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Education, Truth and Subjectivity: Revisiting Kierkegaard

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Title: Education, Truth and Subjectivity: Revisiting Kierkegaard
Language: English
Authors: Roberts, Peter (ORCID 0000-0003-4408-5125)
Source: Oxford Review of Education. 2023 49(3):376-389.
Availability: Routledge. Available from: Taylor & Francis, Ltd. 530 Walnut Street Suite 850, Philadelphia, PA 19106. Tel: 800-354-1420; Tel: 215-625-8900; Fax: 215-207-0050; Web site: http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals
Peer Reviewed: Y
Page Count: 14
Publication Date: 2023
Document Type: Journal Articles
Reports - Evaluative
Descriptors: Ethics, Deception, Philosophy, Social Attitudes, Social Responsibility, Moral Values, Educational Philosophy, Religious Factors
DOI: 10.1080/03054985.2022.2091536
ISSN: 0305-4985
1465-3915
Abstract: Over recent years, it has been claimed that we live in a 'post-truth' age: a moment in history where the ideal of truth seems to have been abandoned. The prevailing attitude towards truth is not one of antagonism but of "indifference." Should this bother us? If so, why? What might we mean by 'truth'? How is truth relevant to education? One thinker who can help us in addressing these questions is the Danish philosopher, Søren Kierkegaard. Kierkegaard demonstrated a deep commitment to truth, not as an abstract idea but as a way of life. For Kierkegaard, a posture of indifference in facing the question of truth would have been abhorrent. One of the best known, but most frequently misunderstood, aspects of his work is his notion that "truth is subjectivity." This stance needs to be carefully distinguished from a position, commonly expressed today, where truth is regarded as 'relative' or 'subjective'. Kierkegaard's concern is not so much with the notion of 'being subjective' as with "becoming an existing subject." Some truths -- notably, those connected with the question of existence -- matter more than others, and education, it is argued in this paper, ought to have a stronger focus on such truths.
Abstractor: As Provided
Entry Date: 2023
Accession Number: EJ1385937
Database: ERIC
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  Value: <anid>AN0163249172;oxr01jun.23;2023Apr25.05:02;v2.2.500</anid> <title id="AN0163249172-1">Education, truth and subjectivity: Revisiting Kierkegaard </title> <p>Over recent years, it has been claimed that we live in a 'post-truth' age: a moment in history where the ideal of truth seems to have been abandoned. The prevailing attitude towards truth is not one of antagonism but of indifference. Should this bother us? If so, why? What might we mean by 'truth'? How is truth relevant to education? One thinker who can help us in addressing these questions is the Danish philosopher, Søren Kierkegaard. Kierkegaard demonstrated a deep commitment to truth, not as an abstract idea but as a way of life. For Kierkegaard, a posture of indifference in facing the question of truth would have been abhorrent. One of the best known, but most frequently misunderstood, aspects of his work is his notion that truth is subjectivity. This stance needs to be carefully distinguished from a position, commonly expressed today, where truth is regarded as 'relative' or 'subjective'. Kierkegaard's concern is not so much with the notion of 'being subjective' as with becoming an existing subject. Some truths – notably, those connected with the question of existence – matter more than others, and education, it is argued in this paper, ought to have a stronger focus on such truths.</p> <p>Keywords: Truth; post-truth; Kierkegaard; higher education; subjectivity; existence</p> <p>The question of 'truth' has been very much in the news recently. Somewhat ironically, truth has come to matter – become a subject of interest – precisely because it no longer seems to matter. We live in what has become known as a <emph>post</emph>-truth age: a moment in history where the ideal of truth seems to have been abandoned (Farrell et al., [<reflink idref="bib11" id="ref1">11</reflink>]; Gibbs, [<reflink idref="bib13" id="ref2">13</reflink>]; Harrison & Luckett, [<reflink idref="bib19" id="ref3">19</reflink>]; Horsthemke, [<reflink idref="bib20" id="ref4">20</reflink>]; Peters, [<reflink idref="bib37" id="ref5">37</reflink>]). With the increasing reach of the Internet and the important role played by social media in many lives, misinformation, half-truths and outright lies can be circulated on a scale and at a speed that could barely have been imagined a hundred years ago. Political leaders have long enjoyed a tenuous relationship with the truth, but in some prominent cases this relationship seems to have been completely severed. 'Truth' has become a hot topic for academic discussion and popular debate partly because the disregard for it is now so brazen. It is not just that the lies being told now are so blatant and so frequent; it is also the response to such lying that is significant. Many citizens, election results sometimes seem to suggest, simply do not <emph>care</emph> whether a political leader is telling the truth. The prevailing attitude towards truth is not one of antagonism but of <emph>indifference</emph>. Truth, it seems, is simply not something worth worrying about. Should this bother us? If so, why? What might we mean by 'truth'? How is truth relevant to education?</p> <p>One thinker who can help us in addressing these questions is the Danish philosopher, Søren Kierkegaard (1813–1855). Having been treated as a somewhat marginal figure in the history of philosophy for many years, Kierkegaard has over the last two decades enjoyed a revival of scholarly fortunes. His ideas are now regularly considered by researchers across a range of disciplinary areas. An important influence on many thinkers in the existentialist tradition (Unamuno, Sartre, Camus, and Beauvoir, among others), Kierkegaard was an extraordinarily productive and inventive writer, completing a very substantial body of work in his short life. Among the key themes addressed in his books are anxiety (Kierkegaard, [<reflink idref="bib23" id="ref6">23</reflink>]), fear (Kierkegaard, [<reflink idref="bib24" id="ref7">24</reflink>]), doubt (Kierkegaard, [<reflink idref="bib25" id="ref8">25</reflink>]), despair (Kierkegaard, [<reflink idref="bib28" id="ref9">28</reflink>]), and love (Kierkegaard, [<reflink idref="bib29" id="ref10">29</reflink>]). Kierkegaard explores several different modes of life: aesthetic, ethical and religious (Kierkegaard, [<reflink idref="bib26" id="ref11">26</reflink>], [<reflink idref="bib27" id="ref12">27</reflink>]). His use of irony and indirect communication, via a number of different pseudonyms (each with their own distinctive 'personalities' and philosophical orientations), leaves plenty of scope for argument over the extent to which the views expressed in his books are his own (Berthold, [<reflink idref="bib2" id="ref13">2</reflink>]; Evans, [<reflink idref="bib9" id="ref14">9</reflink>]; McCreary, [<reflink idref="bib34" id="ref15">34</reflink>]; Saeverot, [<reflink idref="bib44" id="ref16">44</reflink>], [<reflink idref="bib45" id="ref17">45</reflink>]; Sharpe, [<reflink idref="bib47" id="ref18">47</reflink>]; Williams, [<reflink idref="bib49" id="ref19">49</reflink>]; Zook, [<reflink idref="bib50" id="ref20">50</reflink>]).