Motivating Children to (Pre)Monitor: Positive Effects on Monitoring Accuracy?
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| Title: | Motivating Children to (Pre)Monitor: Positive Effects on Monitoring Accuracy? |
|---|---|
| Language: | English |
| Authors: | Sophie Wacker (ORCID |
| Source: | Metacognition and Learning. 2024 19(1):1-19. |
| Availability: | Springer. Available from: Springer Nature. One New York Plaza, Suite 4600, New York, NY 10004. Tel: 800-777-4643; Tel: 212-460-1500; Fax: 212-460-1700; e-mail: customerservice@springernature.com; Web site: https://link.springer.com/ |
| Peer Reviewed: | Y |
| Page Count: | 19 |
| Publication Date: | 2024 |
| Document Type: | Journal Articles Reports - Research |
| Education Level: | Early Childhood Education Elementary Education Kindergarten Primary Education Grade 2 |
| Descriptors: | Metacognition, Decision Making, Comparative Analysis, Student Motivation, Young Children, Self Evaluation (Individuals), Kindergarten, Grade 2, Elementary School Students, Associative Learning, Task Analysis, Memory |
| DOI: | 10.1007/s11409-023-09351-0 |
| ISSN: | 1556-1623 1556-1631 |
| Abstract: | When young children evaluate their confidence, their monitoring is often overoptimistic, that is, inaccurate. The present study investigated a potential underlying mechanism for kindergarteners' and second graders' overconfidence within a paired associates learning paradigm. We implemented a pre-monitoring phase motivating children to differentially evaluate their confidence for each alternative "before" children could choose an answer in the subsequent recognition phase. For one, we intended to weaken the influence of one single and prepotently selected memory trace. For another, we motivated and enabled children to evaluate all four answer alternatives concerning their certainty before evaluating their final recognition choice by giving a confidence judgment. We compared monitoring discrimination and monitoring bias with a control condition whose task sequence did not include a pre-monitoring judgment. Contrary to our expectations, the pattern of results indicated that being instructed to pre-monitor did "increase" and not decrease overconfidence in young children. The present results will be discussed against the background of memory-metamemory interaction, confirmation bias, and methodological issues. |
| Abstractor: | As Provided |
| Entry Date: | 2024 |
| Accession Number: | EJ1418224 |
| Database: | ERIC |
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| FullText | Links: – Type: pdflink Url: https://content.ebscohost.com/cds/retrieve?content=AQICAHj0k_4E0hTGH8RJwT4gCJyBsGNe_WN95AvKlDbXJGqwxwFTZ3bJ2btQXF-K5mmHmeZ9AAAA4zCB4AYJKoZIhvcNAQcGoIHSMIHPAgEAMIHJBgkqhkiG9w0BBwEwHgYJYIZIAWUDBAEuMBEEDPJ-ZMAnHrRRsQTZWwIBEICBmx1CEGj41rszzU6K3ZmoMhYGGIPb-6U21aiKXpXt6_8R0QdvwOrpZwtPhigvUu4V4RK0sJXfQFh0Wt-EYKgl_1PgHHYoxDr6lQXvnWPv9oe3CJZdpys4UhM8vVvE0KFsVIDgRHxP06udv3qk-1fO6eImwSqYU2P-2_ZVXy5v9ReAK1yPGHKzA-CTvHq5iltbL0eM7ETV0vdePPDE Text: Availability: 1 Value: <anid>AN0176300788;[3d0h]01apr.24;2024Apr01.06:28;v2.2.500</anid> <title id="AN0176300788-1">Motivating children to (pre)monitor: positive effects on monitoring accuracy? </title> <p>When young children evaluate their confidence, their monitoring is often overoptimistic, that is, inaccurate. The present study investigated a potential underlying mechanism for kindergarteners' and second graders' overconfidence within a paired associates learning paradigm. We implemented a pre-monitoring phase motivating children to differentially evaluate their confidence for each alternative before children could choose an answer in the subsequent recognition phase. For one, we intended to weaken the influence of one single and prepotently selected memory trace. For another, we motivated and enabled children to evaluate all four answer alternatives concerning their certainty before evaluating their final recognition choice by giving a confidence judgment. We compared monitoring discrimination and monitoring bias with a control condition whose task sequence did not include a pre-monitoring judgment. Contrary to our expectations, the pattern of results indicated that being instructed to pre-monitor did increase and not decrease overconfidence in young children. The present results will be discussed against the background of memory-metamemory interaction, confirmation bias, and methodological issues.</p> <p>Keywords: Cognitive development; Metacognition; Monitoring; Overconfidence; Children</p> <hd id="AN0176300788-2">Introduction</hd> <p>One of the most critical milestones in a child's development is reaching the ability to monitor and regulate cognitive functions. So-called metacognitive processes allow to monitor behavior and enable adaptive information processing under varying task demands (Conn et al., [<reflink idref="bib11" id="ref1">11</reflink>]; Wang et al., [<reflink idref="bib83" id="ref2">83</reflink>]). In metacognitive research, one distinguishes between declarative (i.e., knowledge about learning strategies and one's memory; Flavell, [<reflink idref="bib23" id="ref3">23</reflink>]) and procedural metacognition (monitoring and control processes; Schneider &amp; Löffler, [<reflink idref="bib69" id="ref4">69</reflink>]). Thereby both, accurate monitoring (i.e., ongoing surveillance of subjective task performance and comparison with objective performance) and efficient control processes (i.e., processes involved in the regulation of one's one cognitive performance: re-study selections, allocation of study time) are essential for school achievement (Dunlosky &amp; Metcalfe, [<reflink idref="bib17" id="ref5">17</reflink>]; de Bruin &amp; van Gog, [<reflink idref="bib13" id="ref6">13</reflink>]; van Loon et al., [<reflink idref="bib78" id="ref7">78</reflink>]), and lifelong learning (Bakracevic Vukman &amp; Licardo, [<reflink idref="bib3" id="ref8">3</reflink>]). First signs of emerging metacognition are already observable at preschool age (Coughlin et al., [<reflink idref="bib12" id="ref9">12</reflink>]; Geurten &amp; Bastin, [<reflink idref="bib25" id="ref10">25</reflink>]; Lipowski et al., [<reflink idref="bib44" id="ref11">44</reflink>]; Lyons &amp; Ghetti, [<reflink idref="bib46" id="ref12">46</reflink>]). Further and significant improvements are then consistently found, especially during the school years (Lyons &amp; Zelazo [<reflink idref="bib47" id="ref13">47</reflink>]; Schneider &amp; Löffler, [<reflink idref="bib69" id="ref14">69</reflink>]). Thus, a critical age window for metacognitive development occurs at a young age building the basis for a protracted development into adolescence.</p> <p>Although early signs of emerging metacognitive skills have repeatedly been documented, monitoring processes of kindergarten and young primary school children still need to get fine-tuned and more differentiated, and thus, their monitoring accuracy is consistently lower compared to adults (Schneider, [<reflink idref="bib68" id="ref15">68</reflink>]). Specifically, young children seem to have difficulties reliably and metacognitively differentiating between correct and incorrect performance in their monitoring judgments (Destan &amp; Roebers, [<reflink idref="bib14" id="ref16">14</reflink>]; Finn &amp; Metcalfe, [<reflink idref="bib22" id="ref17">22</reflink>]; Lipko et al., [<reflink idref="bib42" id="ref18">42</reflink>]), with a strong tendency to a positive bias, also called "overconfidence". Some authors have argued that one reason for their overoptimistic monitoring may be that young children do not take enough time to monitor alternative answers and their final responses but rather jump too quickly on a positive (very certain) monitoring judgment (Bryce et al., [<reflink idref="bib9" id="ref19">9</reflink>]; Roebers, [<reflink idref="bib61" id="ref20">61</reflink>]). This overconfidence, also labelled as miscalibration, severely and negatively impacts subsequent control decisions and hampers efficient adjustments within learning processes (e.g., be uncertain and then go back and double-check; Dunlosky &amp; Rawson, [<reflink idref="bib19" id="ref21">19</reflink>]; Hacker et al., [<reflink idref="bib28" id="ref22">28</reflink>]; van Loon et al., [<reflink idref="bib80" id="ref23">80</reflink>]). The question thus arises whether young children are generally incapable of monitoring accurately or whether, under certain circumstances, they can be supported to monitor more accurately. This is the focus of the present approach.