across DIT2 dilemmas, it is conceivable that DIT2 dilemma content has something to do with the findings. Therefore, efforts to more closely study the lenses through which individuals consider moral dilemma content may be a promising avenue in understanding the roles of rational deliberation and affective states in the processing of a moral situation.</p> <hd id="AN0158320155-28">Disclosure statement</hd> <p>No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.</p> <ref id="AN0158320155-29"> <title> References </title> <blist> <bibl id="bib1" idref="ref21" type="bt">1</bibl> <bibtext> Aybek, E. C., Cavdar, D., & Ozabaci, T. M. N. (2015). University students' moral judgment and emotional intelligence: A model testing. Procedia – Social and Behavioral Sciences, 191, 2740 – 2746. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.sbspro.2015.04.666</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibl id="bib2" idref="ref10" type="bt">2</bibl> <bibtext> Barger, B., & Derryberry, W. P. (2013). Do negative mood states impact moral reasoning? Journal of Moral Education, 42 (4), 443 – 459. https://doi.org/10.1080/03057240.2013.809517</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibl id="bib3" idref="ref62" type="bt">3</bibl> <bibtext> Baril, G. L., & Wright, J. C. (2012). Different types of moral cognition: Moral stages versus moral foundations. Personality and Individual Differences, 53 (4), 468 – 473. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2012.04.018</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibl id="bib4" idref="ref30" type="bt">4</bibl> <bibtext> Bodenhausen, G., Sheppard, L., & Kramer, G. (1994). Negative affect and social judgment: The differential impact of anger and sadness. European Journal of Social Psychology, 24 (1), 45 – 62. https://doi.org/10.1002/ejsp.2420240104</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibl id="bib5" idref="ref29" type="bt">5</bibl> <bibtext> Bradley, M. M., Cuthbert, B. N., & Lang, P. J. (1996). Picture media and emotion: Effects of a sustained affective context. Psychophysiology, 33 (6), 662 – 670. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1469-8986.1996.tb02362.x</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibl id="bib6" idref="ref2" type="bt">6</bibl> <bibtext> Damasio, A. (1994). Descartes' error: Emotion, reason, and the human brain. Grossett/Putnam.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibl id="bib7" idref="ref25" type="bt">7</bibl> <bibtext> Derryberry, W. P., & Thoma, S. J. (2005). Functional differences: Comparing moral judgment developmental phases of consolidation and transition. Journal of Moral Education, 34 (1), 89 – 106. https://doi.org/10.1080/03057240500049372</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibl id="bib8" idref="ref57" type="bt">8</bibl> <bibtext> Eisenberg, N., Morris, A. S., McDaniel, B., & Spinrad, T. L. (2009). Moral cognitions and responding in adolescence. In R. M. Lerner & L. Steinberg (Eds.), Handbook of adolescent psychology: Individual bases of adolescent development (pp. 229 – 265). John Wiley and Sons, Inc.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibl id="bib9" idref="ref83" type="bt">9</bibl> <bibtext> Glover, R. J., Natesan, P., Wang, J., Rohr, D., McAfee-Etheridge, L., & Booker, D. D. (2014). Moral rationality and intuition: An exploration of relationships between the Defining Issues Test and the Moral Foundations Questionnaire. Journal of Moral Education, 43 (4), 395 – 412. https://doi.org/10.1080/03057240.2014.953043</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Graham, J., Nosek, B. A., Haidt, J., Iyer, R., Koleva, S., & Ditto, P. H. (2011). Mapping the moral domain. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 101 (2), 366 – 385. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0021847</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Greene, J. D., Sommerville, B. R., Nystrom, L. E., Darley, J. M., & Cohen, J. D. (2001). An fMRI investigation of emotional engagement in moral judgment. Science, 293 (5537), 2105 – 2108. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1062872</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Haidt, J., & Joseph, C. (2008). The moral mind: How five sets of innate intuitions guide the development of many culture-specific virtues, and perhaps even modules. In P. Carruthers, S. Laurence, & S. Stich (Eds.), Evolution and cognition. The innate mind Vol. 3 Foundations and the future (pp. 367 – 391). Oxford University Press.