</p> <p>Perhaps the most complete statement of Kierkegaard's philosophy, despite the title appearing to suggest otherwise, is his <emph>Concluding Unscientific Postscript</emph> (Kierkegaard, [<reflink idref="bib31" id="ref21">31</reflink>]). A central claim in this book, with particular relevance for the present paper, is that <emph>truth is subjectivity</emph>. This is one of the best known but also most frequently misunderstood aspects of Kierkegaard's work (Hamilton, [<reflink idref="bib15" id="ref22">15</reflink>]; Hughes, [<reflink idref="bib21" id="ref23">21</reflink>]; Evans, [<reflink idref="bib10" id="ref24">10</reflink>]; Jacoby, [<reflink idref="bib22" id="ref25">22</reflink>]; Kwak, [<reflink idref="bib33" id="ref26">33</reflink>]; Reindal, [<reflink idref="bib38" id="ref27">38</reflink>]; Schacht, [<reflink idref="bib46" id="ref28">46</reflink>]). Kierkegaard demonstrated a deep commitment to truth, not as an abstract idea but as a way of life. He pursued his studies with rigour and sought to stay true to himself, notwithstanding the difficulties this posed for him. Living in a manner that was consistent with his ideals brought him derision and ridicule. He was an 'outsider' (Allen, [<reflink idref="bib1" id="ref29">1</reflink>]), alienated from others in his immediate locality and at odds with the established church. For Kierkegaard, an attitude of indifference towards truth would have been abhorrent. Truth <emph>mattered</emph> to him, and he has something important to teach us about <emph>truths that matter</emph> in education. I argue that the stance taken in <emph>Concluding Unscientific Postscript</emph> needs to be carefully distinguished from a position, commonly expressed today, where truth is regarded as 'relative' or 'subjective'. Kierkegaard's concern is not so much with the notion of 'being subjective' as with <emph>becoming an existing subject</emph>. Some truths – notably, those connected with the question of existence – matter more than others, and education, it will be suggested, ought to have a stronger focus on such truths. The first section of the paper outlines key ideas in <emph>Concluding Unscientific Postscript</emph>, while the second considers their implications for education.</p> <hd id="AN0163249172-2">Kierkegaard on truth and subjectivity</hd> <p>Kierkegaard devoted more than four years to the composition of <emph>Concluding Unscientific Postscript</emph>, 'without perhaps a single day's interruption of effort' (Kierkegaard, [<reflink idref="bib31" id="ref30">31</reflink>], p. 530). Writing the book demanded total commitment: 'I may truly testify', he declares, 'that I staked my life to the utmost, ... even if to others what I achieved may seem a long-winded triviality' (p. 530). Kierkegaard could see that the question of truth – what it means and what it demands of us – could literally become a matter of life and death. This principle is beautifully captured in Kierkegaard's famous statement that he wanted 'to find a truth which is truth <emph>for me</emph>, to find <emph>the idea for which I am willing to live or die</emph>' (Kierkegaard, [<reflink idref="bib30" id="ref31">30</reflink>], p. 19). Kierkegaard assigns the authorship of this work to Climacus, a voice of doubt among his pseudonyms, and casts himself in a supporting role of being responsible for the book's publication. Climacus can be contrasted with another of Kierkegaard's pseudonyms, 'Anti-Climacus', who adheres to a particularly strict view, 'taking himself to be a Christian to an extraordinary degree' (as cited in Hannay, [<reflink idref="bib16" id="ref32">16</reflink>], p. 15). Anti-Climacus was, in Hannay's words, 'used to present in ideal form a background assumption which for Kierkegaard himself was indefeasible, but which, once expressed in this way, he would reasonably find himself falling short of' (Hannay, [<reflink idref="bib16" id="ref33">16</reflink>], pp. 15–16). Care thus needs to be taken in attributing the views expressed in the book directly to Kierkegaard himself. Nevertheless, when read alongside those works authored under his own name, it is clear that, on the most critical philosophical points (e.g. the centrality of the question of existence), the Climacus of <emph>Concluding Unscientific Postscript</emph> does not differ substantially from Kierkegaard. Of particular interest in this connection is the fact that Kierkegaard only resorted to the use of this pseudonym at a very late stage in the production of the book. The decision was made only at the point at which he was 'preparing the fair copy' (Hannay, [<reflink idref="bib18" id="ref34">18</reflink>], p. xviii). This last-minute decision 'undermines any impression one may have of Kierkegaard's pseudonymity as a pre-planned and strategic manipulating of marionette figures behind whose studied posturing the manipulator himself remains a secret' (p. xviii). It may be Climacus who speaks to us in the final version of the book, but Kierkegaard cannot help revealing much of himself in the voice he assigns to his pseudonym.</p> <p>Kierkegaard's idiosyncratic approach to philosophy is evident in multiple ways in this book, from its title, to its style and substantive content. His title, <emph>Concluding Unscientific Postscript</emph>, is likely to strike the contemporary reader as irritatingly odd. 'A "postscript" to <emph>what</emph>?' it might be asked. And isn't at least one of the three terms redundant – why have both a 'conclusion' and a 'postscript'? Yet, this is no haphazard decision. As Hannay (p. vii) points out, properly speaking, a postscript does not conclude but provides an addition or supplement to what has already been said. And what has been said is, in this case, captured in Kierkegaard's earlier work, <emph>Philosophical Fragments</emph> (Kierkegaard, [<reflink idref="bib24" id="ref35">24</reflink>]), sometimes translated as <emph>Philosophical Crumbs. Concluding Unscientific Postscript</emph> extends ideas from the <emph>Fragments</emph>, developing them at much greater length and with more humour and witty asides. Climacus's 'conclusion' is more than 500 pages long, and contains within itself its own 'Conclusion' chapter. The book targets both Hegel and Kant, but the 'scientific' element of the title is primarily a reference to 'human science', which for Climacus can be taken to mean 'any objective approach to truth essential to human being' (Hannay, [<reflink idref="bib18" id="ref36">18</reflink>], p. xx). <emph>Concluding Unscientific Postscript</emph> points to the limits of the language of science, while at the same time defending the importance of truth, and offers an alternative way of understanding what it means to be human.</p> <p>The account of truth presented in <emph>Concluding Unscientific Postscript</emph> rests on a distinction between 'objective' and 'subjective' paths. The subjective path focuses on the development of a certain kind of 'inwardness': a deliberate, careful examination of existence, as experienced by the individual. The objective path encourages a distancing of the human subject from the question of his or her existence. Climacus cautions against excessive inwardness, where an individual lives, as it were, completely in a world of his or her own. In extreme cases, a person may be insane, and unable to properly exercise his or her reason in the pursuit of truth. But the objective path, in its attempt to extinguish the individual – to make the subject indifferent to him- or herself – also constitutes a form of madness. There is, Climacus suggests, something disturbingly inhuman in this quest. Modern speculation has done everything possible to 'get the individual to transcend himself objectively' (p. 166), but this is a misguided endeavour. Existence intrudes, whether we want it to or not. For Climacus (and for Kierkegaard), thinking should not become a purely abstract, 'disinterested' activity; rather, it should be practical, passionate, and interested. Kierkegaard, speaking with his own voice, makes his position plain in his 1835 journal entry: 'What I really need is to be clear about <emph>what I am to do</emph>, not what I must know, except in the way knowledge must precede all action' (Kierkegaard, [<reflink idref="bib30" id="ref37">30</reflink>], p. 19). The object and the subject of thought need to become more tightly intertwined, and the problem of existence needs to be seen as a central concern for us all (Kierkegaard, [<reflink idref="bib31" id="ref38">31</reflink>], pp. 162–165, 258).