</p> <p>Because overconfidence is a well-known phenomenon in metacognitive research including kindergarten and young primary school children, some studies have tried to improve and support monitoring processes in young children by applying different experimental designs, for example, inducing feedback (Lipko et al., [<reflink idref="bib43" id="ref24">43</reflink>]; O'Leary &amp; Sloutsky, [<reflink idref="bib57" id="ref25">57</reflink>]; Oudman et al., [<reflink idref="bib58" id="ref26">58</reflink>]; van Loon &amp; Roebers, [<reflink idref="bib77" id="ref27">77</reflink>]). However, the evidence as to whether overconfidence can be corrected is very inconsistent (Bol et al., [<reflink idref="bib8" id="ref28">8</reflink>]; Nietfeld et al., [<reflink idref="bib56" id="ref29">56</reflink>]; Saenz et al., [<reflink idref="bib67" id="ref30">67</reflink>]). Even more importantly, the underlying processes contributing to children's inaccurate monitoring are yet to be understood.</p> <p>The theoretical background of our experimental manipulation is the interplay of memory retrieval, memory monitoring, and strategic decisions about memory performance as outlined by Bjork ([<reflink idref="bib7" id="ref31">7</reflink>]) and Koriat and Goldsmith ([<reflink idref="bib36" id="ref32">36</reflink>]). Within these frameworks, memory and metamemory are no longer considered separated, independent constructs, but rather to be closely intertwined. Monitoring and control processes uniformly rely on retrieving information from long-term memory (Bjork, [<reflink idref="bib7" id="ref33">7</reflink>]; Koriat, [<reflink idref="bib34" id="ref34">34</reflink>]). According to the model of strategic regulation of memory accuracy (Koriat &amp; Goldsmith, [<reflink idref="bib36" id="ref35">36</reflink>]), information from long-term memory is retrieved and, at the same time, monitoring processes are triggered to choose the best candidate answer (the answer with the highest/most positive monitoring judgment). These fast and early retrieval processes from long-term memory coupled with early monitoring processes are likely to regulate or influence later monitoring processes, an interaction that has been neglected when addressing children's developing monitoring skills. By asking children to report on their confidence <emph>before</emph> selecting a memory answer, we sought to step into this memory-monitoring interplay to gain insights into their very early monitoring processes.</p> <p>Against the background of such strategic regulation processes based on ongoing, early monitoring processes that are intertwined with memory retrieval, children's tendency to quickly jump on an answer seems fatal, or at least, be contributing to overconfidence. That is, when quickly selecting an answer, more detailed differentiation of different degrees of confidence and thorough comparisons among the answer alternatives (or, in the case of free recall, a further search for an answer with a higher likelihood to be correct) rarely occurs (Barnes et al., [<reflink idref="bib4" id="ref36">4</reflink>]). Indirect evidence for the assumption that children's overconfidence stems – at least in part – from their reluctance to engage in (pre)monitoring processes stems from studies in which children were highly motivated to answer correctly (e.g., receiving gold coins for every correct answer). With such a paradigm, young children were found to be quite capable of monitoring accurately (Roebers &amp; Fernandez, [<reflink idref="bib62" id="ref37">62</reflink>]; Koriat &amp; Ackerman, [<reflink idref="bib35" id="ref38">35</reflink>]). These results suggest that efficient monitoring abilities are already present at a young age but not yet automatically used.</p> <p>Furthermore, the first and possibly impulsive answer is not always the most suitable. Resisting a prepotent response (Simpson et al., [<reflink idref="bib73" id="ref39">73</reflink>]) and considering additional information to evaluate the most suitable answer may be terminated prematurely (Nelson, [<reflink idref="bib53" id="ref40">53</reflink>]). In doing so, children might be neglecting contradicting evidence, which then contributes to a confirmation bias, increasing confidence (Koriat et al., [<reflink idref="bib39" id="ref41">39</reflink>]). Investing time and effort in comparing the different degrees of confidence of the different answer alternatives might not seem relevant to young children. In other words, overconfidence might be reduced by enabling and powerfully motivating children to address and consider contradictory information. For this reason, our design prompted children to actively consider information against and in favor for the chosen answer, as well as for the three other alternatives (Koriat et al., [<reflink idref="bib39" id="ref42">39</reflink>]). In other words, we prompted monitoring processes at time point during the task sequence in which no definitive answer had yet been selected.</p> <hd id="AN0176300788-3">The present study</hd> <p>The present study implemented a pre-monitoring phase that motivated children to evaluate their confidence not only in one but in all answer alternatives <emph>before</emph> choosing an answer (recognition). Participants solved a paired associate learning task with a pre-monitoring (only the experimental condition), a recognition, and a post-monitoring phase. Before choosing an alternative in the recognition phase, participants in the experimental condition had to give a monitoring judgment for every answer alternative. After choosing one alternative in the recognition phase, participants then rated their confidence in the chosen alternative, as is done in classical studies using confidence judgments (Destan et al., [<reflink idref="bib15" id="ref43">15</reflink>]; Dunlosky &amp; Metcalfe, [<reflink idref="bib17" id="ref44">17</reflink>]). We included kindergarten and second graders because some metacognitive monitoring abilities are already developed at kindergarten age (Coughlin et al., [<reflink idref="bib12" id="ref45">12</reflink>]), and the transition to school age represents an important time window for further fine-tuning of monitoring abilities (Schneider, [<reflink idref="bib68" id="ref46">68</reflink>]).</p> <p>We hypothesized that participating in the experimental condition (including pre-monitoring judgments) would improve monitoring accuracy compared to the control condition (no pre-monitoring judgments). More precisely, we expected the pre-monitoring phase to encourage a comprehensive evaluation of all four alternatives (Koriat &amp; Goldsmith, [<reflink idref="bib36" id="ref47">36</reflink>]; Navajas et al., [<reflink idref="bib52" id="ref48">52</reflink>]). This in turn, should lead to more accurate monitoring in the following recognition phase. This was expected, because at the time of the pre-monitoring judgments, no answer had yet been selected possibly reducing the memory retrieval-monitoring coupling. For another, participants had to judge each alternative actively to determine the best candidate answer. Thus, participants had to invest time in searching for contradicting information rather than immediately choosing one answer and ignoring the alternatives.</p> <hd id="AN0176300788-4">Method</hd> <p></p> <hd id="AN0176300788-5">Participants</hd> <p>The sample for the present study consisted of N = 330 children from urban and rural regions in the vicinity of a university town [further information withheld for blinded review]. The study included preschool children and second grade students. We excluded participants with less than 25% correct recognition (preschool children N = 18, second grade students N = 7). Recognition scores under 25% correct may be based on chance level as there were four alternatives. This exclusion led to a total sample of N = 305, with N = 143 kindergartners (49.7% female) between 5-6 years of age (<emph>M</emph> = 5.9, <emph>SD</emph> =.47), and N = 162 second grade students (53.1% female) between 7-8 years of age (<emph>M</emph> = 7.8, <emph>SD</emph> =.36). The Ethics Committee of the Faculty of Human Sciences of the University had approved the study (Approval No: 2002-100005). Only children who had written parental consent were allowed to participate in the study. Additionally, participation was voluntary for the children, and they were informed that they could terminate the tasks at any time without giving any explanation. No child ever did. Data were treated entirely anonymously.