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Haidt, J., & Joseph, C. (2004). Intuitive ethics: How innately prepared intuitions generate culturally variable virtues. Daedalus, 133 (4), 55 – 66. https://doi.org/10.1162/0011526042365555</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Haidt, J. H. (2001). The emotional dog and its rational tail: A social intuitionist approach to moral judgment. Psychological Review, 108 (4), 814 – 834. https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-295X.108.4.814</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Horne, Z., & Powell, D. (2016). How large is the role of emotion in judgment of moral dilemmas? PLoS One, 11 (7), 1 – 19. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0154780</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Killen, M., & Smetana, J. G. (Eds.). (2006). Handbook of moral development. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Kohlberg, L. (1969). Stage and sequence: The cognitive-developmental approach to socialization. In D. Goslin (Ed.), Handbook of socialization theory and research (pp. 347–380). Rand McNally.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Konrath, S., O'Brien, E. H., & Hsing, C. (2011). Changes in dispositional empathy in American college students over time: A meta-analysis. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 15 (2), 180 – 198. https://doi.org/10.1177/1088868310377395</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Landmann, H., & Hess, U. (2018). Testing moral foundation theory: Are specific moral emotions elicited by specific moral transgressions? Journal of Moral Education, 47 (1), 34 – 47. https://doi.org/10.1080/03057240.2017.1350569</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Mayhew, M. J., Seifert, T. A., & Pascarella, E. T. (2010). A multi-institutional assessment of moral reasoning development among first-year students. The Review of Higher Education, 33 (3), 357 – 390. https://doi.org/10.1353/rhe.0.0153</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Monin, M., Pizarro, D. A., & Beer, J. S. (2007). Deciding versus reacting: Conceptions of the moral judgment and the reason-affect debate. Review of General Psychology, 11, 99 – 111. 2 https://doi.org/10.1037/1089-2680.11.2.99</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Olejnik, A. B., & Larue, A. A. (1980). Affect and moral reasoning. Social Behavior and Personality, 8 (1), 75 – 79. https://doi.org/10.2224/sbp.1980.8.1.75</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Rest, J., Narvaez, D., Bebeau, M. J., & Thoma, S. J. (1999). Postconventional moral thinking: A neo-Kohbergian approach. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Shaver, P., Schwartz, J., Kirson, D., & O'Connor, C. (1987). Emotion knowledge: Further exploration of a prototype approach. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 52 (6), 1061 – 1086. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.52.6.1061</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Skoe, E. E., Eisenberg, N., & Cumberland, A. (2002). The role of reported emotion in real life and moral dilemmas. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 28 (7), 962 – 973. https://doi.org/10.1177/014616720202800709</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Surdel, N., & Klimenko, M. (2018). Filing for moral bankruptcy: An examination of how affect and empathy predict moral competence. Ethics in Progress, 9 (2), 16 – 26. https://doi.org/10.14746/eip.2018.2.2</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Szekely, R. D., & Miu, A. C. (2015). Incidental emotions on moral dilemmas: The influence of emotion regulation. Cognition and Emotion, 29 (1), 64 – 75. https://doi.org/10.1080/02699931.2014.895300</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Tasso, A., Sarlo, M., & Lotto, L. (2017). Emotions associated with counterfactual comparisons drive decision-making in Footbridge-type moral dilemmas. Motivation and Emotion, 41 (3), 410 – 418. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11031-017-9607-9</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Thoma, S. J. (2006). Research using the Defining Issues Test. In M. Killen & J. Smetana (Eds.), Handbook of moral development (pp. 67 – 91). Lawrence Erlbaum.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Thoma, S. J., & Bebeau, M. (2008, April). Moral judgment competency is declining over time: Evidence from twenty years of Defining Issues Test data [Paper presentation]. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Educational Research Association, NewYork, NY.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Walker, L. J., Pitts, R. C., Hennig, K. H., & Matsuba, K. M. (1995). Reasoning about morality and real-life moral problems. In M. Killen & D. Hart (Eds.), Cambridge studies in social and emotional development. Morality in everyday life: Developmental perspectives (pp. 371 – 407). Cambridge University Press.