</p> <p>If our concern is not with knowledge abstracted from the human subject but with the existing knower, the form of knowing that matters most is 'ethico-religious knowing' (p. 166). From an objective perspective, the knower is not concerned with examining him- or herself as an existing individual; from an ethico-religious standpoint, this is crucial. Climacus explains: 'Objectively the question is merely about categories of thought, subjectively about inwardness. This "how" at its maximum is the passion of the infinite, and the passion of the infinite is itself the truth. But the passion of the infinite is precisely subjectivity, and in this way subjectivity is truth' (p. 171). From an objective standpoint, no 'infinite decision' needs to be made; this means that the question of how to distinguish 'good' from 'evil' can be put to one side. The 'infinite distinction between truth and falsehood' is likewise suspended (p. 171). Climacus speaks of a 'fork on the road', where a decision needs to be made by the existing subject (p. 171). At this juncture, there is a path that breaks away from objective knowledge, and in choosing to follow this, we orient ourselves towards what is infinite, eternal, unchanging.</p> <p>From a subjective perspective, we exist as ethical beings who must make decisions, form ideas, and take action. The question of how best to do so – i.e. how to exist – is pivotal in understanding what it means to live in the truth. The objective thinker, in denying the significance of the question of existence, lives in untruth. For Climacus, our existence is directed towards the infinite, towards that which we ordinarily assume we cannot know. As beings who exist in time, the infinite is not simply given to us; we must, in existing, <emph>strive for this</emph>. This can be an unsettling and uncomfortable process. At the fork in the road to which Climacus refers, all we think we know objectively becomes uncertain, but precisely because of this, the development of a passionate inwardness becomes all the more important. In passionate inwardness a tension is expressed that is at the same time the very definition of truth for Climacus: '<emph>the objective uncertainty maintained through appropriation in the most passionate inwardness is truth</emph>' (p. 171). This definition, Climacus adds, is 'another way of saying faith' (p. 171). To take the path of faith involves risking oneself, but without this risk faith is not possible. This is why the path of subjective knowing, of passionate inwardness, can be seen as a <emph>leap</emph>: it takes courage to launch ourselves forward in the face of uncertainty.</p> <p>It should be noted that while the phrase 'leap of faith' is often attributed to Kierkegaard, this is, as Hannay ([<reflink idref="bib18" id="ref39">18</reflink>]) reminds us, 'an expression nowhere to be found in Kierkegaard's work' (p. xxvii). Climacus's comments on 'the leap' in <emph>Concluding Unscientific Postscript</emph> relate principally to the work of Lessing, and on the latter's relation to this idea, he says: 'It is not much in itself' (Kierkegaard, [<reflink idref="bib31" id="ref40">31</reflink>], p. 89). Climacus admits, nonetheless, that '[t]he little that is to be found in Lessing has been important for me' (p. 89). Even if the phrase 'leap of faith' is not employed, it is clear that having faith involves <emph>making a choice and being committed to this</emph>. This is important for it connects with the idea, to be discussed in further detail in the next section, of 'choosing oneself', an act that requires a committed faith. Faith in Kierkegaard's work pertains to God: 'If I can grasp God objectively', Climacus contends, 'then I do not have faith, but just because I cannot do this, I must have faith' (p. 172). We can, however, also speak of faith in a more general way, linking this with the notion of commitment in the face of uncertainty – a requirement, it can be argued, if we are to take the task of education seriously. For Kierkegaard, to live and stay in faith means holding on to objective uncertainty. We must be able to be '70,000 fathoms deep' and yet retain our faith (p. 172).</p> <p>The speculative philosophers of Kierkegaard's time took a dim view of passion; yet passion is 'the very height of existence' (p. 166). For Climacus, passion, thought and existence are intertwined with each other. Pure thought, which Hegel believed could be attained through abstraction, is, according to Climacus, a 'phantom' (p. 263). Thinking must <emph>matter</emph> to us at the deepest level possible. We must, Climacus shows, <emph>want</emph> to ask questions of and about ourselves. Objective philosophy seeks to distance the subject from the object to be known. Climacus brings the two closer together, and for him, the subject is both the knower and, ultimately, what must be known. It is not enough, however, to consider what must be known; from a subjective perspective, the <emph>relation between</emph> the knower and the known is critical. Climacus turns the objective view on its head, viewing not the subject but knowing that is disconnected from existence as accidental (p. 166). The process of seeking to know cannot be reduced to a 'method', to a series of steps or rules to be followed; knowing is a complex, multifaceted <emph>mode of being</emph>. From a Kierkegaardian perspective, then, epistemology should not be separated from ontology. Knowledge claims are also, in one way or another, claims about the self. The subjective philosopher is interested not just in what is known, or how it is known, but also in <emph>why</emph> we seek to know and <emph>who is doing the knowing</emph>.</p> <p>The idea of truth as subjectivity, as developed by Climacus (and embraced by Kierkegaard himself), needs to be carefully distinguished from a position where truth is seen as 'relative'. To say that truth is subjectivity is not the same as saying that truth is <emph>subjective</emph>. Kierkegaard does not support an 'anything goes' view of truth, where 'your' truth is as good as 'my' truth. Subjective truth, as understood here, is also not consistent with epistemological or metaphysical solipsism. Kierkegaard does not deny the existence of other minds or the reality of a world outside the mind. Acknowledging the importance of how one knower relates to what is known does not mean we cannot, and should not, also acknowledge this possibility for others. The particular form that existing takes for us may be ours and ours alone, but this does not mean our inwardness must be seen as <emph>all</emph> that exists. Kierkegaard's point is not that anything can be true, or that we should believe whatever we want to believe. Nor would he want to say that we cannot distinguish between 'better' and 'worse' ways of understanding the world. His principal concern is with what truth means to the existing human subject (Evans, [<reflink idref="bib10" id="ref41">10</reflink>]; Schacht, [<reflink idref="bib46" id="ref42">46</reflink>]). Truth is subjectivity in the sense that it is in existing, in being a subject, that truth matters most. From a Kierkegaardian perspective, it is not so much a matter of living <emph>for</emph> the truth as of <emph>living truthfully</emph>, which is to say, living authentically – that is, <emph>in</emph> the truth. It is not that what we come to know is irrelevant or unimportant; to know something, however, is also to <emph>be</emph> a knower.