</p> <hd id="AN0176300788-6">Measures and Procedures</hd> <p>Participants solved a computer-based task running on tablets (Samsung Galaxy S7) using the app software <emph>Ionic</emph>. All instructions during the task were given via headphones. The task had been extensively piloted regarding understandability and usability for children from both age groups. During the testing phase, children were closely supervised to assist in case of technical problems. Children solved a paired associate learning task to capture monitoring processes (about 30 minutes). The task was accompanied by a cover story about two children who are taking pictures of animals (e.g., bird) that are engaged in actions toward different objects (e.g., bread). Participants were instructed to memorize the associated pairs to help the protagonists find the associated pictures that belong together later on.</p> <p>Participants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions (control vs. experimental condition). Being part of the control condition entailed the following structure. After a familiarization phase, preschool children had to study 20, and second grade students 26 item pairs, respectively. Each pair was presented for four seconds. After a one-minute filler task to ensure standardized delay and to prevent memory strategies, the stimulus picture (the animal) was presented with four alternatives (recognition phase; four different objects, i.e., feed, environment). A monitoring phase followed this recognition phase (Fig. 1). Now, children had to evaluate their confidence by reporting their degree of confidence on a classical 7- Likert scale which was illustrated with a thermometer (Koriat &amp; Shitzer-Reichert, [<reflink idref="bib38" id="ref49">38</reflink>]) ranging from blue (very unsure) to red (very sure). Confidence judgments were converted into values from 1 to 7. Prior to the testing phase children were introduced to the thermometer and had to solve different examples correctly and give appropriate confidence judgments before proceeding to start the testing phase.</p> <p>Graph: Fig. 1Schematic Illustration of the Task Procedure</p> <p>The procedure of the experimental condition followed the same sequence except for an implemented "pre-monitoring phase" between learning and recognition. After the filler task, participants saw the stimulus picture and the four alternatives. Underneath every alternative, a 7-Likert scale appeared (Fig. 2). The Likert scale was visualized with seven stars of increasing size (ranging from a small star on the left to a large star on the right). For every alternative, participants were told to choose a star. An interactive animation introduced the stars. The smallest star was introduced as follows: "If you think the pictures do not belong together, you can choose a small star." The stars in the middle section were visualized on a continuum from a small to a large star. For these stars, the instruction: "If you think it could be the right picture, you can choose stars in the middle" was given. In the end, it was explained that choosing all seven stars including the largest star would represent a maximum of confidence introduced with the following explanation: "If you are convinced that these images belong together, you can choose all the stars up to the largest star". A practice trial accompanied every introduction. Using the abovementioned questions, children were asked which star they would choose. When they chose the correct star, they proceeded to the next question until they answered every practice question with the intended star. If participants chose an inappropriate star, they were corrected by the experimenter. When the exercise was solved 100 percent correctly, the practice trials were terminated, and the program progressed to the actual task. These pre-monitoring judgments (stars) were converted into values from 1 to 7.</p> <p>Graph: Fig. 2Pre-Monitoring Phase for Experimental Condition</p> <p>To evaluate monitoring accuracy, we included two different measures. For quantifying relative monitoring accuracy, a discrimination score was calculated for each child, indicating how reliably children can metacognitively differentiate between correct and incorrect recognition with their confidence judgment (difference score; Dunlosky &amp; Thiede, [<reflink idref="bib20" id="ref50">20</reflink>]; Fleming &amp; Lau, [<reflink idref="bib24" id="ref51">24</reflink>]; Schraw, [<reflink idref="bib70" id="ref52">70</reflink>]). Thereby, higher confidence judgments for correct than for incorrect responses indicate more accurate monitoring. Further, we included a measure of absolute monitoring accuracy, a bias index, reflecting under- to overconfidence (Schraw, [<reflink idref="bib70" id="ref53">70</reflink>]). Values for absolute monitoring accuracy can vary between +1 (overestimation) and –1 (underestimation). The closer the value is to zero, the more accurately the confidence rating matches performance.</p> <hd id="AN0176300788-7">Statistical Analysis</hd> <p>Data was analyzed with Python using Scipy, Numpy, Pandas, and StatsModel as packages. We used Seaborn and Matplotlib for data visualization. Our hypotheses regarding different monitoring aspects were analyzed by running between-subject analyses of variances (ANOVAs). As an estimation for effect sizes, we used partial eta squared (η<subs>p</subs><sups>2</sups>).</p> <hd id="AN0176300788-8">Results</hd> <p></p> <hd id="AN0176300788-9">Performance</hd> <p>Mean performance for kindergarteners was 9 out of 20 correctly solved items (mean proportion correct: 45%, <emph>SD</emph> =.14<emph>)</emph>, and 14 out of 26 correctly solved items for second graders (mean proportion correct: 53%, <emph>SD</emph> =.15). This represents an approximately equal number of correctly and incorrectly solved items across both age groups and thus provides a balanced database for evaluating monitoring processes.</p> <p>Because monitoring measures are intertwined with performance, we wanted to rule out that differences in monitoring between the two conditions (control vs experimental condition) may be due to differences in performance. Therefore, we first analyzed performance by means of a between-subject ANOVA. As expected, there was a significant main effect of age (<emph>F</emph> (<reflink idref="bib1" id="ref54">1</reflink>, 301) = 26.8, <emph>p</emph> &lt;.001, η<subs>p</subs><sups>2</sups> =.08), with higher performance for second graders (<emph>M</emph> =.53, <emph>SD</emph> =.15) than for kindergarteners (<emph>M</emph> =.45, <emph>SD</emph> =.14). Furthermore, there was no significant main effect of condition (<emph>F</emph> (<reflink idref="bib1" id="ref55">1</reflink>, 301) = 1.07, <emph>p</emph> =.30, η<subs>p</subs><sups>2</sups> =.01) and no interaction (<emph>F</emph> (<reflink idref="bib1" id="ref56">1</reflink>, 301) =.757, <emph>p</emph> =.39, η<subs>p</subs><sups>2</sups> =.00).</p> <hd id="AN0176300788-10">Monitoring</hd> <p>To capture metacognitive discrimination (relative monitoring accuracy), we computed a difference score by subtracting confidence for correctly from incorrectly solved items. In young children higher values then indicate better discrimination between correctly and incorrectly solved items. The ANOVA with age and condition as between-subject factors revealed a significant main effect of age (<emph>F</emph> (<reflink idref="bib1" id="ref57">1</reflink>, 301) = 34.50, <emph>p</emph> &lt;.001, η<subs>p</subs><sups>2</sups> =.10). Second graders (<emph>M</emph> =.83, <emph>SD</emph> = 1.9) outperformed kindergartners (<emph>M</emph> = -.40, <emph>SD</emph> = 1.8) in terms of metacognitive discrimination. The main effect of condition (<emph>F</emph> (<reflink idref="bib1" id="ref58">1</reflink>, 301) = 2.64, <emph>p</emph> =.105, η<subs>p</subs><sups>2</sups> =.01) and the interaction (<emph>F</emph> (<reflink idref="bib1" id="ref59">1</reflink>, 301) = 1.40, <emph>p</emph> =.24, η<subs>p</subs><sups>2</sups> =.01) did not reach significance.