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Zarinpoush, F., Cooper, M., & Moylan, S. (2000). The effects of happiness and sadness on moral reasoning. Journal of Moral Education, 29 (4), 397 – 412. https://doi.org/10.1080/713679391</bibtext> </blist> </ref> <aug> <p>By W. Pitt Derryberry; Sarah Richardson; Anna Simpson; Megan Wilson and Andrea Ambam</p> <p>Reported by Author; Author; Author; Author; Author</p> <p></p> <p>W. Pitt Derryberry , Ph.D. is a Professor of Psychology and Co-Department Head at Western Kentucky University. His research interests pertain to socio-cognitive development during adolescence and the college years with specific emphases on the development of moral judgment and self-understanding.</p> <p>Sarah Richardson is a graduate student in the Department of Psychology's Ed.S School Psychology Graduate program at Western Kentucky University and served as one of Dr.Derryberry's graduate research assistants.</p> <p>Anna Simpson is a 2020 graduate of the Gatton Academy for Math and Science at Western Kentucky University. She served as an undergraduate research assistant for Dr. Derryberry.</p> <p>Megan Wilson is a 2017 graduate of the Department of Psychology's MA graduate program at Western Kentucky University. She served as one of Dr. Derryberry's graduate research assistants.</p> <p>Andrea Ambam graduated from Western Kentucky University in 2019 with a BA in Psychology. She served as an undergraduate research assistant for Dr. Derryberry.</p> </aug> <nolink nlid="nl1" bibid="bib16" firstref="ref1"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl2" bibid="bib11" firstref="ref3"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl3" bibid="bib14" firstref="ref4"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl4" bibid="bib17" firstref="ref5"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl5" bibid="bib29" firstref="ref6"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl6" bibid="bib21" firstref="ref7"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl7" bibid="bib23" firstref="ref8"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl8" bibid="bib22" firstref="ref11"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl9" bibid="bib32" firstref="ref12"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl10" bibid="bib19" firstref="ref22"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl11" bibid="bib26" firstref="ref23"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl12" bibid="bib25" firstref="ref26"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl13" bibid="bib31" firstref="ref27"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl14" bibid="bib24" firstref="ref38"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl15" bibid="bib18" firstref="ref52"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl16" bibid="bib30" firstref="ref53"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl17" bibid="bib10" firstref="ref76"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl18" bibid="bib13" firstref="ref77"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl19" bibid="bib12" firstref="ref78"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl20" bibid="bib20" firstref="ref88"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl21" bibid="bib15" firstref="ref91"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl22" bibid="bib27" firstref="ref93"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl23" bibid="bib28" firstref="ref94"></nolink>
Header DbId: eric
DbLabel: ERIC
An: EJ1365524
AccessLevel: 3
PubType: Academic Journal
PubTypeId: academicJournal
PreciseRelevancyScore: 0
IllustrationInfo
Items – Name: Title
  Label: Title
  Group: Ti
  Data: Negative Affective States and Moral Judgment: A Closer Look at Their Joint Involvement
– Name: Language
  Label: Language
  Group: Lang
  Data: English
– Name: Author
  Label: Authors
  Group: Au
  Data: <searchLink fieldCode="AR" term="%22Derryberry%2C+W%2E+Pitt%22">Derryberry, W. Pitt</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="AR" term="%22Richardson%2C+Sarah%22">Richardson, Sarah</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="AR" term="%22Simpson%2C+Anna%22">Simpson, Anna</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="AR" term="%22Wilson%2C+Megan%22">Wilson, Megan</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="AR" term="%22Ambam%2C+Andrea%22">Ambam, Andrea</searchLink>
– Name: TitleSource
  Label: Source
  Group: Src
  Data: <searchLink fieldCode="SO" term="%22Journal+of+Moral+Education%22"><i>Journal of Moral Education</i></searchLink>. 2022 51(3):387-403.