</p> <p>Climacus maintains that '[t]he objective accent falls on <emph>what</emph> is said, the subjective on <emph>how</emph> it is said' (p. 170). In asking about truth objectively, reflection is directed at truth 'as an object to which the knower relates'; in asking about truth subjectively, however, reflection is directed 'on the individual's relation' (pp. 167–168). Climacus takes 'knowledge of God' as an example. In pursuing the objective path, the focus will be on 'bringing God to light objectively', but this is an impossibility, 'since God is subject and therefore for subjectivity in inwardness' (p. 168). Subjectively, it is establishing a 'true relation of inwardness to God' that matters, and it is only via the subjective path that an infinite decision must be made. The question of how one relates to the idea of immortality is also illustrative here. In searching for immortality, the objective path can only result in 'an approximating that never ends' (p. 169). Subjectively, however, one can, like Socrates, live – and die – as if there is immortality. The act of choosing to live in a certain way is not a trivial matter. Objectively, questions relating to God and immortality can be pursued in a leisurely manner; subjectively, 'every delay means mortal danger', and the decision is a matter of infinite importance and urgency (p. 169). As Biesta ([<reflink idref="bib5" id="ref43">5</reflink>]) observes:</p> <p>The difference between objective truth and subjective truth ... does not coincide with the difference between truth and falsehood or between objectivism and relativism, but has to do with the distinction between the theoretical and the existential, that is, between what is true and <emph>what matters</emph>. Since in the theoretical plane we can always ask further questions, we can always discover that what was considered to be objectively true turns out to be not so – which is how we understand the ongoing 'quest for certainty' that is called 'science' – subjective truth is neither a relation to objective truth nor to relative truth but to what Climacus characterises as 'an objective uncertainty'. (p. 458)</p> <p>This quotation serves as a useful bridge to the next section, for it draws attention to a distinction that is not only relevant to the question of truth but also the purpose of education. At first glance, it might appear as if Biesta is suggesting that 'the theoretical' does not matter, or matters less than 'the existential'. This might seem odd for someone clearly committed to theorising. There is, however, a difference between what is <emph>held to be true in a merely theoretical sense</emph> and the process of engaging in the <emph>act of theorising</emph>. In the case of the former, the task is to <emph>establish</emph> 'the truth' (or the 'objective' truth, as compared with something that does not meet this standard); in the case of the latter, the goal is to <emph>live</emph> truthfully – that is to say, in a manner where we come to care about the ideas developed. The quotation also hints at the dynamism that is central to the process of education. What we hold to be true at any one time may, Biesta helps us to see, not be so in a later period – or, we might say, under different circumstances, or when viewed in the light of further evidence or argument. Education involves living with uncertainties, with risks, with change, but these are among the key features that make it worthwhile. These ideas find further development below.</p> <hd id="AN0163249172-3">Implications for education</hd> <p>There is much in Kierkegaard's work that is potentially relevant to education but the focus here will be on the notion of subjective truth considered in <emph>Concluding Unscientific Postscript</emph>. We have seen that Kierkegaard, through his pseudonym Climacus, places particular emphasis on the idea of living truthfully; that is, on living passionately in the truth as an individual human being. This way of looking at truth differs substantially from the approach commonly adopted in educational systems around the world today. Direct references to the concept of 'truth', and to philosophical debates over the nature of truth, are relatively rare in contemporary educational policy and practice. This is reflective of the broader tendency towards indifference noted at the beginning of the paper, but that does not mean there is not an <emph>implied</emph> view of truth in the dominant discourses on education in our current age. Truth is frequently seen to reside in some form of objectivity: in what can be demonstrated as known, by students or by teachers and researchers. There has been a strong push for 'evidence-based' changes in education, suggesting that truths about what works best in (say) teaching are there to be discovered, by anyone who looks, in any context, with a sufficiently objective eye. Aspects of education more closely connected with the Kierkegaardian idea of truth as subjectivity tend to be ignored or trivialised. I shall argue here that they need to occupy centre stage in our thinking about education. In orienting ourselves more directly towards the problem of existence, and in paying greater attention to the question of how one relates to what is known, concepts such as commitment, care and curiosity take on new significance and meaning.</p> <p>Kierkegaard encourages us to examine ourselves afresh; to think deeply about the process of becoming a subject. 'Examining' in this context implies a form of knowing, but it is also more than that; it implies a certain way of living. The idea of an 'examined life' goes back at least as far as Socrates, and has, in one form or another, traditionally been espoused as one of the key goals of higher education. Universities encourage students to develop as critical, curious, inquiring beings who seek to understand themselves, others and the world in which they live. From a Kierkegaardian perspective, the quest for 'knowledge' can only take us so far in this process. Ultimately, we must <emph>choose</emph> the truth to which we will become committed and continue to test how we relate to that truth through ongoing reflection. Living in the truth in this way involves making a 'leap' to commit to something that cannot be understood in purely rational terms. It is not that we abandon our capacity for reason altogether; it is more that we come to recognise the <emph>limits</emph> of reason and <emph>choose</emph> to pursue a relation to an object passionately and purposefully (see further, Roberts & Saeverot, [<reflink idref="bib42" id="ref44">42</reflink>]). We come to <emph>care</emph> about what we do and thereby make a decisive shift in our relation not just to the object of our pursuit but also to others and the world.</p> <p>It is the rigour, this seriousness, in considering the who, the how, and the why of existence that distinguishes the approach signalled by Climacus from our present age. Even if we cannot take the path of faith proposed by Climacus, we might nonetheless accept that a central task for us all is becoming a subject (i.e. 