</p> <p>Thus, contrary to our assumption, when comparing relative monitoring accuracy between the control and experimental condition, this difference was not significant. The descriptive data even suggested that participants in the control condition reached a better discrimination score. Although non-significant, it appears with respect to relative monitoring accuracy that engaging in pre-monitoring (providing star ratings) before choosing an answer may even negatively influence monitoring accuracy in children.</p> <p>Turning to the bias index, this score indicates an absolute monitoring accuracy measure and ranges from underestimation to overestimation. The ANOVA with age and condition as between-subject factors revealed a main effect of age (<emph>F</emph> (<reflink idref="bib1" id="ref60">1</reflink>, 301) = 39.77, <emph>p</emph> &lt;.001, η<subs>p</subs><sups>2</sups> =.12). In line with our assumption, older children (<emph>M</emph> =.27, <emph>SD</emph> =.19) show less overconfidence than younger children (<emph>M</emph> =.42, <emph>SD</emph> =.20). Again, contrary to our expectations, results revealed a significant main effect of condition (<emph>F</emph> (<reflink idref="bib1" id="ref61">1</reflink>, 301) = 14.74, <emph>p</emph> &lt;.001, η<subs>p</subs><sups>2</sups> =.05), with <emph>less</emph> overconfidence in the control condition (<emph>M</emph> =.30, <emph>SD</emph> =.21) than in the experimental condition (<emph>M</emph> =.38, <emph>SD</emph> =.19). In other words, participating in the experimental condition and evaluating the four alternatives before selecting the best candidate answer by giving pre-monitoring judgments seemed to <emph>increase</emph> rather than decrease overconfidence in young children, independent of age as the non-significant interaction revealed (<emph>F</emph> (<reflink idref="bib1" id="ref62">1</reflink>, 301) = 2.4, <emph>p</emph> =.12, η<subs>p</subs><sups>2</sups> =.01).</p> <hd id="AN0176300788-11">Post Hoc Analysis: Searching for Reasons for Unexpected Results</hd> <p>As the results so far did not confirm our assumptions regarding the effects of our implemented pre-monitoring judgments, we ran some post hoc analysis to shed light on the implemented pre-monitoring judgments. Firstly, we looked at the distribution of pre-monitoring judgments within an item (<emph>differentiation within alternatives</emph>, see below). In doing so, we analyzed whether participants discriminated between the four alternatives (give different numbers of stars within one item indicative of active monitoring). Secondly, we evaluated the relation of the pre-monitoring judgments with subsequent recognition. More precisely, we analyzed which alternative obtained the highest pre-monitoring judgment, and then addressed whether this alternative was selected in the recognition phase (<emph>relation pre-monitoring judgment and answer in recognition</emph>, see below). Thirdly, we compared the pre-monitoring judgment with the monitoring judgment given <emph>after</emph> recognition (<emph>consistency between pre-monitoring judgment and confidence judgment</emph>, see below).</p> <hd id="AN0176300788-12">Differentiation within Alternatives</hd> <p>Results revealed that only N = 7 children did not differentiate between the alternatives by giving every alternative the same pre-monitoring judgment. Because all other participants had variability in their scoring pattern (scoring different pre-monitoring judgments within four alternatives), we are tempted to believe that the vast majority of children followed our instructions and seriously monitored differentially; that is, rated lower, or higher levels based on their evaluations for the four alternatives.</p> <hd id="AN0176300788-13">Relation Pre-Monitoring Judgment and Answer in Recognition</hd> <p>Descriptive statistics of both age groups revealed that out of 100% (N = 3049) registered pre-monitoring judgments, 88.3% (N = 2692) of the alternatives having received the highest level were also selected in the recognition phase. Only 11.7% (N = 357) of the alternatives that had received the highest pre-monitoring judgments were not selected in the recognition phase. These results suggest that there is a very strong relation between pre-monitoring and recognition (see Table 1). This pattern of result remained the same when we analyzed the two age groups separately.</p> <p>Table 1 Pre-Monitoring Judgments (Kindergarteners and Second Graders) as a Function of Match in the Recognition Task in Percent</p> <p> <ephtml> &lt;table frame="hsides" rules="groups"&gt;&lt;thead&gt;&lt;tr&gt;&lt;th colspan="8"&gt;&lt;p&gt;Pre-Monitoring Judgments&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/th&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;&lt;tr&gt;&lt;th /&gt;&lt;th&gt;&lt;p&gt;1&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/th&gt;&lt;th&gt;&lt;p&gt;2&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/th&gt;&lt;th&gt;&lt;p&gt;3&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/th&gt;&lt;th&gt;&lt;p&gt;4&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/th&gt;&lt;th&gt;&lt;p&gt;5&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/th&gt;&lt;th&gt;&lt;p&gt;6&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/th&gt;&lt;th&gt;&lt;p&gt;7&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/th&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;&lt;/thead&gt;&lt;tbody&gt;&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;p&gt;Recognition Match&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;p&gt;0.0&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;p&gt;1.2&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;p&gt;1.4&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;p&gt;3.1&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;p&gt;5.8&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;p&gt;6.8&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;p&gt;81.7&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;p&gt;Recognition no Match&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;p&gt;0.0&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;p&gt;6.2&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;p&gt;4.8&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;p&gt;5.0&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;p&gt;10.4&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;p&gt;9.5&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;p&gt;64.2&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;&lt;/tbody&gt;&lt;/table&gt; </ephtml> </p> <p>Recognition match = answer rated with the highest pre-monitoring judgment was also selected in recognition. Recognition no match = answer rated with highest pre-monitoring judgment was not selected in recognition</p> <p>Additionally, for kindergarteners and second graders, pre-monitoring judgments were generally high (see Table 1). Overall, participants favored one alternative and gave it the highest pre-monitoring judgments to express the outcome of their pre-monitoring. This trend confirms young children's tendency to choose rather high confidence judgments (in any case, even in the face of contradicting information).</p> <hd id="AN0176300788-14">Consistency between Pre-Monitoring Judgment and Confidence Judgment</hd> <p>To evaluate the consistency of the two different monitoring measures, we looked at the correspondence between pre-monitoring and confidence judgment, as a function of the correctness of recognition. By comparing the levels of both monitoring measures, we evaluated if participants tended to rate higher, lower or the same level of confidence on both monitoring measures but on the two different scales. Because the pattern of results revealed no difference between kindergarteners and second graders, we report them collectively. A descriptive overview of all judgments of both age groups can be found in Table 2.