– Name: Avail
  Label: Availability
  Group: Avail
  Data: Routledge. Available from: Taylor & Francis, Ltd. 530 Walnut Street Suite 850, Philadelphia, PA 19106. Tel: 800-354-1420; Tel: 215-625-8900; Fax: 215-207-0050; Web site: http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals
– Name: PeerReviewed
  Label: Peer Reviewed
  Group: SrcInfo
  Data: Y
– Name: Pages
  Label: Page Count
  Group: Src
  Data: 17
– Name: DatePubCY
  Label: Publication Date
  Group: Date
  Data: 2022
– Name: TypeDocument
  Label: Document Type
  Group: TypDoc
  Data: Journal Articles<br />Reports - Research
– Name: Audience
  Label: Education Level
  Group: Audnce
  Data: <searchLink fieldCode="EL" term="%22Higher+Education%22">Higher Education</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="EL" term="%22Postsecondary+Education%22">Postsecondary Education</searchLink>
– Name: Subject
  Label: Descriptors
  Group: Su
  Data: <searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Moral+Values%22">Moral Values</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Decision+Making%22">Decision Making</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Video+Technology%22">Video Technology</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Comparative+Analysis%22">Comparative Analysis</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Moral+Development%22">Moral Development</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Developmental+Stages%22">Developmental Stages</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Affective+Behavior%22">Affective Behavior</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Values%22">Values</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Measures+%28Individuals%29%22">Measures (Individuals)</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Natural+Disasters%22">Natural Disasters</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Hunger%22">Hunger</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Food%22">Food</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Trend+Analysis%22">Trend Analysis</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Crime%22">Crime</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Cancer%22">Cancer</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Drug+Therapy%22">Drug Therapy</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22State+Universities%22">State Universities</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22College+Students%22">College Students</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Psychological+Patterns%22">Psychological Patterns</searchLink>
– Name: SubjectThesaurus
  Label: Assessment and Survey Identifiers
  Group: Su
  Data: <searchLink fieldCode="SU" term="%22Defining+Issues+Test%22">Defining Issues Test</searchLink>
– Name: DOI
  Label: DOI
  Group: ID
  Data: 10.1080/03057240.2021.1887831
– Name: ISSN
  Label: ISSN
  Group: ISSN
  Data: 0305-7240<br />1465-3877
– Name: Abstract
  Label: Abstract
  Group: Ab
  Data: This paper considers two studies that address negative affective states and moral reasoning while taking the Defining Issues Tests (DIT, DIT2). Both studies confirmed earlier findings that the DIT dilemma, 'Heinz and the Drug,' and the DIT2 dilemma, 'Famine,' are related to increased anger and sadness and decreased moral reasoning. Similar findings were observed in the context of a video consideration of a real-life dilemma paralleling these two dilemmas (Study 1). Comparable findings pertaining to Famine were also observed among three samples of different moral judgment developmental levels, further implicating the role of dilemma content where the trends observed are concerned (Study 2). Overall, both studies illustrated similar patterns of affective states and moral reasoning across all considered DIT/DIT2 dilemmas thereby offering further evidence of the joint involvement of rational deliberation and affective states in the consideration of DIT/DIT2 dilemmas.
– Name: AbstractInfo
  Label: Abstractor
  Group: Ab
  Data: As Provided
– Name: DateEntry
  Label: Entry Date
  Group: Date
  Data: 2023
– Name: AN
  Label: Accession Number
  Group: ID
  Data: EJ1365524
PLink https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=eric&AN=EJ1365524
RecordInfo BibRecord:
  BibEntity:
    Identifiers:
      – Type: doi
        Value: 10.1080/03057240.2021.1887831
    Languages:
      – Text: English
    PhysicalDescription:
      Pagination:
        PageCount: 17
        StartPage: 387
    Subjects:
      – SubjectFull: Moral Values
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Decision Making
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Video Technology
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Comparative Analysis
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Moral Development
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Developmental Stages
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Affective Behavior
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Values
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Measures (Individuals)
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Natural Disasters
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Hunger
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Food
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Trend Analysis
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Crime
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Cancer
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Drug Therapy
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: State Universities
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: College Students
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Psychological Patterns
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Defining Issues Test
        Type: general
    Titles:
      – TitleFull: Negative Affective States and Moral Judgment: A Closer Look at Their Joint Involvement
        Type: main
  BibRelationships:
    HasContributorRelationships:
      – PersonEntity:
          Name:
            NameFull: Derryberry, W. Pitt
      – PersonEntity:
          Name:
            NameFull: Richardson, Sarah
      – PersonEntity:
          Name:
            NameFull: Simpson, Anna
      – PersonEntity:
          Name:
            NameFull: Wilson, Megan
      – PersonEntity:
          Name:
            NameFull: Ambam, Andrea
    IsPartOfRelationships:
      – BibEntity:
          Dates:
            – D: 01
              M: 01
              Type: published
              Y: 2022
          Identifiers:
            – Type: issn-print
              Value: 0305-7240
            – Type: issn-electronic
              Value: 1465-3877
          Numbering:
            – Type: volume
              Value: 51
            – Type: issue
              Value: 3
          Titles:
            – TitleFull: Journal of Moral Education
              Type: main
ResultId 1