'being subjective': Kierkegaard, [<reflink idref="bib31" id="ref45">31</reflink>], p. 108). Educational institutions such as universities have a key role to play in highlighting this task for students. At first glance, it might appear as if there is nothing to do here. For in becoming a subject, I become what, in some sense, I already am. Why, Climacus asks on behalf of imagined objectors, would we want to waste our time on such a task? It is, however, precisely because the task seems so unrewarding that it is necessary. We take our existence for granted, seldom pausing to reflect on it – on <emph>ourselves</emph> as existing individual subjects. Indeed, we do everything possible to distract ourselves from our existence. We immerse ourselves in the world of images. We seek constant stimulation. We live in environments characterised by incessant activity and 'noise'. Stopping to examine how we are being shaped by these influences is an uncomfortable, difficult task. Existence is always 'there' and yet, as we go about our busy lives, it remains perpetually hidden. We want, Climacus argues, to become anything other than what we are. Seen in this light, becoming a subject is 'extremely hard, the hardest task of all' (p. 108), and the question of existence will always need to be addressed. As Carlisle ([<reflink idref="bib7" id="ref46">7</reflink>]) points out, while this question 'is perennial, ready to strike at any moment, ... it is also constantly changing'; '[e]ach time it is asked, it concerns a particular person at a particular moment of his life, in a particular time and place' (p. 13).</p> <p> <emph>Concluding Unscientific Postscript</emph> can also teach us something about ourselves that we frequently do not want to hear. The same insignificance Climacus ascribes to himself (Kierkegaard, [<reflink idref="bib31" id="ref47">31</reflink>], p. 524) applies to every individual. We are all fragile, fellow human sufferers, struggling and striving to make sense of ourselves and the world around us, even if our efforts are of little consequence in the bigger scheme of things. This does not mean life is just a pointless comedy. Climacus does suggest that all stages of life have something of the comical in them. But <emph>seeing</emph> the comical 'takes humour, and also, at a lower level, irony' (p. 17; see also, Hannay, [<reflink idref="bib17" id="ref48">17</reflink>]). Our suffering need not be futile. Climacus appeals to his sufferings as 'my teachers' (p. 24). When we look for such teachers in person – teachers of 'the ambiguous art of thinking about existence while existing' - we cannot find them (p. 525). Climacus's response to this situation is to become a 'learner of existing': someone who does not claim to know more than others but who at least knows that he or she does not know (p. 525). These days, we are constantly encouraged to seek happiness, and when we fail to find it, we are told we need help – often in the form of therapy or drugs. But Kierkegaard teaches us that unhappiness and suffering need not always be seen as 'problems' that need to be 'fixed'. There is an underlying current of despair in many lives. Facing up to the truth of our existence, as an educational task of prime importance, means not ignoring these uncomfortable realities but learning from them (Chen, [<reflink idref="bib8" id="ref49">8</reflink>]; McKnight, [<reflink idref="bib35" id="ref50">35</reflink>]; Roberts, [<reflink idref="bib41" id="ref51">41</reflink>]).</p> <p>Becoming a 'learner of existing', as described by Climacus, is a lifelong commitment. It is not a process that follows predetermined rules; nor does it occur in the same way for each person. It will often be unrecognised as it is taking place. It places heavy demands on us, but we should, Climacus argues, be unafraid to take on this challenge: 'one only has to risk being a human being' (Kierkegaard, [<reflink idref="bib31" id="ref52">31</reflink>], p. 259). The concept of <emph>Erziehung</emph>, as explained by Biesta ([<reflink idref="bib6" id="ref53">6</reflink>]), is helpful in elaborating on this point. Biesta observes that our first questions are more likely to pertain to our subject-ness than to our identity. Before we listen, receive and speak, we are already being addressed. We enter a world where the conversation is already underway; we are 'in a sense, always too late' (p. 841). It is here, Biesta maintains, that we begin to 'find ourselves', grappling with 'the question [of] what all this is asking from me, what it is trying [to] say to me, and what kind of response might be called for' (p. 841). We can be addressed in domesticating and inhibiting ways, but there are other ways of being spoken to that 'call us into life, ... into our own existence' (p. 842). These 'educational gestures' fall within the domain of what is known as <emph>Erziehung</emph> in the German-speaking world (p. 842). Teaching that is educative (rather than, say, indoctrinatory) is consistent with this idea. Teaching '"arrives" from an "outside", and therefore always occurs as an interruption of what is going on' (p. 842). This is not merely the exercising of power; rather, it is 'an "appeal" to the freedom of another human being' (p. 842).</p> <p>Taking up the task of existence, as Climacus depicts this, is similar to the process of grappling with what is being asked of us, as described by Biesta. It is very much an individual process but this does not mean it is undertaken alone. If we are, in Climacus's words, to 'risk being a human being', we do so not in an abstract, ideal environment but in a world that is already structured by its own concerns, conventions and conversations. To be taught, in an educative manner, is to be invited to participate in the process of living truthfully – i.e. becoming a subject – such that we can play our distinctive role in continuing the conversation. In our current age, there is, as Biesta ([<reflink idref="bib6" id="ref54">6</reflink>]) notes, sometimes a 'fear' of being taught. We can see teaching as 'an unwarranted act of power', one that limits the freedom of the student (p. 842). But this view is itself limiting, and can fail to distinguish between power and freedom. 'The real question', Biesta suggests, 'if we wish to exist in the world together with other human beings and on a planet that is not just a construction, is not how we can escape from what and who is other, but how we can give what and who is other a place in our own lives' (p. 842). Biesta argues that <emph>Erziehung</emph> 'works precisely in the tension between power and authority, aiming at the (mysterious) transformation of power into authority' (p. 842). 'Authority', as Paulo Freire pointed out many years earlier, must not be confused with <emph>authoritarianism</emph> (Freire & Shor, [<reflink idref="bib12" id="ref55">12</reflink>]). A teacher can <emph>exercise</emph> authority in pedagogical terms (e.g. in providing a sense of structure and direction for educational dialogue) and should <emph>be</emph> an authority in his or her subject domain. To be authoritarian is to say, in effect, 'It shall be this way and no other'. It is to suppress questioning and engagement, denying the subjectivity of the student. How we relate to the truth, to return to Kierkegaard, can depend crucially on how we are guided by teachers. Our sense of what matters is not formed 'out of nowhere' but emerges through the encounters we have with others who are already participating in the conversation to which Biesta refers.