</p> <p>Table 2 Pre-Monitoring and Confidence Judgments (Kindergarteners and Second Graders)</p> <p> <ephtml> &lt;table frame="hsides" rules="groups"&gt;&lt;thead&gt;&lt;tr&gt;&lt;th colspan="9"&gt;&lt;p&gt;Pre-Monitoring Judgments&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/th&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;&lt;tr&gt;&lt;th /&gt;&lt;th /&gt;&lt;th&gt;&lt;p&gt;1&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/th&gt;&lt;th&gt;&lt;p&gt;2&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/th&gt;&lt;th&gt;&lt;p&gt;3&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/th&gt;&lt;th&gt;&lt;p&gt;4&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/th&gt;&lt;th&gt;&lt;p&gt;5&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/th&gt;&lt;th&gt;&lt;p&gt;6&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/th&gt;&lt;th&gt;&lt;p&gt;7&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/th&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;&lt;/thead&gt;&lt;tbody&gt;&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td rowspan="7"&gt;&lt;p&gt;Confidence Judgments&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;p&gt;1&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;p&gt;0.0&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;p&gt;0.1&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;p&gt;0.1&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;p&gt;0.3&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;p&gt;0.1&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;p&gt;0.0&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;p&gt;2.1&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;p&gt;2&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;p&gt;0.0&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;p&gt;0.1&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;p&gt;0.1&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;p&gt;0.2&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;p&gt;0.1&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;p&gt;0.0&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;p&gt;0.7&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;p&gt;3&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;p&gt;0.0&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;p&gt;0.0&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;p&gt;0.1&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;p&gt;0.5&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;p&gt;0.3&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;p&gt;0.3&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;p&gt;0.9&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;p&gt;4&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;p&gt;0.0&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;p&gt;0.1&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;p&gt;0.4&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;p&gt;0.6&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;p&gt;0.8&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;p&gt;0.8&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;p&gt;4.4&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;p&gt;5&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;p&gt;0.0&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;p&gt;0.2&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;p&gt;0.2&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;p&gt;0.5&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;p&gt;1.3&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;p&gt;1.3&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;p&gt;3.9&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;p&gt;6&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;p&gt;0.0&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;p&gt;0.1&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;p&gt;0.2&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;p&gt;0.5&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;p&gt;0.9&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;p&gt;2.2&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;p&gt;5.9&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;p&gt;7&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;p&gt;0.0&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;p&gt;0.6&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;p&gt;0.4&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;p&gt;0.7&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;p&gt;2.3&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;p&gt;2.3&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;p&gt;63.9&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;&lt;/tbody&gt;&lt;/table&gt; </ephtml> </p> <p>This table displays values in percent under the assumption that the answer with the highest star was also selected in recognition</p> <p>High consistency would mean that reporting a very low pre-monitoring judgment leads to a high likelihood of choosing a very low confidence judgment in the retrospective confidence judgment (see marked diagonal in Table 2). The diagonal of agreements adds up to 68.1% of all monitoring judgments. We further split the judgment range into two groups (1- 6 and 7). Regarding the judgments' range from 1 to 6, results suggest that only 4.2% of these monitoring judgments showed consistency. However, for the highest rating (very sure in the pre-monitoring judgment and very sure in the confidence judgment), results showed a total agreement of 63.9%, thus very high consistency across judgments. This distribution clearly shows that most retrospective confidence judgments are built on a very high pre-monitoring judgment and a very high confidence rating that matches the pre-monitoring judgment. Thus, most participants reported very high confidence in both monitoring measures (Fig. 3). To address whether the high confidence was primarily observed concerning correct answers (then, high confidence seems justified), we ran the same analyses for correct and incorrect recognition, respectively. Interestingly, the pattern of results turned out to be equivalent.</p> <p>Graph: Fig. 3Association between Pre-Monitoring and Confidence Judgements. Note. 3D Plot displays pre-monitoring judgments on the left (y-axis) and confidence judgments on the right (x-axis) for kindergarteners and second graders. The number of judgments is mapped on the z-axis</p> <p>As reported above, most confidence judgments (68.1%) were in agreement with the pre-monitoring judgment. The remaining 31.9% were either rated higher or lower in the subsequent confidence judgment. Out of these remaining 31.9% a total of 9.3% of judgments mirrored higher confidence compared to the previous pre-monitoring judgment indicating a tendency towards a strengthening of the subjective confidence. But, 22.6% of judgments were found to mirror <emph>lower</emph> confidence compared to the previous pre-monitoring judgment, indicating a decrease in overconfidence as we had initially expected. Furthermore, we conducted a Pearson Chi-Squared test. There was a significant relationship between the ratings of pre-monitoring and confidence judgments, X<sups>2</sups>(<reflink idref="bib30" id="ref63">30</reflink>) = 550.20, <emph>p</emph> &lt;.001, <emph>N</emph> = 2692. The relationship indicates a moderate effect (<emph>CC</emph> =.412, <emph>p</emph> &lt;.001).</p> <hd id="AN0176300788-15">Discussion</hd> <p>Overconfidence is a well-known challenge in metacognitive research in children. Although some studies have already attempted to improve children's monitoring, results were inconsistent, and underlying reasons for children's overconfidence still need to be explored. We implemented a pre-monitoring phase enabling children to monitor possible answers before making a final decision in the recognition phase. With this experimental approach, we intended to motivate a differentiated evaluation of each alternative thereby preventing that just one, hastily selected answer, builds up a dominating memory trace. We hypothesized that participating in the pre-monitoring phase would enable a deeper and more differentiated monitoring, considering all four alternatives (in the sense of the regulation of memory accuracy of Koriat &amp; Goldsmith, [<reflink idref="bib36" id="ref64">36</reflink>]), which might positively influence young children's monitoring accuracy.</p> <p>In line with previous research, our results revealed that kindergarteners and second graders were able to metacognitively discriminate between correct and incorrect answers (Lyons &amp; Ghetti, [<reflink idref="bib45" id="ref65">45</reflink>]). As expected, both age groups showed a high tendency towards overconfidence (Destan et al., [<reflink idref="bib15" id="ref66">15</reflink>]; Finn &amp; Metcalfe, [<reflink idref="bib22" id="ref67">22</reflink>]; van Loon et al., [<reflink idref="bib79" id="ref68">79</reflink>]). Furthermore, our results align with studies showing that the ability to monitor adequately increases with age (Schneider &amp; Löffler, [<reflink idref="bib69" id="ref69">69</reflink>]).