</p> <p>While the emphasis in the present discussion is on the educational implications of Kierkegaard's thought for adults, the imperative to recognise and value the subjectivity of the student applies at all ages. Some approaches to teaching will be more consistent with this goal than others. In an entry in his journal in 1838, Kierkegaard argued for a Socratic approach to the education of children: 'One must awaken an appetite in them to ask questions instead of waving aside a sensible question'; the key is 'to bring the poetic to bear on their lives in every way' (as cited in Klausen, [<reflink idref="bib32" id="ref56">32</reflink>], p. 43). As Klausen ([<reflink idref="bib32" id="ref57">32</reflink>]) shows, from a Kierkegaardian perspective, storytelling can be seen as 'integral to the formation of the children's personality' (p. 43). This is a form of what might now be seen as 'experiential' education, where curiosity is a pivotal element in the learning process. Kierkegaard advances an idea of the teacher as story-teller: someone who sets out not to test the children but to quietly ask what they are reading, seeking to 'relate in an individual way precisely with what they are otherwise engaged in, though always <emph>en passant</emph>, so that the child's soul is electrified by it and he feels the omnipresence of something poetic' (as cited in Klausen, [<reflink idref="bib32" id="ref58">32</reflink>], p. 44). This fosters a 'constant mental mobility' in the child, a 'permanent attentiveness to what the child hears and sees, an attentiveness one must otherwise elicit by <emph>external</emph> means' (p. 44). Kierkegaard speaks against the notion of supplying children with knowledge that is deemed useful, for this leads to the development of 'purely atomistic knowledge' that gives 'no credence to any deeper relation to the children and their existence' (p. 44). This hints at what would later become a central theme in Kierkegaard's work: the asking of questions directly related to the central task of existing.</p> <p>One of the major impediments in our current age to seeing questions of the kind raised by Kierkegaard as important is our obsession with measurement and performance (Biesta, [<reflink idref="bib4" id="ref59">4</reflink>]; Webster, [<reflink idref="bib48" id="ref60">48</reflink>]). These days, we seem to want to count and compare almost everything: from television ratings, to hits on websites, to steps taken in attaining our daily exercise. We seek to standardise, to systematise, and to sort. Countries are ranked in relation to each other on a host of measures, with the league tables produced through such exercises often exerting a powerful influence over policy priorities. We tally up incomes and expenses but also pretend to be able to measure 'happiness' and 'wellbeing'. There is, it might be said, a kind of measurement madness at work here, altering our sense of what matters, and of who we are. An obsession with measurement distances us from ourselves: from what we are meant to be, and do, as human beings. In constantly looking outwards to justify what we do, and in feeling shame when we fail to 'measure up', we lose the art of turning inwards. <emph>We</emph> end up becoming little more than numbers; little more than the scores we achieve or the 'likes' we receive. If we become too swept up in the rush to rank everything, we lose sight of not only what we are assessing but of why we are doing so and of what this might be <emph>doing to us</emph>.</p> <p>These trends are evident in universities, where knowledge has been commodified and the notion of higher education serving a 'public good' role has largely been lost (Roberts, [<reflink idref="bib43" id="ref61">43</reflink>]). In the Western world, there has over the last three decades been a heavy emphasis on economic advancement and meeting the demands of employers and industry. Most policy statements on tertiary education have little to say about the value of further study in enhancing self-understanding or inner growth; the focus is predominantly on a narrowly defined set of external goals (see, for example, New Zealand Government, [<reflink idref="bib36" id="ref62">36</reflink>]). Tertiary education is seen as a means for making citizens more productive, more efficient and more competitive on the world economic stage. It is assumed that attaining greater prosperity is a universal aspiration. It is what can measured in the form of GDP, export earnings or OECD rankings that matters, not inner investigation, deep reflection or enlightenment. The differences between the language employed in many policy documents and that found in Kierkegaard's works could not be more stark. A student heeding the ancient call to 'know thyself' (see, Besley & Peters, [<reflink idref="bib3" id="ref63">3</reflink>]; Hadot, [<reflink idref="bib14" id="ref64">14</reflink>]) is likely to find little or no sustenance in these policy texts, and if the inwardness considered by Kierkegaard's Climacus is to be taken seriously, it must be encouraged and cultivated <emph>in spite</emph> of what is currently prioritised in the tertiary sector, not because of it.</p> <p>'Knowing thyself', it must be remembered, is not enough; we must, from a Kierkegaardian point of view, also <emph>'choose'</emph> ourselves. 'Choice' in this context has little connection with contemporary applications of the term. Under the influence of neoliberal ideas, choice has been largely reduced to a set of consumer-style decisions, in the arena of the marketplace. Kierkegaard's concern is with <emph>existential</emph> choice, where, as he would see it, the decisions to be made, the relations to be formed, and the actions to be taken are of a much more serious and significant nature. These are, as signalled earlier in the paper, choices of a 'life or death' kind, where the very question of one's existence is at stake. From an educational perspective, it is crucial that such choices be well-informed. Students need to be given alternatives; they need to be exposed, through teaching, to a range of different perspectives on what it means to be human, how we come to know, how we ought to structure our societies, and so on (cf., Roberts & Freeman-Moir, [<reflink idref="bib40" id="ref65">40</reflink>]). But the lessons they encounter should also teach them that in the end, <emph>they</emph> must make decisions, as existing individuals, about what they will commit themselves to and why. The same responsibility to choose and to commit exists for those who teach, at all levels in the education system. The very idea of becoming a teacher is itself a momentous decision, requiring a leap towards the unknown, the uncertain and the unpredictable (see further, Roberts, [<reflink idref="bib39" id="ref66">39</reflink>]). This point applies whether one is teaching a class of hundreds of students or serving as a guide for just one person. There is no going back in making such a choice, for even if one's career path takes a different turn in the future, the distinctive qualities developed through living as a teacher never fully disappear.