</p> <p>To address the effect of the experimental condition, we investigated two measures of monitoring accuracy. The findings pointed in the same direction for the relative (discrimination score) and the absolute (bias index) measure of monitoring accuracy. Contrary to our expectations, participating in the experimental condition decreased rather than increased monitoring accuracy in both age groups. More precisely, pre-monitoring was not helpful for children when asked to discriminate between correct and incorrect answers. Pre-monitoring seemed even to increase overconfidence in both age groups. Given the inconsistent findings in studies addressing interventions to improve monitoring, the present results might not be entirely surprising (O'Leary &amp; Sloutsky, [<reflink idref="bib57" id="ref70">57</reflink>]; Oudman et al., [<reflink idref="bib58" id="ref71">58</reflink>]). Nevertheless, our study confirms that when trying to improve monitoring accuracy in children, researchers are facing severe methodological and theoretical challenges (Azevedo, [<reflink idref="bib2" id="ref72">2</reflink>]; Schraw &amp; Moshman, [<reflink idref="bib71" id="ref73">71</reflink>]).</p> <p>We did some post hoc tests to evaluate what children really did during the pre-monitoring phase and whether there was consistency across the different phases of our task. Analysis revealed that overall, participants seriously discriminated between every answer alternative. Providing different pre-monitoring judgments for each alternative, we can assume that participants did not make fast and superficial decisions and simply moved on to the next item prematurely without at least considering the other alternatives (Simpson et al., [<reflink idref="bib72" id="ref74">72</reflink>]). Even if this pre-monitoring phase seemed to trigger a differentiated comparison as we had anticipated, the consequence differed from what we expected as it increased rather than decreased overconfidence. Children might – already at this stage – have trapped in the confirmation bias (Nickerson, [<reflink idref="bib55" id="ref75">55</reflink>]; Peters, [<reflink idref="bib59" id="ref76">59</reflink>]).</p> <p>Results indicated that the alternative rated with the highest pre-monitoring judgment was, in most cases, also chosen in recognition. This connection suggests that choosing a high pre-monitoring judgment may indicate high certainty already and therefore serves as a cue for again selecting this alternative as the final answer. The high consistency between the pre-monitoring, recognition choice, and the confidence judgment supports this interpretation. Moreover, participants also chose the same scale level to express their confidence.</p> <hd id="AN0176300788-16">Reasons for Overconfidence</hd> <p></p> <hd id="AN0176300788-17">Memory and Monitoring</hd> <p>The attempt to separate monitoring processes from memory seems more difficult than expected (Bjork, [<reflink idref="bib7" id="ref77">7</reflink>]; Koriat &amp; Goldsmith, [<reflink idref="bib36" id="ref78">36</reflink>]; Roebers &amp; Schneider, [<reflink idref="bib64" id="ref79">64</reflink>]). This finding raises the question of to what extent it is possible to consider and investigate monitoring and memory as separate processes (Koriat, [<reflink idref="bib33" id="ref80">33</reflink>]). The dynamic association between memory and metamemory seems to be underestimated and even more critical than assumed (Busey et al., [<reflink idref="bib10" id="ref81">10</reflink>]; Bjork, [<reflink idref="bib7" id="ref82">7</reflink>]; Vernon &amp; Usher, [<reflink idref="bib81" id="ref83">81</reflink>]). Pre-monitoring judgments may already be related to memory processes (Dinsmore &amp; Parkinson, [<reflink idref="bib16" id="ref84">16</reflink>]; Ferreira et al., [<reflink idref="bib21" id="ref85">21</reflink>]; Vernon &amp; Usher, [<reflink idref="bib81" id="ref86">81</reflink>]). These considerations raise the question of whether a confidence judgment can be considered an isolated and memory-independent process. Are confidence judgments really a representation of confidence or rather a feeling of ease of accessibility from memory? This assumption might be supported by research addressing the delayed JOL effect. Immediate JOLs are less accurate than delayed JOLs by showing less agreement with subsequent performance (Nelson &amp; Dunlosky, [<reflink idref="bib54" id="ref87">54</reflink>]). That is, delayed judgments of learning are more likely to match subsequent recognition than immediate judgments of learning. The pronounced agreement between delayed judgments and recognition might be due to the retrieval of similar memory traces.</p> <hd id="AN0176300788-18">Cues and Heuristics</hd> <p>Deciding under uncertainty may trigger some rules or heuristics to choose an alternative that seems to be the best (Tversky &amp; Kahneman, [<reflink idref="bib75" id="ref88">75</reflink>]). It has already been shown that even young children use cues as a source of information to guide their memory decisions (Geurten &amp; Willems, [<reflink idref="bib26" id="ref89">26</reflink>]; Koriat, [<reflink idref="bib32" id="ref90">32</reflink>]; Koriat et al., [<reflink idref="bib40" id="ref91">40</reflink>]; Roebers et al., [<reflink idref="bib65" id="ref92">65</reflink>]). Using invalid cues, for example, such as how easily accessible the learned item pairs can be retrieved (Dunslosky &amp; Nelson, [<reflink idref="bib18" id="ref93">18</reflink>]; Koriat, [<reflink idref="bib33" id="ref94">33</reflink>]; Koriat &amp; Levy-Sadot, [<reflink idref="bib37" id="ref95">37</reflink>]; Mazzoni &amp; Nelson, [<reflink idref="bib48" id="ref96">48</reflink>]) might have influenced monitoring accuracy. The more accessible such information can be retrieved, the higher the feeling of confidence (Bastin et al., [<reflink idref="bib5" id="ref97">5</reflink>]; Benjamin, [<reflink idref="bib6" id="ref98">6</reflink>]; Metcalfe &amp; Finn, [<reflink idref="bib49" id="ref99">49</reflink>]; Unkelbach &amp; Stahl, [<reflink idref="bib76" id="ref100">76</reflink>]) and might, therefore, also guide monitoring processes (Hertzog et al., [<reflink idref="bib30" id="ref101">30</reflink>]; Kelley &amp; Lindsay, [<reflink idref="bib31" id="ref102">31</reflink>]). Furthermore, the evaluation of pre-monitoring can act as an indirect mediator between cue and target. Due to the selection of a high pre-monitoring judgment, the connection between cue and target is further reinforced (Atiya et al., [<reflink idref="bib1" id="ref103">1</reflink>]). Thus, this implicit reinforcement can be associated with higher confidence (Pyc &amp; Rawson, [<reflink idref="bib60" id="ref104">60</reflink>]; Whittlesea &amp; LeBoe, [<reflink idref="bib84" id="ref105">84</reflink>]). Repeated exposure to the same item throughout the task may have strengthened the influence of these cues. However, invalid cue utilization might then be a reason for the observed overconfidence in young children.</p> <hd id="AN0176300788-19">Evidence Accumulation and Selective Attention</hd> <p>Navajas et al. ([<reflink idref="bib52" id="ref106">52</reflink>]) suggested that even if a decision has been made, there is still further accumulation of information that can work in favor for or against one's answer. Several studies have shown that a hasty answer often suffers from inaccuracy (Simpson et al., [<reflink idref="bib72" id="ref107">72</reflink>]). With additional time to perform a differentiated analysis, including monitoring, further information is considered before choosing the best candidate answer (Atiya et al., [<reflink idref="bib1" id="ref108">1</reflink>]; Wacker &amp; Roebers, [<reflink idref="bib82" id="ref109">82</reflink>]). Current research addressed evidence accumulation under uncertainty with a perceptual discrimination paradigm in toddlers (Leckey et al., [<reflink idref="bib41" id="ref110">41</reflink>]). Including eye movement measures, such as gaze switching, shed light on the implicit processing of evidence accumulation. Results revealed that toddlers accumulate more information through gaze switching when uncertain. Therefore, depending on item difficulty, a pre-monitoring phase might lead to more gaze switching between difficult items and slower evidence accumulation resulting in lower confidence. Therefore, a differentiated evaluation of all four alternatives and a subsequent monitoring phase, as in our study design, should provide a valuable opportunity (Murphy et al., [<reflink idref="bib50" id="ref111">50</reflink>]). However, results indicated that instead of accumulating further information, children might feel more confident through a misleading accumulation of invalid information (Talluri et al., [<reflink idref="bib74" id="ref112">74</reflink>]; Rollwage et al., [<reflink idref="bib66" id="ref113">66</reflink>]). In addition, the time invested (i.e., to exclude other alternatives with lower certainty) could strengthen the feeling of accomplishing a differentiated process. Consequently, the preferred answer with the highest certainty rating would gain a subjective feeling of confidence.</p> <p>Furthermore, selective activation of attention to a particular alternative influences subsequent cognitive activation (Nadel et al., [<reflink idref="bib51" id="ref114">51</reflink>]). The selective attention may have contributed to boosting overconfidence. Moreover, after choosing an alternative, the selected answer was highlighted with a yellow frame. This visual accentuation might have additionally increased selective attention to that one particular alternative.</p> <hd id="AN0176300788-20">A Closer Look at the Scale Level of Both Monitoring Measures</hd> <p>We can distinguish three different patterns of association between the pre-monitoring and the corresponding confidence judgments. In the first pattern, children enhanced their confidence judgment compared to the prior pre-monitoring judgment indicating a tendency towards increasing overconfidence through pre-monitoring. In the second pattern, participants chose the same confidence level for the pre-monitoring and the subsequent confidence judgment - this association was most frequent. However, as our results revealed, for both monitoring measures, most answers were already scored on the highest scale level. Therefore, the first pattern of association (tendency towards enhancing confidence through the task) may be underrepresented because of that obvious ceiling effect. Because children mainly chose already the highest score in their pre-monitoring judgment, their confidence judgment could not be rated higher – even if children would have wanted to. Contrarily, the possibility of downregulating their confidence would have been possible, as shown in the third pattern of association. Such a downregulation becomes visible when a confidence judgment is lower than the prior pre-monitoring judgment. This downregulation indicates that a differentiated evaluation of answer alternatives might trigger doubts or lead children to give their confidence second thoughts. As a result, children might reduce their over-optimistic estimation and rate a more fine-tuned and accurate monitoring judgment. Results from the latter pattern, that is, a downregulation of confidence, are still promising. In line with our assumptions, in around one-fifth of the item judgments there was a downregulation of confidence. In other words, in 20% of the items, a differentiated evaluation might indeed have led to more accurate monitoring in our participants. Besides the strong pattern of overconfidence, this smaller proportion of downregulating confidence seems promising. Of course, it raises the question of to what extent we can support children to increase the proportion of downregulation.</p> <p>From a theoretical point of view, the attempt to downregulate confidence might be only relevant for incorrect answers because being sure concerning a correct answer is reasonable and well justified. However, results revealed that regardless of correctness, most confidence judgments indicated the same overoptimistic confidence rating. Thus, it is not that children should no longer be confident in correct answers per se, but children might benefit in general from a more fine-tuned monitoring.</p> <hd id="AN0176300788-21">Implications</hd> <p>Based on the present results, the question arises as to what extent we can measure pure monitoring. These findings may, therefore, also influence research on different monitoring measures. The high accordance of pre-monitoring judgment and recognition underscores the assumption that monitoring judgments such as JOL and FOK are predictive of later retrieval (Hart, [<reflink idref="bib29" id="ref115">29</reflink>]). However, this prediction may be influenced by the strength of the memory traces (Koriat, [<reflink idref="bib33" id="ref116">33</reflink>]). The best candidate answer may be selected based on retrieval processes and indirectly triggers searching information confirming this alternative (Koriat &amp; Goldsmith, [<reflink idref="bib36" id="ref117">36</reflink>]; Vernon &amp; Usher, [<reflink idref="bib81" id="ref118">81</reflink>]). Having previously engaged in a differentiated evaluation for choosing the best candidate answer may foster a subjective feeling of high confidence in the decision, which is then – in most cases – maintained. Overall, children most often choose the highest point on the scales to express their confidence. The tendency of favoring high confidence levels in both of our scales (pre-monitoring and confidence judgments) confirms that overconfidence is a robust phenomenon. Including a broader age range in future research would be interesting. The present study revealed indications that participants sometimes downregulated their confidence judgments after the pre-monitoring phase. Including different age groups could – in this context - shed light on whether there are further subgroups or a possible age range where participants may systematically benefit from pre-monitoring.</p> <hd id="AN0176300788-22">Limitations</hd> <p>The selection of our stimulus pictures with animals and the corresponding food or environment of the animal might have induced a particularly stronger bias towards high confidence compared to other paired-associate learning tasks. Children at this age are often in contact with animals (i.e., books, etc.). Consequently, the familiarity of the pictures might have reinforced a strong feeling of familiarity at this age. The influence of this cue, including "ease of processing" might have reinforced the confirmation bias. As even young children use mnemonic cues to evaluate their confidence (Geurten et al., [<reflink idref="bib27" id="ref119">27</reflink>]; Koriat, [<reflink idref="bib33" id="ref120">33</reflink>]; Roebers et al., [<reflink idref="bib65" id="ref121">65</reflink>]), these may have further increased confidence. Therefore, using less familiar stimuli, may reduce familiarity and the concomitant confirmation bias (Destan &amp; Roebers, [<reflink idref="bib14" id="ref122">14</reflink>]; Roderer &amp; Roebers, [<reflink idref="bib63" id="ref123">63</reflink>]).</p> <p>Furthermore, even if we evaluated our items and their corresponding item difficulty, there might be some noise within the alternatives. For example, some alternatives might associate more or less strongly with the stimulus picture, but this should be unsystematic across children. Of course, some items were easier or more difficult, also depending on the answer alternatives, but such variability in item difficulty is important to have in a task. Moreover, continuously changing confidence is also part of daily life experiences. However, the present approach contained a larger number of items than other studies including these age groups, and in our pilot study, we carefully evaluated different answer alternatives. Together, we have reason to believe that the task appropriately mapped both age-related differences and individual differences, within age-groups.</p> <p>We used the same scales as in the retrospective confidence judgments for the pre-monitoring phase. However, they might trigger different processes because one phase is completed before and the other after recognition. Nevertheless, it is important to note that our focus was laid on the retrospective confidence judgments, thereby investigating whether a pre-monitoring phase can positively affect monitoring compared to the control condition. Only within our post hoc analysis we compared the two measures, however, not with the point of view that both arise on the base of the same cue but rather to investigate on which scale level participants expressed their confidence.