</p> <p>From everything said thus far, it appears that we have strayed quite some way from the notion of living in the truth espoused by Climacus in <emph>Concluding Unscientific Postscript</emph>. The idea of peering inwards, deeply and honestly, appears to be utterly at odds with the spirit of the times. But let us pause for a moment to consider a possible objection to this claim. Surely, it could be contended, 'inwardness' is exactly what we <emph>do</emph> find: social media sites are replete with examples of individuals who cannot stop talking about themselves, who feel a need to talk about their entire lives for the benefit of the rest of the world. There is an important distinction to be made, however, between the kind of self-<emph>centredness</emph> that is all too evident today and the form of self-<emph>examination</emph> that Kierkegaard had in mind. The existing subject who thinks, through existing and while existing, about his or her existence, is not concerned with displaying 'the self' for all the world to see. Inwardness of the sort described by Climacus in <emph>Concluding Unscientific Postscript</emph> is, by its very nature, inward looking; it eschews publicity and brings few external rewards. Indeed, a serious commitment to the inner activity that is necessary in becoming a subject, as Climacus depicts this, will sometimes bring loneliness, despair and ridicule.</p> <p>The thinking subject in Kierkegaard's universe is not concerned with performance, praise or prosperity, but with knowing what it means to exist. Being ethical in Climacus's terms is not a matter of making one's good deeds known to others – of being <emph>seen</emph> to be a good, responsible citizen – but of living with quiet integrity. Taking <emph>responsibility</emph> for oneself, as opposed to being <emph>accountable</emph> to others, consists in myriad moments of goodness – in thought, feeling and action – unseen, unrecorded and unrewarded. We may all fall short, each in our own ways, in meeting these ideals, but a decision to commit to them is in itself a quiet act of rebellion. The emphasis in our current age is on appearances, on facing outwards, even when the focus is ostensibly on that which is within. Kierkegaard's work offers an alternative that is, on the surface, deceptively simple. When considered carefully, his ideas are anything but; they constitute a radical critique of contemporary culture and offer a path that is both more difficult and potentially more rewarding than anything currently marketed to us in our ultra-commercialised world.</p> <hd id="AN0163249172-4">Conclusion</hd> <p>Kierkegaard offers a distinctive perspective on truth with important implications for education. Truth in his philosophy is not merely an idea of interest to epistemologists; it is <emph>lived</emph>. The indifference towards truth characteristic of a post-truth age has no place in Kierkegaardian thought. We should, Kierkegaard's work suggests, come to <emph>care</emph> about truth, and this commitment should be fostered in our educational institutions. If Kierkegaard's <emph>Concluding Unscientific Postscript</emph> is our guide, the questions that matter most are those connected with the problem of human existence, and these questions warrant closer attention by educationists. There are significant impediments to taking this task seriously, some of which are imposed by current policy and practice, others of which arise from limitations in our thinking – about education and about ourselves. The notion of a 'post-truth' world implies that we are somehow existing <emph>after</emph> truth; Kierkegaard, through his various pseudonyms, helps us to see the value of living <emph>in</emph> truth, however uncomfortable this may be.</p> <p>It would be inconsistent with the ideas considered in this paper to propose straightforward educational 'solutions' to the problems we face. Nonetheless, some broad shifts in pedagogical direction might be signalled as possibilities. A helpful start could be made in listening to students' views on the question of truth and in learning more about what matters to them. Examples of lying, or of 'fudging' the truth, by public figures can be made the subject of reflection and discussion in school and university classrooms. Standing up for truth through critical engagement with policy can also be encouraged. Including more philosophical content in teacher education programmes, with a particular focus on thinkers who address questions relating to the meaning and significance of truth and existence, may bear fruit in the pedagogies adopted with future generations of students. Widening the range of sources on which we draw – e.g. by allowing students to ponder the theme of existence via literature or film – can be beneficial. Fostering a love of learning that will extend beyond the completion of a professional teaching qualification and promote deeper investigation of ontological, epistemological and ethical questions across the lifespan can become a central goal of a university education. If we are to live truthfully, in the Kierkegaardian sense, retaining a sense of humility and openness in examining our own assumptions, perceptions and commitments as teachers and researchers will always be important. Being prepared to acknowledge limitations, and to change, is often the hardest leap we must take. Inner investigation of the kind described in Kierkegaard's work may be difficult, but the effort required is, from an educational perspective, thoroughly worthwhile.</p> <hd id="AN0163249172-5">Disclosure statement</hd> <p>No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).</p> <ref id="AN0163249172-6"> <title> References </title> <blist> <bibl id="bib1" idref="ref29" type="bt">1</bibl> <bibtext> Allen, D. (1983). Three outsiders: Pascal, Kierkegaard, Simone Weil. Wipf & Stock.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibl id="bib2" idref="ref13" type="bt">2</bibl> <bibtext> Berthold, D. (2011). The ethics of authorship: Communication, seduction, and death in Hegel and Kierkegaard. Fordham University Press.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibl id="bib3" idref="ref63" type="bt">3</bibl> <bibtext> Besley, T. (A.C.), & Peters, M. A. (2007). Subjectivity and truth: Foucault, education, and the culture of self. 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Kierkegaard, seduction, and existential education. Studies in Philosophy and Education, 30 (6), 557 – 572. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11217-011-9239-6</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Saeverot, H. (2013). Irony, deception and subjective truth: Principles for existential teaching. Studies in Philosophy and Education, 32 (5), 503 – 513. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11217-012-9346-z</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Schacht, R. (1973). Kierkegaard on 'truth is subjectivity' and 'the leap of faith'. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 2 (3), 297 – 313. https://doi.org/10.1080/00455091.1973.10716045</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Sharpe, M. (2016). Socratic ironies: Reading Hadot, reading Kierkegaard. Sophia, 55, 409 – 435. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11841-016-0512-6</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Webster, R. S. (2017). Valuing and desiring purposes of education to transcend miseducative measurement practices. Educational Philosophy and Theory, 49 (4), 331 – 346. https://doi.org/10.1080/00131857.2015.1052355</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Williams, G. W. (2012). Irony as the birth of Kierkegaard's "single individual" and the beginning of politics. Toronto journal of theology, 28 (2), 309 – 318.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Zook, D. C. (2008). The irony of it all: Søren Kierkegaard and the anxious pleasures of civil society. British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 16 (2), 393 – 419. https://doi.org/10.1080/09608780801969191</bibtext> </blist> </ref> <aug> <p>By Peter Roberts</p> <p>Reported by Author</p> <p></p> <p>Peter Roberts is Professor of Education at the University of Canterbury in New Zealand. His teaching and research interests are in philosophy of education and educational policy studies. His latest books include Performativity, Politics and Education: From Policy to Philosophy (2022), Education and the Limits of Reason: Reading Dostoevsky, Tolstoy and Nabokov (with Herner Saeverot, 2018), Happiness, Hope, and Despair: Rethinking the Role of Education (2016), and Education, Ethics and Existence: Camus and the Human Condition (with Andrew Gibbons and Richard Heraud, 2015).</p> </aug> <nolink nlid="nl1" bibid="bib11" firstref="ref1"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl2" bibid="bib13" firstref="ref2"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl3" bibid="bib19" firstref="ref3"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl4" bibid="bib20" firstref="ref4"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl5" bibid="bib37" firstref="ref5"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl6" bibid="bib23" firstref="ref6"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl7" bibid="bib24" firstref="ref7"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl8" bibid="bib25" firstref="ref8"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl9" bibid="bib28" firstref="ref9"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl10" bibid="bib29" firstref="ref10"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl11" bibid="bib26" firstref="ref11"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl12" bibid="bib27" firstref="ref12"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl13" bibid="bib34" firstref="ref15"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl14" bibid="bib44" firstref="ref16"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl15" bibid="bib45" firstref="ref17"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl16" bibid="bib47" firstref="ref18"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl17" bibid="bib49" firstref="ref19"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl18" bibid="bib50" firstref="ref20"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl19" bibid="bib31" firstref="ref21"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl20" bibid="bib15" firstref="ref22"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl21" bibid="bib21" firstref="ref23"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl22" bibid="bib10" firstref="ref24"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl23" bibid="bib22" firstref="ref25"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl24" bibid="bib33" firstref="ref26"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl25" bibid="bib38" firstref="ref27"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl26" bibid="bib46" firstref="ref28"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl27" bibid="bib30" firstref="ref31"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl28" bibid="bib16" firstref="ref32"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl29" bibid="bib18" firstref="ref34"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl30" bibid="bib42" firstref="ref44"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl31" bibid="bib17" firstref="ref48"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl32" bibid="bib35" firstref="ref50"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl33" bibid="bib41" firstref="ref51"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl34" bibid="bib12" firstref="ref55"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl35" bibid="bib32" firstref="ref56"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl36" bibid="bib48" firstref="ref60"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl37" bibid="bib43" firstref="ref61"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl38" bibid="bib36" firstref="ref62"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl39" bibid="bib14" firstref="ref64"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl40" bibid="bib40" firstref="ref65"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl41" bibid="bib39" firstref="ref66"></nolink>
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  Data: Education, Truth and Subjectivity: Revisiting Kierkegaard
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  Data: <searchLink fieldCode="AR" term="%22Roberts%2C+Peter%22">Roberts, Peter</searchLink> (ORCID <externalLink term="http://orcid.org/0000-0003-4408-5125">0000-0003-4408-5125</externalLink>)
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  Data: <searchLink fieldCode="SO" term="%22Oxford+Review+of+Education%22"><i>Oxford Review of Education</i></searchLink>. 2023 49(3):376-389.
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  Data: Routledge. Available from: Taylor & Francis, Ltd. 530 Walnut Street Suite 850, Philadelphia, PA 19106. Tel: 800-354-1420; Tel: 215-625-8900; Fax: 215-207-0050; Web site: http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals
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  Data: 14
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  Label: Publication Date
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  Data: 2023
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  Data: Journal Articles<br />Reports - Evaluative
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  Data: <searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Ethics%22">Ethics</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Deception%22">Deception</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Philosophy%22">Philosophy</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Social+Attitudes%22">Social Attitudes</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Social+Responsibility%22">Social Responsibility</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Moral+Values%22">Moral Values</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Educational+Philosophy%22">Educational Philosophy</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Religious+Factors%22">Religious Factors</searchLink>
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  Data: 10.1080/03054985.2022.2091536
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  Data: 0305-4985<br />1465-3915
– Name: Abstract
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  Data: Over recent years, it has been claimed that we live in a 'post-truth' age: a moment in history where the ideal of truth seems to have been abandoned. The prevailing attitude towards truth is not one of antagonism but of "indifference." Should this bother us? If so, why? What might we mean by 'truth'? How is truth relevant to education? One thinker who can help us in addressing these questions is the Danish philosopher, Søren Kierkegaard. Kierkegaard demonstrated a deep commitment to truth, not as an abstract idea but as a way of life. For Kierkegaard, a posture of indifference in facing the question of truth would have been abhorrent. One of the best known, but most frequently misunderstood, aspects of his work is his notion that "truth is subjectivity." This stance needs to be carefully distinguished from a position, commonly expressed today, where truth is regarded as 'relative' or 'subjective'. Kierkegaard's concern is not so much with the notion of 'being subjective' as with "becoming an existing subject." Some truths -- notably, those connected with the question of existence -- matter more than others, and education, it is argued in this paper, ought to have a stronger focus on such truths.
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      – TitleFull: Education, Truth and Subjectivity: Revisiting Kierkegaard
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