</p> <hd id="AN0176300788-23">Conclusion</hd> <p>In sum, the present study offers new insights into the association between memory and metamemory, showing that the relationship seems far more complex than previously expected. Therefore, the question arises of how we can capture monitoring processes more independent from prepotent memory traces. Results indicated that the influence of prepotent memory traces might have additionally increased overconfidence in young children. The association between memory and metamemory seems underestimated and more critical than assumed. More research is needed to understand the underlying mechanisms of overconfidence in young children.</p> <hd id="AN0176300788-24">Author's contribution</hd> <p>Conceptualization: Sophie Wacker, Claudia M. Roebers.</p> <p>Methodology: Sophie Wacker, Claudia M. Roebers.</p> <p>Formal analysis: Sophie Wacker.</p> <p>Project administration: Sophie Wacker, Claudia M. Roebers.</p> <p>Supervision: Claudia M. Roebers.</p> <p>Writing – original draft: Sophie Wacker.</p> <p>Writing – review &amp; editing: Sophie Wacker.</p> <hd id="AN0176300788-25">Funding</hd> <p>Open access funding provided by University of Bern</p> <hd id="AN0176300788-26">Data availability</hd> <p>Data are available on request from the author.</p> <hd id="AN0176300788-27">Declarations</hd> <p></p> <hd id="AN0176300788-28">Conflict of interest</hd> <p>The authors declare that they have no conflict of interest.</p> <hd id="AN0176300788-29">Ethics approval</hd> <p>Ethical approval based on the APA's Ethical Principles of Psychologists and Code of Conduct (2002) was obtained from the Faculty's Ethics Committee (Faculty of Human Sciences, University of Bern; Approval No. 2020-10-00005).</p> <hd id="AN0176300788-30">Informed consent</hd> <p>Written consent (by caregivers of participants, data was anonymous).</p> <hd id="AN0176300788-31">Publisher's note</hd> <p>Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.</p> <ref id="AN0176300788-32"> <title> References </title> <blist> <bibl id="bib1" idref="ref54" type="bt">1</bibl> <bibtext> Atiya NA, Rañó I, Prasad G, Wong-Lin K. 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| Header | DbId: eric DbLabel: ERIC An: EJ1418224 AccessLevel: 3 PubType: Academic Journal PubTypeId: academicJournal PreciseRelevancyScore: 0 |
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| Items | – Name: Title Label: Title Group: Ti Data: Motivating Children to (Pre)Monitor: Positive Effects on Monitoring Accuracy? – Name: Language Label: Language Group: Lang Data: English – Name: Author Label: Authors Group: Au Data: <searchLink fieldCode="AR" term="%22Sophie+Wacker%22">Sophie Wacker</searchLink> (ORCID <externalLink term="http://orcid.org/0000-0001-9551-4298">0000-0001-9551-4298</externalLink>)<br /><searchLink fieldCode="AR" term="%22Claudia+M%2E+Roebers%22">Claudia M. Roebers</searchLink> (ORCID <externalLink term="https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3048-7609">0000-0003-3048-7609</externalLink>) – Name: TitleSource Label: Source Group: Src Data: <searchLink fieldCode="SO" term="%22Metacognition+and+Learning%22"><i>Metacognition and Learning</i></searchLink>. 2024 19(1):1-19. – Name: Avail Label: Availability Group: Avail Data: Springer. Available from: Springer Nature. One New York Plaza, Suite 4600, New York, NY 10004. Tel: 800-777-4643; Tel: 212-460-1500; Fax: 212-460-1700; e-mail: customerservice@springernature.com; Web site: https://link.springer.com/ – Name: PeerReviewed Label: Peer Reviewed Group: SrcInfo Data: Y – Name: Pages Label: Page Count Group: Src Data: 19 – Name: DatePubCY Label: Publication Date Group: Date Data: 2024 – Name: TypeDocument Label: Document Type Group: TypDoc Data: Journal Articles<br />Reports - Research – Name: Audience Label: Education Level Group: Audnce Data: <searchLink fieldCode="EL" term="%22Early+Childhood+Education%22">Early Childhood Education</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="EL" term="%22Elementary+Education%22">Elementary Education</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="EL" term="%22Kindergarten%22">Kindergarten</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="EL" term="%22Primary+Education%22">Primary Education</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="EL" term="%22Grade+2%22">Grade 2</searchLink> – Name: Subject Label: Descriptors Group: Su Data: <searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Metacognition%22">Metacognition</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Decision+Making%22">Decision Making</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Comparative+Analysis%22">Comparative Analysis</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Student+Motivation%22">Student Motivation</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Young+Children%22">Young Children</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Self+Evaluation+%28Individuals%29%22">Self Evaluation (Individuals)</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Kindergarten%22">Kindergarten</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Grade+2%22">Grade 2</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Elementary+School+Students%22">Elementary School Students</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Associative+Learning%22">Associative Learning</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Task+Analysis%22">Task Analysis</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Memory%22">Memory</searchLink> – Name: DOI Label: DOI Group: ID Data: 10.1007/s11409-023-09351-0 – Name: ISSN Label: ISSN Group: ISSN Data: 1556-1623<br />1556-1631 – Name: Abstract Label: Abstract Group: Ab Data: When young children evaluate their confidence, their monitoring is often overoptimistic, that is, inaccurate. The present study investigated a potential underlying mechanism for kindergarteners' and second graders' overconfidence within a paired associates learning paradigm. We implemented a pre-monitoring phase motivating children to differentially evaluate their confidence for each alternative "before" children could choose an answer in the subsequent recognition phase. For one, we intended to weaken the influence of one single and prepotently selected memory trace. For another, we motivated and enabled children to evaluate all four answer alternatives concerning their certainty before evaluating their final recognition choice by giving a confidence judgment. We compared monitoring discrimination and monitoring bias with a control condition whose task sequence did not include a pre-monitoring judgment. Contrary to our expectations, the pattern of results indicated that being instructed to pre-monitor did "increase" and not decrease overconfidence in young children. The present results will be discussed against the background of memory-metamemory interaction, confirmation bias, and methodological issues. – Name: AbstractInfo Label: Abstractor Group: Ab Data: As Provided – Name: DateEntry Label: Entry Date Group: Date Data: 2024 – Name: AN Label: Accession Number Group: ID Data: EJ1418224 |
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| RecordInfo | BibRecord: BibEntity: Identifiers: – Type: doi Value: 10.1007/s11409-023-09351-0 Languages: – Text: English PhysicalDescription: Pagination: PageCount: 19 StartPage: 1 Subjects: – SubjectFull: Metacognition Type: general – SubjectFull: Decision Making Type: general – SubjectFull: Comparative Analysis Type: general – SubjectFull: Student Motivation Type: general – SubjectFull: Young Children Type: general – SubjectFull: Self Evaluation (Individuals) Type: general – SubjectFull: Kindergarten Type: general – SubjectFull: Grade 2 Type: general – SubjectFull: Elementary School Students Type: general – SubjectFull: Associative Learning Type: general – SubjectFull: Task Analysis Type: general – SubjectFull: Memory Type: general Titles: – TitleFull: Motivating Children to (Pre)Monitor: Positive Effects on Monitoring Accuracy? Type: main BibRelationships: HasContributorRelationships: – PersonEntity: Name: NameFull: Sophie Wacker – PersonEntity: Name: NameFull: Claudia M. Roebers IsPartOfRelationships: – BibEntity: Dates: – D: 01 M: 04 Type: published Y: 2024 Identifiers: – Type: issn-print Value: 1556-1623 – Type: issn-electronic Value: 1556-1631 Numbering: – Type: volume Value: 19 – Type: issue Value: 1 Titles: – TitleFull: Metacognition and Learning Type: main |
| ResultId | 1 |